The Concept of Fear and the Matter of Emotions in Lithuania’s Foreign Policy

This article reflects on the concept of fear in theories of international relations and foreign policy. The text discusses the concepts of the phenomenon of fear and rational behavior emphasizing that the concept of fear, contrary to the concept of anarchy, has no emotional charge in the theory of international relations. Having surveyed the factor of emotions in the theory of international relations and foreign policy, the author suggests that the emotional meaningful charge be returned to the concept of fear. The study stresses that fear (if treated as an emotion) can also have a destructive function disrupting the international system and disturbing the international communication. The third part of the article is devoted to an analysis of the ideas of Lithuania’s foreign policy. The study explores the idea of Lithuania as a regional leader. The writer claims that the idea was irrational because it was based on the factor of the emotion of fear.

Introduction

In the theory of international relations, fear is an important factor assisting the explanation of the behavior of national states. Realists generally treat fear as a natural reaction to the anarchic system of international relations. It is believed that in the dangerous world order, reminiscent of the “jungle”, the fear of the Other can help to objectively assess the situation and, since fear is caused by reasons of the international system structure, shape a rational foreign policy of the state. In other words, fear is a stimulus for the rational and pragmatic behavior of the state. In the liberal perspective of international relations, the causes of fear are the dynamics of the change of identities. Fear emerges when the Other distances itself from “I” or ignores universal liberal values and seeks to revise the status quo. In this respect, the ideas of liberals are close to those of constructivists who treat fear as a tool for presenting to the public (securitization act) and solving (desecuritization act) problems of national security. In other words, for constructivists the fear of
the Other performs an important function of *social building* (construction of the identity) and *social enabling* (problem solving).

These concepts of fear in each of the aforementioned theories are important constructs of the explanation and understanding of international processes on which both the identification of scientific problems and strategies of their solution depend. However, such definitions of concepts, when only the structural or identity-related nature is attributed to fear, have a price – the simplification of social reality and social processes. This, in its turn, poses the threat that the dynamics of social processes and forces driving it will not be revealed or assessed sufficiently accurately. For example, for realists the reasons of state fear will always be external (in the international structure) and always related to the increase in parameters of the originally poor state power. Therefore, fear for everyone and forever will be the same, independent of the subjective qualities of an international subject.

It is possible to observe that in the provided concepts of fear the emotional origins of the phenomenon of fear do not get revealed at all or only slightly. In other words, both realists and liberals use not the emotional (irrational), but the pragmatic (rational) concept of fear. In one and the other paradigm fear even possesses a peculiar positive function: to correctly assess the international environment (realism) or construct and expand (by excluding or involving menacing Others) identities (liberalism, constructivism).

In this study, the concept of fear is reflected upon by “returning” to it the irrational emotional charge. Such an emotionalization of fear is treated in this study as a heuristic tool helping to better understand and explain the influences of the phenomenon of fear (as an emotion) on international relations as well as processes of foreign policy shaping. The article states that fear is not necessarily of an external nature: the cause of the international system (the asymmetry of power) or the structure of the identity (the asymmetry of identities). Fear can also be a consequence of the articulated within a state belief system which identifies threats and fears rather due to the structural content of the belief system than the external reasons of the international environment.

1. Rational Behavior of the State in the Theory of International Relations

Realism can deservedly be considered as one of the most important or even fundamental theories of international relations. The shaping of international relations as an individual social science with its own object and methods
was based on the concept of realism. The scientific and philosophical influence of realism on foreign policy researches is also great. Realists, having criticized their predecessor idealists, urged an explanation of international behavior in terms of national interests, without taking into consideration moral attitudes and cherished hopes or attitudes and hopes of nations, which are inherent to the observers.\(^1\) Therefore, according to Hans Morgenthau, the aspiration of realists is to separate the truth from the opinion – that is everything that is objectively and rationally right and substantiated by data from what is only a subjective assessment not related to facts and inspired by prejudice as well as whimsical reasoning.\(^2\) Thus, a realist perceives the nature of the human being and the state such as it is and not as it should be and sees historical events the way they happened and not the way they had to happen.

In the theoretical perspective of realism, universal political constraints, determined by people’s egoism and absence of international government, are emphasized.\(^3\) Explanations of foreign policy are very important factors. Each state had to react to these universal circumstances at all times; therefore, we can speak about a certain conformity to the law and stimuli common and uniform for all states which, in essence, determine how a state will behave in the face of a threat. (For example: will it balance the threat, climb on the bandwagon of the threat, seek neutrality?\(^4\)). Consequently, in his neorealist concept, Kenneth Waltz concentrates the analytical attention on the structure of the international system. In order to understand behavior of individual states, it is necessary to first grasp the international system but not the peripeteia of the foreign policy of concrete states.

In prioritizing macro-level processes, neorealist paradigms circumvent and pay no significant attention, in foreign policy research, to the elite of states, leaders and their qualities which can often be exceptionally rhetoric, emotional or personal. The most important is the anarchic international system, which, by “pressing” states, forces the consideration of survival as the primary goal of foreign policy. Thus, national interest is associated with the aspiration for state security and power in the anarchic environment of international relations. The attempt to ignore this reality (to ignore the origins of anarchy) is equal to the risk of being “punished” or even completely “destroyed” by systemic powers. It is in this logical generalization identifying a permanent threat that the concept

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of realism’s fear, as a rational stimulus, lies. Having acknowledged that the behavior of a state is only a consequence, whereas the anarchic international system is the cause, it is not worthwhile to question the rationality of fear or distrust of the Other. In other words, fear is a systemic (therefore, rational) phenomenon. Consequently, a great number of other stimuli characteristics of the social world – culture, historical memory, prevailing traditions, etc. – are ignored. This way, realists leave only a very limited space to objective behavior – i.e. having acknowledged the rationality of fear, to react to it by balancing power, bandwagoning or maintaining neutrality.

