JOURNAL OF SECURITY AND SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES
ISSN 2029-7017 print/ISSN 2029-7025 online
2019 March Volume 8 Number 3
https://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2019.8.3(12)

Scopus®

A MODERN WARFARE PARADIGM: RECONSIDERATION OF COMBAT POWER CONCEPT

Gintautas Razma

The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania
Šilo Str. 5A, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania

E-mail: gintautas.razma@mil.lt

Received 20 march 2018; accepted 17 February 2019; published 30 March 2019

Abstract. World Wide Web, Information Technologies and Web-Enabled Collaborative Technologies 2.0 accelerate the process of globalization. In modern globalization process, these technologies dictates how information is designed and how information flow is used in global communication system. In such interactive global environment, Fourth Generation Warfare has emerged where people's identities and beliefs are the primary source of conflict. Primary fight is held not between countries, but between cultures. It is obvious - the nature of war has drastically changed and it almost eliminates the boundaries between the war and peace. Such an understanding generates a different view of modern warfare. From the modern perspective the main risks are directed to the state's internal identity through people's "hearts and minds" and society's moods. People's loyalty to attractive ideas and not to organizations is a major shift. It supports Sun Tzu's and Clausewitz's main ideas - winning wars without massive destruction by breaking down the enemy's will and determination to fight with a limited use of military power. It is needed to reconsider not only the definitions of modern warfare and warfighting but also rethink the concept of combat power. It is obvious that the role of the military in peacetime activity must change significantly. Nevertheless, the new understanding rise a necessity to integrate the whole society and subjects of state in dealing with threats. The holistic defense approach is a new, more effective way of tackling modern security and sustainability issues of the states that need to be clearly defined.

Keywords: warfighting functions, combat functions, enabling functions, combat power, modern warfare, convergence warfare, warfighting, nature of war, military

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Razma, G. 2019. A modern warfare paradigm: reconsideration of combat power concept, *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues* 8(3): 435-452. https://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2019.8.3(12)

JEL Classifications: H56, N40

Additional disciplines: political sciences; military sciences

1. Introduction

Recent conflicts have revealed new shapes and patterns of modern war and it is not surprising why scholars have renewed discussion of war and warfare (Nordin & Oberg, 2014). It is obvious that western and non-western have significantly different values and understanding of human rights, define peace and war differently (Bunker, 2011). These major differences between civilizations generates tensions, especially, when the process of globalization has reached the peak – where are not left suitable space and points for assimilation. From the position of non-western the definitions of war, warfare and warfighting are more broad than the western ones (Bartles, 2016; Kasapoglu, 2015; Nordin & Oberg, 2014). The main reason for it is that the way western understand the nature of war, mindset of warfare and logics of warfighting has not actually changed or evolved. If after World War 2 the direct confrontation (at notion of war) among nuclear superpowers was very unlikely, for now it is very likely but in different shapes at different operational domains and with different actors of war (Bartles, 2016). The main reasons of shift are emergence of Information Technology (IT), World Wide Web

(WEB) and especially Web Enabled Collaborative Technologies 2.0 (WEB 2.0).

It is clear that western assumptions of the post-cold war world order were totally wrong (Lucas, 2014). The euphoria about the end of the war era and trusting the future without threats for the sovereignty by military power has created the prerequisites for a drastic reduction in defense funding. It is not surprising, therefore, why military affairs are still detached from the development of the state. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg's (2018) statement accurately confirms the western attitude and mismatch to the non-western ones: "In 2014, only 3 Allies spent 2% of GDP or more on defense. This year we expect 8 Allies to meet the target". Even the stability based on the fear of using a weapon of mass destruction is not seen as the key element of deterrence but "the possession of nuclear weapons has increasingly been used as an instrument of coercion" (Hedenskog, Persson, & Vendil Pallin, 2016, p. 111). Therefore, it is necessary that western not only reestablish the importance of military affairs but also adopt a clear and new understanding of the modern nature of war.

The main issue is not about how we fight on the ground or even is not a question of what our ways of fighting are, but firstly it is all about the definition and the nature of war (Nordin & Oberg, 2014; Renz & Smith, 2016). From the current perspective, there is a gap in the concepts of war, among the states of western and non-western. Western have a traditional claim of war – a clear distinction from peace and crisis (Nordin & Oberg, 2014). The law of war is a necessary precondition at military operations (ADRP 3-0, 2012) even when fighting against insurgents, terrorist or other combatants. Meanwhile, non-western have a totally different claim of war. Russians consider war to be a permanent process (even in peacetime) (Bartles, 2016), the Chinese perceive war without limitation of rules (Fleming, 2011) and from the Islamic point of view it is not limited by methods (White, 2014). For non-western, war is something much more than a military conflict (Bartles, 2016). From such a perspective: wartime, peacetime, crisis do not exist as separate terms. Therefore, it is clear that the non-western mindset of war are more advanced than the western ones. Such significant differences between the concepts make western and non-western stationed in to the asymmetrical position. From such a position "it is naïve to assume the West will win with this new battle with the same formula it used in the Cold War" (Pomerantsev, 2014). Therefore, it is needed western at least get back symmetry in terms of war or even better – build own war understanding.

It can be admitted that the science of war is most advanced in Russia's military thought: "In Russian military thought, foresight is directly linked to military science, with military science being the science of future war" (Bartles, 2016). Such a holistic mindset of war is strongly connected with the laws of war (Kasapoglu, 2015) which center of gravity is legitimacy of actions. As an example – Russians many times has used a legal excuse for interventions, based on the Kosovo precedent (Karagiannis, 2014). Therefore, it clear - the manipulation and adaptation of international law and laws of war is a very important object of war. In addition, it can be assumed that Russia's main goal is to create, sustain, and expand a gap of asymmetry in terms of war, warfare and warfighting in order to get advantage (superiority) against the mindset of western. Moreover, the asymmetry gap is rising and the biggest challenge of western is how to reconcile the new nature of war with the principles of democracy, human rights, people and media freedom.

Scientific problem – The modern warfare understanding, especially in the case of western, has a lack of theoretical solutions that meet contemporary needs on the basis of which it could be purposefully improved and implemented effective and reliable state defense systems.

Purpose – The purpose of this research is to create suitable conditions for the military and political community to operate more effectively under Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) conditions.

Key research tasks:

- Explore to open up an actual picture of Modern War;
- Analyze to define the composition of modern warfare;
- Systemize to clarify the composition of modern warfighting functions.

Methodology/approach – This research paper was prepared by using several qualitative research scientific methods combination in order to enable symbiosis of science, art and personalized practice of the researcher. Such an approach of the study was chosen in order to get relevant concepts, definitions, meanings and usable models. In this study also was moved from exploratory literature review to the focused literature review method. Focused scientific and military relevant literature review was combined with analyzation and systemization of the key definitions by understanding their causal and inter-segmental relationships. Such a mapping technique of the key definitions has created conditions for using the modeling method to create the necessary conceptual models. Visualization of conceptual models and their clear description mainly was based on deductive cognitive method.

