

Vytautas Jokubauskas*

*Institute of Baltic Region History and Archeology, Klaipėda University
The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania***

Territorial Defence and Partisan Resistance (Lithuania's Experience)

In the 21st century – as in the first half of the 20th century – Lithuania has faced threats posed to its national security and statehood. Owing to its limited resources, the country is not essentially able to establish large regular forces; therefore, it is permanently developing its territorial defence forces. In the interwar period, their nucleus was formed by the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, while in the 21st century it is by the National Defence Volunteer Forces. While modelling new concepts of territorial defence, it is inevitable to consider not only the practices of other countries and their military theories but also Lithuania's national experience. Of course, this is the experience of 1990-2004, but in the first part of the 20th century the idea of territorial defence was also put into practice and cultivated at the theoretical level. Another aspect is that territorial defence in practice is inextricably entwined with the tactics of guerrilla warfare and their application. Lithuania's historical experience and analysis of its territorial defence and partisan war is not only knowledge for its own sake. It may have tangible practical value since Lithuania considered, premeditated and applied these notions in practice repeatedly in the first half of the 20th century. Furthermore, the geographical location of the country and distribution of eventual sources of conflict in comparison with the interwar period have virtually not changed. In the interwar period, East Prussia, part of Germany and separated by the Polish Corridor, had been a semi-exclave up until September 1939. Similarly, it is only by sea and air that this territory is accessible at present, though now a subject of the Russian Federation as the Kaliningrad region. Due to geopolitical transformations, after World War II the 'enemy from the East' had moved geographically to Western Lithuania. There exists a similar situation on the south-eastern border of Lithuania, where a none-too-friendly interwar Poland changed to a Belarus governed by Alexander Lukashenko. Lithuania's northern border with Latvia, also a NATO member at present, remains unchanged and comparatively safe; in the interwar period, only attempts were made to discuss the idea of having mutual defence although Latvia had planned to provide some support for the Lithuanian forces in the case of a Wehrmacht attack from East Prussia to the East. So it is expedient to elaborate on what attention the Lithuanian Armed Forces in the interwar period paid to the history of war, what kind of experience of the 20th century territorial defence and partisan resistance they gained, and how this may be of value to defence experts in the 21st century.

* *Dr. Vytautas Jokubauskas* is a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute of Baltic Region History and Archaeology, Klaipėda University. Address for correspondence: Herkaus Manto 84, LT-92294 Klaipėda, Lithuania; tel. +370-46- 398806; e-mail: pilsotas@yahoo.com.

** This study was commissioned by the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. Contract no. 8P-5, 13 November 2017.

Introduction

In recent years, in Lithuania, due to the changed security environment in Eastern Europe and around the globe, intensive military reforms have been implemented and military forces are being modernized and developed. On 1 January 2016, the 2nd Brigade – Motorized Infantry Brigade Žemaitija – was restored in the Lithuanian Armed Forces and on 27 March 2017, the 3rd Brigade – Light Infantry Brigade Aukštaitija – was established. Military units of the National Defence Volunteer Forces are being restored in various parts of Lithuania. There has been a substantial increase in financial resources allocated to national defence (723.8 million euros in 2017, or 1.75 percent of GDP), 873 million euros in 2018 (over 2 percent of GDP), thus allowing modernizing and equipping military forces with innovative armament systems. However, a parallel debate on the concept of defence is taking place. The concept of territorial defence, which was a priority before Lithuania's membership in NATO (2004), is being actively discussed and planned. Since 2014, the Lithuanian Armed Forces have undergone both quantitative and in particular qualitative transformations which are possible inasmuch as there is strong public support, stable political support and constant increases in funding the defence system. The most recent legal acts (on various levels) of the Republic of Lithuania place emphasis on the importance of territorial defence. The Lithuanian Military Doctrine 2016 states that “territorial security and defence as well as civil resistance¹ and defence are total and unconditional and a constituent part of standing defence plans.”² The document details to whom the function of territorial defence is ascribed, saying that “the National Defence Volunteer Forces, the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union and other military units of armed resistance (partisans) of citizens and their organizations are assigned to territorial units.”³ Hence, the Doctrine names partisan units as one of the elements of territorial defence, thereby acknowledging an unequivocal correlation between territorial defence and the application of tactics of guerrilla forces. Approved in 2017, the White Paper on Lithuanian Defence Policy stresses the significance of territorial defence, stating: “In the face of current modern threats, the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) have an important task for territorial defence. While preparing for this task, the NDVF closely cooperates with the

¹ For more information regarding the most recent insights into civil resistance in Lithuania, see a collective monograph: Ramonaitė A., Petronytė-Urbonavičienė I., Skirkevičius P., Vosylius E., *Kas eitų ginti Lietuvos? Pilietybių pasipriešinimo prielaidos ir galimybės*, Vilnius: Aukso žuvis, 2018. 200 p.

² *Lietuvos karinė doktrina*, Vilnius: Lietuvos kariuomenė, 2016, p. 4-25.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 5-6.

Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, local communities and other non-governmental organizations.”⁴

The ideas of carrying out the concept of territorial defence are also transferred to the 2017-2022 guidelines of the Minister of National Defence, in which it is scrutinized what should be implemented at the preparatory stage: “Territorial defence capabilities are being augmented, ensuring the accumulation of necessary armament and supply and their proper distribution within Lithuanian territory. The National Defence Volunteer Forces (hereinafter referred to as NDVF) will further be consolidated as a territorial defence force, and through the NDVF the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (henceforth referred to as LRU) is to be integrated into national defence.”⁵ In the aforementioned legal acts it is revealed that it is the volunteers (NDVF) and riflemen who have to play the crucial role in the implementation of the concept of territorial defence; the riflemen's role is believed to be aggrandized in accordance with the enlargement of this organization as well as with the increase in military riflemen's platoons. The newest National Security Strategy foresees that Lithuania shall “enhance the integration of the Lithuania Riflemen's Union into the state defence system and strengthen its preparedness to participate in armed state defence.”⁶ In this context, one should point out that the riflemen and volunteers are a result of the paramilitary movement that disintegrated in the newly restored Lithuania (in 1991).⁷ In the interwar period there operated one structure, that is the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (established in 1919), whose majority of functions urgent in the interwar years have already been superseded by the NDVF in the 21st century.

Recurring to territorial defence is not only a decision or matter for Lithuania, for “in acknowledging the status of the Baltic states as possible forward-area states, NATO encourages the consolidation of territorial defence capabilities.”⁸ Lithuania has therefore received support from its allies in the domain of territorial defence development. It is vital to mention that territorial defence is not competing with or overlapping the idea and plans of collective defence. It is a supplementary element of collective defence and its integral

⁴ *Baltoji Lietuvos gynybos politikos knyga*. Vilnius: LR Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2017, p. 34.

⁵ Krašto apsaugos ministro 2017–2022 m. gairės. Patvirtintos Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos ministro 2017 m. kovo 22 d. įsakymu Nr. V-259, l. 2.

⁶ Nacionalinio saugumo strategija. Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo 2017 m. sausio 17 d. nutarimo Nr. XIII-202 redakcija, l. 14.

⁷ Jokubauskas V., Vaičėnionis J., Vareikis V., Vitkus H., *Valia priešintis: paramilitarizmas ir Lietuvos karinio saugumo problemos*. Moksl. Red. V. Vareikis; Sud. V. Vareikis; H. Vitkus. Klaipėda: Druka, 2015, p. 158–174.

⁸ *Baltoji Lietuvos gynybos politikos knyga* (footnote 4), p. 19.

place at the national level. Moreover, territorial defence can be activated rapidly without the consent of the allies or their support. It is also a variant of autonomous activity in the event of unexpected geopolitical changes in the region or around the world. At the same time, one is faced with the content and form of territorial defence, that is, which actions (methods) are to be treated as territorial defence and how certain territorial defence methods are to be applied in Lithuania in the 21st century security environment. This problem is aggravated when both Lithuanian society and armed forces accentuate the importance of the 20th century Lithuanian partisan resistance, yet there has been little research conducted into how this experience can be realized in dealing with new situations, especially in the sphere of territorial defence and partisan resistance.

With the restoration of Lithuania's statehood in 1990 there also emerged the conundrum of establishing national military forces. It should be noted that Lithuania was one of the few post-Soviet countries that did not adopt or inherit military units of the occupying Soviet army (unlike Ukraine, Belarus and other 'republics'); also, it did not have *its own army* (unlike Poland, Hungary or other countries belonging to the Warsaw bloc). Lithuania derived from the occupation forces only infrastructure that was often retrieved but in a very abandoned state (as in 1940 the Soviet Union took over Lithuania's military objects with all their possessions). The armed forces developed in two directions: a) by cultivating the territorial VNDS (*Voluntary National Defence Service*) that was reorganized into the NDVF (*National Defence Volunteer Forces*) in 1998⁹; and b) by forming the units of regular forces and creating their compounds. In the first case, the forces were formed on a voluntary basis, in the second case on conscription. In both structures, there was a corresponding number of officers, non-commissioned officers and military professional specialists.¹⁰ Before Lithuania's invitation to join NATO's armed forces it was widely debated on the issues of territorial defence and partisan resistance, in that the country's armed defence was predicated on the very concept of territorial defence to which it reverted after war broke out in Ukraine in 2014.

