ISSN 2669-2023 (print) / ISSN 2538-8959 (on-line) / **https://doi.org/10.47459/cndcgs.2026.49**

Media Discourse, Trust and Geopolitical Influence of Information in the Context of National Security

Yuliia TURCHENKO[1]*, Svitlana PRYSIAZHNIUK[2]

[1] *Department of Political Economy, King's College London, Strand Campus,30 Aldwych, WC2B 4BG, London, United Kingdom,*
[2] *Department of Quality Assurance in Education and Higher Education, Military Institute, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, 81 Yuliia Zdanovska Street, 03189, Kyiv, Ukraine*

*Correspondence:*yuliiaturchenko@gmail.com*

Abstract

This paper examines how digital media discourse influences national security and institutional trust using UK-related data (39,760 mentions; reach 255.3 million) collected between November 2025 and April 2026. Applying AI-assisted media analytics, it identifies key risk patterns, including the dominance of negative sentiment, platform-driven amplification, and the transnational circulation of narratives. The findings show how these dynamics generate structural vulnerabilities for democratic institutions and complicate strategic communication. The study proposes a practical analytical framework for monitoring influence operations, enabling earlier detection of coordinated campaigns and supporting faster, evidence-based policy responses in complex digital information environments today.

KEY WORDS: *defence; information warfare; disinformation; institutional trust; credibility erosion; hybrid threats; geopolitical influence; AI-generated propaganda; democratic resilience.*

Citation: Turchenko,Y.; Prysiazhniuk, S. Media Discourse, Trust and Geopolitical Influence of Information in the Context of National Security. In Proceedings of the Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation, Brno, Czech Republic, 7-10 September 2026. ISSN 2538-8959, https://doi.org/10.47459/cndcgs.2026.49

1. Introduction

In the contemporary geopolitical environment, information has evolved from a supporting instrument of statecraft into a strategic domain that shapes political legitimacy and national security. The rapid expansion of digital platforms, algorithmic amplification, and artificial intelligence has fundamentally transformed how information is produced, distributed, and consumed. As a result, information operations increasingly precede and structure political and security outcomes rather than merely accompanying them.

A growing body of research has examined the role of disinformation, computational propaganda, and digital media in shaping political processes. Bennett and Livingston [1] conceptualize the contemporary environment as a "disinformation order," where institutional authority is increasingly destabilized by networked communication. Similarly, Woolley and Howard [25, 2] demonstrate how computational propaganda enables coordinated manipulation through automated and data-driven techniques, while Tucker et al. [20] highlight the relationship between social media, political polarization, and declining trust.

More recent studies shift attention toward the structural and platform-specific dynamics of disinformation. Ruiz [18] shows that disinformation is embedded in platform market logics that incentivize visibility and engagement, thereby normalizing the circulation of misleading content. In a similar vein, Tripodi, Marwick, and Garcia [19] emphasize the role of platform affordances in enabling users to actively participate in the production and amplification of disinformation, blurring the boundary between manipulation and organic communication.

However, existing research remains fragmented in three important respects. First, much of the literature focuses either on theoretical frameworks or on specific platforms, without integrating cross-platform dynamics. Second, empirical studies often analyse disinformation in isolation, without linking it systematically to trust as a strategic variable. Third, there is a lack of analytical models that combine large-scale computational data with geopolitical interpretation of influence operations in real time.

Peer-review under responsibility of General Jonas Žemaitis Miltitary Academy of Lithuania and University of Defence, Czech Republic.

This study addresses these gaps by examining how media discourse related to UK national security evolves within a transnational and platform-driven information environment. It focuses on three interrelated research questions:

(1) How does digital discourse on national security evolve over time?

(2) What patterns of amplification and influence characterize this discourse?

(3) How do these dynamics affect institutional trust?

The paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it provides an empirically grounded, cross-platform analysis of digital discourse based on large-scale monitoring data. Second, it conceptualizes trust not merely as a social attitude but as a strategic variable shaped by information dynamics. Third, it develops a replicable analytical framework that integrates AI-assisted media analytics with political and security analysis.

By situating empirical findings within broader debates on information warfare, hybrid conflict, and democratic resilience, the study advances understanding of how contemporary information environments reshape the conditions of national security.