Results of the research – The results of this study are of a qualitative origin. Relevant clarification of the basic definitions of modern warfare, actualization of their relationships through visualized models are main results of this research paper for the future studies and practical implementation. Such a models like: "corners of state security", "composition of modern warfare" and especially "concept of modern combat power" has a scientific and practical usage possibilities.

Research limitations/implications – The proposed models, concepts and generated findings of this research paper must be empirically checked before a full-scale implementation. The implications are to be seen with regard to education in the military.

Originality/value of paper – The application of the concept of modern combat power is original. The practical value of this research paper is the relevance and specificity of conceptual models that could be successfully adapted to military needs by effectively managing military, paramilitary and non-military units.

2. Picture of Modern War

The nature of war inevitably changes the mindset of warfare and logics of warfighting. Lind *et al.* (1989) precisely described the future of modern warfare, and it is obvious that the real changes are still in the future. According Lind *et al.* (1989) we are at 4GW and it cannot be excluded from the previous warfare generations. Thus, an anticipation of what the next war will be like is essential (Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). If war is "interest driven, organized collective violence" (Fleming, 2011), "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" and "the continuation of policy by other means" (Clausewitz, 1989), then it is clear that the primary efforts of warfare are directed towards state security. Therefore, it is essential to define clearly primary targets of an attack of each warfare generation.

According to Clausewitz (1989), resilience of states are based on three main elements – Society, Government and Military (DOD, 2007, p. 8) – which can be described as 'Corners of State Security' (Fig. 1). Therefore, there is no doubt that primary targets of an attack are directed to these security corners (DOD, 2007, p. 8).

According to Clausewitz (1989), the following are considered the enemy's victory:

- Capture of the enemy's capital ('Government' as a target);
- Destruction of the enemy's military forces ('Military' as a target);
- The elimination of enemy allies ('Support' as a target).



Fig. 1. Corners of state security

Source: author's adaptation of Clausewitz, 1976

Listed targets can be mostly associated with first, second and third generation warfare. First generation warfare (1GW) was based on massed manpower (Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). The primary target of 1GW is a military corner and a mass is a center of gravity. The tactics of line and column were common (Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). Evolving technologies especially in firepower enabled the emergence of second generation warfare (2GW) based on massed firepower (Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). The primary target of 2GW is military corner and a place is a center of gravity. The tactics of line were common (Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989). Another technological jump brought not only tanks in military operations but also a new way of fighting. It enabled the emergence of third generation warfare (3GW) based on maneuver, bypassing and collapsing enemy from the rear (Lind, 2004). The primary target of 3GW is government corner and a time is a center of gravity. Although Lind *et al.* (1989) and Lind (2004) treat 3GW as nonlinear but actually it has clearly defined lines between the opposing forces in battlefield and a clear distinction between combatants. Therefore, 3GW cannot be called nonlinear. It can be referred to as modified linear tactics with modification in depth and contiguous and noncontiguous operational areas (FM 3-0, 2017; JP 3-0, 2017). In other words, it could be referred to as the tactics of objective.

However, the listed targets do not limit modern resilience issues to the state security. Blurred lines between war and peace (Bartles, 2016; Kasapoglu, 2015; Lind, 2004; Lind et al., 1989), blurred distinction of opposing forces (Pomerantsev, 2014) and operational domains are truly nonlinear warfare (Kasapoglu, 2015). If in 1GW, 2GW and 3GW the main threat was external and orientated to sovereignty, in 4GW the threat is internal and orientated to core of the state identity (Davis, 2014). 4GW is based on the exploitation of superior ideological (cultural) ideas (Schmidt, 2014) by braking enemy (whole nation or society) from the inside (Davis, 2014; Lind, 2004). It can be assumed that for the first time in the history of war, nonmilitary means became more important than the military ones. From the Russian perspective "war is now conducted by roughly 4:1 ratio of nonmilitary and military" means (Bartles, 2016). The primary target of 4GW is an identity core and ideas are a center of gravity (Quackenbush, 2015) by using nonmilitary means (Davis, 2014). "Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures, not merely states, in conflict" (Lind, 2004). Sustaining and developing a desirable mindset and attacking the mindset is not possible without significant differences in ideas of living. That is why the tactics of asymmetry is now common at 4GW (Bartles, 2016). Examples of the tactics of asymmetry can be found in Kilcullen's publication (2006) where the mentioned practice is presented as still relevant.

However, 1GW, 2GW, 3GW and 4GW classification must be accepted limited. Such a classification represents only the western approach. Jokubauskas (2017) study is one of example of non-western approach to warfare, where so-called 4GW was used much earlier that western recognized it. It is a good illustration of western misunderstanding to changed nature of war. Nevertheless, the concept of 4GW is still relevant. According to theoretical insights, 4GW may be best understood by the following explanation:

- Asymmetry in operational domains;
- Asymmetry in actors of war;
- Asymmetry in mindset of fighting;
- Asymmetry in methods of fighting.

3. Asymmetry in operational domains

According to the Army doctrine reference publication (ADRP) No. 2-0 (2012), "An operational environment includes physical areas (air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment, which includes cyberspace". However, recently, cyberspace has been reconsidered as a separate domain of operations (Stoltenberg, 2016). Looking further into a newly published Army Field Manual (FM) No. 3-0 (2017) an operational environment "encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains; as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and other factors". It is clear that the main discussion is around the Information environment and Cyberspace origin, composition and position in modern warfare. The lack of concrete distinction of operational domains is obvious. If the cyberspace is now recognized as a separate operating domain (MOD, 2017), the same cannot be said about information space, or electromagnetic space. A clear definition of operational domains enables the authority and legitimacy to operate in it for the military. Especially, it is important to the western. Without it the military has some limitations and constraints on actions and counteractions (Fleming, 2011) and are not able to respond to threats and risks in a proper way. Meanwhile, non-western have their own view in the operational environment and operational domains. In the so called the doctrine of Gerasimov Russians conceptually separated information space, while others domains are disguised (Bartles, 2016; Schmidt, 2014). However, exclusive capabilities of cyber warfare (Plėta, Karasov, & Jakštas, 2018; Wilson, 2014) and electronic warfare (McDermott, 2017) give a evident insight of Russian's conceptualization of cyberspace and electromagnetic space as operational domains.

Nevertheless, the conceptualization of information space as an operational domain is not very accurate: "Russia's view of the future is one of contactless war where the main battles are held is in the mind" (Renz & Smith, 2016). According to Schmidt (2014) the main purpose of a modern war is "changing minds of our opponents to force them to fulfill our will", and actually "no lethal force is needed". Information with the combination of various measures is only the material in information warfare and does not have nothing in common with the operational domain. Thain and Bradley (2012) in the book "Store Wars: The Worldwide Battle for Mindspace and Shelfspace" have introduced and covered the term mindspace as the operational domain. Capabilities to "withstand intended mental influence to our minds" and "deliberate influence to undermine our beliefs into our value structures" are questions for discussion; as well as even attacking the enemy's mindspace by information flow (Schmidt, 2014). Thus, the term mindspace is more accurate and less misleading.