However, though the explanation of realists is truly rational, it is not realistic. It is rather possible to perceive the theory of realism of international relations due to its conceptual narrowness as the theory of topical realism. Guided by the strictly structural logic of reasoning as well as by generalities, realists of international relations attempt to squeeze reality into one scheme. In their opinion, we can know the states’ interests (real interests), as if the algorithms of the interests of a monolithic and predictable political subject, without having studied the history and culture of that state. According to them, the international environment is unidirectional, predictable and based on the same conformity to laws. This, correspondingly, limits the explanation potential. The historical time with the present rules, norms and values is current for the pragmatic attitude. Therefore, theoretical schemes, methodological dogmatism, attachment to one truth or one explanation in social sciences cannot to a measure reflect but rather squeeze reality in a procrustean way into the narrow frames of perception, homogenize and too much simplify the sources of human motivation.

The theory of international relations proposed by Ned Lebow and based on ideal types, partly attempts to solve this problem. By claiming that conventional theories of international relations, by being orientated towards the structural and not procedural explanation, one cannot perceive the genuine causes of social processes. Therefore, the author, by distinguishing in his theory ideal types of international culture, grants priority to process and not to structure, to changes but not to stability and thus seeks to concentrate on the analysis of dynamic processes causing changes of the international system. Lebow grounds his theory on the distinguishing of ideal structural types non-existent, permitting not becoming attached to one universal stimulus (aspiration to power, aspiration to wealth, aspiration to honor); and on the other hand, creating possibilities to observe and assess structural changes (the dynamics of

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5 N. Lebow distinguishes ideal cultural types of the international system – reason, spirit, appetite and fear.
ideal types). This, in Lebow’s words, enables to provide a non-moment-related explanation of international relations. In other words, the author emphasizes that it is possible to say much more about the international system than, for example, Waltz would believe. Moreover, Lebow reflects on the concept of fear (as a rational stimulus) defined by realists and separates it (as an emotion and as a factor destroying structures of international politics) from other stimuli. Taking all this into consideration, research on the phenomenon of fear is further surveyed and sources of generating fear as an emotion are analyzed.

2. The Destructive Concept of the Emotion of Fear

During the past decade, scientists, assessing the impact of emotions on the processes of the international politics, adhere to the position that the ontology of the phenomenon of emotions cannot be reduced to psychology and physiology. Ema Hutchison and Roland Bleiker in their article “Theorizing Emotions in World Politics” discuss the fundamental issue of the concept of emotions. The authors come to the conclusion that emotions are not only an individual phenomenon. Emotions also have a clear social charge; therefore, they require political (not only psychological or neurological) theorizing as well. The authors point out that emotions transcend the limits of physiology and psychology and can be treated as a social and normative phenomenon. Scientists state that what people feel and express through physiology as an emotion is a product of the clash between social and cultural processes. The expression of fear, anger, trust, empathy largely depends on the cultural context which makes emotions meaningful and acceptable to society.

In this context, Hutchison stresses that in the constructing of identity, emotions acquire a specific function – they act as a peculiar medium and a tool of community consolidation seeking to involve those members that have no direct link to events (for example, historic) important for a concrete community and its identity. Thus, due to the very appealing to feelings, emotions can become

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9 Ibidem, p. 504.
10 Ibidem, p. 505.
11 Ibidem, p. 504.
the most important force making individuals and communities identify with something or even die for something. For example, in times of social unrest, revolutions, wars and catastrophes, individuals or communities can suddenly identify themselves with hitherto alien, unfamiliar identities or, on the contrary, exclude identities that hitherto belonged to the category “We.”

The emotion of fear is one of the most important emotions identified in human behavior. It can be perceived in different ways. In some cases, the origin of fear is perceived as biological. For example, it is asserted that the human is naturally afraid of rapidly approaching objects. However, laboratory researches show that fear can be also acquired. The emotion of fear can be a phenomenon of social structures, i.e. a collective emotion well.

Contrary to neorealists, who perceive fear as an objective reaction to structural changes, Ulrich Beck provides a socio-cultural phenomenon of fear and emphasizes in his works that fear arises because of the subjective structure principle of a concrete society. The author’s name for it is Risk Society.\textsuperscript{13} Beck points out that the mobility of time and space made the new risks (nuclear, ecological, chemical, gene engineering risks) indefinite in time and space; therefore, it is difficult to explain them to society in compliance with the principles of guilt, causality or responsibility. In other words, Beck speaks about the emerging in society threats and fears solely because of the nature of the society structure and present in it cultural filters which affect and shape our perception.\textsuperscript{14}

Barry Glassner\textsuperscript{15}, Holger Molder\textsuperscript{16} call such an entrenchment of fear in social life the culture of fear which, in the opinion of the authors, has a great impact on decisions carried out in society. Molder emphasizes that in the culture of fear, the emotion of fear is predominant because of the constant sense of an unavoidable threat manifesting itself as the anxiety, insecurity, instability of a state (state societies, leaders). This prompts states to react to events sentimentally, and emotionally, but not pragmatically. If this emotional charge of fear gets established in the international system, the area and scope of perceived threats can widely expand and really become a cultural element. In other words, fear becomes not so much a reaction to a specific (objective) threat but rather a part

of the perception of the social structure itself (fear becomes independent of the environment). This partly corresponds to the phenomenon of danger presented by David Campbell as an interpretation but not as a necessary and unavoidable reaction to a concrete problem.\textsuperscript{17}

Having assessed this, it is important to keep in mind that the statement that the culture of fear is very closely related to the concept of anarchy, as provided in the studies of realists, should be treated with caution. In the opinion of the author of the article, the statement that the predominance of fear (or simply the predominance of the culture of fear) is characteristic of anarchy is not only inaccurate but also inconvenient in the heuristic sense. By stating that fear is a consequence of anarchy, we, on the one hand, oversimplify the fact of what anarchy is and how it functions and, on the other hand, we emotionalize the concept of anarchy itself. In this article, we maintain that in anarchy the culture of fear should not necessarily be a consequence of anarchy. Anarchy is a structure in which the culture of fear arises and dominates as a specific belief system due to other reasons independent of the logic of anarchy itself. The emotionalization of the concept of anarchy was observed to some extent by Buzan who claimed that the absence of power in the anarchic system is estimated negatively. This similar to poverty and diseases that are also defined as a lack of certain normal qualities (for example, order, hierarchy).\textsuperscript{18}

