
**ATTEMPT TO VIEW WAR AND PEACE ISSUES THROUGH RELIGION
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE AND CURRENT PERCEPTIONS**

Tomasz Kośmider¹, Piotr Baczar², Mariusz Kuryłowicz³

^{1,2,3}*Academy of Justice, 50 Wiśniowa Street, 02-520 Warsaw, Poland*

E-mail: ¹tomasz.kosmider@swws.edu.pl (Corresponding author)

Received 9 March 2021; accepted 15 May 2021; published 30 June 2021

Abstract. Despite rich experience indicating that waging wars is risky and not very ‘profitable’, particularly from the last decades’ perspective, and it also has a demoralizing effect on societies engaged in the conflict strengthening the tendency to aggression, nationalism, at the same time destroying the natural environment, it is difficult to imagine the world without an armed confrontation in the future. Such a course of action is proven by ‘the Ukrainian scenario’, or the situation in the Middle East. Motives pushing people to armed confrontations are quite complex and do not result from a simple need of domination and possession. War is quite closely connected with the domain of the sacred. Violence and religion are placed in close neighbourhood. Thus can values represented by great monotheist religions be ‘useful’ in the conducted polemological-irenological discourse and in the process of building a desired international security system? Do the components fostering war aggression dominate over ‘pacifist reflection’ in Judaic-Christian and Islamic spirituality? One may risk a statement that religion regardless of time and latitude, is not an indifferent factor from the point of view of waged conflicts.

Key words: peace; war; religion; coexistence of violence; polemology; security

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Kośmider, T., Baczar, P., Kuryłowicz, M. 2021. Attempt to view war and peace issues through religion. Historical perspective and current perceptions. *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, 11, 383-393. <https://doi.org/10.47459/jssi.2021.11.34>

Discipline: Security Sciences

1. Introduction

Violence, the use of force and armed confrontation have accompanied mankind since the dawn of time, despite various actions and initiatives undertaken, although aims and principles of waging war are subject to some evolution. Admittedly, the liberal thought outlines visions of humanity living in peace, free of violence, also in situations of existing antagonisms, however, such a prospect is not possible to be implemented, for instance, in the context of the latest developments in Ukraine, the Middle East, North Africa or terrorist attacks carried out in Europe. It rarely happens that an armed conflict is triggered by one factor, although in a given region a specific cause may dominate, such as long lasting territorial disputes.

In the history of mankind it often happened that there were periods in which peace was a unique phenomenon while war was a daily life. Unfortunately, it refers to the Old Continent to a large extent. R. Allen Brown stressed that ‘The origins of Europe were hammered on the anvil of war’ (Brown, 1972), the frequency of armed conflicts then is not the highest in comparison with, for instance, the 17th century when Europe could boast of ‘only’ one war for two years and in the following centuries even one for three years. However, taking into account the extent of European conflicts and their gravity, the contribution of Europeans to the world war statistics could satisfy even the most ambitious militarist.

It should not be forgotten that apart from the right to enter into treaties or send envoys, war was one of factors that reflected the sovereignty of the state. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, a legal ban of war, was not signed until 1928. As a matter of fact, from the ancient times as political and ethical systems evolved, there have been undertaken attempts to outline certain legal and moral restrictions regarding the way war is waged or crisis is managed, including the elimination of so called private wars which gradually losing feudal sanctions were perceived as duels between individuals or common banditry (Keegan, 1993).

Up to the 14th century, the rules of waging wars, their limitations and laws, were described in detail and unified throughout the whole Western Christianity. This partly resulted from the pressure exerted by the Church which 'harnesses the ritual into the service of pacifist ideals' and partly from a growing influence of the Roman law. This type of activity is perfectly illustrated by the *Pax et Treuga Dei* (*Peace and Truce of God*) binding in medieval Europe, which was a kind of a code guiding the principles of conducting an armed confrontation between Christians. Its provisions prohibited fighting on certain days of the week from Wednesday evening to Monday morning, the ban was soon extended to some liturgical periods, such as Advent, Lent and other holy days, which accounted for almost two thirds of the calendar year. *The Peace of God* was officially sanctioned at the Council of Clermont in 1095. Moreover, the range of applied measures of fighting was also limited. The Second Council of the Lateran, held in 1139, banned the use of bows and crossbows against Christians as *mortifer et odibilis* (lethal and contemptuous weapon). The provisions of that Council could be treated as the first international convention on rules guiding waging wars in the history of Europe. Although, as in case of all norms and prohibitions, these provisions were applied quite selectively, as reported by sources. War craft became more formalized. However, no rules were binding during wars with the unfaithful and sins of knights waging them could be absolved. It must be added that such a crusade under the Church auspices was conducted by the Teutonic Knights in the late Middle Ages in the areas of north-east Europe (Howard, 2009; Crepon, 1991).