Audrius Butkevičius, the first director (later minister) of the restored National Defence System, stated: "It is important to mention that before making decisions to establish territorial military forces on the basis of volunteers, we have debated a lot about the aims and functions to which these forces

⁹ Auryla J., Džiavečka V., Šaltenienė J., Voveris V., *Tėvynės sargyboje. Krašto apsaugos savanorių pajėgų dvidešimtmečio kronikos 1991–2011*. Vilnius: Krašto apsaugos ministerija, 2011. 232 p.

¹⁰ Jokubauskas V., „The Financing and Personnel of the Lithuanian Army“, *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review*, Vol. 13: 2014–2015. Vilnius, 2015, pp. 147–170.

are to be entrusted.”¹¹ The VNDS was tasked with training military personnel, protecting high-value objects, providing assistance in the event of extreme situations, assisting the border guard services and police, helping to maintain social stability and security in the face of a threat and realizing territorial national defence.¹² Having come into force in 1991, the Law on the National Defence Volunteer Service prescribed that the service should work on a territorial principle; moreover, not only the cheapest but also an effective means of state defence was embedded, resembling the pre-war operations of the Lithuanian riflemen (“Moreover, the law also legitimized the tactics of the post-war partisans of Lithuania. The partisans, who were Lithuanian volunteer soldiers, respected the principle of territorial defence. The districts where partisans operated were divided into units. And now [in 1996] there are ten VNDS units in the country.”¹³ On the pages of *Karys* (issued in 1994) it was stated that “the main follower of the traditions of the pre-war Riflemen’s Union is now the volunteer service. The status of volunteers in the national defence structure is similar to that of the pre-war riflemen.”¹⁴

Prepared by Major Eugenijus Jakimavičius and published in 1993, the VNDS booklet *Resistance* writes that in the 21st century “nor will power states attack the little ones as brutally as they did half a century ago – rather, they will attempt to provoke internal conflicts and direct their ‘help’ units to those countries. In the 21st century, guerrilla warfare will be in fashion.”¹⁵ In 1995, the Lithuanian Military Academy published material from a seminar dedicated to territorial defence issues.¹⁶ In 1997, Stanislavas Adomaitis’ book on the operations of guerrilla forces was published.¹⁷ In 2001, the conference Territorial Defence was held at the Lithuanian Military Academy, where wide-scale analysis and modelling of territorial defence scenarios were carried out by referring to the experience of Lithuania and other countries.¹⁸ Interest in these issues dwindled in Lithuania as soon as it joined NATO in 2004.

Territorial defence was widely and is still applied at different periods in different countries. During the Cold War, small European countries invested

¹¹ Butkevičius A., „Sąjūdis, politiniai sprendimai. Krašto apsaugos sistema 1990–1994 metais,“ in: *Lietuvos krašto apsaugos sistemos atkūrimas 1989-1993 metais. Istorinis dokumentų leidinys*, Sud. J. Užurka. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2015, p. 23.

¹² „Lietuvos Respublikos savanoriškos krašto apsaugos tarnybos įstatymas“, *Karys*, 1991, Nr. 3, p. 26.

¹³ Simanaitis E., „Savanorių penkmetis bankų krizės šešėlyje“, *Trimitas*, 1996, Nr. 2, p. 6.

¹⁴ Voveris V., „Mano namai – mano tvirtovė“, *Karys*, 1994, Nr. 9, p. 14.

¹⁵ Jakimavičius E., *Rezistencija*, Vilnius: SKAT, 1993, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Teritorinė gynyba*, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 1995. 59 p.

¹⁷ Adamonis, S. *Partizanų karas: (strategija ir taktika)*, Kaunas: R. Belovo leidykla, 1997. 120 p.

¹⁸ *Konferencijos „Teritorinė gynyba“ medžiaga*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2001. 96 p.

heavily in territorial defence and developed its concepts,¹⁹ however after the Cold War most European countries diminished or abandoned their territorial defence forces²⁰ with the uncommon exception of the Baltic and Scandinavian countries. The issue of territorial defence was reconsidered anew after Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014. The territorial defence structures of the Baltic countries were also analysed.²¹ Poland has recently paid meticulous attention to issues of territorial defence²² as it has started to form large-scale territorial forces. It is therefore natural that Polish authors analyse how the Lithuanian territorial defence system functions.²³ One delves into Ukraine's recent experience as well as into possibilities for its applicability.²⁴ The concepts of territorial defence are examined.²⁵

This study aims to analyse the cases of 20th century territorial defence and partisan resistance in Lithuania and discuss the possibilities of applying and utilizing these practices in the 21st century. By referring to historical sources the hypothesis is verified that in the first half of the 20th century the practices of territorial defence and partisan resistance were widely used in Lithuania, and this was influenced by theoretical concepts and plans derived from other countries and developed in Lithuania. The choice of territorial defence and partisan resistance in Lithuania was determined not only by the situation – whenever there was a vacuum of power in the provinces and the security of communities was jeopardized – but also by traditions and theoretical knowledge as well as practical preparation. Therefore, considering Lithuanian historical experience, this article analyses the concepts and practices of the content and form of territorial defence which may partially or fully be utilized in the 21st century by developing in Lithuania the concept of territorial defence and partisan resistance. Territorial defence and tactics of guerrilla warfare are globally widespread (both in time and

¹⁹ Rickli J.-M., „European small states' military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies“, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 21, No. 3, September 2008, pp. 307–325.

²⁰ Paszyn M., „Territorial Defence in the structures of the Member States of NATO defence derived from the former Warsaw Pact“, *AARMS (Academic and Applied Research in Public Management Science)*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2014), pp. 477–491.

²¹ Szymański P., Gotkowska J., „The Baltic states' Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats“, *OSW Commentary*, No. 165, 2015, pp. 1–8.

²² A collection of articles: *Bezpieczeństwo teoria i praktyka wojska obrony terytorialnej w Polsce i na świecie w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku*, Red. M. Lasoń, M. Klisz, Kraków: Krakowska Akademia im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego, 2017. 428 s.

²³ Żak J., „Wojska obrony terytorialnej w systemie obronnym Litwy“, *Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*, 2017, Nr 1 (8), s. 189–208.

²⁴ Żak J., Gotowiecki P., „The territorial defence in Poland – the influence of the Ukrainian conflict experiences“, *Зовнішні справи*, 2016, № 12, pp. 26–31.

²⁵ Żuchowski R., Stachowski M., „Poland's Ministry of Defence Concept for Territorial Defence Forces“, *Ante Portas – Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem*, 2016, Nr. 2 (7), pp. 107–118.

space), which are researched in various countries by many authors with different angles. However, this study is a case analysis (Lithuania) within defined chronological limits, not seeking to conduct a broader comparative investigation, which would require the efforts of a group of scientists, and the results are to be presented in the work of a separate study (collective monograph).

1. Historical Experience

Historia est Magistra Vitae is a well-known idea, yet the approach to history and its practical application raise doubts and discussions. The history of war can, however, serve as the material enabling one to delve into the reflections of those analysts and experts. Divisional General of the Lithuanian Army Stasys Raštikis wrote in the interwar period that in order to become a “good warlord, not only a military commander’s innate capabilities, good experience and tactical preparation are required but also knowledge of the history of war, for the history of war is one of if not the most important branch of warfare [featured in the document – V. J.]” He stated that “before anyone wants to be a warlord, there lies a book entitled *The History of War*.²⁶ According to the Commander of the General Staff Directorate of the Lithuanian Army Lieutenant General Zenonas Gerulaitis, the history of war is taught to servicemen as it sought to reveal: 1) “why our knowledge of historical facts is useful in preparing future military personnel, and how our knowledge of the past is exploited for the future”; 2) on the grounds of historical facts “to substantiate such theory of war that is quite often presented here as mere speculation based on pure logic.”²⁷ In the interwar period, the Lithuanian army paid significant attention to the history of war. It was a means of educating and motivating military servicemen as well as developing officers’ qualifications.²⁸ The interwar Lithuanian generals were not really original; the idea corresponds to the most renowned warfare theorists of the 19th century. Having spoken widely about the advantages and threats of applying the history of war in the development of military theories, Prussian Major General Carl von Clausewitz stated that “still one has to consent that the history of recent wars must always be the

²⁶ Raštikis S., „Karo istorijos reikšmė ir jos dėstymo metodas vokiečių gen. št. mokykloje“, *Mūsų žinynas*, 1934, t. XXVI, Nr. 109, p. 289.

²⁷ Gerulaitis Z., *Karo istorijos įvadas*, Kaunas: Generalinio štabo kursai, 1932, p. 1–2.