Buzan proposes to simply perceive anarchy in terms of the absence of central power and to treat the concept itself as the description of the form of the security problem but not of the problem itself. A similar concept of anarchy is provided by Wendt who claims that the “logic of anarchy” \textit{per se} does not exist.\textsuperscript{19} Wendt provides the classification of anarchy types (Hobbes, Locke and Kant) by explaining cases of the distribution of differing ideas and their internalization. With Hobbes’ anarchy culture in force, in the social structure, a collective picture of the Other as an enemy will predominate; therefore, states, in projecting their foreign policy, will orientate towards the worst variant (the theory of the worst case) and consequently states will tend to destroy or conquer hostile Others. In Locke’s culture, a collective image of competitiveness, based on the acknowledgement of the sovereignty institute and the principle “live and let the Other live” will prevail. Kant’s culture, according to Wendt, arises from the belief that intentions of Others are also peaceful. It is possible to treat all


these anarchy cultures, provided by the author, as social, psychological inter-state relationship types, capable of forming systems possessing independent kinds of logic. Though in this respect all the described cultures are imaginary pictures and psychological interrelations, in Hobbes’ anarchy, because of the self-isolation of subjects and the articulation of the image of anarchy at the closed state level, a fear-saturated belief system will prevail – “destroy or you will be destroyed”. In other words, Hobbes’ anarchy, because of its form (the construction of the imagining of anarchy is going on with little or no interaction with the environment) as well as its content (the relationship of subjects is based on conflict and denial of each other but not on cooperation), differs from Locke’s and Kant’s anarchies and thus can be considered a phenomenon of a completely different type.

The existing differences between these anarchy cultures (particularly the difference of Hobbes’ anarchy from the anarchies of Locke and Kant) could be explained as the cause of the identity-related openness level of structure subjects characteristic of the anarchy culture. Theoretically, it is possible to imagine all identities on a straight line of openness and closedness. The more closed the identity the less dependent its identity code is on other identities and the less affected such an identity is by external processes. The marginal (maximal) case of identity-related closedness should be, in essence, a negative possibility of the existence of any other identity (thus, of the identity itself per se). Meanwhile, the more open the identity the more affected it is by external changes and the more dependent its identity code is on other identities. In case of the marginal (maximal) identity openness, the identity per se also disappears (because there is no longer any difference between I and the Other) however, the process itself of “identity vanishing”, contrary to what would go through the identity closedness, is positive – involving Others, but not negative – denying or destroying Others. Thus, perceiving that each identity has a different bent for closedness or openness (and, in fact, never arises on the basis of the mentioned limiting cases) it is reasonable to classify identity into the extrovert and introvert identities.

By considering this elementary sequence at the hypothetical level, we shall easily come to the conclusion that the ideal type of the closed identity will be much more stable than the ideal type of the open identity. In an ideal case of a completely introvert identity, the identity will be stable, resistant to identity-related shocks, which may destroy social identity aggregations. However, this type of stability is only feasible in case of the limiting identity closedness (when other identities do not longer exist). The closedness of identity in the structure where other identity subjects exist will always experience a greater
friction and external pressure than identities of the extrovert type, capable of both to faster get adjusted to changing conditions and to neutralize, through the integration of identities, possible identity-related frictions. It is possible to state that this is one of the essential reasons why Hobbesian anarchy grounded on identity introvertism is conflicting (therefore, unstable), whereas Lockean and Kantian anarchies, though at different levels, yet based on identity extrovertism, are peaceful and in terms of structure stable structures (see Figure 1). It is also worthwhile to claim that the place of identity on the straight line of openness and closedness is directly related to what fear and how the identity subject will feel. For example, in Locke’s and Kant’s anarchies, fear concerning the extrovertism of identity should be directly dependent on external factors. Meanwhile, in Hobbes’ anarchy, fear will arise and will be sustained by exceptionally internal factors; therefore, in its form and content it will qualitatively differ from the previous two types (qualitative differences of fear in examples of introvert and extrovert identities are discussed in the second part). Thus, if fear can be rational (as a reaction to the objective reality) in extrovert anarchy types of Locke and Kant, in the introvert anarchy of Hobbes it emerges and develops rather as an emotion within the subject; therefore, it should be treated as an irrational phenomenon. This, in essence, is one of the most important factors linking the emotion of fear and identity.

Figure 1. Map of the Construction of Cultural Types of Anarchy
From the point of view of the constructivist perspective, fear (as an emotion) can also be treated as an obstacle of the international system (at the macro level) though possessing the function of maintaining stability and sustainability at the micro (the internal level of the state) level. For example, fear can unite a nation (particularly by escalating it in the public discourse) in the face of a national threat. This is related to the fact that the formation of the community can be perceived as an act, pushed by socio-psychological stimuli, in which the fear that Others, not belonging to the group, can and intend to harm the members of the group will dominate. Consequently, fear can be a stimulus to more clearly, more firmly and more rapidly define a collective identity. However, this domination of fear in the narrative of identity at the same time programs instability and irrational interaction of subjects at the international level, in which identities based on introvertism and fear will determine the emergence of a fear-based system. It is not accidentally that Lebow notes that in political and psychological literature the perception of the Other is an ideological (in this study, ideological would correspond to the statement that such a representation is formed subjectively within the state) rather than real representation. Though the stimulus of fear can encourage cooperation, it is probable that this cooperation will only last as long as the very threat that started the cooperation. Therefore, Lebow presents the fear-based culture as a trap which is easy to get into but difficult to get out of.

3. Concepts of the Perception of Threat as the Cause of Fear

Having defined the concept of the emotion of fear as well as the impact of the culture of fear (the dominance of the emotion of fear) on social structures, we should now characterize reasons for the emergence of fear. Taking into consideration the provided reasoning, it is logical to treat fear as a reaction to the perception of the emerged threat. Having integrated the attitudes of realists, liberals, constructivists as well as those dealing with the first level of analysis, based on the concepts of foreign policy research, we will further present in this study theoretical concepts of the perception of the emerged threat: threat as a

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consequence of the power asymmetry, threat as a consequence of the identity asymmetry and threat as a consequence determined by the belief system. It is necessary to emphasize that the concepts of threat perception provided in the study are treated as differing, changing each other and interrelated schemes of the perception of the picture of the causes of threat (ideal types). Consequently, not a single model among the ones provided is treated as the general theory of the perception of threat. The invocation of all these concepts rather creates possibilities for all-around analysis of the impact of the fear factor on foreign policy formation and implementation.