2. Conceptual Framework: Media Discourse and National Security

Through information – be it aimed at shaping international perception and preference or introducing or reinforcing internal political narratives – actors seek to influence policy-makers. Because of their vested interest in political outcomes, media outlets cannot be considered neutral conduits; the manner in which they present information shapes meaning and interpretation, processes well established in the study of public policy [8, pp. 8-15]. Governments possess capabilities across a range of instruments they can apply to pursue similar objectives; the unconstrained nature of political discourse in democratic societies presents distinctive challenges as well as avenues for opportunism and further design [10, p. 133]. Accordingly, legislation, regulation, and diplomacy regarding governing media and securing the digital space are subject to normative scrutiny by other national and supranational actors that must be factored into national security considerations [23]. The proliferation of information and communication technologies has generated vast and complex data that, when harvested and analyzed through suitable algorithms, provide insights into individual and institutional preferences, behaviour, and intent; amplifying information thus becomes an enticing candidate for achieving influence objectives.

3. Digital Platforms, Algorithms, and Information Operations

Modern governments routinely employ coercive information tactics to restrict, redirect, or manipulate political narratives. Such efforts can be classified according to three axes: transmission, restriction, and bypass. Four instruments characterize coercive operations: disinformation, narrative control, network manipulation, and multimedia modification [15]. States pursue them to protect themselves from external coercion in an increasingly information-centric world. Although coercive information strategies frequently target political opposition, they can also be aimed at foreign adversaries, journalists, and the general population.

Disinformation, broadly defined as “false or misleading information shared with the intent to harm”, is founded on at least four avenues: fabricating fictional narratives and events; misattributing genuine but irrelevant narratives and events to individuals or groups; promoting real-world statements or actions with materially altered meaning, context, or emphasis; and falsifying the topic of public discussion. Misinformation, which conveys no intent, and malinformation, which relies on true information, are distinct from disinformation.

Four basic methods govern narrative control: framing, repetition, linking, and timing. Framing emphasizes particular aspects of a narrative at the expense of others and clarifies its meaning. Repetition dilutes any competing counternarrative and heightens familiarity; ongoing repetition at variable intervals prolongs exposure. Linking steers attention, connects different issues, and possesses additional motivational value. Finally, timing capitalizes on events that provide heightened receptiveness; dissemination increases both prior and subsequent to mobilization peaks.

Despite their persistence, coercive information operations remain subject to detection, debunking, and counter-narrativizing. Resilience depends upon the vigor of independent reporting, competition among media outlets, exposure to varied viewpoints, and pre-existing media literacy.

4. Research Methodology

This study employs a mixed-method research design that integrates computational data analysis with qualitative political interpretation. It conceptualizes digital media discourse as a dynamic and contested information environment in which actors compete to shape legitimacy, threat perception, and institutional trust. In line with the research questions, the methodology is designed to capture (1) temporal evolution of discourse, (2) patterns of amplification and influence, and (3) the relationship between discursive dynamics and institutional trust.

The empirical basis consists of a 166-day monitoring period (November 2025 – April 2026), covering 39,760 mentions with a cumulative reach of 255.3 million users. Data were collected using the Brand24 AI-assisted social listening platform, which aggregates content from social media, online news, and other digital sources. To ensure analytical robustness, the dataset was filtered by keyword relevance, language (English), and thematic alignment with UK national security discourse. While Brand24 provides aggregated analytics, the study focuses on relative patterns and cross-platform

comparisons rather than absolute precision. AI-assisted monitoring helps to track not only how much content is produced, but also its tone, main topics, and how it spreads across platforms. As Bennett and Livingston [1] argue, modern information environments require approaches that can capture both the scale and the complexity of digital communication.

AI-assisted monitoring enables the systematic analysis of both the scale and structure of digital communication, including volume, tone, thematic distribution, and diffusion patterns. The analytical framework combines several complementary techniques. First, temporal trend analysis is used to identify patterns of discursive acceleration and attention cycles, which are indicative of coordinated or event-driven amplification. Second, sentiment analysis is applied to assess the emotional structure of discourse. Sentiment classification follows a lexicon-based approach integrated within the analytics system, categorizing content as positive, neutral, or negative based on linguistic markers and contextual weighting. Although this approach does not fully capture complex semantic features such as sarcasm, it provides consistent comparative estimates across large datasets, allowing the identification of persistent negativity as a structural feature.