²⁸ For more information see: Jokubauskas V., „Karo istorija ir jos svarba Lietuvos kariuomenei tarpukariu“, *Karo archyvas*, 2017, t. XXXII, p. 161–217.

most reliable sphere to derive examples from.”²⁹ His contemporary, Swiss General Antoine-Henri Baron de Jomini who served in the French army and in the Russian army, reasoned that the General Staff had to prepare for an unexpected war during peacetime and that its archives should contain vast amounts of data on the history of war and include theoretical works related to military matters.³⁰

From a historical point of view, it must first be noted that such phenomena as territorial defence and partisan war³¹ are very old. Its examples can be found in cases of tribal warfare, or in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (henceforth referred to as GDL) where nobility from administrative districts (especially near the border) gathered to defend themselves in their own districts. But it is important to separate a territorial system of mobilization and composition of military units from territorial defence. Many examples of the first case can also be observed in the GDL and in the interwar period both in Lithuania and abroad. Partisan tactics were typical of Lithuanian warfare in the times of the Grand Duchy, especially when the enemy had an advantage, for example in the wars with Sweden and Moscow in the mid-17th century. At the end of August 1655, in Žemaitija, “partisan units were formed in the struggle against the plundering Swedish troops [and] hindered the delivery of food to Swedish garrisons in urban areas; they turned out to be islands surrounded by the enemy from all sides.”³² In the rebellion of 1830–1831, after the Polish regular army units had withdrawn from Lithuania, thus creating a disbalance between the capabilities of the rebels and that of the Russian Imperial Army, the rebels in Žemaitija decided to divide into small groups and started to fight a guerrilla war.³³ The 1863–1864 uprising in Lithuania also had a clear partisan character.³⁴ So, in the 19th century, the insurrections taking place in Lithuania and Poland were also marked by principles of territorial action employing partisan tactics. And a whole series of Polish authors developed the concept of guerrilla warfare in the context of the 19th century revolts.³⁵

²⁹ Clausewitz von C., *Apie karą*, t. I, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2008, p. 127.

³⁰ Жомини Г., *Стратегия и тактика в военном искусстве*, Москва: Центрполиграф, 2009, с. 48.

³¹ Boot M., *An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient times to the Present*, New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013. 809 p.

³² Dundulis B., *Švedų feodalų įsiveržimai į Lietuvą XVII–XVIII a.*, Vilnius: Mokslas, 1977, p. 65.

³³ Sliesoriūnas F., *1830–1831 m. sukilimas Lietuvoje*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1974, p. 361; Maksimaitienė O., *Lietuvos sukilėlių kovos 1863–1864 m.*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1969, 296 p.

³⁴ Janulaitis A., *1863–1864 m. sukilimas Lietuvoje*, Kaunas: Krašto apsaugos ministerijos Lietartūros skyrius, 1921, p. 28–43.

³⁵ Vareikis V., „Bandymas apčiuopti šaknis: ideologinės Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos ištakos“, in *Paramilitarism in the Eastern Baltics, 1918–1940: Cases Studies and Comparisons = Paramilitarizmas Rytų Baltijos regione 1918–1940: atvejo studijos ir lyginimai (Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis, Vol. XXVIII)*, ed. by V. Jokubauskas, V. Safronovas, V. Vareikis, Klaipėda, 2014, p. 19–40; Jokubauskas V., (footnote 7), p. 21–32.

The tactics of 19th century partisan warfare were highlighted by military theorist Major General Carl von Clausewitz who stated that intelligent partisan units in small groups would be more effective by engaging scanty squads and transport. Moreover, he identified the challenges that regular forces would have to cope with, especially in mountainous areas where the enemy's partisan units operated.³⁶ Also he emphasized that "Landsturm and national armed groups shall not be used against the main enemy forces or bigger military units; they must not crack the nut but slightly gnaw its shell. People must rise up in the provinces that are close to the theatre of war."³⁷ General A. H. de Jomini also drew attention to the benefits partisans gained and even advantages they took under certain conditions, especially in mountainous terrain, by acting in coordination with regular forces or organizing raids on the enemy-occupied territories.³⁸ Moreover, he contributed to the establishment of the General Staff Academy in Russia, while his ideas significantly affected the development of the Russian military school.

Denis Davydov's exclusive work was published in 1821 in which the author – referring to 17th- and 18th-century military experience as well as to his own military experience gained in 1812 – summed up the possibilities of partisan resistance³⁹. The concept of partisan tactics was developed by Russian military theorists who, in the 19th century and first half the 20th century treated partisan activities as a national resistance (in Russian: народная война) and as an activity for separate groups organized by state military forces directly in the back of the enemy, calling them raids.⁴⁰

Part of the book *Partisan Activities* (in Russian: *Партизанские действия*⁴¹), written by Russian General Vladislav Klembovsky and published in 1894, was translated into Lithuanian in 1921, and manuscript copies were sent to the riflemen who fought with the Polish forces along the demilitarized zone. The text outlines who is suitable for partisan activities, and where and how partisans must operate. It is argued that partisan activities should be coordinated by the directorate of the regular forces; partisans must act unexpect-

³⁶ Clausewitz von C., *Apie karą*, t. II, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2009. 252 p.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 111.

³⁸ See: Жомини Г. (footnote 30), с. 77, 218, 235, 258, 283, 330.

³⁹ Довыдов Д., Опыт теории партизанского дѣйствія, Москва: Топография С. Селивановского, 1821. 217 с.

⁴⁰ For more information, see: Прозное оружие. Малая война, партизанство и другие виды асимметричного овевания в свете наследия русских военных мыслителей, Москва: Русский путь, 2007. 760 с.

⁴¹ Клембовский В. Н., Партизанскія дѣйствія, Санкт-Петербург: Издал В. Березовский, 1894. 282 с.

tedly and persistently, attacking the enemy's communications, headquarters and storages, gathering information and trying hard to do as much damage as possible to the enemy in all possible ways. Partisans, acting on territory where they have gained the support of the local population, were capable of withstanding even the most abundant enemy forces for a very long time; they would sooner or later be plunged into constant terror and attacks. Such partisan activity contributed enormously to the regular forces. It is stated that each unit – there must be as many units as possible – must operate in the designated territory in which they would establish permanent and temporary headquarters and have a network of informants in the local population.⁴² Lithuanian riflemen thus relied on the methodological tools of the Russian military school.

Of valuable attention is the textbook *The History of Military Art*, published in 2006 in the Russian Federation and dedicated to preparing military officers.⁴³ The last chapter is devoted to the historical analysis of special operations in the USSR and the Russian Federation. In essence, partisan activities are studied in three sections: a) the experiences the USSR and Russia had to cope with in the 20th century; b) how the USSR used guerrilla warfare methods; and c) how to operate effectively in small guerrilla-based military subunits in a particular territory. The text deals with the experience of the Russian civil war as well as with partisan upheavals in Karelia, the Caucasus and Central Asia in the interwar period. According to Soviet military theorist Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky, in such cases it is necessary to use small active subunits and, considering the process of actions (revolt), strike a blow either to the “rebel-affected territory or the enemy's living force.”⁴⁴ In this context, Kęstutis K. Girnius's precise insight is that to catch the whole fish one needs to drain the pond.⁴⁵ *Water*, in this case, is represented as society inhabiting a territory smitten by guerrilla warfare, and the *fish* is viewed as fighting partisans. As *fish* does not survive long without *water*, and neither do partisans without social support.

USSR guerrilla warfare concepts and development-related plans in the interwar period are discussed, and Soviet partisan resistance in territories occupied by Germany during World War II are elucidated. Particular attention is paid to the partisan war in the Baltic states and Ukraine after World War II, noting that there operated effective systems of controlling partisan units at va-

⁴² Trumpi nurodymai partizanams veikti (santrauka iš „Partizanų veikimas“ – N. V. Klembovskiū) [1921 m.]. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 381, l. 17–17 apv. l.

⁴³ Абагуров В.В. et al., История военного искусства. Москва: Военное издательство, 2006. 399 с.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 360.

⁴⁵ Presented at the seminar “The Right for Uprising.” Nida, 16–17 September 2016,

rious levels, and that in Lithuania this resistance assumed an exceptional scale (“the most powerful and most organized partisan movement in the Baltic states developed in Lithuania”). One should point out that in order to overcome this kind of (partisan, territorial) resistance it is important: a) to support the local population as much as possible; b) to disintegrate military forces fighting with partisans into small subunits and allocate them evenly across the territory; c) to develop intelligence and a network of agencies; d) to coordinate the actions of different military forces and headquarters; e) to consider the specifics of local conditions and act unconventionally (by going beyond the classical canons of warfare); and f) to eliminate partisan units by reconnoitring and blocking them. The experience gained in the Baltics and Ukraine in the 1940s and 1950s is presented as a good and sought-after example; the military actions that took place in Chechnya in 1994-1996 are regarded as a failure.⁴⁶

Such examples of the analysis and evaluation of the history of military art could and should incentivize Lithuania to cast a closer look at its national experience, to analyse it not only through the prism of the construction/deconstruction of historical narratives but also through the prism of warfare. This way it is sought to answer questions on how territorial partisan units can operate effectively, how one can eventually fight against them and what counterterrorism measures can be taken against military forces trying to overcome partisan resistance, i.e., how their plans can be destroyed so that an eventual aggressor would not ruin Lithuania’s plans. It is widely known that the highest level of strategy is to attack the enemy’s plans (though to attack is not necessarily associated with the realization of overt military means; the implication is that it is sought to make the enemy’s plans no longer effective before war breaks out); a lower level of strategy deals with attacking the allies and then the enemy; and the worst strategy has to do with attacking the enemy’s fortifications.