3.1. Power Asymmetry

The perception of fear based on power asymmetry partly coincides with the attitude of realists of international relations towards the causes of threat and fear. In this perspective of the explanation of international politics, the most important source of threat and fear is the formation and increase of power asymmetry in the anarchic system of international relations. For example, it was Thucydides who drew the conclusion that the cause of the war between Athens and Sparta was the created power asymmetry between the two poles and an increase in that asymmetry. In other words, power acquisition by any other subject of the international system is potentially threatening and dangerous. According to realists, this is a thesis calling for no discussion. According to the pioneers of realpolitik, Machiavelli and Hobbes, a human or a state will always have/must have a permanent aspiration to gain and develop power; it is a result programmed by the state of anarchy.

Waltz integrated these statements into his scientific theory of international relations. Waltz claims that threat is a function of power asymmetry. If, for example, state X has more power than state Y, the fear of X is grounded because no one in the anarchic system can restrain Y from using force against X. Thus, to identify and perceive threat on the basis of Waltz’s neorealist tradition is not very complicated: if it is feasible to easily measure power asymmetry among subjects of the system, then it will be equally simple to understand whether the threat is present or not.23 In short, it is sufficient to assess and compare military, economic, political, geographic and demographic criteria. For example, the neighboring state X, in comparison with state Y has greater military, economic and demographic resources at its disposal as well as great or increasing

political influence. It is natural that such a situation makes state Y estimate the power asymmetry as threatening. If state Y ignores this, as has already been mentioned, it risks to be punished by the systemic logic (conquered, annexed, etc.). So, fear that will arise as a reaction to threat, which emerged because of power asymmetry, will essentially be determined by material factors (greater military power, stronger and more rapidly growing economy, etc.). This would allow for the assumption that fear is a rational reaction. If the logic of the international system is such as provided by Waltz, to fear (a stronger or getting stronger other subject) means to behave rationally, prudently and adequately to the actual conditions.

However, it is not completely agreed in the realistic perspective of international relations why a threat arises. Stephen Walt is one of the theoreticians that reflected on the logic of Waltz’s “calculation” of threat. According to Walt, threat is a function of 1) military power, 2) geographic proximity, 3) offensive capability, and 4) aggressive intentions.\(^\text{24}\) It is an important contribution to explaining the genesis of threat because it shows that states rather balance against threat and not against power. These factors, though retaining the perception of threat as the principle of the identification of power asymmetry, allow to slightly relax from strict structural reasoning and force to deeper consider analysis at the levels of state, bureaucracy and an individual.

It should be emphasized that the perception of threat through power asymmetry should not necessarily be understood as the recognition of realists’ logic or its reiteration. Statements by realists concerning the concept of fear as power asymmetry are more important as reference points of the object of fear (power asymmetry) than those of fear ontology (aggressiveness of states and self-interest are inherent). So, if the factor of power asymmetry is not perceived as perpetuum mobile of the international structure, the calculation of power, depending on the situation, will simply be a natural and even rational reaction to the environment. However, if the principle of power asymmetry dominates and even becomes a part of identity, independently of the environment and its changes, one could speak about the power asymmetry method as the belief system. In other words, the concept of power asymmetry indicates that threat and fear are dynamic because of the orientation towards the behavior of the fear object (towards generation of power and its employment and partly towards threat balancing described by Walt) but not towards its origin. This is also related to the fact that the subject analyzed in the model of power asymmetry will have the identity inclined towards extrovertism whereas states presented by realists

(particularly the classical ones and partly Waltz) in this context would more often correspond to players of the introvert identity type. Consequently, threat perceived by following the logic of power asymmetry may even contradict some realists who, by considering other states as inherent enemies, would rather conform to the structural aspects of the presented in this study belief system than to that of the asymmetry of powers.

3.2. Identity Asymmetry

The perception of fear through the asymmetry of identities is based on the imagining of social reality by liberals and constructivists. If the social world in the concept of power asymmetry is in part “stable” (power redistribution is active and dynamic – the source of threat), having more or less clear compliance with the laws (preservation of sovereignty, principles of relative power and relative security), the concept of the asymmetry of identities points to a much more “active” social and values-related space grounded on the dynamics of identity change. Accordingly, this changes the way the origin of threat or fear is perceived.

Liberals’ perception of threat is related to the “encroachment” on the order based on the existing Western values (free market, democracy, human rights). In other words, according to this concept, fear arises because of the attempt to question the primatus of homo economicus. Liberals are convinced that it is these values that are the source of state’s power, prosperity and security. To put it another way, all have a possibility of and the right to power, prosperity, security and development. Meanwhile, the ignoring of universal liberal values is associated with the contradiction to modernization and state prosperity. This is perfectly illustrated by the dualist theory of development which accentuates that poverty and political instability of underdeveloped states arise due to the incapability of these states to accept and implement a liberal mechanism of organizing the state.

Thus, in perceiving threats, the most important factor for liberals is identity. If, for example, a state of democratic, liberal market starts arming itself (or otherwise changes the distribution of power), it will not necessarily be treated as a threat to a similar democratic state. In other words, for the identification of a revisionist state its very unrecognizability is important. If we are unable to attribute it to the category We, it is highly probable that political, economic and military ambitions of any state will be treated as a threat. On the other hand, liberals may also consider circumstances favorable for the emergence of a revisionist power as a threat. For example, threatening can be non-democratic regimes that seek or may seek in the future to gain more power.
Finally, liberals have a clear strategy for the neutralization of such threats. The panacea for neutralizing threats is world democratization and liberalization; in other words, universalization and homogenization of world identities (so, identity-related extrovertism is typical of this attitude). Michael J. Boyle illustrates this in his article claiming that the USA directly related the decision on the threat of terrorism after 9/11 attacks to the democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, the existing or developing revisionist powers (the threatening Others) can be positively neutralized by involving through the liberalization and democratization of the Other. The more extrovert the identity-related I, the more intensive the neutralization of threats through the involvement will be. This significant aspect shows that in this model of threat concept there is no fixed, existential source of fear (see Figure 2). Threat and its level create a dynamic phenomenon directly dependent on the character of international and interstate relations. This thesis is, in essence, substantiated by David L. Rousseau who defends the statement that the level of identifying with the Other is negatively proportionate to the perception of threat.\textsuperscript{26}

3.3. The Belief System

In the models of the concept of threat provided, threat perception and the intensity of threat perception are related to the dynamics of significant variables (power, identity). Thus, these models can be assessed as models responding to the international environment and the processes occurring within it. In other words, although threat has clearly defined causes, it does not have a fixed source that would itself be a cause of threat.