The concept of a just war gradually crystallized as a result of the transformation of the holy war idea. According to many scholars, we have been dealing with theories of just wars in the full sense of the word not earlier than since the 12th century and they refer to wars waged not due to political reasons 'but to restore justice in relations between Christian princes'. This evolution of war as a social phenomenon leads to 'the royal war and then the national war' (Minois, 1994).

Not only did the constantly developed codification of the rules of war result from the appealing to Christian consciences, but also from the growing commercialization of war. Throughout the following centuries the principles of Christian ethics were modified, however, St. Augustine's *bellum iustum* is still located in the contemporary polemology area of interest. Note that its notion was already known in the ancient times (Keen, 1965).

2. Attempt to view war and peace issues through religion

Serious achievements concerning the elimination of violence from international relations were recorded in the 20th century, although, at the same time it remained in people's memory as 'the century of mega-deaths'. This tendency as the consequence of World War II, the bipolar division of the world and the nuclear competition pointed to limited effectiveness of such problem solving, both in the global and regional dimensions as well. In practice, all projects aiming at building a world free from threats and injustice appeared little effective. Even Mahatma Gandhi's principles of non-violence (promoter of nonviolent resistance) crashed in connection with wars waged between India and Pakistan over Kashmir (Artymiak, 2001).

The most important limitations of war defined differently depending on adopted research methods of output criteria, are subject to human will and actions only to a certain extent. It should not be forgotten that non-state actors and structures play a vital role in wars waged in the new millennium (Tvaronavičienė et al., 2020; Kooiman, 1993; Kriviņš, 2021; Shumilo et al., 2021).

Carl von Clausewitz, who lived at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, while analysing the problem of war, noticed that it is not only a political action but also a genuine tool of politics and a continuation of political

relations. This constitutes a kind of compromise that reconciles the interest of the state with such values as sovereignty, diplomacy or treaties signed. However, as John Keegan claims war is something more than politics as war is expressed in the culture of a given society, war is sometimes a determinant of culture and is a culture in some societies (Keegan, 1993).

Not all researchers perceived interpersonal relations merely in the context of confrontation, among them was Dutch historian and jurist Huigh de Groot living at the turn of 16th and 17th centuries, called the father of international law. He claimed that the social drive is an inherent feature of human nature expressed in tendencies to cohabit with other people peacefully, fulfilling commitments, etc. He opposed the view that people are selfish by nature, concentrating exclusively on achieving their own benefits and striving for open confrontation. He left the legacy of the way of thinking about international relations, the laws of war and peace, to which we more or less consciously refer to today (Korporowicz, Plichta, 2016). Immanuel Kant's concept of perpetual peace, which assumes that the rule of force will give way to justice, is gaining popularity now. This corresponds to the principles stated in the 6th century BC by Chinese general and military theoretician Sun Tzu. He claimed that the attainment of assumed political goals should be realized most of all by applying non-martial measures, he treated war as the last resort. He said that 'For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill'. American general William Tecumseh Sherman, a participant of the American Civil War, noticed that 'War is Hell', whereas Georges Minois added that it is 'a rebellion if irrationality against reason' (Wintle, 1989).

Despite rich experience indicating that waging wars is risky and not very 'profitable', particularly from the last decades' perspective, and it also has a demoralizing effect on societies engaged in the conflict strengthening the tendency to aggression, nationalism, at the same time destroying the natural environment, it is difficult to imagine the world without an armed confrontation in the future. Such a course of action is proven by 'the Ukrainian scenario', or the situation in the Middle East. Motives pushing people to armed confrontations are quite complex and do not result from a simple need of domination and possession. There occurred frequent cases in history when the idea became a driving force as evidenced by crusades organized by Europeans in the Middle Ages, the conquests of the Arab followers of Muhammad, who were driven to war by the desire to spread faith or activities undertaken by Israelites to take possession of 'the Promised Land'.

War is quite closely connected with the domain of the sacred. 'The gods cannot look indifferently at the war of their people. The followers seek their opinions on the legitimacy of the war praying to them for support'. In most polytheistic religions there are deities directly responsible for military matters. This issue is more complicated in the case of monotheistic religions of a universal character. God is the God of all people in these religions, however, he can command their followers to wage war against those who do not want to acknowledge him, against the unfaithful. Thus Judaism knows the notion of wars of the Lord, Islam – jihad, and Christianity – crusades (Minois, 1994).

Particularly the issue of jihad, an essential element of the Muslim identity, evokes emotions and ignites the imagination of the West due to Islamic terrorists or Islamic Caliphate. Nevertheless, it must be realized that it is difficult to call jihad aggressive activities against other countries or communities and even against their tribesmen, which have rather more political than religious context. Terrorism is not jihad it is heresy, and any thesis could be justified by a quotation from the Quran if the words are taken out from the context, just like in the case of the Bible. The interpretation of the Quran is not a simple matter as there are fragments in it, in which we can be convinced that they are in contradiction to each other. Thus transferring 'secondary and doubtful things to the level of necessity may lead to fanaticism' (Stróżewski, 2013).