In addition to clearly defining operational domains, connecting them into a multidimensional battlespace is also an issue. Nevertheless the lack of concrete distinction of operational domains, at FM 3-0 (2017) an operational environment is understood in terms of multi-domain extended battlefield. The mentioned term can be understood also as battlespace (AAP-06, 2013). From the modern warfare perspective, the notion of battlefield is obsolete and will be replaced by the term of battlespace (Leonhard, Buchanan, Hillman, Nolen, & Galpin, 2010). Also "the battlespace should be understood as a wide variety of battle spaces that links each other into one complex" (Schmidt, 2014). It enables a holistic mindset and major shifts in warfare. However, without IT the input cross-domain approach is not possible, especially, Command and Control (C2) (Bartles, 2016; Leonhard et al., 2010). That is why IT is becoming more and more important because it enables capabilities of creational environment (Lasmar, 2012) rather than acting in an aging environment.

4. Asymmetry in actors of war

Recently much effort has been put to explain modern warfare and its forms. Striving to explain the irregular warfare origin is not an exception (DOD, 2007; Harris, Jr, 2013; Kimbrough IV, 2008; O'Driscoll, 2011) and can be best described in the dichotomy with the regular warfare origin. Regular warfare and irregular warfare are best described by using the concept of actors of war. The understanding of modern actors of war by western and non-western differs significantly and brings parties to the asymmetry position. According to the Geneva Conventions, only combatants can hold military actions, and a distinction between combatants and noncombatants is essential in describing who is regular and who is not (Khen, 2016). However, modern warfighting is conducted not only between friendly and hostile force combatants. Moreover, non-western see modern actors of war with no restrictions. Therefore, military actions do not belong exclusively to the forces of combatants. Nevertheless, a precise dichotomy of regular warfare and irregular warfare still exists when explaining the modern warfare origin.

According to the Geneva Conventions (UN, 1949), combatants must fulfil the following conditions:

- that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
- that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
- that of carrying arms openly;
- that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war;

If regular warfare used to be conducted by regular combatants and irregular warfare by non-regular combatants (Fleming, 2011) then now irregular warfare must be understood in a much wider space. The main issue regards the term irregular. From the current perspective actors of war as fighting entities have many names, like: states actors (Cordesman, 2014; Gentry, 2014), terrorists (Gentry, 2014; Zeman, Břeň, & Urban, 2018), insurgents (Gentry, 2014), adversaries (Fleming, 2011), hybrid adversaries (Davis, 2014), hybrid threat actors (Fleming, 2011), transnational actors (Lasmar, 2012), threat actors (Fleming, 2011), non-state entities (Bunker, 2011), non-state actors (Cordesman, 2014; Davis, 2014; Fleming, 2011; Gentry, 2014; Hoffman, 2009; Lasmar, 2012) non-state military formations (Jokubauskas, 2017) and many more. Nevertheless, Bartles (2016) claims that the actors of war "could come in the form of undeclared conventional forces, peacekeepers, special operators, Cossacks, private military companies, foreign legionnaires, biker gangs, Russian-sponsored NGOs, and cyber/propaganda warriors". Also it can include "various paramilitary, terrorist, organized crime organizations, or even private armies" (ADRP 2-0, 2012) like lone wolf terrorists (Zeman et al., 2018). Thus, despite the fact that the terms unlawful combatants and unprivileged combatant/belligerent is not included in the treaties of international humanitarian law (Dorman, 2003) and they do not follow the rule of law or the Geneva Conventions (Davis, 2014) it must be part of irregular term. Therefore, from the current perspective, non-regular combatants and unlawful combatants conduct irregular warfare.

The variety of unlawful combatants (M. D. Maxwell & Watts, 2007) but also status of civilians (Khen, 2016), society, government and organizations itself in modern warfare are the main issue (Gentry, 2014). According to Bartles (2016) "warfighting subjects are no longer limited only to the military personnel". Nevertheless, actors of war cross the physical domain boundaries and "use their own internal divisions and populations as weapons" (Cordesman, 2014). "It also includes interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations" (ADRP 2-0, 2012). Therefore, the public and worldwide opinions of civilians (Davis, 2014) and international organizations, respectively, become actors of war in the cognitive level. It is rather clear that the support from the civilians and organizations, through public opinion and world opinion will be a part of the future warfighting.

To sum up, the ability to combine regular and irregular actors of war in an exclusive way as a unified operational force (Fleming, 2011) will be a desirable capability (Leonhard et al., 2010). Such a simultaneous combination expands military operations "functional requisites and increases its overall complexity" (Lasmar, 2012). It becomes clear that a future warfighting will be conducted neither between two sides (two countries, two blocks of allies) nor two against two, nor three against one but "all against all" (Pomerantsev, 2014). The capability

to manage such a complex military operation requires a different approach to C2 (Leonhard et al., 2010), or even the adoption of a new one military management concept. However, it will be a great challenge for western societies to acknowledge changes in actors of war, especially in terms of law.

5. Asymmetry in mindset of fighting

If the understanding of regular warfare and irregular warfare dichotomy is best described by the use of the term actors of war, then the understanding of conventional warfare and unconventional warfare dichotomy must be described by using the term mindset of fighting. According to Buffaloe (2006) "warfare is a struggle at the strategic level" and cannot be separated from the strategy. The strategy itself is "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives" (DOD, 2017, p. 220). In addition, it must present "the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve […] objectives" (LKS AAP-6, 2014, pp. 285–286).

To sum up, the conventional warfare and unconventional warfare dichotomy is best described in association with the two sub-objects in mindset of fighting:

- Application of physical instruments of fighting (weapons and equipment used);
- Application of cognitive instruments of fighting (methods used).

This concept can be explained by adapting the IT classification logic, where physical instruments of fighting can be understood as hardware (tools, machinery, and other durable equipment), and cognitive instruments of fighting as software (the programs and other operating information). Both in the field of IT and in the field of warfare, hardware and software cannot work separately. This understanding gives us an insight that it is hardware that can be used in many different ways by using different software. Therefore, it is not surprising that not only new weapons and methods are being developed, but also new ways of using them. These new strategies or just new 'ways of fighting', become more and more important at 4GW, especially when technological advances are so fast (Schwab, 2017) and using regular forces is significantly limited by weapons of mass destruction and doctrines of using them (Hedenskog et al., 2016).