2. Practices in the Years 1918-1923

At the end of 1918 and beginning of 1919, on the territory of Lithuania there emerged the peculiar situation of an authority and power vacuum. The German military administration was not that willing to further maintain order, but the new central government of the restored Lithuanian state was not yet fully able to control all of the regions. Having reached Lithuania during the

⁴⁶ Абатыров В.В. et al. (footnote 43), c. 359–391.

aforementioned period, the Red Army, which was striving towards the West while ‘carrying revolution’, inspired communities to assemble into armed self-defence groups in certain areas, without avoiding mutual terror and compulsion.⁴⁷ Lithuanian peasant society was economically exhausted by World War I and so the new authorities of the Red Army and their requisitions and mobilization⁴⁸ into the army of *workers* and *peasants* did not bring great sympathy among the local population. What made Lithuanians’ expectations even more pessimistic was that the land was not divided among the peasants but funnelled into collective farms. Communities that had grown into their land over a long period of time neither understood nor accepted such practice. And what exacerbated the situation was that various gangs of marauders were rampaging across the country. So it was this set of reasons and the fact that the Lithuanian Council declared the independence of the state in which Lithuanians should be its masters persuaded the communities to gather into self-defence groups. The main organizers and leaders of these partisan groups were the former soldiers of the Russian Empire who began to return to their homeland and who gained a very valuable two-fold experience: the experience of self-organization and that obtained on the front line during World War I. As the interwar Lithuanian Minister of Agriculture Juozas Audėnas noted in his recollections: “German gendarmes were preparing to leave Lithuania. In addition, Lithuanian residents were encouraged by their local authorities to set up committees of parishes. Everyone flinched. It was beyond joy! [...] There were knowledgeable people who knew how to elect committees and even a parliament. It was those who had returned from Russia wherein they’d had the chance – after the overthrow of the Tsarist government – not only to participate in elections but also to get acquainted with political parties.”⁴⁹ It is possible to discern two major self-defence movements that concentrated in local areas right at the end of 1918 and at the beginning of 1919: the partisans of Joniškėlis in northern Lithuania (Figure 1A) and the partisans of Seda who were led by the future Lithuanian General Povilas Plechavičius⁵⁰ and his brother Aleksander (Figure 1B).

⁴⁷ Balkelis T., „From Defence to Revolution: Lithuanian Paramilitary Groups in 1918 and 1919“, in *Paramilitarism in the Eastern Baltics, 1918–1940: Cases Studies and Comparisons = Paramilitarizmas rytų Baltijos regione 1918–1940: atvejo studijos ir lyginimai* (Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis, Vol. XXVIII). Ed. by V. Jokubauskas, V. Safronovas, V. Vareikis. Klaipėda, 2014, p. 43–56.

⁴⁸ Audėnas A., *Paskutinis posėdis*, New York: Romuva, 1966, p. 46.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 41–42.

⁵⁰ Jankauskas V., *Nepriklausomos Lietuvos generolai*, Vilnius: Vilniaus dailės akademijos leidykla, 1998, p. 126.




Figure 1. Areas of territorial-partisan resistance in Lithuania in 1918-1923

Compiled along: Michniewicz-Helman M., „Vilniaus kavalerijos brigados reidas Kėdainių kryptimi“, *Mūsų žinynas*, 1926, t. X, Nr. 28, p. 49; *Gen. Povilas Plechavičius*, Sud. P. Jurgėla; P. Jurkus. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Karys, 1978. 300 p.; Aničas J., *Nepriklausomybės kovos Pasvalio krašte 1918–1919 metais*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 1997. 126 p.; Vareikis V., „Pasienio incidentai (Lietuvos šaulių partizaninė veikla)“, *Darbai ir dienos*, 2004, t. XL, p. 109–128; Lesčius V., *Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2004. 498 p.; *Lietuvos nacionalinis atlasas*, t. II, Vilnius: Petro ofsetas, 2015, p. 60.

On 11 November 1918, the Lithuanian government's appeal to the public was understood as “an invitation to arm the whole nation and organize a territorial army. Therefore, the elected rural committees first started to organize large units of militia that comprised almost 150 men.”⁵¹ The partisans of Joniškėlis assembled in a Soviet-occupied territory without having any contacts with the rest of Lithuania and fought, as was written in the press, “without knowing even the fact that the troops of the Lithuanian national army began to increase in Kaunas.”⁵² Right at the end of 1918 and at the beginning of 1919,

⁵¹ Gudelis P., „Šiaurės Rytų partizanai ir jų apdovanojimas“, *Kardas*, 1935, rugsėjo 15, Nr. 18 (223), p. 383.

⁵² „9-to pėst. L. K. Vytenio pulko šventė“, *Karys*, 1921, gegužės 12, Nr. 19 (103), p. 214.

the partisan movement operated actively in the area of Joniškėlis, which, after the Red Army had occupied the territory, did not disappear and the fighters did not withdraw but remained on the occupied land. For conspiratorial reasons, the partisans acted in *threes*; that is, each partisan knew only three other partisans.⁵³ At the start of 1919, a vacuum of power did occur in Saločiai: the Germans settled in Bauska and the Soviets were still in the eastern part of the country, so a national rural committee was elected immediately in Saločiai and 25 men were assembled with the pastor's help. Twenty-five Russian rifles and ammunition were brought by the commander of German troops stationed in Bauska. A partisan squad started to gather in Saločiai.⁵⁴ In March 1919, the partisans began to act quite overtly and stationed within a range of 60-70km in the field; the movement consisted of up to 850 partisans and together with militia it comprised roughly 1500 men. These forces assumed a military structure (a headquarters and three companies) and were actively engaged in military operations against the Red Army. In the same year, 1919, directly on the basis of these partisans, Joniškėlis Battalion was formed which was reorganized into the 9th Infantry Regiment of the Lithuanian Army.⁵⁵ In the interwar period, Major Petras Gudelis, the organizer (later Lithuanian army officer) of the Vaškai rural committee in Joniškėlis in 1918, wrote that "the Joniškėlis militia had a lot of similarity to a territorial army."⁵⁶ On 10 December 1919, the 9th Infantry Regiment Lithuanian Duke Vytenis of the Lithuanian army was established on the basis of the Joniškėlis partisan battalion.⁵⁷

In parallel, the partisans from Seda were active in the north-western part of the country. These partisans were gathered by P. Plechavičius to one-and-a-half companies' infantry and half of the squadron's cavalrymen. These forces became involved in an active struggle against the Bolsheviks and the Bermontians, or the Western Russian Volunteer Army.⁵⁸ In his recollections, Rapolas Skipitis (Lithuanian Minister of the Interior in 1920-1922), referring to the story told by a local, described Plechavičius's work in the following way: "It is hard to recount what has happened at the start of this year [1919 – V. J.] – when the Bolshevik gangs flooded Žemaitija. They established their own committees in districts and

⁵³ Lesčius V., *Lietuvos kariuomenė nepriklausomybės kovose 1918–1920*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 2004, p. 72–78.

⁵⁴ Trimokas S., „Saločių partizanų būrio 1919 m. žygiai“, *Karys*, 1922, gegužės 11, Nr. 19 (155), p. 222–226.

⁵⁵ Lesčius V. (footnote 53), p. 72–78.

⁵⁶ Gudelis P., „Partizanų apdovanojimas – sveikojo tautos instinkto pagerbimas“, *Trimitas*, 1935, spalio 24, Nr. 43 (776), p. 786.

⁵⁷ For more information, see Aničas J., *Nepriklausomybės kovos Pasvalio krašte 1918–1919 metais*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 1997. 126 p.

⁵⁸ *Gen. Povilas Plechavičius*, Sud. P. Jurgėla; P. Jurkus. Brooklyn, N.Y.: Karys, 1978, p.10.

rural areas, and their armed groups plundered and terrorized the whole population. Only such a man as Plechavičius managed to organize partisans to fight the Bolsheviks, for he did not make others conduct the most dangerous combat operations but was the first to do it himself. [...] It is no secret that there are those who were killed. It is clear that for the relatives those who were killed were innocent and groundlessly shot dead. And I can say that not a single innocent person was killed by Plechavičius and his men. Had we not shot them dead, today in Žemaitija we would have a Bolshevik government along with looting and shootings. [...] To bring order out of anarchy is not an easy task.”⁵⁹ Hence there was violence, and the social situation during the War of Independence has not yet substantially been researched.⁶⁰ And a wave of violence and terror after World War I was a common phenomenon not only in Lithuania but also in other countries.⁶¹ It should be noted that the Joniškėlis and Seda partisans’ self-organization was inextricably intertwined with the establishment of local self-government institutions, and in both cases the same people were acting in the local area. Thus, the activities of the partisans and that of self-government are complementary and mutually supportive – in other words, synergetic.

Another stage of partisan resistance was associated with the fighting in 1919 in northern Lithuania against the Bermontians (Figure 1C). When the Bermontians occupied the northern part of Lithuania in 1919, local residents who did not abide their arbitrariness began to fall into partisan groups, and the partisans of Joniškėlis, Šiauliai, Papilė, Gruzdžiai, Stačiūnai and Linkuva were distinguished by their active engagement.⁶² According to the writer Antanas Vienuolis, a witness of the events, “one would not even speak of any organized armed resistance, although I have heard that the pillaged farmers and the shaken intelligentsia began to assemble into partisan units and ambushed the plunderers.”⁶³ At the end of 1919, the Bermontians killed 33 people in Šiauliai and injured 124 civilians, burned 171 houses, stole 1328 horses and 1644 pigs

⁵⁹ Skipitis R., *Nepriklausomą Lietuvą statant: atsiminimai*, Chicago, Ill.: Terra, 1961, p. 115–116.

⁶⁰ In 2017–2021, a research is being conducted, and the dissertation is being prepared: “Civilian Experiences in Lithuania during Armed Conflicts (1918–1923)” (Dissertation project funded by the Research Council of Lithuania, No KD-17001).