Third, unsupervised topic modelling is used to identify dominant narrative clusters. This is based on keyword co-occurrence and clustering techniques, enabling themes to emerge inductively without predefined categories and supporting the detection of recurring discursive patterns linked to security narratives and disinformation. Fourth, network and amplification analysis examines how visibility is distributed across actors and platforms. Amplification is operationalized as the concentration of engagement (shares, reposts, and interactions) and reach generated by a limited number of highly active or influential sources, allowing the identification of asymmetries and potential coordination effects. Finally, cross-platform comparison is employed to assess structural differences between social media and traditional news environments, providing the basis for identifying platform asymmetry in tone, speed, and narrative diffusion.

To enhance validity, quantitative findings are interpreted through qualitative geopolitical analysis, linking observed patterns to broader contexts of information warfare, hybrid threats, and strategic communication. While AI-assisted tools enable large-scale data processing, their outputs are treated critically, acknowledging potential limitations such as algorithmic bias, data incompleteness, and platform-specific distortions.

Overall, the methodology advances a replicable approach that bridges computational media analytics with security-oriented interpretation, enabling the detection of influence patterns and structural vulnerabilities in digital information environments.

5. Information Environment: Results and Analysis

The discourse exhibits a predominantly negative emotional tone. More than half of all mentions are negative, while positive content is almost non-existent. Arguably, this imbalance is not accidental; rather, it reflects the nature of the topics themselves – threats, conflicts, accusations, and suspicions. In this sense, the digital environment operates as a space where negativity is not just present, but structurally dominant.

Turning now to the structure of the media environment, one platform clearly stands out – X (Twitter). It accounts for over half of all mentions, which, importantly, makes it the central arena where narratives first emerge and spread. Due to its speed, partial anonymity, and algorithmic amplification, it creates favourable conditions for both organic discussions and coordinated influence campaigns. At the same time, traditional news media play a secondary but still crucial role: they often pick up narratives originating on social media and, in doing so, give them additional visibility and legitimacy. Consequently, what we observe is not a fragmented system, but a connected ecosystem in which different types of media reinforce each other. While Brand24 provides aggregated analytics, the study interprets outputs critically and focuses on relative patterns rather than absolute precision.

To better understand how different media environments shape the discourse on national security and disinformation, it is useful to compare the two dominant channels X (Twitter) and online news media. Although both operate within the same thematic space, they produce markedly different informational dynamics, particularly in terms of tone and audience reach (Table 1).

Table 1.

Comparative Overview of Media Channels

Indicator	X (Twitter)	News Media
Number of Mentions	26,111	13,649
Audience Reach	148.9M	106.4M
Share of Negative	80%	18%
Share of Positive	2%	1%

Table 1. The table interpretation of comparative Overview of Media Channels (Source: Brand24: AI-assisted social listening), Nov 2025 – Apr 2026)

What stands out immediately is the striking tonal gap between the two environments. X (Twitter) generates negative content 4.4 times more intensively than news media. This is not just a statistical difference –it points to a deeper structural asymmetry.

In essence, social media platforms amplify emotionally charged, conflict-driven narratives due to their speed, virality, and algorithmic logic. News media, by contrast, operate under editorial norms that tend to moderate tone, even when covering the same issues. As a result, while both channels contribute to the same discourse, they do so in fundamentally different ways: one accelerates and intensifies it, while the other filters and stabilises it.

Overall, this comparison suggests that the digital information environment is not homogeneous. Instead, it is shaped by platform-specific logics that influence not only how information spreads, but also how it feels to audiences – whether as heightened threat and urgency, or as more measured and contextualised reporting.

Following the comparative analysis of platform-level dynamics (Table 1), it is necessary to extend the examination to the spatial dimension of the discourse. Table 2 therefore presents the geographical distribution of mentions, allowing for a more precise understanding of how national security narratives are distributed across countries and regions.

Building on the platform and thematic analysis, the geographical dimension provides further insight into how the discourse on UK national security and disinformation is structured across borders. The data reveal a clearly transnational pattern, in which discussions are not confined to the United Kingdom but are actively shaped by global audiences.

Table 2.

Geographical Distribution: A Global Discourse

Country	Mentions	Share	Reach	Share of Reach
United States	7,973	34.4%	56.9M	30.8%
United Kingdom	2,481	10.7%	28.5M	15.4%
India	1,562	6.7%	19.9M	10.8%
Pakistan	1,128	4.9%	4.7M	2.5%
Canada	1,042	4.5%	5.3M	2.9%
Philippines	649	2.8%	5.3M	2.9%
Australia	643	2.8%	5.1M	2.7%
Nigeria	415	1.8%	2.1M	1.1%
Ukraine	343	1.5%	6.9M	3.7%

Table 2. The table show the geographical distribution of online discourse on national security and disinformation. (Source: Brand24: AI-assisted social listening tool) data, Nov 2025 – Apr 2026)

At first glance, the most striking finding is the dominance of the United States. Despite the fact that the analysis is focused on UK national security, the United States generates more than three times as many mentions as the United Kingdom. This imbalance is not incidental; rather, it reflects a structural feature of the English-language digital environment, where US-based users play a disproportionate role in shaping global conversations, regardless of the geographical origin of the issue.