The Quranic doctrine contains many pacifist passages. 'Oh, Faithful ones, enter in peace', commands one surat. The word *salam* (peace) and its derivatives can be found over 30 times in the holy text of Islam, whereas the word *harb* (war) and its derivatives – only 6 times. At the same time, great importance is attached to the idea of jihad, which is both a personal and collective duty, at least in relation to spiritual activities, i.e. greater jihad. In the case of physical war, the believer is recommended to desire it. 'Who dies, and never went on a war expedi-

tion nor sustained thoughts about it, dies in some kind of hypocrisy'. In Islam, spiritual and material struggle is more closely interwoven than in Christianity. The crux of the problem is located in the Quran and its argumentation, but in fact in the lack of it. As a matter of fact, Islam and peace in Arabic come the same root, however, looking at the centuries-old history of Islam it is difficult to spot clearly the reflection of peace.

The connections between religion and negative cooperation, conducted for centuries, have long been an area of interest for researchers and experts. One can risk saying that violence and religion are placed in close neighbourhood. Although the use of force was practiced in the past by followers of all religions, but, as it has already been mentioned, numerous terrorist attacks carried out by Islamic extremists impose the necessity of a new look at the problem and a certain redefinition of the adopted methodological perspective. Searching for answers explaining the logic of waging wars often leads to holding religions responsible for initiating and strengthening bloody conflicts. Mass media have contributed to such a perception as they create social imagination. Religion frequently becomes 'the main defendant in an ongoing trial for breaching peace and welfare of nations in various parts of the globe', although it must be added that the hypothesis treating religion as a relevant generating conflicts factor is difficult to prove (Zenderowski, 2012).

Thus can values represented by great monotheist religions be 'useful' in the conducted polemological-irenological discourse and in the process of building a desired international security system? Do the components fostering war aggression dominate over 'pacifist reflection' in Judaic-Christian and Islamic spirituality? It should be noted that many notions and ideas, such as spiritual struggle or bloody martyrdom can be interpreted ambiguously and 'lead both to the glorification of the holy war and an integral peace as well. So does the content contained in the Bible or the Quran favour the consolidation of peaceful sentiments? Each epoch seems to read holy books differently and draw from them what is needed to support its ideologies. Man in the service of his instincts uses everything possible, including religion, although it mainly refers to transcendence'.

Great revealed religions have difficulty incorporating war into their entire theological vision of the world. It is particularly visible in Christianity. The interest to promote peace and security derives from its very nature. The theory of the 'Jehovah war (battles)' presented in the Old Testament should be looked at rather in the categories of theological and literary expression, aiming at instilling in the people the image of God who may save from the worst trouble. The holy war never existed as a historical phenomenon. The peaceful message is an important part of evangelical teaching of Jesus Christ. Relations between Christianity and war should be considered rather in the context of the interpretation of the phenomenon than the cause, not forgetting about ongoing evolution of his attitude towards negative cooperation. Among Christians 'there have always been pacifists and belligerent people, fanatic supporters of holy wars and quiet people, pure in heart (...) in each epoch some tendencies were expressed more strongly than others' (Minois, 1994).

Much attention to peace and the elimination of war is found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church which refers to the Council discussion (*Vaticanum Secundum*), resulting in the content of *Gaudium et Spes, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World*, promulgated by Pope Paul VI on 7 December 1965, the Pope thanks to whom on every 1st January, beginning from 1968, the Bishops of Rome address a peaceful message to all people of good will. This idea involved the desire 'to celebrate The Day of Peace, throughout the world, on the first day of the year, January 1, 1968. It is Our desire that then, every year, this commemoration be repeated as a hope and as a promise, at the beginning of the calendar which measures and outlines the path of human life in time, that Peace with its just and beneficent equilibrium may dominate the development of events to come' (Gizicki, 2009).

Peace in theology and specially in theological anthropology should be connected with the issue of human freedom. But freedom is an extremely difficult category to achieve. The implementation of individual freedom is even more difficult. The ethical order to strive for peace requires complete effort in order to abolish international antagonisms and create a climate of dialogue and cooperation between nations. Pope John Paul II, the initiator of a special meeting in Assisi in 1986, was greatly interested in these issues. He prayed for peace together with the spiritual patriarchs and superiors of the world's major religions. That meeting became a testimony indicat-

ing a universal character of peace and the confirmation that it does not only result from political and diplomatic negotiations but it is a category that should be perceived in a much wider dimension. Besides, Pope Wojtyła appears as one of the greatest contemporary authorities in the area of security. The initiatives undertaken by him are an exemplification of frequent in the past cases of religious leaders' engagement for peace, such as peace actions of Pope Benedict XV during World War I, in fact the only moral authority calling for peace, or the activity of the Holy See and Pope John XXIII himself during the Cuban crisis. The issue of religion and religious leaders is systematically returning in international armed conflicts and terrorist attacks which are particularly characteristic for the last decades (Zieliński, 1999)