⁶¹ *War in Peace: Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War*, Ed by. R. Gerwarth; J. Horne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 287 p.; Balkelis T., „War, Revolution and Terror in the Baltic States and Finland after the Great War“, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 46, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 1–9; Laurinavičius Č., „On Political Terror During the Soviet Expansion into Lithuania, 1918–1919“, *Journal of Baltic Studies*, vol. 46, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 65–76; Petronis V., „Neperkirstas Gordijaus mazgas: valstybinės prievartos prieš visuomenę Lietuvoje genėžė (1918–1921)“, *Lietuvos istorijos metraštis*, 2015, Nr. 1 (Vilnius, 2016), p. 69–95.

⁶² Jurevičiūtė A., Veilientienė A., „Šiauliai Nepriklausomybės kovose“, *Lietuvos istorijos studijos*, Nr. 6, 1998, p. 64–69.

⁶³ Vienuolis A., *Raštai*, t. II, Klaipėda: Lituhanos, 1922, p. 173–174.

and robbed locals of a great deal of money and other assets.⁶⁴ It is, therefore, natural that in this occupied land there emerged a partisan resistance, which was encouraged and supported by the central government. According to the historian Vyngantas Vareikis, in the autumn of 1919, R. Skipitis went on secondment to Šiauliai to launch a partisan campaign with a view to combating the Bermontians and formally integrating unorganized partisans into the ranks of the Riflemen's Union. At the end of October, the instructors of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (henceforth referred to as the LRU) were sent to various locations in Lithuania; they would inform the LRU headquarters according to the mood of the local people, and the Bermontians' high-handedness, and organize groups from the local population. Partisan groups also had to carry out intelligence, that is, gather sensitive information not only about the Bermontians' looting but also about their forces and the movement of their military units. On 28 October 1919, the LRU Central Board ordered the divisions located in Tauragė, Jurbarkas and Raseiniai to "attack the enemy's small gangs migrating through villages and towns, disarm the enemy and make him out; thi must be done by telling the riflemen informally that it is an organized force of riflemen and trying to create the impression that it is the local people who operate there." In the eyes of the *Entente* observers, the riflemen had to give the impression of an "armed civilian uprising." On 11 November 1919, instructor K. Ralys stated in his report to the LRU Central Board that "we cannot rely too much on the riflemen because they are still very weak, but they are the only spokesmen of an armed civilian uprising, and they will be able to play a demonstrative role in the uprising."⁶⁵ One estimate is that approximately 20 Lithuanian partisan units – which had about 100 clashes with the enemy⁶⁶ – fought the Bermontians; another estimate is that there were at least 30 partisan units in the group located in the northern part of the country in autumn 1919. It is preliminarily stated that while fighting against the Lithuanian partisans the Bermontians lost 147 soldiers and 13 partisans were killed.⁶⁷ In mid-July 1919, having visited the north-eastern part of Lithuania, the lawyer Mykolas Römeris (future rector of Vytautas Magnus University) pointed out: "The current war is completely different from the Great War that the powerful states

⁶⁴ Baniusevičius A., „Lietuvos kariuomenės kautynės su bermontininkais prie Radviliškio“, *Karo archyvas*, t. XIII, 1992, p. 159.

⁶⁵ Vareikis V., „Išėjimas iš K. Donelaičio gatvės: Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos karinė veikla 1919 m.“, *Kauno istorijos metraštis*, 2013, t. XIII, p. 147–161.

⁶⁶ Daugvydas K., „Šiauliai nepriklausomybės kovose“, *Karys*, 1971, spalio, Nr. 8 (1475), p. 283.

⁶⁷ Lesčius V. (footnote 53), p. 230–232.

began in 1914. The current war is a partisan warfare.”⁶⁸

Territorial partisan units assumed a larger scale of operations in autumn 1920, when the allegedly rebellious Polish military forces were headed by General Lucjan Żeligowski (Polish: *bunt Żeligowskiego*) invaded Lithuania.⁶⁹ During this military operation, the Vilnius Brigade (13th Vilnius and 21th Grodno Uhrlans regiments) of the Polish Cavalry organized raids into the rear of the Lithuanian forces, where they covered 250km in seven-and-a-half days.⁷⁰ The Lithuanian regular infantry units almost did not succeed in preventing this cavalry brigade against which the riflemen and partisans were acting successfully (Figure D). A demilitarized zone between Lithuania and Poland (including a quasi-state, Central Lithuania, which was incorporated into Poland in 1922) was established right at the end of 1920. Thus, the conflict was frozen for two decades. By 1923, however, in this area – from Vištytis by the border with Germany to Zarasai by the border with Latvia – there arose a broad-scale armed conflict wherein territorial partisan units were permanently operating along with regular forces.⁷¹ Archival documents reveal that men (from adolescents to those in their fifties) from all villages would enrol in partisan units, and by uttering an oath they would be given certain pseudonyms, for instance *Karvelis* (Pigeon), *Arėjas* (Ares), *Aidas* (Echo), *Vilkas* (Wolf), *Garnys* (Heron), *Ažuolas* (Oak), *Dagilisn* (Goldfinch), *Geniukas* (Little Woodpecker), etc. Hence, a certain socio-cultural phenomenon or tradition of ‘partisanisation’, whose continuity can be observed in the 1944-1953 guerrilla war, came into existence in a certain region (especially in forested Dzūkija).

3. Interwar Concepts

During the interwar period, Lithuania faced a wide range of threats, including an economic blockade, poverty, social inequality, propaganda, disinformation, etc.,⁷² which contributed to a state of permanent instability. But the issue of armed defence was existential for the whole two decades. Due to the favourable geopolitical situation that arose after World War I and the

⁶⁸ Cited by: See Vareikis V. (footnote 65), p. 153.

⁶⁹ Rezmer W., „Vidurio Lietuvos karinis potencialas“, *Darbai ir dienos*, t. 40, 2004, p. 79–88.

⁷⁰ Michniewicz-Helman M., „Vilniaus kavalerijos brigados reidas Kėdainių kryptimi“, *Mūsų žinynas*, t. X. Nr. 28, 1926, p. 59.

⁷¹ Vareikis V., „Pasienio incidentai (Lietuvos šaulių partizaninė veikla)“, *Darbai ir dienos*, t. 40, 2004, p. 109–128.

⁷² Jokubauskas V., „Threats and Challenges to the Security and Stability of the State of Lithuania: Historical Perspective“, *Journal of Security and Sustainability Issues*, vol. 6, no. 4, June 2017, pp. 673–689.

DOI: [http://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2017.6.4\(12\)](http://doi.org/10.9770/jssi.2017.6.4(12))

activities of the Lithuanian Armed Forces during the War of Independence, Lithuania – after 123 years of occupation – succeeded in restoring and consolidating its statehood. However, it found itself in a fairly unstable and unsafe geopolitical environment. At the end of 1920, that is, after the war with Poland, there remained a frozen conflict over the Vilnius region occupied by the Polish forces.⁷³ After Lithuania attached the Klaipėda region in 1923, a conflict with Germany was predetermined.⁷⁴ That is how Lithuania happened to be in a rather ambiguous position. On the one hand, it was possible to regain Vilnius only in the wake of a large-scale war in the region (which actually happened in the autumn of 1939); on the other hand, to preserve Klaipėda one needed the stability of the Versailles system. With the retreat of the western allies, Lithuania was forced to transfer Klaipėda to the Third Reich after Germany issued its ultimatum in March 1939.

On the basis of armed defence, the Lithuanian Armed Forces considering a broad spectrum of issues had to plan its actions in the event of a possible war. It can be stated that countries are identified as potential foes in different periods, for instance only Poland was viewed as a potential enemy in the 1930s, and Germany was added to this list in the 1940s. Germany was eventually considered to be the main threat when tensions arose owing to the status of the Klaipėda region. Commander Colonel General Stasys Raštikis, in his May 1937 report to Minister of National Defence Colonel Stasys Dirmantas, wrote: “It is hard to presuppose that Germany, having become more powerful, would transfer the Klaipėda region to a Lithuania despised by Germans. There are no measures to eliminate Germany’s threat. There are only measures to pull it off to the far future, and these measures are to be undertaken to strengthen our military capabilities as much as possible and become closer to states and their blocs that are interested in suppressing Germany.”⁷⁵ The situation of 1939-1940 became even more complicated: Poland as a state ceased to exist after a *de facto* defeat in September 1939, and Lithuania acquired a previously non-existent border with the USSR. In the interwar period, the Soviets played

⁷³ Surgailis G., „The 1919–1920 Lithuanian War of Liberation“, in *Wars of Lithuania: A Systemic Quantitative Analysis of Lithuania’s War in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, Ed by G. Vitkus. Vilnius: The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, pp. 149–222.

⁷⁴ Žalys V., *Kova dėl identiteto. Kodėl Lietuvai nesisekė Klaipėdoje tarp 1923–1939 m.*, Lüneburg: Nordost-deutsches Kulturwerk, 1993. 104 p.; Vareikis V., „Klaipėdos krašto užėmimas“, in *1923 metų sausio įvykiai Klaipėdoje (Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis, t. IV)*. Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universiteto leidykla, 1995, p. 35–40.