In this sense, the discourse on UK national security appears to be partially "externalised." That is, it is not only produced and consumed domestically but is also interpreted, reframed, and amplified by external actors – most notably in the United States. As a result, British security narratives become embedded within a broader Anglo-American information space, where agenda-setting power is unevenly distributed.

At the same time, the data reveal the presence of a distinct South Asian cluster. India (6.7%) and Pakistan (4.9%) together account for more than 11% of all mentions. This is particularly significant when considered alongside the thematic analysis, which identified Indo-Pakistani tensions as a major driver of disinformation-related narratives. In other words, regional geopolitical conflicts do not remain regionally contained; instead, they spill over into discussions of UK national security, contributing to the globalisation of the discourse.

A further noteworthy case is Ukraine. Although it accounts for a relatively small share of mentions (1.5%), its share of total reach is considerably higher (3.7%). This suggests a high average reach per mention, indicating that Ukrainian sources – particularly those addressing Russian disinformation – are able to engage large audiences. Consequently, Ukraine functions as a high-impact node within the information network, despite its lower volume of content.

Taken together, these patterns point to an important conclusion. The discourse on UK national security is not territorially bounded; rather, it is shaped by a complex, transnational network of actors and narratives. External contributors – especially from the United States – play a central role in defining both the scale and tone of the discussion, while regional conflict zones inject additional layers of meaning and urgency.

From a national security perspective, this has significant implications. It suggests that the UK does not fully control the informational environment in which its own security is debated. Instead, that environment is co-produced in a global digital space, where influence is distributed unevenly and where external actors can amplify, distort, or reframe national security narratives.

All calculations were performed on the dataset collected via Brand24. The resulting metrics are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.

Taken together, the two tables clearly indicate a broader and more nuanced picture of how the discourse on UK national security operates in the digital environment. First and foremost, platforms – especially X (Twitter) – do not simply host discussions but actively shape them. In particular, they make the discourse faster, more reactive, and significantly more negative, which, in turn, amplifies perceptions of threat and urgency.

Secondly, the geographical distribution demonstrates that this conversation is not confined to the United Kingdom. A substantial proportion of content is generated externally, with the United States playing a particularly dominant role. At the same time, contributions from other regions introduce additional geopolitical perspectives, thereby linking UK security discussions to wider global conflicts and narratives.

Finally, these two dimensions are closely interconnected. On the one hand, platform dynamics enable the rapid global circulation of content; on the other hand, the international composition of participants further intensifies and diversifies the discourse. As a result, UK national security is discussed within a highly networked and externally influenced information space.

6. Discussion

The findings of this study contribute to ongoing debates on disinformation, computational propaganda, and democratic resilience by providing an empirically grounded account of how digital discourse operates as a strategic environment. In contrast to existing research that often isolates specific platforms or phenomena, the results highlight the systemic nature of contemporary information dynamics. This framework informs the empirical analysis by linking discourse structures to measurable patterns of amplification and sentiment.

First, the dominance of negative sentiment supports prior arguments about the affective dimension of digital communication but extends them by demonstrating its persistence at scale. Rather than being episodic, negativity appears as a structural feature of the information environment, reinforcing perceptions of instability and risk. This suggests that emotional tone should be understood not merely as a by-product of communication, but as a mechanism through which influence is exercised.

Second, the observed platform asymmetry confirms and refines existing literature on platform logics. While previous studies emphasize algorithmic amplification, this study demonstrates how different media environments perform distinct but interconnected functions: social media accelerate and intensify narratives, whereas traditional media filter and legitimize them. This interaction creates a feedback loop in which visibility and credibility are mutually reinforced across platforms.

Third, the transnational distribution of discourse challenges state-centric assumptions in national security analysis. The findings indicate that national security narratives are increasingly co-produced within a global information space, where external actors play a significant role in shaping both agenda and tone. This has important implications for policy, as it limits the capacity of national governments to control or stabilize their domestic information environments.