According to Fleming (2011) "Strategy is often codified in overarching strategic documents to provide guidance for […] organizations to organize for war*"* and "much trust was placed in documents such as the Geneva Conventions – whereby the great powers agreed to certain rules of war and thus dictated the management of violence" (Buffaloe, 2006). Conventions – legal International treaties on the laws of war are the key sources in explaining conventional warfare and unconventional warfare. Nevertheless, while the definition of unconventional warfare is clearly presented in military glossaries (DOD, 2017, p. 239; LKS AAP-6, 2014, p. 455), however, the approved definition of conventional warfare is missing and can be only found in a few sources (FM 3-05.130, 2008; Kimbrough IV, 2008). The questions of what conventional warfare is what conditions it must fulfil and whether it is not obsolete remain open and unanswered. On the contrary, the unconventional warfare concept is also changing. An aspiration to separate special forces from unconventional warfare as solely holders (D. Maxwell, 2013) is lately seen by suggesting the necessity of the new special warfare concept (Madden et al., 2014). Now unconventional warfare is seen in a much wider spectrum. However, it is clear that actors of war acting too much in an unconventional way may reach to the war crime state, and it is a reason why unconventional warfare is gaining also a negative meaning.

For a long time, in describing conventional warfare and unconventional warfare was a question of military or other government security forces involvement (Kimbrough IV, 2008). In modern warfare, all actors of war can fight both conventionally and unconventionally. That is why for now, this question is obsolete, and it should be a question of regular warfare and irregular warfare.

Despite the fact that there is no approved definition of conventional warfare, clear dichotomy of conventional warfare and unconventional warfare still exist when explaining the modern warfare origin.

In order to keep the actors of war using appropriate (conventional) physical and cognitive instruments of fighting, from the modern perspective, it must fulfil the following conditions:

- that of having open and direct confrontation between two or more states (FM 3-05.130, 2008; Leonhard et al., 2010; O'Driscoll, 2011);
- that of encompassing all kind of armed confrontation (FM 3-05.130, 2008; Hedenskog et al., 2016; Leonhard et al., 2010);
- that of using not prohibited weaponry, munition and explosives (DOD, 2017, p. 52; Kimbrough IV, 2008; LKS AAP-6, 2014, p. 123);
- that of excluding usage weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, biological, and chemical munitions (Kimbrough IV, 2008; LKS AAP-6, 2014, p. 123);
- that of using military or (and) paramilitary equipment (Leonhard et al., 2010);
- that of conducting military style operations (DOD, 2017, p. 52; FM 3-05.130, 2008; Kimbrough IV, 2008) in accordance with the law and customs of war (Schmidt, 2014; UN, 1949);
- that of using military style activities exclusively against military or other government security power and military purpose installations (FM 3-05.130, 2008; Kimbrough IV, 2008);
- that of seeking to force a change in an adversary's government or policies (FM 3-05.130, 2008);
- that of seeking to minimize civilian interference in operations (FM 3-05.130, 2008);

To sum up, if actors of war fulfil the mentioned conditions of combatants then their activity can be treated as regular warfare, if they do not – as irregular warfare. Moreover, if mindset of fighting falls under the mentioned conditions of appropriate (conventional) physical and cognitive instruments of fighting then it can be treated as conventional warfare, if it does not – as unconventional warfare. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that totally conventional warfare, unconventional warfare, regular warfare or irregular warfare exist only in theory.

It should be admitted that regular warfare and irregular warfare as well as conventional warfare and unconventional warfare are naturally paired (Kimbrough IV, 2008). In addition, these warfare dichotomies are not just only naturally paired itself, but also they are interconnected (Fig. 2). Such an understanding is especially important in explaining modern warfare.



Fig. 2. Composition of modern warfare

Source: Author

In modern warfare, the strong divisions between regular warfare and irregular warfare as well as conventional warfare and unconventional warfare are out of date. Complex modern warfare "will incorporate as many decentralized components of war as possible that are not and will not be understood as traditional components of war, but will provide a strategic advantage over an unprepared enemy in unprecedented ways by unanticipated means with unpredictable impacts" (Schmidt, 2014). Moreover, the "strategic success goes to those who identify important vulnerabilities in their opponents and successfully exploit them in ways that terminate the conflict on favorable terms before the other side can do the same" (Gentry, 2014). According to Hoffman (2009), the modern warfare is best described by the notion of convergence and can be called as convergence warfare. Nevertheless, convergence warfare can be also called as compound Warfare or hybrid warfare (Fleming, 2011). Hoffman (2009) has precisely described the philosophy of Convergence warfare as following:

"However, the evolving character of conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence. This includes the convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and nonkinetic, and combatants and noncombatants. So, too, we see the convergence of military force and the interagency community, of states and nonstate actors, and of the capabilities they are armed with. What once might have been distinct operational types or categorizations among terrorism and conventional, criminal, and irregular warfare have less utility today. They suggest that our greatest challenge in the future will not come from a state that selects one approach but from states or groups that select from the whole menu of tactics and technologies and blend them in innovative ways to meet their own strategic culture, geography, and aims".

Lately Russian mindset of fighting, as the specific shape of convergence warfare, is widely discussed. According to Bartles (2016), western have misinterpreted it as hybrid warfare. However, it is something very different.

Firstly, western have stuck in mindset of reductionism, while Russians have evolved and improved their mindset of holism. The habits of clear objects, subjects and activities separation that are concerned with western do not fit modern needs. From the modern perspective, nothing can be separated from the development of the state. Therefore, peace cannot be separated from war, the government from the society or military and the vice versa. Western see objects, subjects and activities in many clearly separated pieces, while Russians and many others non-western perceive it as a whole. From such a perspective it is clear why mass media, private companies, gangs, NGOs, etc., in non-western, are part of warfare. Meanwhile, the law and regulations of war are a great challenge to western. Also, the western are looking at the warfare theoretical extremes, while non-western look at warfare as a whole. It imposes constrains, which include "rules of engagement, political will, global media coverage, military traditions, norms of warfare, as well as cognitive and geographic boundaries" (Fleming, 2011). It is evident that non-western use manipulation as a weapon (Schmidt, 2014). Therefore, the great question is how to reconcile the western understanding by the term of law and the non-western understanding by manipulation of term of law? Actually, it is great risk to the Western' way of living.

		Non-western strategic approach	
		Direct	**Indirect**
Western strategic approach	**Direct**	Western advantage	**Non-western advantage**
	Indirect	Non-western advantage	Western advantage

Fig. 3. Current picture of strategic approaches

Source: Author's adaptation of Huntington, 1993; Arreguín-Toft, 2005; Richardson, 2011

Secondly, the modern Russian mindset of fighting cannot be called as hybrid warfare, because it seeks to create, maintain and develop the state of asymmetry and indirectness through unique campaigns and operations (Bartles, 2016). According to Buffaloe (2006), such a multidimensional mindset of fighting has an asymmetric nature. That is why such a mindset of fighting can be best described as asymmetric warfare (Bartles, 2016; Leonhard et al., 2010). The main difference of Russian warfare is firstly based not on the capability of combining different types of warfare but rather based on the capability to find, build and use the indirect strategic approach. The same approach is seen in other mindsets of fighting of non-western (Fig. 3). It allow to obtain the advantage against western, which have superior direct action capabilities.