⁷⁵ Žalys V., „Lietuvos diplomatinės tarnybos ir kariuomenės vadovybės sąveika įtvirtinant Lietuvos valstybingumą 1923–1938 metais“, in *Lietuvos nepriklausomybei – 80. Straipsnių rinkinys*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 1999, p. 71.

an ambiguous role in Lithuanian politics – Kaunas irrespectively treated them as an ally, while Moscow regarded Lithuania only as a means to incite intrigue and obtain information.⁷⁶ In the army's operational plan No 2, 'G+P' (dedicated to the case of waging war simultaneously with Poland and Germany), it is concluded: "We are a small and weakly armed state. We will not be able to withstand the armed forces of a joint German-Polish attack. This war would mean real and inevitable catastrophe. Our diplomacy must realize and maintain good relations with the Poles or the Germans and guarantee the security of our eastern or western borders."⁷⁷ Even though the USSR was considered to be Lithuania's ally in 1939-1940, Lithuania was forced to sign an agreement on mutual assistance and 20,000 Red Army soldiers were allowed to enter its territory, which was expected to help Lithuania in the event of war with Germany. Only then was the USSR itself seen as a possible aggressor and an 'R' plan was prepared.⁷⁸

In planning the country's defence, the Lithuanian army primarily relied broadly on its previous experience (in essence, the history of war). The main examples of the interwar period were World War I and Lithuania's War of Independence. Being in charge of both the Officer Training and the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army, General Leonas Radas-Zenkavičius (author of the first Lithuanian Military Doctrine, 1922⁷⁹) wrote in the introduction to his book about World War I, published in 1924: "From a cycle of warfare subjects, only the history of war demonstrates the coordinated actions of all the elements of war; only the history of war can showcase how through unexpectedness and other unknown factors the leader is incapable of foreseeing work in the process of realizing certain plans and intentions. Today's leader cannot consider himself suitable to conduct his duties in wartime unless he is at least familiar with the history of war, especially with the Great War [World War I – V. J.]" This work is dedicated to the Lithuanian Army's officers.⁸⁰ In the interwar period, the Lithuanian army highly emphasized and deeply analysed the experience of Entente allies – two small states: Belgium and Serbia. The

⁷⁶ Kasparavičius A., „Lietuvos kariuomenė Maskvos politinėse ir diplomatinėse spekuliacijose (1920–1936)“, in *Lietuvos nepriklausomybei – 80. Straipsnių rinkinys*, Vilnius: Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija, 1999, p. 5.

⁷⁷ Operacijų planas Nr. 2 „V+L“ 1937 m. sausio 12 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 994, l. 23.

⁷⁸ Jokubauskas V., „Lietuvos kariuomenės „R“ planas (1939–1940 m.)“, *Istorija*, 2014, t. XCIII, Nr. 1, p. 5–47.

⁷⁹ Jokubauskas V., „Pirmoji Lietuvos Respublikos kariuomenės karinė doktrina ir jos autorius [Radas-Zenkavičius, Leonas. Dėl karo doktrinos priėmimo Lietuvos kariuomenėj (dokumento publikacija)]“, *Karo archyvas*, 2015, t. XXX, p. 176–237.

⁸⁰ Radas-Zenkavičius L., *Trumas Didžiojo karo eskizas*, Kaunas: Vyr. štabo Karo mokslo skyriaus leidinys, 1924, p. 2.

documents note that the role of small states in a big war was secondary; their destiny depended on the success of powerful allies and their 'morality'. And looking into the future it was doubtful whether the USSR – on winning the war (had Lithuania been its ally) – would treat Lithuania in the same way the Entente treated Belgium and Serbia after World War I.⁸¹

In his book published in 1939, Staff Major General Vytautas Bulvičius, a lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University, generalized an attitude of the Lithuanian army in the interwar period toward warfare, widely discussed historical experiences, and emphasized:

Armed partisan groups can be prepared relatively quickly. But this will not be a true armed force of the state. Armed partisan units cannot be despised. They can successfully fight alongside a regular army; they can realize many secondary military tasks. The state, however, cannot rely solely on armed partisan units <...> By acting against the most significant forces of the enemy, armed units can only halt or reconnaissance the enemy, but these warfare tactics cannot determine the act of winning. <...> Today, only a regular army can win in a decisive battle against a regular and un-demoralized army [outlined in the document – V. J.].

“Should this regular army be further strengthened by armed partisan units that will carry out various subordinate tasks if needed, the army will undoubtedly gain more power, in that it will be able to accumulate its energies in the main directions, at the main places.”⁸² The Lithuanian regular army was thus predicated on the armed defence of the state, whereas the territorial units of riflemen and partisans were a very important auxiliary structure that should allow regular units to concentrate in the most important directions and hinder the operations, movement and concentration of the enemy forces.

In the interwar period, the Lithuanian army and the Riflemen's Union were actively preparing along with the regular forces to rely – in the event of war – on territorial units of riflemen and partisans as they did amid the War of Independence.⁸³ In 1924, Lithuanian military press wrote that in the event of war it would be necessary to form autonomous partisan units (up to 60 fighters), which should avoid open battles and confine themselves to ambushes. These subunits could not stay for very long in one place.⁸⁴ In the same year, *Trimitas* wrote that should war break out, all Lithuanian men should le-

⁸¹ Lietuvos valstybės finansų mobilizacijos planas karo metui. 1935 m. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 663, apv. l. 10–11, apv. l. 21.

⁸² Bulvičius V., *Karinis valstybės rengimas*, Kaunas: Kariuomenės štabas, Spaudos ir švietimo skyrius, 1939, p. 199–200.

⁸³ Jokubauskas V., “The Concept of Guerrilla Warfare in Lithuania in the 1920-1930s,” *Baltic Region*, 2012, No 2 (12), pp. 32-43. DOI: https://journals.kantiana.ru/upload/iblock/16f/Jokubauskas%20V._32-43.pdf

⁸⁴ „Ginkite gimtą lizdą nuo priešininko“, *Trimitas*, 1924, birželio 19, Nr. 192, p. 19.

ave their villages and go to the forests to gather into partisan units of 40 to 60 fighters. The units of that size – operating actively in the enemy’s rear and robbing its ordnance – had to provide supplies and ammunition. Remaining in the villages, the women and children had to stay on their own. These partisan units had to restrain the actions of the enemy forces.⁸⁵

In 1925, *Kardas*, analysing the prospects of military defence, stated: “It may happen that we will stay alone in the event of war. [...] We should bear in mind that we may be absolutely alone; therefore, we have to set up defence positions from the hills. These tactics will undoubtedly lead to guerrilla warfare from the outset. In order to succeed in this fight, it will be necessary to divide the whole territory of Lithuania into regions, counties, districts and even villages. [...] It is necessary to organize partisan units, provide for commanders of those units, [...] collect information for Lithuania’s military geography; examine the whole area in terms of defence; start military education in the country; introduce compulsory military training in the schools; introduce studies of all partisan wars [as compulsory subjects] in military institutions; colonize the country’s borders with partisans; and direct them to the areas where teachers, townsmen, foresters, rebels and police operate. Otherwise, when war breaks out, we will be faced with a lethal blow we will not be able to escape, just as no one saved Georgia [a reference to the Soviet Union’s and the Turks’ invasion of Georgia in 1921 and its occupation and territorial division – V. J.].⁸⁶ In 1927, *Trimitas* noted that for various reasons a positional war was hardly possible to come by, so the actions undertaken in war would be that of guerrilla warfare. Since the objective of any war is to win, “the enemy’s failure causes dissatisfaction in all its territory. This circumstance will help defeat the greatest enemy.” Thus, it is foreseen that the enemy’s army will have difficulty in operating in an occupied area where partisan resistance supported by local people will take place.⁸⁷ The principles and structure of dividing the land into definitive territorial units of resistance, applying the tactics of partisan activities and engaging the whole of society are formulated in a concrete way.

In Lithuania, a territorial cavalry war established the composition of the Riflemen’s Union in the interwar period⁸⁸ and a separate board of territorial dragoons was founded too.⁸⁹ Amid the biggest manoeuvres of the Lithuanian

⁸⁵ „Karas ir gyventojai“, *Trimitas*, 1924, liepos 10, Nr. 195, p. 16.

⁸⁶ Džukų Partizanas, „Mūsų kovos būdai“, *Kardas*, 1925, birželio 1, Nr. 10, pp. 5–6.

⁸⁷ „Kariški nakties pratimai“, *Trimitas*, 1927, vasario 18, Nr. 7, p. 208–209.

⁸⁸ Kurkietis I., „Šauliai-dragūnai“, *Trimitas*, 1931, gegužės 7, Nr. 19, p. 366.