Importantly, the study advances the conceptualization of trust as a strategic variable. Rather than treating trust solely as an outcome of political processes, the findings show that it is continuously shaped by discursive dynamics, including amplification, repetition, and emotional framing. This perspective aligns with recent scholarship but extends it by providing measurable indicators of trust erosion within large-scale datasets.

From a practical perspective, the results suggest that existing approaches to countering disinformation may be insufficient. Strategies focused on content removal or fact-checking address only isolated elements of a broader system characterized by speed, scale, and network effects. More effective responses require continuous monitoring, early detection of amplification patterns, and adaptive communication strategies capable of operating within rapidly evolving digital environments.

7. Conclusions

This study set out to examine how digital media discourse reshapes national security through the lens of trust, using large-scale monitoring data and political analysis. The findings demonstrate that contemporary information environments are not simply channels of communication, but active arenas of influence, where narratives are produced, amplified, and contested at high speed and across national boundaries.

A key conclusion is that the scale and intensity of discourse have reached a level where they themselves become a strategic factor. The monitoring data – covering more than 39,760 mentions and nearly 300 million users – shows that discussions related to national security and disinformation are not marginal or episodic. On the contrary, they form a persistent and expanding layer of the public sphere. The observed acceleration of discourse indicates that information dynamics are increasingly driven by amplification mechanisms rather than organic engagement. This creates conditions in which narratives can rapidly gain visibility and become dominant before institutional actors have time to respond.

Equally important is the finding that the emotional structure of discourse is heavily imbalanced. The clear dominance of negative sentiment is not accidental phenomenon, but reflects deeper platform logics and audience behavior. Monitoring results show that negativity intensifies during politically sensitive moments, reinforcing perceptions of instability and crisis. In this context, trust is gradually eroded not through a single shock, but through continuous exposure to critical and threat-

oriented narratives. This supports the central argument of the article: trust should be understood not only as a social attitude, but as a strategic resource directly linked to national security resilience.

Another significant conclusion concerns the structural asymmetry of information environments. The data reveals a clear divide between social media and traditional media. Social platforms function as high-speed amplifiers of emotionally charged content, while news media play a more moderating role. However, these two systems are interconnected. Narratives that originate in fast-moving digital spaces can migrate into mainstream media, gaining legitimacy and broader reach. This interaction complicates the task of managing information risks, as it blurs the boundary between informal and institutional communication.

The study also highlights the uneven distribution of influence within digital discourse. A relatively small number of actors – often including automated or coordinated accounts – are responsible for a disproportionate share of content production and amplification. This suggests that visibility is increasingly shaped by coordination and repetition, rather than credibility or expertise. From a security perspective, this creates structural vulnerabilities, as it allows both state and non-state actors to manipulate the information environment without requiring large audiences or resources.

The thematic analysis further demonstrates a shift toward what can be described as epistemic conflict. Instead of focusing primarily on policy issues, a large portion of discourse is dedicated to questioning the reliability of information itself. This transformation has profound implications. When public debate becomes centred on the question of "what is true," rather than "what should be done," the foundations of democratic decision-making are weakened. Monitoring data confirms that discussions about disinformation and manipulation now dominate the agenda, indicating a deeper crisis of credibility.

A particularly important insight emerging from the monitoring is the transnational nature of contemporary discourse. Despite the focus on UK national security, the majority of content originates outside the UK. This demonstrates that national security narratives are increasingly shaped in a global information space, where external actors play a significant role. The dominance of English as a common communication language further accelerates this process, enabling rapid cross-border dissemination. As a result, national governments face the challenge of responding not only to domestic audiences, but also to globally distributed and highly interconnected information flows.

Taken together, these findings suggest that the current information environment is characterized by speed, asymmetry, emotional intensity, and global reach. These characteristics fundamentally alter the conditions under which national security is understood and managed. Traditional approaches that focus on controlling information or responding to isolated incidents are no longer sufficient. Instead, there is a need for a more systemic perspective that recognizes the continuous and dynamic nature of information influence.

In practical terms, this implies several directions for policy and research. First, monitoring systems must go beyond simple data collection and incorporate analytical frameworks capable of identifying patterns of amplification, coordination, and narrative transformation. Second, institutional responses need to become faster and more adaptive, reducing the gap between the emergence of narratives and official communication. Third, greater attention should be given to the role of platforms, whose algorithmic structures significantly shape visibility and engagement.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that technological solutions alone are insufficient. The challenge is not only technical, but also political and societal. Strengthening resilience requires rebuilding trust, improving transparency, and fostering critical media literacy among audiences.