Threat here means: a constant feeling of threat can be simply programmed in reasoning and belief systems of social formations (for example, Beck’s Risk Society). An excellent example of such threat concept is provided in the study by Alastair Johnston where the author analyzes the role of memories (how state leaders remember certain events) in foreign policy. Johnston not only claims that preferences of societies of countries and their leaders can shape the foreign policy of the state, but also demonstrates that threats are an internal phenomenon rather than that of the structure (as would be explained by external constructivists, for


example, Wendt). Having analyzed Chinese military texts, Johnston identified in his study an active, parallel, belief system which, being established in foreign policy discourses, has an impact on its shaping and implementation. The author named it the *parabellum* – a belief that it is necessary to get ready for war.

In the author’s opinion, the *parabellum* belief system is based on beliefs and stereotypes but not on the observation of the international environment (identification of power or identity asymmetries) that warfare is a constant element of human communication, that military capabilities are important in settling international problems as well as on the belief that conflict is always a zero-sum game (your win is my loss). Such a perception of threat essentially differs from both power and identity asymmetry models because threat does not depend (or slightly depends) on the environment and its changes. In other words, contrary to the afore-mentioned models of the picture of fear, the belief system is based on identity introvertism. Thus, beliefs and the process of establishing the belief system (emotionalization of memories and political events, historical analogies, stereotypization, etc.), according to Beck’s terminology, create preconditions for the formation of society with a permanent sense of threat.

The formation of fear or a belief system of a different nature is also dependent on the intensity of the communication of a state with other states. The more closed a society, the more its identity tends to introvertism (when in the construction of I, myself is not attached to significant Others), the higher probability that original, characteristic of only that particular state belief systems will be strong and influential in foreign policy. For example, in the Russian Federation, the mass media is highly dependent on the state, and the existence of the authorities themselves is based on the existence of a clear vertical. Accordingly, this provides possibilities to legitimize, at the state level, various myths, stereotypes which not only explain but also shape foreign policy of the country; for example, the belief in the hostile West, fascism of the Baltic States, the necessity of Russia as a world power and savior.

For belief systems grounded on fear, the external environment and processes taking place in it are not particularly important. The external environment is subordinated to the model of the belief system and can simply perform the function of a convenient simulacrum. The formation of the belief system based on a sense of permanent threat depends more on dominating in the community-biased beliefs and perceptions that distort the reality and a possibility to find a

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28 Ibidem.
rational solution to a threatening situation (for example, researches by Irving Janis and Leon Mann\textsuperscript{29}, Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross\textsuperscript{30}). Robert Jervis accentuates that, contrary to what models of a rational solution would require, society does not renew information by assessing and perceiving the current situation, but often relies on the previously acquired experience and knowledge.\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, the perception of threat in the belief system (for example, parabellum) can be understood as a subjective, based on the introvert identity, and, therefore, a very biased environment reflection process where a lack of information about the environment and its processes is compensated by personal, historical, emotional, cultural experience. In other words, in the reflection of the environment and Others, the I narrative (imaging oneself) is very distinct and influential. Consequently, in the concept of the belief system, the articulated causes of threat are more internal and directly related to the stereotypical models established in the subject's identity and their emotional manifestation; therefore, the international environment (as the objective reality) has little potential to affect and change the level and intensity of threat.\textsuperscript{32} International changes and the dynamics of international processes are, in essence, important only in activating passive or creating new leitmotifs of belief systems (for example, fear of something) which are later constructed and sustained in an exclusively closed identity-related space of the state (see Figure 2).


\textsuperscript{32} Significant insights into the way of the formation of the belief system are also provided by the proponents of the line of the psychological trend explanation who claim that psychological bias is one of the essential factors determining the origin of threat perception and its escalation. For example, in the fundamental attribution failure concept, it is explained that when one person is observing another, the observer tends to interpret the behaviour of another person according to one's own character, nature and deep-rooted motives. At the same time, the observer tends to think that one's own behaviour is merely a reaction to the situation and the actions of the observed person and is in no way related to subjective implications of the character, nature or motives. This situation makes leaders and society justify themselves, treating themselves as less hostile, only reacting to the situation. Kelley H., Michaela J., "Attribution Theory and Research", \textit{Annual Review of Psychology}, vol. 31, 1980, p. 457-501.
This is also one of the key causes that distinguish the belief system from other discussed dynamic models of power and identity asymmetry. The driving force of the belief system is that a strong introvert identity is not characteristic of either power or identity asymmetries. Therefore, it is the identification of the identity nature (introvert or extrovert) that makes it possible to determine whether in the construction of fear of a political subject belief systems or concrete asymmetry models prevail. In other words, the fear of power asymmetries or of a concrete identity can be the essential pillar of a concrete belief system; however, it is only in the introvert type identities that the mentioned fears will be perceived as consequences of the belief system. Thus, in this sense, individual ideas of both realism and liberalism or their predominance in introvert identity constructions can serve as building material for belief systems. Therefore, ideological schemes (liberal or realistic) preserved in the identity and having no sufficient contact with social phenomena outside will tend to construct a sense of threat as irrational and, most probably, inadequate to the reality. In general, it can be stated that these threat perception models are valuable in analyzing foreign policy processes, particularly in the construction of goals, visions or foreign policy identities. For example, if the causes of fear are the belief system, then
there is a high probability that the culture of fear will subordinate the strategy of foreign policy which will be very inflexible, non-extensive and irreponsive to the environment as well as to material and non-material structural changes. If the causes of fear are the identity asymmetry, the intensity of fear will be directly proportionate to identity changes.