⁸⁹ Jokubauskas V., „Lietuvos kariuomenės kavalerija tarpukariu: reguliarieji pulkai, šauliai dragūnai ir teritorinių dragūnų tarnyba“, *Karo archyvas*, 2015, t. XXX, p. 238–288.

army in 1930, “so-called territorial squadrons were formed for the first time. This is nothing but a cavalry mobilized on territorial (local) grounds. Having performed their military service, cavalymen with their horses, saddles and bridles – at the first call – assemble into mobilization areas where they fall into organized units. Several squadrons are called up to conduct these manoeuvres.”⁹⁰ In 1932, the Lithuanian military magazine *Karys* wrote about the Finnish Army’s reforms, “where a newly reorganized army incorporated permanent and territorial systems. [...] A territorial army will be comprised of all riflemen and other residents who are bound to conscription but due to various reasons are relieved from active military service or not inscribed in the reserve. The country’s territory is divided into 30 mobilization regions (counties). Each region will have its own headquarters. The headquarters will aim to organize training for territorial units, prepare them for mobilization and realize mobilization.”⁹¹ In a sense, this is the core of the concept, understanding the difference between regular and territorial military units. It was written in the press that “given the territorial defence of the state, the roads of all people concur. One does not distinguish young people from adults, women from men, etc., who are able to fight in one or another way against the enemy of the state.”⁹²

It is equally worth pointing out that the partisans’ tactics were indispensable not only to the armed groups led by riflemen and partisans but also to the regular army units. Partisan warfare was separately discussed in Part II (on battle) of Statute P-51 of the Infantry Regiment of the Lithuanian Army: “Partisan teams, units or groups usually operate in the rear of the enemy. In one case, they can be left in advance (pulling), in another sent separately. Partisan activities are very diverse: destroy the enemy’s infrastructure (railways, bridges, etc.), attack headquarters and messengers after having severed communication centres, etc.; ambush separate networks of the enemy and his units; burn and explode the enemy’s ordnance. [...] What is best suited for partisan activities is big forests, swamps that are difficult to move in – in general, rugged terrain. The partisan units’ capabilities, composition and weapons depend on the task they are given. The actions of the partisans are determined not by their number but their value, in particular by the value of their commanders. The best and most daring soldiers are chosen for conducting partisan operations.”⁹³ The statute discussed what assets one should provide

⁹⁰ M., „Didieji mūsų kariuomenės manevrai“, *Karys*, 1930, rugsėjo 25, Nr. 39 (591), p. 768.

⁹¹ „Perorganizuojama Suomijos kariuomenė“, *Karys*, 1932, lapkričio 10, Nr. 46 (711), p. 917.

⁹² Vosylius B., „Nepagrįsta baimė“, *Karys*, 1935, birželio 13, Nr. 24 (847), p. 568.

⁹³ *Pėstininkų statutus P-51. II dalis. Kautynės*, Kaunas: Spaudos ir švietimo skyrius, 1936, p. 247–248.

partisans with, what size of subunits is needed, how to bring food them, and it also included instructions on how partisans should act in the rear of the enemy and what actions they should take in the event of encirclement. All of the above instructions recurred in Statute P-51, which was republished in 1939.⁹⁴

In 1939, when analysing why the Polish army was defeated, it was written in Lithuania that in the event of confrontation with the enemy's dominance in the air it was important to properly allocate and mobilize forces in advance, in that its movement (manoeuvring) was dangerous. Therefore, it was stressed that "small units of territorial formations, which, by using all available labour of the local population and transport forces to set up barriers, can if not halt then at least slow down the enemy's plundering of the land. It is taken for granted that territorial formations will not match the armed forces, either in training or weapons. This situation is quite natural as the armed forces are used to fighting in the main directions, whereas territorial formations can perform their tasks in secondary directions with cheaper weapons and less well-trained men."⁹⁵ Attention was paid to the fact that "the Poles were incapacitated to organize territorial units – cheap and extremely significant in war in terms of defence – on a wider scale, for the first condition of establishing such formations was to have a mass of faithful citizens interested in winning a war [in the interwar period in Poland, the Poles represented only 69 percent, the rest were Ukrainians, Belarusians, Jews, Germans, etc.,⁹⁶ who were not always loyal to the national state of Poland – V. J.]. This resulted in remobilization since there was no other way the Poles could use a tremendous number of those who were not interested in victory but to make them perform regular military service wherein people were forced to fight at least in terms of discipline."⁹⁷ There is another condition, identified in interwar Lithuania, for creating territorial units and implementing territorial defence – that is, loyal and motivated residents in such areas where a territorial defence system is employed.

Referring to Lithuania's experience in the interwar period, it can be stated that territorial defence is at least a seven-element symbiosis: 1) it operates in a specific and defined territory, interacting with neighbours; 2) local people are involved in, contribute to, or at least support the resistance; 3) local civil authority participates in the resistance; 4) combat units are comprised

⁹⁴ *Pėstininkų statutas P-51. II dalis. Kautynės*. 2 laida, Kaunas: Spaudos ir švietimo skyrius, 1939, p. 247–250.

⁹⁵ V. B., „Trumpo Lenkijos karinio pasipriešinimo priežastys“, *Kardas*, 1939, spalio 15, Nr. 20 (322), p. 504.

⁹⁶ Davies N., *Dievo žaislas Lenkijos istorija. Nuo 1795 metų iki mūsų dienų*, t. II, Vilnius: Lietuvos rašytojų sąjungos leidykla, 2002, p. 446.

⁹⁷ V. B., „Svarbiausioji priežastis“, *Kardas*, 1939, gruodžio 1, Nr. 23 (326), p. 571.

of the local population; 5) guerrilla tactics are often utilized although their applicability is not equal to territorial defence and vice versa; 6) territorial resistance takes place in territory occupied by the enemy, and its participants do not withdraw together with regular units but continue the battle with no time limit; 7) elimination of resistance in one of the territories does not directly affect the continuation of the struggle in other territories. Thus, autonomy, the unconstrained continuity of the struggle, interconnectedness between the combatants and the area of action, civil authority and population (old social relations are important and not new ones created only in wartime) are the essential elements of territorial defence from a historical point of view. The first objective of such forces is not to win but not to lose. The ability to survive and continue the fight is already a victory, in that it prevents the enemy from winning, locking the enemy into a stalemate.

In the interwar period, by using the territorial principle, the Lithuanian army resolved two major issues related to territorial defence:

- 1) the mobilization of reservists and composition of military units
- 2) *territorial defence*:
 - a) territorial *cover* – demolition of infrastructure and hindrance of enemy forces
 - b) territorial *resistance* – unarmed and armed combat in its own territory occupied by the enemy in mobilizing the population and destroying the enemy's living forces, important objects, resources, communication lines, infrastructure in general
 - c) territorial *protection* – protection of infrastructure and other important objects, maintenance of public order and the fight against the enemy's actions in the back of friendly forces⁹⁸

It has to be noted that during the interwar period, in order to carry out territorial defence tasks one would draw on the militarized public organization, the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (LRU), which had a wide network of autonomous and decentralized units (companies and platoons). In 1940, there were about 1,200 subunits including 88,000 riflemen (bishops, sponsors,

⁹⁸ Jokubauskas V., „Teritorinė gynyba tarpukariu Lietuvoje“, *Savanoris*, 2016, lapkritis / gruodis, nr. 11–12 (489), p. 20–26.

candidates, women, children) of whom 48,000 were riflemen⁹⁹ 26,000 military personnel and two civilians conducted their service in the regular forces.¹⁰⁰ Hence, a ratio of regular units and active reserve and territorial forces was 1:1.85, which was not fixed but existed on its own accord since the state did not limit the number of riflemen but urged society to join the LRU in order to increase the active reserve. Incidentally, little did the state contribute to maintaining the riflemen's structure; many subjects were funded by the principle of mutual aid, or even by letting the riflemen's units borrow from banks.

It is important to note that the LRU headquarters in Kaunas or the Conscript Board in the event of war had little direct impact on the activities of riflemen's units; right at the beginning of the war everyone had to act independently according to the premeditated plans and then show initiative with regard to the existent situation. Nor did the value of the territorial units of riflemen and partisans depend on their number and arsenal – rather, it relied on the leader's intelligence and initiative and the fighters' motivation. The key precondition for maintaining resistance is the support and assistance of the local population; therefore, fighters had to carry out combat operations with great care and prudence, taking into account the lives of the local people. The LRU structure was so flexible, decentralized and autonomous (meaning that should the Central Staff or Conscript Board and their commanders cease, every riflemen's unit would be able to operate successfully and continue to resist) that a network of riflemen – after *de jure* dissolution of the LRU by the Soviets in 1940 – was not annihilated. Their number was too large even for the Soviets to observe or take control of them all.¹⁰¹

One of the principal factors determining the success of military operations was the ability to quickly mobilize and act coherently (Figure 2). However, one would fear an unexpected assault since general mobilization of the

⁹⁹ Of 48,107 riflemen there were 19,067 of the first class; 8,902 of the second class up to the age of 45 (reserve personnel); 16,448 who did not perform their military service and were up to the age of 45; 3,372 who did and who did not carry out their military service and were over the age of 45. At that time, the LRU needed approximately 19,000 rifles, 1,000 machine guns, 1 million cartridges, and 5,000 grenades more. Dėl LŠS vado rašto Nr. 1378. 1940 m. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 591, apv. l. 43; LŠS vado 1940 m. balandžio mėn. raportas kariuomenės vadui. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1097, l. 29–30.

¹⁰⁰ Grigoraitis V., „Lietuvos kariuomenės automobiliai 1919–1940 m.“, *Lietuvos archyvai. Apie Lietuvos kariuomenę*, 1999, t. XII, p. 23–47.

¹⁰¹ *Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga valstybės ir visuomenės tarnyboje 1919–2004*, Sud. V. Kavaliauskas; J. Širvinskas, S. Jegelevičius. Kaunas: Lietuvos šaulių sąjunga, 2005, p. 157–197.

