Leadership Revised: How Did the Ukraine Crisis and the Annexation of Crimea Affirm Germany’s Leading Role in EU Foreign Policy?
Volume 14, Issue 1 (2016), pp. 101–116
Pub. online: 9 December 2016
Type: Article
Open Access
Published
9 December 2016
9 December 2016
Abstract
The recent string of existential crises in Europe – the Euro crisis, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and the refugee crisis of 2015 – have resulted in new dynamics within the European Union. In Brussels, Germany has emerged as the hardly contested nexus of decision making. It was in particular through the Ukraine crisis and the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 that Germany found itself assuming a leadership role also in the EU’s foreign policy, a role it has shunned in the past. However, for Berlin this new role is far from obvious – it is only gradually that Germany grew comfortable with its enhanced role, which is due more to external circumstances than by its own design. Conscious of its own image abroad and, due to the still prevalent feeling of historical guilt, the fear of being perceived as a dominating power has so far prevented Germany from occupying the forefront of the stage, preferring to pulling strings from behind and presenting itself as the EU’s “Chief Facilitation Officer” (German Missions in the United States, “Foreign Minister Steinmeier Travels to Washington, Atlanta”, Mar 16, 2015, http://www.germany.info/Vertretung/usa/en/__pr/P__Wash/2015/03/11-Steinmeier-USA.html). This article analyses how Germany, in particular through the Ukraine crisis starting in 2014, affirmed itself – albeit reluctantly – as a nexus of decision making in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and became the de facto leading nation for defining the EU’s response towards Russia. The article points out the internal and external consequences of this new role and, in particular, its impact on the Baltic States.