Can war be reconciled with the fifth commandment of the Decalogue? The coexistence of violence and love causes serious problems not only of axiological nature. Biblical texts are interpreted by many as a total ban on the use of force even in necessary defence. The adoption of integral pacifism, as stressed by Rev. Jan Bocian from the Higher Seminary of the Verbites Priests in Pieniężno, is 'an extremely imprudent behaviour as it does not take into account the great evil stemming from a passive attitude towards unjustified violence. Moreover, such an attitude is contrary to the natural right to defence that each human being deserves (...). In the light of the natural law, biblical teaching and doctrines of the Catholic Church, the necessary defence is not only a right but also a duty of man. Even bringing death (...) to a person whose activity threatens the life, health or dignity of another human being does not contradict the fifth commandment of the Decalogue nor properly understood love for one's neighbour. What is essential, however, is the concern that even in the necessary defence one should not use force greater than it is needed' (Bocian, 2014). Moreover, the Church canonizing numerous 'military' saints such as St. George, St. Martin, St. Maurice or St. Theodore makes us realize that an activity carried out in this area does not have to be *a priori* reprehensible.

Being a crucial element integrating society, religion is a complex and difficult to define social phenomenon. According to Jonathan Fox, four aspects of religion can be distinguished, i.e. the belief system, rules and standards of behaviour resulting from religious truths, religious institutions and the source and methods of legitimacy (Fox, 2004). The author presents five 'social manifestations of religion' which involve a basis for identity, a belief system which influences behaviour, religious doctrine or theology which determine social behaviour, a source of legitimacy and justification as well as religion associated with religious institutions (Fox, Sandler, 2006).

In addition to social ideologies and nationalistic movements, religion affects group identity providing individuals with the sense of existence. It also obliges community members to respect social values and norms lending them the value of sanctity. Anthony D. Smith draws attention to an interesting feature that assumes crossing culture, class and even ethnic barriers by religions preaching salvation (Smith, 2000). It should not be forgotten, however, that religion can destructively affect a given social system, weakening the sense of community. Its disintegration action is particularly noticeable where religious divisions become more important than ethno-cultural solidarity, as exemplified recently in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also religious divisions in Ukraine. According to Patrick Michel, many times 'contrary to its official mission of preaching what is universal, religion serves mostly to express and justify what is particular. In order to be able to do it in a reasonable credible way, it must invoke its universal character' (Michel, 2000).

Thus religion may strengthen objective and subjective features of national identity such as the concept of homeland, common history, culture, traditions, language or communal rights and duties. Therefore it is worth stressing the role of religion as a potent mobilization force that in many cases enables many social groups to survive. The use of religion to build national identity can take place in a more or less official dimensions. In the latter case it is about spontaneous grassroot initiatives aiming at the manifestation of religious – national identity. The dimension of relationships occurring between religion and national identity is worth underlying due to the differences that appear in certain periods in the national identity perception and its relation with religion between political elite and 'people' (Luhmann, 1998; Smith, 1991).

Ethno-history is crucially important as its political and religious threads are so connected that it is impossible to separate them precisely. The fate of the nation is interpreted in religious categories, whereas the territory

considered as homeland is perceived in the 'holy land' category. This phenomenon refers in a special way to 'nations in a difficult situation of political change, i.e. for those who either lose strength, or (...) become victims of history, martyrs, elements of the history of salvation' (Neuhaus, 2006-2007). Religion may contribute to saving what is the most precious in the nation, especially when a nation loses their state as it happened in the history of 'the Chosen People'.

The phenomena of religion ethnization should not be perceived in terms of the expansion of nationalism and the phenomenon of nation sacralisation in the categories of the expansion of religion. We should rather speak about the offensive of nationalism and instrumentalization of religion, its desacralisation and deuniversalization which is an imminent consequence of political instrumentalization. With regard to Christianity, the origin of this problem should be sought in very distant times, namely Constantine's turn which took place in the 4th century AD. The church was then instrumentalised as 'the support of the state' and became an important tool for legitimacy of political power and tasks it carried out. In the following centuries it resulted in building various kinds of alliances of 'the throne and the altar', or 'the nation and the altar' and even led to 'bishops' and abbots' military activity in the service of emperors and kings' (Prinz, 1994).