While western are developing and building direct military capabilities, non-western are developing and building indirect capabilities of multidimensional actions. The primary targets of western are military and government corners (Fig. 1). The main efforts are concentrated on the development of direct military power capabilities and pressures on the enemy government's apparatus sustainment. Meanwhile, the primary target of non-western is identity – the core of state security (Fig. 1). The main efforts are concentrated on nonmilitary capabilities and influencing the development of the enemy government by sustaining long-term tensions in the society of an enemy. Such very different strategic approaches are an illustration of asymmetric reality.

Another illustration of asymmetric reality is Chinese modern mindset of fighting, known as unrestricted warfare (Buffaloe, 2006; Schmidt, 2014). According to Buffaloe (2006), the Chinese do not pose a real traditional threat. China's asymmetric threat is expressed in their military doctrine by the three main principles (Schmidt, 2014):

- omni-directionality – the recognition that the battlefield is everything around us;
- synchrony – the recognition that war can be conducted at the same time on different battlefields;
- asymmetry – the recognition that the overlooking and circumventing laws of war is a norm.

It is obvious that the mindset of fighting of western is still based on 3GW while non-western base their mindset of fighting on 4GW. According to Schmidt (2014), "there is no way how to enforce states to play a fair game of traditional conventional war", so it obvious, this asymmetry must to change.

6. Concept of modern combat power

According to ADRP 3-0 (2012) "combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time". In other words, combat power can be understood as the potential of military power capability to perform an effective action at specific time and space (in terms of operational domains). However, as recent modern conflicts has shown, the current concept of combat power does not fit modern needs (Fleming, 2011). Nevertheless, NATO and United States military publications has significantly different recognition of combat power and their elements composition and definitions (ADRP 3-0, 2012; ATP-3.2.1, 2018). In addition, if United States military publications sustains a conceptual framework integrity of combat power and warfighting functions, while in NATO publications this is not the case. Especially it is seen between ATP-3.2.2 (2016) and ATP-3.2.1 (2018) publications, where definition of "combat power" is mixed with "fighting power", definition of "warfighting functions" is replaced by "combat function", and most important these publications has significantly different composition and explanation framework of combat functions. Such a confusion is unacceptable, so the best way is to take combat power framework for improvement which is expressed in ADRP 3-0 (2012). The existing concept of combat power was good for 3GW actions, operations and campaigns but not for 4GW. It is obvious that 3GW and 4GW have different methods of fighting. Therefore, the obvious asymmetry in methods of fighting is unacceptable.

Firstly, the existing concept of combat power is suitable for the so-called hard power development and application. However, under the conditions of convergent warfare the hard power (the conventional combat power) is important but no more decisive. The military based on hard power can fight direct threats at conventional wars, but is incapable to fight indirect threats at unconventional wars (Fleming, 2011). According

to Arreguín-Toft (2001) it is needed to have two militaries: one for direct threats based on hard power, and another for indirect threats based on the so-called soft power. It is obvious that non-western have advanced rapidly by developing soft power capabilities (Cordesman, 2014; Hedenskog et al., 2016; Renz & Smith, 2016; Weichong & Chong, 2013). Nevertheless, lately mixed variations of hard power and soft power at war actions, operations and campaigns have been noticed (McDermott, 2017). Moreover, western lately highlighted the need of soft power development (Glando, 2013; Stoltenberg, 2016; Wilson, 2014). Therefore, it is needed to have not two armies but one army with hard power and soft power capabilities. That is why the concept of combat power must be changed and adapted to the modern needs. The adoption of upgraded warfighting functions could be promising. The future combat power will be used in the unified land operations (ADRP 3-0, 2012), but with an increased complexity regarding the involvement of soft power and the application need at crossover operational domains.

The overall complexity of modern warfare poses a need to rethink the logic of combat power. The way we understand the combat power in the cognitive level is very important, because it programs our thinking and acting. Military traditions of structural logic are very old and strong (Zakarevičius, 2013). The frameworks of elements of combat power (ADRP 3-0, 2012, fig. 3-1, p. 3-1) and the operations process (ADP 5-0, 2012, fig. 1, p. iv) are examples of structural logic. In the first example, the most important is the mission command warfighting function, in the second one – commanders. Also, it must be added that "The Army's framework for exercising mission command is the operations process" (ADP 5-0, 2012). Thus, commanders and the chain of command are still a center of gravity. Such a structural and hierarchical thinking was suitable for first, second and 3GW but as far as 4GW is considered it is out of date. The rapid development of IT and cybernetics is changing structures into networks and hierarchies into hubs. Such a major shift in the logic of military by changing structural thinking and by enabling holosystematic thinking has a perspective. That is why the future concept of combat power must be based on the holosystematic approach instead of the structural approach.

Based on the symbiosis of science, art and personalized practice, the concept of modern combat power is further suggested (Fig. 4). The suggested concept of modern combat power is based on elements of combat power framework (ADRP 3-0, 2012, fig. 3-1, p. 3-1), but it has a major improvements.

Firstly, the concept of modern combat power is based on the holosystematic approach instead of the structural approach. All elements are an important part of the system and crossover related. Neither element is defined as most important. Each element has its own functions, tasks and unique purpose. All elements are treated as the convergent system with the common mission and purpose. The fusion of the elements enables a capability to use hard power and soft power simultaneously. In such a system, the position of a commander should be understood firstly as a facilitator (Shekshnia, 2018) and then, if there is a struggle, as a commander. Such an understanding of the modern combat power allows to accelerate both the speed of processes and precision of actions. According to Schwab (2017), namely speed and precision will be the most important principles of effective acting which can be defined as core principles of the future warfighting. Core principles of future warfighting define for what purposes the concept of modern combat power has been designed.

Secondly, the elements of modern combat power are called as warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0, 2012). Warfighting functions split into two categories – combat functions (ATP-3.2.2, 2016) and enabling functions. Such a distinction of functions clarifies what the military can do bearing in mind their responsibility. Combat functions define clearly how military power is going to conduct actions, operations and campaigns, whereas enabling functions define clearly how military power can decisively enhance speed and precision. Based on the concept of modern combat power, combat functions have seven elements: management, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment and support, intercommunication, and protection. In addition, enabling functions have four elements: knowledge, technology, leadership, experience. All elements of combat functions and enabling functions are collectively described as warfighting functions. Nevertheless, the suggested concept has some major changes, which need to be discussed.