In conclusion, the study confirms that information has become a central dimension of national security, where influence is exercised not only through content, but through the structure and dynamics of communication itself. The monitoring data provides empirical evidence that trust erosion, amplification asymmetries, and global information flows are not abstract concerns, but measurable and ongoing processes. Understanding and addressing these processes is essential for maintaining both democratic stability and strategic security in the digital age.

References

1. **Bennett W.L, Livingston S.** The disinformation order: Disruptive communication and the decline of democratic institutions. European Journal of Communication 2018; 33(2): 122-139.
2. **Bradshaw S, Howard P.N.** The Global Disinformation Order. Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute; 2019.
3. **Economic Forum. Global Risks Report 2024. Geneva: WEF; 2024.**
   Available online: https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-risks-report-2024 (accessed on 30 April 2026).
4. **European External Action Service. Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)** Threat Report. Available online: https://www.eeas.europa.eu (accessed on 30 April 2026).
5. **Farrell H, Newman A.L.** Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security 2019; 44(1): 42-79.
6. **Freedman L.** The Future of War: A History. London: Penguin; 2017.
7. **Giles K.** Russia's "New" Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power. London: Chatham House; 2016.
8. **Gonina, S.; Ngantem,** L. Mass Media, Terrorism and National Security: Defining the Threats. In Contemporary Security Studies; Academic Press: London, UK, 2019; pp. 1–15.
9. **Howard P.N.** Lie Machines: How to Save Democracy from Troll Armies, Deceitful Robots, Junk News Operations, and Political Operatives. New Haven: Yale University Press; 2020.

10. **Huntington, T.J.** Exposing the Clandestine: Silence and Voice in America's Drone War. In Security, Secrecy and Conflict; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2016; pp. 133–158.
11. Integrated Review Refresh 2023: Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World. London: HM Government; 2023. Available online: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641d72f45155a2000c6ad5d5/11857435_NS_IR_Refresh_2023_Supply_AllPages_Revision_7_WEB_PDF.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2026).
12. **Lucas E, Nimmo B.** Information warfare: What is it and how to win it? CEPA Report; 2015.
13. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Robotrolling 2020/2021. Riga: NATO StratCom COE; 2021. Available online: https://stratcomcoe.org/pdfjs/?file=/publications/download/Robotrolling_06sept2021_fin.pdf?zoom=page-fit (accessed on 18 April 2026).
14. **Nye J.S.** Cyber power. Cambridge (MA): Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs; 2010.
15. **Oates, S.** The Easy Weaponization of Social Media: Why Profit Has Trumped Security for U.S. Companies. In Social Media and Democracy; Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, 2020; pp. 211–230.
16. **Rid T.** Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux; 2020.
17. **Rid T.** War and Media Operations: The U.S. Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq. London: Routledge; 2007.
18. **Ruiz, C.D.** Disinformation on digital media platforms: A market-shaping approach. New Media & Society 2023. Available online: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14614448231207644 (accessed on 20 April 2026).
19. **Tripodi, F.,Marwick, A., Garcia, L.** 'Do your own research': affordance activation and disinformation spread. Information, Communication & Society 2023. Available online: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2023.2245869#d1e211 (accessed on 15 April 2026).
20. **Tucker J.A, Guess A, Barberá P, Vaccari C, Siegel A, Sanovich S, Stukal D, Nyhan B.** Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature. Political Science Quarterly 2018; 133(1): 1-36.
21. **Turchenko**, **Y.** How information warfare is transforming the UK's security landscape. ECPR's blog The Loop. Available online: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/how-information-warfare-is-transforming-the-uks-security-landscape (accessed on 25.04.2026).
22. **Vlasova O.** War's shadow: exploring multifaceted strategies in the politics of fear. Challenges to National Defence in Contemporary Geopolitical Situation 2024; Vol. 1 No. 1: (article 2106); 2024:161.
23. **Wardle C, Derakhshan H.** Information Disorder: Toward an Interdisciplinary Framework for Research and Policy Making. Strasbourg: Council of Europe; 2017.
24. **Wirzburger, A.** A Critical Discourse Analysis of U.S. Media Coverage of Government Leaking during the Trump Administration. In Media and Politics in the Digital Age; Routledge: London, UK, 2018; pp. 89-110.
25. **Woolley S.C, Howard P.N.** Computational Propaganda: Political Parties, Politicians, and Political Manipulation on Social Media. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2018.