At present, while analysing the relations between religion and nationalism, it should not be forgotten that it is a complex problem in reference to the Old Continent. A process incapacitating religion by nationalism is perceptible in Western Europe and in this way religion is not able to evoke in the society, regardless of the will of political power, emotions that could cause deep changes in political reality. However, in Central and Eastern Europe, with the exception of the Czech Republic, the situation looks completely different. There religion and nationalism coexist as two potent powers that could effectively influence society. The Balkans are an interesting case and they occupy a special place in Huntington's vision of the clash of civilizations due to the merging (interweaving) of three civilizations, namely Western, Orthodox and Islamic.

In the context of the adopted research problem, it seems particularly interesting to consider religious issues in an institutionalized aspect, that is through spiritual leaders' and their religious organizations' engagement in creating and consolidating particular visions of national or ethnic unity as well as the perception of social function of religion. The latter case does not refer to the activity of a given religious institution and its perception but also it is about a social perception of religion as a more or less important element of national life. According to George Weigel, 'religious beliefs are the source of knowledge about the sense of life, (...) and ideas have their consequences'. Understanding consequences of ideas shaping a given historical epoch is *conditio sine qua non* of the 'proper management of the state' and the creation of a cooperation and collaboration platform (Weigel, 2007).

Relations between religion and politics and war are characterized by a kind of ambivalence. On the one hand, religion can be the basis for forming various kinds of – isms, on the other, it can be in opposition to them as a 'competitive supplier of sense (Mihelj, 2007). History provides much evidence to prove this thesis. It is worth underlying numerous initiatives undertaken by clergy and laity, defined as faith-based diplomacy for counter-acting, inter alia, ethnic and ethno-religious conflicts. Importantly, none of the world's major religions today calls openly for violence. Only some, detailed interpretations of religious doctrines may incline to make such suppositions pointing at the need to fight. Nevertheless, there are many religious wars on the pages of history. Taking into account the criterion of faith, they may be divided into inter-religion conflicts, so referring to military confrontation waged among followers of different religions, fought within the same faith or between a religious community and a secular entity declaring a religious indifference or atheism. The first category in our civilization circle includes fights in the Middle Ages against Muslims attacking Europe, although, it must be added that the Muslim threat was initially perceived mainly as an ethnic, not religious threat. The symbol of such a cooperation could be the siege of Constantinople against attacking forces of the Umayyad Caliphate in 717–718. This event deserves attention as in fact it decided about the fate of Europe and 'the identity of further development of related civilizations: Western – Christian and Eastern – Islamic, despite the fact that their mutual penetration was still ongoing'. The Islamic – Christian conflict in Nigeria and Sudan, Hindu – Christian one in India and Islamic – Jewish in Palestine are a part of this trend in modern times.

The need to wage liberation fights in Spain in the Middle Ages that aimed at freeing the Iberian Peninsula from the rule of Prophet Muhammad's followers gave birth to the idea of holy war or crusade. The origin of this phenomenon is Pope Alexander's II appeal addressed to all European nations to help the Spaniards. It is noteworthy that in the time when the Church introduced the notion of holy war, the interest in knighthood grew. Sanctifying the war entailed the sanctification of the profession of a warrior, whose duties, apart from the allegiance to the king and senior, were enriched with fighting for the faith. Interestingly, despite many centuries of struggle against Arabs, the Byzantines did not take advantage of the concept of holy war, it also refers to Persian wars led by Heraclius (Minois, 1994).

Armed fighting within the same faith is also quite common. This category includes a medieval campaign against a heretical sect called Catharists or Albigenses in Languedoc, the Czech Hussite wars, the St. Bartholomew's Day massacre of French Huguenots in France in 1572, the rivalry between the Shia and Sunni, or Cairo's streets and the Islamic Brotherhood's uprising against Husni Mubarak's regime, which led to, so called Arab awakening in Egypt. The crusade against Catharists is often referred to as an example of breaking ethical rules which were officially binding in the Church then in terms of waging wars. Papal legate Arnold Amaury, although it is not absolutely certain, was to encourage the crusades to fight with the words 'Kill everyone, as God will sort them all out later'. According to preserved sources nearly 30 000 inhabitants of Béziers lost their life on that day (Crepon, 1991). Crusades against heretics did not prevent the splits in Christianity. The 16th century brought the biggest changes, leading to the outbreak of religious wars, in which the parties to the conflict repeatedly violated the rules of Christian ethics. All the fighters committed atrocities with almost equal zeal.

The massacre of Huguenots is a perfect illustration of frequent in history actions aiming at achieving an ethnic – religious unity of a given community. The lack of success in 'converting countrymen' onto the right path and their 'restraint' in adopting desirable standards binding in a given community often led to extreme and violent actions which can be manifested by the massacre of Christians in Japan in 1616–1638, as well as current persecution of Christians in India and Iraq. The mentioned actions do not have to result in physical violence, they can be expressed in radical social marginalisation, as suffered by Catholics in the British Isles who could not hold public offices until 1829. The Act of Settlement concerning the succession to the English throne, which was passed 1701, excluded 'all and every Person and Persons who ... is, are or shall be reconciled to or shall hold Communion with the See or Church of Rome or shall profess the Popish Religion or shall marry a Papist' (Wilson, 1994; Tesař, 2007). However, the Act of Settlement did not refer to other religions. It must be added that the exemption of persons in the line of succession from the ban to marry a Catholic was introduced in 2013. Since that time, only the first six persons in the line of succession will have to apply for the monarch's consent to the marriage. The monarch, as the Head of the Church must join in communion with the Church of England (Act of Settlement).