4. The Emotion of Fear in Lithuania’s Foreign Policy

Since the restoration of independence, it has been common practice in Lithuania’s foreign policy to distinguish stages in Lithuanian foreign policy. The first stage covers the period from the restoration of independence of Lithuania to the Euro-Atlantic membership in 2004 (Ieva Karpavičiūtė identifies a prior stage of the establishment of sovereignty in 1990-1994\textsuperscript{33}), the second stage from 2004 to 2009 is presented as a stage of the articulation of ambitious visions, and the stage of the development of a pragmatic foreign policy that started in 2009. This periodization of the Lithuanian foreign policy is based on a different articulation of foreign policy visions which was determined by the process of seeking a national identity.

Nevertheless, in the current studies on the Lithuanian foreign policy, little attention was given to the stimuli which not only forced correction of the perception of the national identity (interpretation of I, We and the Other), but also filled the content of the proposed identity. In other words, the research carried out limited itself to a more traditional, sufficiently “passive” logic of constructivism by emphasizing the most important identity factors, and thus leaving aside the very process of the formation and implementation of ideas. Thus, although in the analysis of the Lithuanian foreign policy the significant identity-related “Others” are clearly identified and analyzed in detail, the nature, dynamics and activity level of the interaction of these significant “Others” with the Lithuanian identity have not been clearly assessed. The present study proposes that the discussed problem be tackled by analyzing the role of the emotion of fear (in the sense suggested in the study) based on the introvert identity in the articulation of the goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy.

The aforementioned aspiration of the vision of Lithuania as the regional leader was “to secure in diplomatic ways a safe and democratic development of the country in the view of new possibilities and threats through using good bilateral relations of Lithuania, the membership in NATO, the European Union

\textsuperscript{33}Karpavičiūtė I., “Kaita ir nacionalinė tapatybė užsienio politikos studijose: Lietuvos atvejis”, Politikos moksly almanachas 07/2013; 13(13).
and other international organizations, and strengthening Lithuania as a dynamic and respectable modern state.\textsuperscript{34} The strategy of the implementation of this aspiration was based on the ambition of Lithuania to assume the role of an attractive center of interregional cooperation, promoting Euro-Atlantic values, tolerance and the spirit of cooperation, uniting cultures and civilizations.\textsuperscript{35}

However, in this narrative of foreign policy, the frequently emphasized regional (particularly that of the East, Poland) dimension has not become a part of the Lithuanian identity. In other words, neither geography nor the identification of a concrete value-related space can be the basis of the constructed identity. This can be discerned when analyzing the concept of the role of Lithuania as the regional leader suggested by President Valdas Adamkus.

An active and leading course of the Lithuanian policy in the President’s state-of-the-nation addresses was first of all directly related to an active and not passive foreign policy. Seeking to attract Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Caucasus closer to the EU and NATO, Adamkus urged Lithuania to form an ambitious agenda of foreign policy and become an attractive center of interregional cooperation, a link, a leader of the region, be full-fledged Europeans and not remain on the periphery of Europe. Such implementation of foreign policy is presented by the President not only as a historic possibility, but also as a historic mission. Thus, Adamkus relates full-fledgedness of the state to its activeness; therefore, the existence on the periphery of Europe or being a golden province has an obviously negative connotation.

In President Valdas Adamkus’ annual report, historical, cultural and, eventually, identity commonality or identification with other “communities” are altogether excluded as factors which are important for the implementation of the goals of the Lithuanian foreign policy. In setting ambitious goals, Lithuania is not identified with “something” (for example, the region). Rather, it is stated that Lithuania should function as a center of interregional cooperation. In other words, there is no clear decision as to what Lithuania “belongs to” or should “belong to”: Lithuania is regarded as being in between something (the East and the West, the North and the South) but not somewhere (in the West, the North, or the East). Thus, despite the aspiration to actively participate in the region, the identity created by the Lithuanian foreign policy is rather introvert in its nature.

Therefore, Adamkus constructs the identity of “the regional center of attraction” the fundamental “details” (related to the identity, geography, and,

\textsuperscript{34} Lietuvos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004–2008 metais, 2004 m. spalio 5 d.
\textsuperscript{35} Lietuvos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004–2008 metais, 2004 m. spalio 5 d.
partly, to values) of the narrative of which, as was noted by Gražina Miniotaitė, do not exist. Lithuania is seen as if in some vacuum, as “a crossroads of civilizations”, having just a functional and a slightly mystical goal: to connect the East and the West, to be “a civilization key” that no one has so far been.

In Adamkus’ addresses, the President’s rather limited concept of a national state gets revealed and that (most likely) this is one of the key reasons why Lithuania is not perceived as part of the European Union. The identity of Lithuania as a regional leader suggests that there is a We (Lithuanians) and a They (Europeans). The EU policy is understood as the policy of the Other. There are no allusions to Lithuania’s European identity; Lithuania is “committed” to the European Union only in terms of values, but not politically.

Looking at this interpretation of this vision of the regional leader, one can see that the key principle of the created identity is striving for exceptionality, independence, functionality understood as the activeness of the country. Although in this concept, threatening motifs regarding the East and Russia can be found, they are not the main binding material of Lithuania as the regional center. Russia is not discarded as a potential partner, and Lithuania, by its active leadership-directed activity, can help it “smooth the way to get involved in European processes of cooperation”. In general, both in the addresses by Lithuania’s Presidents and in the National Security Strategies (2005 and 2012), Russia does not feature as a clearly perceived threat; rather, it is defined as a state within the space causing certain concern because of its indefiniteness, unpredictability and otherness to the Western space (see Figure 2). In other words, Russia causes concern not because it is “a threat in itself”, but because it is in an indefinite space. In this phase of Lithuanian-Russian relations, the Lithuanian picture of Russia as a threat is not fixed. Threat, its level and intensity, depend on clear changes in reality: a threat can decrease, for example, under a positive change in the identity asymmetry (with Russia faster approaching a definite and friendly value-related structure) or under a positive change in the power asymmetry. Therefore, in the future, a constructive cooperation can be seen not only as feasible (with Russia having escaped from the threatening space), but also as desirable (for example, the reset policy emphasized in the Program of the 16th Government).

Nevertheless, in the created identity of Lithuania as a leader, the sense of fear is important, however, it arises not from the indefiniteness and otherness of the Other (of the East, Russia), but from the concern for the state and the nation not to remain on the periphery as well as the belief that only high political acti-

37 Prezidento Valdo Adamkaus metinis pranešimas, 2005 m.
veness and state leadership is the condition for the prosperity of the state or even for its survival. In other words, the aspiration of the state to be a leader should be understood as an action taken because of fear to remain small, weak, unheard or removed from the center. Following this logic, it is fear and not geopolitics, geo-economics, or geo-culture that is the backbone of this foreign policy vision.