Fig. 4. Concept of modern combat power

Source: Author

The structural warfighting functions framework is transformed into a holosystematic concept. Moreover, in order to fit modern war needs the mission command must be accepted as the military management technique, as much important as the detailed command. The introduction of military management instead of mission command as the warfighting function element would be a major shift in military. The future commander will have not only to command but also facilitate (Shekshnia, 2018) team members, units and activities in the complex military activities, operations and campaigns (Leonhard et al., 2010). The ability to facilitate and if it is needed to command, firstly will be enabled through the so-called social power. The acceptance of commanders' position as part of the team but not as the most important element in the team will be essential (Kilcullen, 2006). Schmidt (2014) has precisely described the future of military management as following:

"The future conflict will have a hybrid shape in a sense that the conflict will be conducted in several battle-spaces, by several means and will pretend to be isolated as different actions with no relation to each other in a military campaign, but will still be driven by a collective idea without the need of a central command and control".

Further, the reconsideration of the military but also whole society roles in the state defense is an issue. According to Davis (2014), in modern warfare "the minds and mindsets of the warring parties play a significant role" and "mental resilience is a crucial defensive capability" (Schmidt, 2014). The military is no more a buffer between the enemy and its own government or people (Buffaloe, 2006). Therefore, defense is not just a military affair but also a matter of every citizen (Cordesman, 2014). Moreover, the battles of ideas is an important attribute of modern warfare allowing gain advantage against a superior enemy. That is why "tactical victories become meaningless without civil victory" (Cordesman, 2014). Therefore, to sustain a shared awareness of common identity (Schmidt, 2014), gain and sustain supportive public opinion and world opinion is an objective of the military community. It is evident that the future military activities, operations and campaigns will have to deal with internal threats to our ideology and willingness of our society to exist and fight. In order to resist the indirect strategy of 'divide and govern' (Schmidt, 2014), the sustainment warfighting function must be extended into sustainment and support warfighting function. From the modern perspective, the effective application of sustainment and support warfighting function enables achieving a strategic victory without direct fighting (Cordesman, 2014).

Moreover, the rapid advance and importance of communication and cybernetics systems cannot be ignored anymore. The intercommunication are forms of soft power, which must be taken in account seriously. Firstly,

intercommunication does not belong to the C2 authority exclusively. Cross-over and proactive communication between various systems without human intervention is a common picture of modern interaction. However, resilience of communication and cyber systems is a great concern, especially, having in mind capabilities of the enemy (McDermott, 2017; NATO STRATCOM, 2016; Wilson, 2014). Therefore, the signal-warriors, cyber-warriors and mind-warriors will be common in the battlespace as now is a machine-gunner. That is why the intercommunication must be accepted as the new elements of warfighting function. The capabilities of friendly forces to have effective internal communication and have appropriate resilience as well to have superior capabilities to attack enemy's communication and cyber systems will be an essential need.

If combat functions are closely related to the direct military unit capability to accumulate combat power, then enabling functions have an indirect impact. The acceptance of enabling functions as part of combat power is conceptually important. Enabling functions acts as a catalyzing effect to the combat power, which allows exclusively to enhance the speed and precision of warfighting. A clearly defined purpose of the enabling element is inseparable from the use of suitable elements. A precise naming of enabling elements gives priorities of real benefit.

If leadership fits the concept of enabling functions as an element, then the information element must be replaced with knowledge. Effective knowledge management envelops data, information and knowledge holistically by sharing an explicit 'know-how' among the internal community. Moreover, knowledge must be understood in more in a broader sense, where knowing, insight and wisdom is integral parts of knowledge paradigm (Razma, 2014). Exclusive knowledge is a great advantage, which is not easily replicated, and it is the reason why obtainment of knowledge is important part of organizational capabilities. Mainly knowledge is identified through the effective knowledge management, but without knowledge-oriented leadership, it is hard to expect obtain desirable knowledge (Shamim, Cang, & Yu, 2017).

Due to the rapid technological advance (Schwab, 2017), the face of modern warfare has been changing faster than ever before and it is a reason why technology must be taken into account as an enabling element. A possession of superior technologies is a great catalyst of warfighting and the social (soft) and material (hard) technologies must be equally important (Lasmar, 2012). However, the real power lies under the capability to use and combine technologies by creating superior measures (equipment, weapons, installations etc.) and means of usage. Every new technology, especially, when its usage is not regulated, creates an advantage for those who possess it. Therefore, the speed in time of the new technology adoption is essential. Especially, it is important when new technologies reduce or even neutralize conventional military superiority (Fleming, 2011). Moreover, IT plays a major role because of its capability to fusion other technologies; thus, the advance of IT must be viewed as priority (Davis, 2014).

Leadership, superior technology and knowledge are important, but experience is no less important. Experience is a personalized and collectivized practical knowledge of actions, which mainly are based on mistakes. Combat or at least appropriate training experience has a direct correlation with the probability to be wounded or shot down (Fraher & Grint, 2016) and from the collective perspective with the probability of the failure of mission accomplishment. According to Buffaloe (2006), "if force planners, strategists, soldiers, academics, bureaucrats, legislators, executives and citizens have a better understanding of the type of warfare in which the United States is engaged, their actions will be better integrated". Therefore, mutual warfighting experience of 'we have been doing it before' will be important not only for the military community but also for the whole society and government.

Conclusions

The nature of war has fundamentally changed. Now the war must be understood as a permanent process, where peace and war do not have distinctive lines. War no more has limitations on operational domains, actors of war, mindset of fighting, or methods of fighting. Direct military confrontation between the states as a form of war is less likely than before. Currently, the main fighting power is related to soft power instead of hard power. Also, the conventional and regular capabilities has been not only updated with unconventional and irregular capabilities, but also have been fused in a convergent way. The main reasons for such a transformation are related to changes

in the use of weapons with capabilities of mass destruction and a rapid development of technologies, especially, information technology. According to theoretical statements a modern warfare can be called as convergent warfare, where Regular and Irregular warfare capabilities as well as Conventional and Unconventional warfare capabilities are uniquely combined for a specific campaign. Such an understanding of the convergent warfare is closely related to the concept of the 4GW, but it is more applicable for states security policy and military practical needs. Convergent warfare is directed to the long-term achievements, the main target of which is the enemy's ideology rather than sovereignty. The desire to create and maintain an asymmetrical position in such a war is very important. Such a needs makes an impact on the warfighting logic, which necessitates the introduction of soft power capabilities into warfare strategies and tactical warfighting. Also, the military on their own cannot withstand the modern war effectively; that is why the complete integration of state subjects is necessary as well.