As regards conflicts waged between a religious community and a secular entity declaring religious indifference or atheism, it is worth mentioning the conflict between Muslim Uighurs, who confess to Sunni Islam, and Chinese authorities. In 2009, serious riots broke out in Xinjiang Region inhabited by the Uighurs population in north – west China. The underlying cause of these events was an attempt to marginalize the Uighurs by incoming new residents – the Han Chinese to this region and increased efforts of the Chinese state to impose social and religious control over them. This category also includes a conflict between Muslim Basmachis and the Soviets which took place between the world wars. At the beginning of the 20s they were the main force of the revolt in Central Asia which had nationalistic and religious character against the Bolsheviks and allied with them Jadidist (Tatar reformers). The Basmachi resistance suppressed in 1923 revived on the turn of the 20s and 30s during the collectivization of villages in Central Asia, to be finally destroyed as a result of military penal expeditions undertaken by Soviet authorities (Zenderowski, 2012).

Regarding the problem of the impact of religion on social relations, it must be remembered as John R. Hall points out that religion is not the category that could be singled out from other social phenomena. 'There is no firewall between religion and other social processes' (Hall, 2003). We are therefore under illusion that the

cause of numerous conflicts have their source in religion when it is not so. It is difficult to find 'purely' religious conflicts in the history of wars. It seems that these requirements are largely met by the Thirty Years' War, waged in 1618–1648, when an unprecedented 'eruption of sanctified violence' took place. Crusades became a symbol of religious confrontation, aimed at the liberation of the 'Holy Land', organized by almost two centuries in the period of 1096–1270, perceived so in the East even today, and it must be added that this conviction was strengthened by the coalition war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. There is no doubt that the most enduring result of crusades was to create the atmosphere of unwillingness and misunderstanding between the Christian and Muslim world.

However, the problem is to determine the religious dimension of this confrontation. How to comment some Crusaders' behaviour, especially during the 4th Crusade, when the temptation of the Constantinople's wealth appeared stronger than the idea to liberate the 'Holy Land' from the rule of the unfaithful. As a consequence of actions undertaken by crusaders the Greek Byzantine Empire gave way to the Latin Empire whose ruler became Baldwin, Count of Flanders. Crusades were treated as punitive expeditions by crusaders and also by the Church that had little in common with the teaching of Christ, or even being its antithesis. In fact religion was used to justify activities of rather 'economic' nature and as a solution to the social problem which was generated by overpopulation in Western Europe. Many analysts point out that in contemporary times it is difficult to make univocal assessments of massive devastation of Orthodox churches in Kosovo committed by the Albanians. To what extent were they the expression of purely religious hatred and how much of ethnic reasons? (Rock, 2004; Marsh, 2007).

Conclusions

To what extent does religion influence conflicts and their course and how important is it for international relations? It is a crucial problem although for most of the last century so painfully experienced by various forms of negative cooperation, religion was not perceived as an essential element of a social and political scene and an important agent in international relations. The fact is that for many people religion was and still is a fundamental value, having an impact on presented social attitudes. As Friedrich Kratochwil points out this thesis is confirmed by events connected with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 which gave some impetus to wars waged in Nigeria, Sudan, or Syria as well the intensification of terrorist activities in the world (Kratochwil, 2005). Many analysts who deal with international relations, however, do not see the reverse process in relation to the secularization and modernization.

In the conviction of already mentioned Israeli political scientist Jonathan Fox, the marginalisation of religion results partly from the fact that the exclusion of religion from the political sphere, as symbolically manifested by the Treaty of Westphalia ending the Thirty Years' War in 1648, is permanent and unchanging, while nations need holy symbols and myths. This regularity, contrary to gradual secularization of the West, and particularly in Europe remains a fact, and this phenomenon is confirmed by politicization and deprivation of religion taking place in many parts of the world (Fox, 2007). It is an aftermath of phenomena occurring during the last decades concerning the relations between political processes and religious revival, visible on a global scale, perhaps except Western Europe.