Therefore, on the basis of the previously presented explanation of the causes of fear, it can be stated that in the identity of the regional leader, the causes of fear are not power or identity asymmetries related to the environment response, but a subjective, independent and original belief system, created by the political elite of the state, subjectively idealizing the history of the country, suffering from a complex of possible inferiority of the country, small size or a possibility of passiveness.

When Dalia Grybauskaitė became President, the belief system of Lithuania as the regional leader constructed during Valdas Adamkus’ presidency was deconstructed. In her state-of-the-nation address 2012, D. Grybauskaitė points out that Lithuanian interests call for creative foreign policy and resourceful democracy. The most important elements of this direction include regional partnership, regional solidarity, regional institutions, historical and geopolitical commonality of the Baltic States, the good experience of the Nordic States. Lithuania is perceived as a part of the international community, so the state is no longer in the identity vacuum, and the hardly perceptible historic mission is replaced by pragmatism (the need to more effectively function in the EU, a clear identity space).

Thus, the new stage of foreign policy that started with Grybauskaitė has no “fixed” threats and fears programmed in the narrative itself. Anxiety or threats in the newly constructed foreign policy identity are manifested rather by the principle of the identity asymmetry – fear is caused by a possibility to distance too much from the identity structures granting stability and prosperity – the European Union or the Nordic countries (this can be perceived as economic pragmatism). It is an action that is contrary to the previous leadership-based identity function because attempts are made to find identity ledges but not simply “jump” into the identity vacuum, imagining oneself as exceptional and special.

Pragmatic relations with Russia were possible because in the identity structure of the Lithuanian foreign policy, the narrative of Russia as a state in an unfriendly environment was prevailing. A positive transformation of Russia was imagined as feasible. Therefore, as early as 2001, with Russia’s growing economic, political and military power, or even having assessed certain actions of Russia’s aggression and revisionism (the war with Georgia in 2008, Russia’s withdrawal in 2007 from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,
cyber and information attacks, energy blackmail, the Russian National Security Strategy up to 2020 where the West is defined as hostile and dangerous), in official discourses of the Lithuanian foreign policy and national security, Russia did not become an existential and inherent threat. As previously mentioned, in the Lithuanian National Security Strategies (2005, 2012) Government Programs and state-of-the-nation presidential addresses no direct military threat to Lithuania was identified. On the contrary, in the Program of the 16th Government it is urged to develop the Lithuanian–Russian relations without looking back—just resetting them. Even in the program of the Conservative Government that always had a stricter attitude towards Moscow, Russia is not regarded as a programmed revisionist state. As an exception may be considered the Strategy of the Deterrence of Russia that was released separately by the Homeland Union and which reflects the position of the party rather than that of the state (see Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1. Definition of the Lithuanian-Russian relations in the Programs of the 15th and 16th Governments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of cooperation</th>
<th>15th Government</th>
<th>16th Government</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy, legal, political aspects</td>
<td>Economy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of the threat from Russia</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Nearly non-existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Further development of relations</td>
<td>Equality of rights, compensation for damage, democratization</td>
<td>“Resetting”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goals regarding Russia</td>
<td>Democratization, Europeanization</td>
<td>Closer, more rational (more pragmatic) relations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Definition of the Lithuanian-Russian relations in the National Security Strategy of Lithuania 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character of relations</th>
<th>Positive (Engagement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Intentions regarding Russia | • Enhance mutual trust in security areas  
• Promote cooperation in economy, in the areas of transport and nuclear energy |
| Lithuania’s goals | • Promote mutual trust and cooperation  
• Support cooperation between NATO and Russia  
• Seek participation of the EU in Lithuanian–Russian relations  
• Involve Kaliningrad in the processes of regional integration  
• Seek higher transparency and regulation of nuclear weapons at Russia’s disposal |
It is possible to state that such an approach to the threat of Russia was based on the identity asymmetry principle. In spite of occasional diplomatic and economic conflicts between Lithuania and Russia, the belief that positive changes in Russia were feasible, made fear itself directly dependent on the existing nature of the relations (fear is dynamic and exists outside). In other words, the prevalent belief was that Russia could be a part of the Western community; therefore, just for pragmatic considerations, it was worth cooperating with it. A perfect illustration of that is the fact that since 2001, the threatening of Russia’s increasing relative (political, economic, military) power on the basis of the power asymmetry failed to become dominant in the official foreign policy discourse.

Of course, the narrative of Russia as an eternal enemy of Lithuania and a major threat to its national security has existed since the very beginning of the declaration of independence of the country. Particularly, a part of the right-wing political elite of Lithuania suggested, most often in public discourses, that Russia should be looked upon as “the empire of the evil”, “a potential invader” or “a geopolitical competitor”. These suggested perceptions of Russia, most frequently very simple, consist of only a few identity criteria (mainly the Soviet experience and other historical grievances); therefore, they are very stable, resistant to change and the influence of different social processes (culture, economics, religion, politics, etc). Yet, this portraying of threat often based on historical grievances and emotional experience has not, in essence, become the dominant position of the country (even, as has been mentioned, after the aggressive Russian policy towards Georgia in 2008). In both official and public discourses, this perspective was counterweighed by other perspectives of imagining Russia that suggested a more diverse perception of Russia’s identity structure. In most cases, these perceptions are complemented by the images of Russia as “an economic partner”, “Russia as a geographical neighbor”, which, in some sense, slowed down the maximization of the fear of Moscow, stereotypization as well as the transfer of it as an ideological leitmotif into the identity under construction.