State security policy and states practical preparedness for state defense must be based on specific and clear picture of modern war. However, the practical value, especially for political and military communities, can be obtained if specific and clear details about modern war is stated. It is very important to define in which operational domains modern war is held, who is an actors of modern war, what kind of warfare strategies and tactical methods can be used. Based on insights of research paper: air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic space and mindspace can be defined as operational domains of modern war. These operational domains are crosslinked to each other by forming one complex battlespace where actors of war conduct campaigns, operations and actions. Such a complex battlespace would not be possible without advanced information technology and changed pattern of actors of war. "All against all" warfighting are conducted not only among friendly and hostile force combatants, but also cover non-regular and unlawful combatants. Nevertheless, modern warfighting cannot be ruled out without at least interaction or even participation of civilians in war campaigns, operations or tactical actions. The same thing can be said about public opinion and world opinion importance. It is obvious that pure warfighting among combatants are out of date, and it is needed integration of soft power capabilities as never before. There is no doubt that soft power mainly can be enabled through direct and indirect activity of civilians, public opinion and world opinion. It cannot be ignored, but acceptance of these changes will be a great challenge for western democratic societies.

Changes in warfighting logic alter the composition of modern combat power. The whole of combat power must be understood from the perspective of the holosystematic approach, which emphasizes the use of warfighting functions. It must be recognized that warfighting functions are composed of combat functions (management, intelligence, movement and maneuver, fires, protection, sustainment and support, intercommunication) and enabling functions (knowledge, technology, leadership, experience). People use resources, measures (equipment, weapons, installations etc.) and the means in order to accomplish tasks, missions or visions. The effective accomplishment is not separated from achieving desirable results, bigger consolidation of people, and obtainment of new superior knowledge. The synergy of warfighting functions will be essential in the future warfare. The same can be said about the fusion of their internal elements. The core principles of future warfighting will be speed and precision, on which the future successful warfare will be based. Mainly precision will be achieved through the outstanding capabilities to use warfighting functions, and most speed will be acquired through the ability to fuse internal elements of combat functions and enabling functions. Rethinking of modern warfare concepts, changing of mindset and rebuilding combat power of warfighting capabilities will be a vital transformational need.

References

AAP-06. (2013). *NATO Glossary of terms and definitions (English and French)*. NATO Standardization Agency (NSA).

ADP 5-0. (2012). *The Operations Process. Army Doctrine Publication No. 5-0.* Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

ADRP 2-0. (2012). *Intelligence. Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 2-0*. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

ADRP 3-0. (2012). *Unified Land Operations. Army Doctrine Reference Publication No. 3-0* (May). Washington DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

Arreguín-Toft, I. (2001). How the weak win wars : a theory of asymmetric conflict. *International Security*, 26(1), 93–128.

ATP-3.2.1. (2018). *Allied land tactics. STANAG 2605 (2)* (B V1). NATO standardization office (NSO).

ATP-3.2.2. (2016). *Command and Control of Allied Land Forces. STANAG 2199 (3)* (B V1). NATO standardization office (NSO).

Bartles, C. K. (2016). Getting Gerasimov Right. *Military Review*, (February), 30–38. Retrieved from https://community.apan.org/cfs-file/__key/docpreview-s/00-00-00-11-18/20151229-Bartles-_2D00_-Getting-Gerasimov-Right.pdf

Buffaloe, D. L. (2006). Defining Asymmetric Warfare. Retrieved July 31, 2018, from https://www.ausa.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/ILW Web-ExclusivePubs/Land Warfare Papers/LWP_58.pdf

Bunker, R. J. (2011). Grand strategic overview: epochal change and new realities for the United States. *Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22*(5), 728–741. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2011.621237

Clausewitz, C. von. (1989). *On War*. (M. Howard & P. Paret, Eds.), English (1989th ed., Vol. 49). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cordesman, A. H. (2014). The Real Revolution in Military Affairs. Retrieved July 29, 2018, from http://csis.org/publication/real-revolution-military-affairs

Davis, J. R. J. (2014). *The Hybrid Mindset and Operationalizing Innovation: Toward a Theory of Hybrid* (No. ADA611901). United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Retrieved from www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA611901

DOD. (2007). *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)* (Version 1.). Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf

DOD. (2017). *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (4th, Aug ed.). US Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://news.maryland.gov/ng/wp-content/uploads/sites/18/2018/03/Military-dictionary.pdf

Dorman, K. (2003). The legal situation of "unlawful/unprivileged combatants." *RICR Mars; IRRC March, 85*(849), 45–74. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_849_dorman.pdf

Fleming, B. P. (2011). *Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art.* United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Retrieved from https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a545789.pdf

FM 3-0. (2017). *Operations. Army Field Manual No. 3-0* (October). Washington DC: Headquarters, Department Of The Army. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-0.pdf

FM 3-05.130. (2008). *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare. Army Field Manual No. 3-05.130* (September). Headquarters, Department of the Army. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf

Fraher, A., & Grint, K. (2016). Agonistic governance: The antinomies of decision-making in US Navy SEALs. *Leadership*, 174271501668091. https://doi.org/10.1177/1742715016680910

Gentry, J. A. (2014). Warning Analysis: Focusing on Perceptions of Vulnerability. *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence*, 28(1), 64–88. https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2014.962354

Glando, B. D. (2013). *Cyberspace Warfare: A New DoD Core Mission Area* (No. ADA581106). National Defense University Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Norfolk. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a581106.pdf

Harris, Jr, W. D. (2013). *Special Operation, Irregular Warfare, and Operational Art: A Theory of Special Operations* (No. ADA606691). United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a606691.pdf

Hedenskog, J., Persson, G., & Vendil Pallin, C. (2016). *Russian Security Policy. In G. Persson (Ed.), Russian Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective - 2016* (Foi-R-3734, p. 158). Stockholm. Retrieved from https://www.foi.se/report-search/pdf?fileName=D:%5CReportSearch%5CFiles%5C5fa9f89b-8136-4b15-9aaf-1d227aee90a0.pdf

Hoffman, F. G. (2009). Hybrid Warfare and Challenges. *Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ)*, 1st quarte(52), 34–48. Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf
Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 22–49. https://doi.org/10.2307/20045621

Jokubauskas, V. (2017). Threats and challenges to the security and stability of the state of Lithuania: historical perspective. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, 6(4), 675–689. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2017.6.4(12)

JP 3-0. (2017). *Joint Operations. Joint Publication No. 3-0*. Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf

Karagiannis, E. (2014). The Russian Interventions in South Ossetia and Crimea Compared: Military Performance, Legitimacy and Goals. *Contemporary Security Policy*, 35(3), 400–420. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2014.963965

Kasapoglu, C. (2015). *Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control* (Vol. 121). NATO Research Division - NATO Defense College. Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195099/rp_121.pdf

Khen, H. M.-E. (2016). Reaffirming the distinction between combatants and civilians: the cases of the Israeli army's "Hannibal Directive" and the United States' drone airstrikes Against ISIS. *Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law*, 33(3), 765–802. Retrieved from http://arizonajournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/04_Moodrick_EICFinal.pdf

Kilcullen, D. (2006). Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level. *Military Review*, 86(3). Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/iosphere_summer06_kilcullen.pdf

Kimbrough IV, J. M. (2008). *Examining U.S. Irregular warfare doctrine*. Air force air university. Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a488263.pdf

Lasmar, J. (2012). Managing great powers in the post-Cold War world: old rules new game? The case of the global war on terror. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2012.678292

Leonhard, R. R., Buchanan, T. H., Hillman, J. L., Nolen, J. M., & Galpin, T. J. (2010). A Concept for Command and Control. *Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest, 29*(2). Retrieved from http://www.jhuapl.edu/techdigest/TD/td2902/Leonhard.pdf

Lind, W. S. (2004). Understanding Fourth Generation War. *Military Review*, (September-October), 12–16. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/lind.pdf

Lind, W. S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J. F., Sutton, J. W., & Wilso, G. I. (1989). The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation. *Marine Corps Gazette Oct, 73*(10), 22–26.
LKS AAP-6. (2014). NATO terminų ir apibrėžčių žodynas [NATO Glossary of terms and definitions]. Vilnius: Krašto apsaugos ministerija [Ministry of national defence].