One may risk a statement that religion regardless of time and latitude, is not an indifferent factor from the point of view of waged conflicts. This regularity particularly refers to so called religious borderlands such as vast areas of Central and Eastern Europe – in Old Continent. Taking into account a certain dimension of ongoing Christian – Islamic 'rivalry', these borderlands should be extended. Religion on the borderland does not only mean the identification with a particular faith, but also a conviction relating to the integrity of one's own ethnic community and very often civilizational community. This trend is perfectly in line with the idea of *antemurale christianitatis* present in Polish history and an important element of national tradition, for example. It should be added that initially it was about the defence of Europe and Christianity against the Tatars and the Ottoman Turks. The motif of the bulwark in the Polish tradition is also as *antemurale* defending the Latin and Catholic world against, for instance, Orthodox Muscovites (Zarycki, 2004).

Religion has often been a convenient tool of a particular strategy, adopted by the parties of the conflict, rather to strengthen it than to initiate it, although history of war provides such examples. However, there are many cases when religion proves useful and extremely helpful in the conducted peace process, creating a platform of cooperation and thus supporting the ongoing efforts towards reconciliation. Religion can 'enforce' peace, being an integration factor in situations such as language or socio-economic divisions as it was in the past, for instance in reference to Belgium or Italy but also 'justify violence in defence of what it considers sacred' (Kratochwil, 2005). This ambivalence, which should not be forgotten, remains a part of religion, being a complex social phenomenon.

In contemporary polemological-irenological discourse, the central point of reference is man and his system of values, the shaping of which is a serious task for religion. The adoption of such a methodological stance is of fundamental importance not only from the point of view of confrontation taking place for centuries, but also and perhaps above all, the creation of necessary conditions for cooperation in social and political dimension.

References

- Act of Settlement, www.legislation.gov.uk. Available at: <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aep/Will3/12-13/2> (accessed 20 January 2021).
- Artymiak, R. (2001). *Wojny i konflikty w XX wieku (Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century)*. In Borkowski, R. (Ed.). *Konflikty współczesnego świata (Conflicts of the Modern World)*. AGH University of Science and Technology Publishing House. Kraków.
- Bocian, J. (2014). Piąte przykazanie Dekalogu i nakaz miłości nieprzyjaciół a "słuszna wojna" (The Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue and the Order of Love of Enemies and "Just War"). In *Chrześcijaństwo i bezpieczeństwo (Christianity and Security)*. Institute of Pope John Paul II. Warsaw.
- Brown, R.A. (1972). *The Origins of Modern Europe*. Constable. London.
- Crépon, P. (1991). *Les religions et la guerre (Religions and War)*. Éditeur: Albin Michel.
- Fox, J. (2004). Is Ethnoreligious Conflict a Contagious Disease. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, 89-106.
- Fox, J., Sandler, S. (2006). *The Question of Religion and World Politics*. In: Fox J., Sandler S. (Ed.). *Religion in World Conflict*. Routledge. London.
- Fox, J. (2007). Religion, politics and international relations. The rise of religion and the fall of civilization paradigm as explanation for intra-state conflict. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 20, 3, 361-382.
- Gizicki, W. (2009). *Ład międzynarodowy w dokumentach Stolicy Apostolskiej (International Order in the Documents of the Holy See)*. Adam Marszałek Press. Toruń.
- Hall, J.R. (2003). *Religion and Violence: Social Processes in Comparative Perspective*. In: Dillon M. (Ed.). *Handbook for the Sociology of Religion*. Cambridge University Press.
- Howard, M. (2009). *War in European History*. Oxford: University Press.
- Keegan, J. (1993). *A History of Warfare*. New York: Random House.
- Keen, M.H. (1965). *The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kooiman, J. (1993). *Modern Governance: New Government Society Interactions*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Korporowicz, L., Plichta, P. (2016). *Mosty nadziei. Jagiellońskie inspiracje dialogu międzykulturowego (Bridges of hope. Jagiellonian inspiration of intercultural dialogue)*. Biblioteka Jagiellońska. Kraków.
- Kratochwil, F. (2005). Religion and (Inter-) National Politics: On the Heuristics of Identities, Structures, and Agents. *Alternatives* 30 (2), 113-140.
- Kriviņš, A., Teivāns-Treinovskis, J., Tumulavičius, V. (2021). Issues of state and national security: Religiously inspired terrorism in the Baltic States: internal and external factors. *Insights Into Regional Development*, 3(1), 65-79. [http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2021.3.1\(4\)](http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2021.3.1(4))
- Luhmann, N. (1998). *Funkcja religii (Functions of Religion)*. Nomos. Kraków.