Nevertheless, the occupation of Crimea in 2014 activates the aforementioned elements of the fear of Russia that existed in the narratives of Lithuania’s national security and foreign policy. Therefore, Russia’s revisionism, the ambition for the status of regional and global power not complying with international legal norms become an inseparable part of the picture of historical, current and future relations between Russia and Lithuania (the West). At the same time, the source of threat and fear is transferred from an abstract alien Eastern space to Russia itself as a specific political entity.
Changes in imagining Russia and the threat of Russia are taking place in both official and public discourses. Emotional epithets describing Russia abound in both media and officials’ speeches (President Grybauskaitė refers to Russia as “a terrorist state”, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Linkevičius compared Russia to Nazi Germany), in Lithuania’s main news portals (in the news related to Russia) militaristic rhetoric, panic about Russia’s expansion to the Baltic States, the passiveness of the West are prevailing. The image of Russia as an unpredictable state dominates in the information messages of the public discourse. The country is often identified with the personality of V. Putin having psychological disorders. Russia is more and more often considered not only as a successor of the rights of the USSR, but also as a successor of its antagonistic policy carried out against the civilization of the West.

There are plenty of messages in which Russia is perceived as a cultural and economic barbarian that not only fails to meet the standards of Western values, but also contains a regressive social structure (and is seeking to impose it on others), uses economy as a political tool. One can even notice interesting value-related shifts regarding the entire Russian nation. If previously it was common to emphasize that it was the Russian authorities (the Kremlin) that were “destructive” but not the Russians themselves (the nation), after the occupation of Crimea, in the Lithuanian media, when discussing the high ratings of Vladimir Putin’s popularity, more and more often odd suggestions to revise this perception were voiced, erasing the clear value-related line between “Putin” and “the Russian society” that hitherto had protected the latter. In other words, the Russian society is also becoming guilty and is identified and seen in the context of one symbol (bad Putin). Eventually, the image of Russia as a historical and inherent enemy of Lithuania (and the West) is born.

When comparing with the previously imagined Russia, the possibility of the change of Russia’s threat is rejected. Thus, the fear of Russia, the belief in the inevitability of conflict (sooner or later Russia is going to attack Lithuania) or in the conversion of Russia turns to be the essential principle of bilateral or multilateral relations. Taking into consideration the previously presented reasoning, this can be treated as the belief system, based on the fear of Russia and close to the parabellum principle, which has been established in the Lithuanian foreign policy and which, because of its content (the issue of Russia becomes essential not only to the security of Lithuania but also to the existence of Lithuania in general), in the future can naturally become a leitmotif of the Lithuanian identity.

One can already now notice that the parabellum narrative is gradually getting established and is replacing the created positive vision of Lithuania’s
foreign policy (integration, pragmatism, strategy) that had to bring Lithuania closer to Western standards by giving way to simply negative response to events (particularly those related to the Russian policy). The emotion of fear, just like in the concept of Lithuania as the regional leader, risks becoming the backbone of the vision of state foreign policy that can influence not only bilateral relations (between Lithuania and Russia) but also the imagining of Lithuania’s identity, its place and function in the region as well as the causes of international processes. It can be noted that this concept differs from others by its exceptionally emotional performativeness. This, on the one hand, makes this vision intimate and attractive to the public space; on the other hand, emotional rhetorical forms, appealing not only to value-related feelings but also to societal psychology step up legitimization of the vision and its establishment in the discourse of the country’s foreign policy. In this context, it can be noted that the idea of Lithuania as the regional leader tightly correlates with the *parabellum* concept under discussion (see Figure 3).

![Map of Lithuanian foreign policy visions](image)

**Figure 3. Map of Lithuanian foreign policy visions**

Of course, it is not completely accurate to claim that internal policy factors and emotions had the greatest impact on the development of the *parabellum* foreign policy narrative. To activate the *parabellum* belief system and establish
it in foreign policy discourses, external, regional processes played an essential role – e.g. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It is possible to say that it was the dominance of the culture of fear in the Russian foreign policy discourse that was the main cause of the conflict (between Russia and Ukraine, between Russia and the West). In Russia’s official and public discourses, the belief in the exceptional mission of the state, a constant presence of a sense of fear for survival, striving for a status but not security\textsuperscript{38} subordinated Moscow’s foreign policy formation and implementation to emotional, fear-based belief schemes. Thus, Lithuania’s fear and concern about the aggression carried out by Russia are grounded; however, the escalation of fear through the \textit{parabellum} reasoning code makes fear self-contained, \textit{autopoietic} (self-generating) and little dependent on the further course of events.

**Conclusions**

The article discusses new perspectives on foreign policy analysis. The concept of destructive fear provided in the study reflects the concept of fear as a stimulus for rational behavior established in international relations and foreign policies. The article does not question the thesis of realists and liberals that fear is rational. Rather, it shows that fears can also be irrational, stereotype-based, subjective and disassociated from the environment beliefs and emotions (as manifestation practices). The most important criterion for “measuring” fear on the scale of rationality-irrationality is its interaction with the environment. In the case of fear as a rational stimulus, the object of fear is always on the outside and is caused by the Other. Consequently, the level of fear intensity is directly dependent on the outside and changes of the Other (the extrovert identity). Therefore, visions of a definite threat as power or identity asymmetry are an example of rational fear. Fear as a cause of the belief system is not rational and destructive in character since fear itself (though caused by a real object of fear) directly depends on the cognitive scheme articulated within the state (in the introvert identity). Thus, in this model, the state’s picture of fear is not, in essence, related to the object of fear and the international environment. Emotions in this model function as one of the key factors legitimizing the belief system; therefore, as the article claims, to perceive fear as an emotion means to derationalize the phenomenon of fear. The three concepts of fear based on different paradigms of

international relations distinguished in this study are not individual explanations of fear perception. Rather, they are ideal types of fear perception, changing and supplementing each other in reality.

The analysis of Lithuanian foreign policy visions, based on the theoretical insights provided in the article, shows that after the occupation of Crimea in 2014, it is possible to speak about a newly developing stage of Lithuanian foreign policy – *parabellum*. It is defined in the study as the belief system based on the existential fear of Russia. Although the narrative of the threat of Russia has been featured in Lithuanian foreign policy since the very restoration of independence, it has never acquired an existential character in the official discourse. Even at the stages of the intensification of the perception of the threat of Russia, the object of threat (Russia) remained on the outside, i.e. the level of threat remained dependent on the dynamics of changes in Russia. Thus, the fear of Russia establishing itself in the Lithuanian discourse is of an emotional character. In its ideological structure, this newly begun stage is very close to the vision of Lithuania as the regional leader, where the articulated emotion of fear manifested itself as the fear to remain on the periphery.

*December 2015*