Lucas, E. (2014). Why, Oh Why, Didn't We Listen to the Eastern Europeans? - Edward Lucas. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/eastern-europe-vladimir-putin-107094_Page2.html

Madden, D., Hoffmann, D., Johnson, M., Krawchuk, F., Peters, J. E., Robinson, L., & Doll, A. (2014). *Special Warfare. The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options*. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR-828-A. Retrieved from https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR828.html

Maxwell, D. (2013). Unconventional Warfare Does Not Belong to Special Forces - War on the Rocks. Retrieved March 28, 2018, from https://warontherocks.com/2013/08/unconventional-warfare-does-not-belong-to-special-forces/

Maxwell, M. D., & Watts, S. M. (2007). "Unlawful Enemy Combatant": Status, Theory of Culpability, or Neither? *Journal of International Criminal Justice, 5*(1), 19–25. https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mql100

McDermott, R. N. (2017). *Russia's Electronic Warfare Capabilities to 2025: Challenging NATO in the Electromagnetic.* Tallinn, Estonia. Retrieved from https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/ICDS_Report_Russias_Electronic_Warfare_to_2025.pdf

MOD. (2017). *Joint Concept Note 1/17. Future Force Concept.* Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre. Retrieved from https://

www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643061/concepts_uk_future_force_concept_jcn_1_17.pdf

NATO STRATCOM. (2016). *Internet Trolling as a hybrid warfare tool: the case of Latvia.* Riga (Latvia). Retrieved from http://stratcomcoe.org/internet-trolling-hybrid-warfare-tool-case-latvia-0

Nordin, A. H. M., & Oberg, D. (2014). Targeting the Ontology of War: From Clausewitz to Baudrillard. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 43*(2), 392–410. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829814552435

O'Driscoll, C. (2011). A "fighting chance" or fighting dirty? Irregular warfare, Michael Gross and the Spartans. *European Journal of Political Theory, 11*(2), 112–130. https://doi.org/10.1177/1474885111425117
Plėta, T., Karasov, S., & Jakštas, T. (2018). The means to secure critical energy infrastructure in the context of hybrid warfare: the case of Ukraine. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, 7*(3), 567–578. https://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2018.7.3(16)

Pomerantsev, P. (2014). How Putin Is Reinventing Warfare. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/

Quackenbush, S. L. (2015). Centers of gravity and war outcomes. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894215570430

Razma, G. (2014). *Profesinės karo tarnybos karininkų žinių vertinimas [Evaluation of professional military service officers' knowledge]*. General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, Vilnius. Retrieved from http://vddb.library.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2014~D_20141002_101236-11380

Renz, B., & Smith, H. (2016). *Russia and Hybrid Warfare: definitions, capabilities, scope and possible responses. Aleksanteri Papers.* Helsinki, Finland. Retrieved from http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/presentations/papers/ap_1_2016.pdf

Richardson, T. (2011). Book Review : How the Weak Win Wars : A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *Small Wars Journal.* Retrieved from http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/692-richardson.pdf

Schmidt, N. (2014). Neither conventional war, nor a cyber war, but a long-lasting and silent hybrid war. *Defense and Strategy*, (2), 73–86. https://doi.org/10.3849/1802-7199.14.2014.02.073-086

Schwab, K. (2017). Interview with Klaus Martin Schwab. *television show "Savaitė."* Lithuania: Lithuanian Radio and Television, lrt.lt. Retrieved from http://www.lrt.lt/mediateka/irasas/1013677145

Shamim, S., Cang, S., & Yu, H. (2017). Impact of knowledge oriented leadership on knowledge management behaviour through employee work attitudes. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*. https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2017.1323772

Shekshnia, S. (2018). How to Be a Good Board Chair. Retrieved April 6, 2018, from https://hbr.org/2018/03/how-to-be-a-good-board-chair

Stoltenberg, J. (2016). Cyberspace is officially a war zone. Retrieved February 20, 2018, from http://www.euronews.com/2016/06/15/cyberspace-is-officially-a-war-zone-nato

Stoltenberg, J. (2018). Secretary General previews meetings of NATO Defence Ministers, 13-Feb.-2018. Retrieved February 15, 2018, from https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_151838.htm

Thain, G., & Bradley, J. (2012). *Store Wars: The Worldwide Battle for Mindspace and Shelfspace* (2 edition). Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119207832

UN. The Geneva Conventions of 12 august 1949 (1949). International Committee of the Red Cross. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf

Weichong, O., & Chong, A. (2013). Waging "Small Wars" in the New Millennium: Chameleonic Missions and Virtual Aggression--An Introduction. *Armed Forces & Society, 40*(1), 3–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X13490929

White, J. (2014). The Combat Performance of Hamas in the Gaza War of 2014. *CTC Sentinel*, September, 9–13. Retrieved from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/White20140929-CTCSentinel.pdf

Wilson, J. R. (2014). Cyber warfare ushers in 5th dimension of human conflict. *Military & Aerospace Electronics, 25*(12). Retrieved from http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/print/volume-25/issue-12/special-report/cyber-warfare-ushers-in-5th-dimension-of-human-conflict.html

Zakarevičius, P. (2013). Vadybos paradigma [Management paradigm]. *Organizacijų Vadyba: Sisteminiai Tyrimai [Organizational Management: Systematic Research]*, 68, 151–159. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.7220/MOSR.1392.1142.2013.68.10

Zeman, T., Břeň, J., & Urban, R. (2018). Profile of a lone wolf terrorist: a crisis management perspective. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues, 8*(1), 5–16. https://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2018.8.1(1)

Gintautas RAZMA is the Master of Social Sciences and Chief Instructor of Tactics and Management for General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. His final Master's Thesis took the 2nd place in the competition of the Lithuanian Association of Science and Technology Societies. Also, he has earned a number of awards for practical management achievements and innovations. Research interests: management, leadership, military science, strategy and tactics, knowledge management, people management, organizational behavior, information technology, education.

ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4761-4523

Register for an **ORCID ID:** https://orcid.org/register