- Marsh, C. (2007). The Religious Dimension of Post-Communist "Ethnic" Conflict. *Nationalities Papers* 35 (5), 811-830.
- Michel, P. (2000). *Polityka i religia: wielka przemiana (Politics and Religion: A Great Change)*. NOMOS Publishing House. Kraków.
- Mihelj, S. (2007). Faith in nation comes in different guises: modernist versions of religious nationalism. *Nations and Nationalism* 13 (2), 265-284.
- Minois, G. (1994). *L'Église et la guerre. De la Bible à l'ère atomique*. Éditeur: Fayard.
- Neuhaus, R.J. (2006-2007). *Naród a religia (Nation versus religion)*. *Teologia Polityczna*. 2, 18-19.
- Prinz, F. (1994). *Religia i naród jako dialektyka realno-historyczna. Civitas Christiana na przykładzie krajów czeskich w średniowieczu i w czasach nowożytnych (Religion and Nation as Real-Historical Dialectics. Civitas Christiana on the Example of Czech Countries in the Middle Ages and Modern Times)*. In: P. Kosłowski (Ed.) *Europa jutra. Europejski rynek wewnętrzny jako zadanie kulturalne i gospodarcze (Europe of Tomorrow: the European Internal Market as a Cultural and Economic Task)*. Catholic University of Lublin Press. Lublin.
- Rock, S. (2004). Introduction: religion, prejudice and conflict in the modern world. *Patterns of Prejudice* 38 (2), 101-108.
- Shumilo, O., Lytvyn, I., Shablysty, V., Korniyakova, T., Popovich, I. (2021). Legal mechanism to ensure national security in the field of use of natural resources. *Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues*, 8(3), 455-470.
- Smith, A.D. (1991). *Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Hoboken New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Smith, A.D. (2000). The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 29 (3), 791-814.
- Stróżewski, W. (2013). *Logos, wartość, miłość (Logos, Value, Love)*. Znak Press. Kraków
- Tesař, F. (2007). *Etnické konflikty [Ethnic Conflicts]*. Praha: Portál.
- Tvaronavičienė, M., Plėta, T., Della Casa, S., Latvys, J. (2020). Cyber security management of critical energy infrastructure in national cybersecurity strategies: cases of USA, UK, France, Estonia and Lithuania. *Insights into Regional Development*, 2(4), 802-813. [http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.4\(6\)](http://doi.org/10.9770/IRD.2020.2.4(6))
- Weigel, G. (2007). *Faith, Reason, and the War Against Jihadism: A Call to Action*. Oxford: University Press.
- Wilson, B. (1994). Religion and the Affirmation of Identity. *Revista de antropologia social* 3.
- Wintle, J. (1989). *The Dictionary of War Quotations*. London: The Free Press.
- Zarycki, T. (2004). Uses of Russia. The Role of Russia in the Modern Polish National Identity. *East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures* 18 (4), 595-627.
- Zenderowski, R. (2012) *Religia, etnonacjonalizm i tożsamość narodowa. Powiązania i modele relacji - ujęcie teoretyczne (Religion, Ethno-nationalism and National Identity. Connections and Models of Relationships - Theoretical approach)*. In R. Zenderowski (ed.) *My już jesteśmy zjedzeni. Rola i znaczenie prawosławia w konflikcie etnicznym w Dolinie Preszewa (We are already eaten. The role and importance of Orthodoxy in the ethnic conflict on the Preszewa Valley)*. Warsaw: Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University Press.
- Zieliński, Z. (1999). *Papiestwo i papieże dwóch ostatnich wieków (Papacy and the Popes of the Last Two Centuries)*. Warsaw: Pax Press.

Tomasz KOŚMIDER is a full professor, director of the Institute of Safety Sciences of the Academy of Justice. In the years 2012–2018 he was the director of the Institute of State Security of the National Defense Academy / Academy of War Art. Author and co-author of nearly 200 scientific studies: books, articles, reviews and expert opinions, incl. 17 research projects. Manager of 4 research projects financed through national and international competitions. He has prepared several dozen expert opinions and other studies commissioned by public institutions or entrepreneurs. He has taken part in expert and competition teams many times. He cooperates with many academic centers and think-tanks in Poland and abroad. Reviewer of many scientific journals, monographs and international projects. Member of editorial committees and scientific councils of journals.

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2129-3642>

Piotr BACZAR is Assistant professor at the Academy of Justice, doctor of social sciences in the discipline of security sciences, graduate of the Police Academy in Szczytno, author of articles on anti-terrorism, former officer of the Independent Counter-Terrorism Police Sub-Unit in Białystok.

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8778-7875>

Mariusz KURYŁOWICZ graduate of the University of Białystok (MA in Pedagogy) and the Police Academy in Szczytno, where he earned his doctoral degree in social sciences, in the field of security sciences. Moreover, he completed postgraduate studies in physical education at the High School of Physical Education and Tourism in Białystok, postgraduate studies in occupational health and safety management and postgraduate studies in human resources management at the Faculty of Management, Białystok University of Technology, as well as postgraduate studies in Master of Business Administration. Prison Service Officer, assistant professor and member of the Senate at Academy of Justice, co-editor and author of monographs and texts on security. Member of the Field Council for Social Readaptation and Aid to Prisoners; Member of the Polish Evaluation Society; Member of the Polish Association of Court Appraisers and Experts.

ORCID ID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6212-5763>