Lithuanian army (it would take two days) had not yet commenced.¹⁰² This was exactly the amount of time that cover units had to win. In resolving this question, a number of measures were undertaken: 1) cover teams (CT) of regular forces, deployed near the border and deprived of mobilization; 2) border guard battalions (BGB) based in the border police and riflemen living near the border had to mobilize to a maximum of ten hours;¹⁰³ 3) non-mobilized members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, involving civilians and local people, had to massively destroy and dismantle communications lines and infrastructure and launch partisan resistance in those territories that had been occupied by the enemy and destroy the headquarters, reserves and forces.

In 1940, the Lithuanian army headquarters held the view that it would be inappropriate to establish companies or battalions on the basis of non-mobilized riflemen and use them for static defence, halting or attack. So the riflemen had to operate: 1) in small subunits (sections and squads) or even individually; 2) in their own well-known areas; and 3) would be given tasks they were fully prepared for. In this context, three objectives for non-mobilized riflemen were formulated: a) to attack the enemy in the rear; b) to protect important assets in their own back; and c) to impede the enemy's mobile groups.¹⁰⁴ The latter task was considered to be the most important. Partisan activities, described as dangerous at the enemy's rear but very honourable, were not preceded by a list of riflemen since every rifleman had to start partisan resistance without additional orders.¹⁰⁵

Cover was one of the essential means to gain time for the mobilization and concentration of regular forces. During the interwar period, the regular Lithuanian army planned to fight by impeding the enemy in broad sectors and itself within the confines of the main rivers (Dubysa, Nevėžis, Šventoji, Neman, Neris). It had to be manoeuvre warfare; positional warfare was repudiated under the conditions existent in Lithuania. In all cases, the main forces had to assemble to the east of the Dubysa, to the west of the Šventoji and to the north of Kaunas. On being engaged in fighting, they had to retreat toward Latvia, depending on the direction from which the enemy was launching his attack.

¹⁰² Such terminology was real and approved in practice – training took place in 1930 and 1937; in September 1939, partial mobilization of the Lithuanian army occurred. For more information about mobilization, see: Jokubauskas V., „Lietuva ant karo slenksčio: 1939 m. kariuomenės mobilizacija“, *Karo archyvas*, 2012, t. XXVII, pp. 276–332.

¹⁰³ Pasienio apsaugos dalimis mobilizuoti direktyva, 1940 m. vasario 20 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 587, l. 2–9.

¹⁰⁴ Šaulių panaudojimo reikalu [1940 m.]. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1097, l. 8–9.

¹⁰⁵ Nurodymai šauliams priedangai panaudoti, 1940 m. balandžio 16 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1153, 2 apv. l.




Figure 2. Principal scheme of the regular Lithuanian Army's concentration and allocation in 1940, according to military operation plan 'G' (Germany) and the tactics of operating in broad sectors

Compiled using: *Pėstininkų statusas P-51. II dalis. Kautynės. 2 laida*, Kaunas: Spaudos ir švietimo skyrius, 1939; Priedangos uždaviniams vykdyti, 1940 m. kovo 23 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 591, l. 34–36.

Note: The Lithuanian army planned to defend the sector between Šiauliai and Kaunas along the Dubysa River (preparatory work was intensively performed so as to fortify these positions) and the Neman River and foresaw that the northern flank would be protected by the forces of Latvia and the USSR (deployed from the base located in Courland) and the southern flank by the USSR military forces stationed in Prienai and Alytus as well as by arriving reinforcement. The defence of the Lithuanian army was predicated on applying the methods of impeding the enemy and operating in wide sectors.

In 1939-1940, amid the realization of the cover methods, there was a move toward so-called 'cell' tactics (Figure 3). It was calculated that in Lithuania each rifleman's unit embraced an average of 70 km² (10 x 7 km) territory with approximately 2,500 inhabitants. It was expected that after having realized mobilization there would remain at least 1,000 able-bodied population, at least 150 horses and 75 carts. Through these capabilities the riflemen had to organize and control the dismantling of infrastructure, destroy bridges, dig roads or block them by using logs. Creating and disabling the obstacles occurred in two levels ('degrees'). Having received the order to carry out the first-level works, it was necessary to leave the possibility to passage with horse-drawn carriages; railways, bridges of four metres or longer and important road junctions, especially in towns, were not destroyed but prepared to be devastated. After the military authorities had ordered to carry out second-level works, the whole infrastructure had to be destroyed. Two levels were needed to allow riflemen to perform part of their work in advance and not prevent the movement of their own reservists and troops. In this way, Lithuania's territory in the event of war would be webbed or look like a honeycomb controlled by the army and division headquarters. It was stated that "in this web our [Lithuanian] army can manoeuvre freely, [...] the enemy's mobile army can go everywhere only at a relatively slow pace. In this way, our troops should have time to respond to all fast movements by the enemy's land forces."¹⁰⁶ Dismantling works that took place two kilometres from the border section were to be carried out by BGB divisions.¹⁰⁷

Riflemen and partisans had to protect from ambush the obstacles that were hard to overcome and pass by the enemy. Cells had to cover the territory of their own rifleman's units and be named, for example, the Veiviržėnai cell. A certain number of cells that were in the same direction of combat operations were subordinated to districts controlled by the commanders of the cover teams and divisions. For instance, 15 'cell districts' were foreseen in the territory of the Second Infantry Division as well as in the areas of the 17th Šakiai, 8th Vilkaviškis, 14th Marijampolė and 9th Seinai rifleman's units.¹⁰⁸ The units' cells were divided into 'cages'.¹⁰⁹ Riflemen deprived from their cell were to move toward pre-planned places and join other riflemen protecting another areas of resistance. Each resistance element located deep within the area would then be

¹⁰⁶ See: Šaulių panaudojimo reikalu (footnote 104), p. 8–11.

¹⁰⁷ Nurodymai PABn panaudoti, 1940 m. balandžio 29 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1153, l. 9.

¹⁰⁸ See: Nurodymai šauliams priedangai panaudoti (footnote 105), p. 3–4.

¹⁰⁹ Kliūčių-ardymų Veiviržėnų plotelyje skaidrė, priedas Nr. 2 (pavyzdys). 1940 m. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 608, l. 23.

protected by a bigger riflemen's force¹¹⁰ only as long as the covert actions were to be carried out. In case of the Wehrmacht's invasion, 1940 cover units were tasked with protecting the line – that is, in Žemaitija, Telšiai – Janapolė – Varniai – Laukuva – Kaltanėnai – Nėmakščiai – Viduklė – Kalnumai for up to 48 hours.¹¹¹

Meanwhile, in trying to find analogues to such 'cell' tactics in other countries as well as the possibilities of mobilizing riflemen, it was argued that riflemen were deployed to fight the mechanized enemy's units, yet only in their own territory where they were supported by the local population, and military activity occurred on a vast front. And it was also stated that "not a single major European country has ever been and is prepared to fight under such conditions, so there should be nothing surprising that when searching for examples that will suit a small state which is about to fight on broad fronts on its own territory, one fails to find any. Small countries often blindly follow the examples of large countries, and therefore it is useless to look for examples of a small country. It is necessary to create these examples without deriving them from other countries and to only rely on the good knowledge of our own conditions."¹¹²

For example, by referring to the plan of 1940, the commander of the 6th Kartena Riflemen's Unit of the 15th Kretinga Riflemen's Detachment was ordered to allocate four armed riflemen to protect the Kartena post and eight riflemen to protect the bridge over the Minija River. Eight riflemen instructors and 14 citizens had to perform road works between Kretinga and Kartena, three kilometres to the west of Kartena. The riflemen and civilians had to dig a trench 1.5 m wide and 1.5 m deep along the whole road alongside which they had to place trees. To carry out these works, the local people had to use six shovels, two crowbars, four saws and six axes. They had to prepare a former ravine for explosion. These obstacles had to be defended by eight riflemen whose task was to occupy the positions in Abakai village on the left bank of the Minija River in case the enemy started removing the obstacles in the road. Eight riflemen instructors and 12 citizens had to prepare a bridge over the Minija at Kartena for burning. Straw and gravel had to be taken from the nearest inhabitants, and the rifleman Kostas Zajančkauskas had to store 80 kg of kerosene at his home. The workers had to bring three crowbars, five axes and six saws to destroy the bridge. The commander of the riflemen's unit during peacetime was to ensure that all of the citizens involved in the demolition work knew in advance what

¹¹⁰ Šauliams priedangai panaudoti nurodymai, 1940 m. kovo 13 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 608, l. 2.

¹¹¹ Laikinieji nurodymai III PD vykdyti priedangą, 1940 m. kovo 16 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1155, l. 1–6.

¹¹² See: Šaulių panaudojimo reikalai (footnote 104), p. 9–9.

tools should be taken.¹¹³ In the event of mobilization, Kartena riflemen's units had to be led by the junior non-commissioned officer Stasys Brazdenkis; his deputies, who would have been privates, were Kostas Zajančkauskas and Jonas Rimkus. In 1940, the unit was comprised of 44 riflemen who were to remain in place in the event of war. The riflemen had two machine guns, 49 rifles and 12,000 cartridges as well as three pistols and 75 casings.¹¹⁴ This was a plan for only one unit in case of war; there were hundreds of such units.




Figure 3. Principal system of cells and dens for realizing territorial cover in 1940

Compiled using: Šaulių panaudojimo reikalu [1940 m.]. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1097, l. 8–11; Šaulių priedangai panaudoti nurodymai 1940 m. kovo 12 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 608, l. 16–23; Jokubauskas V. „Mažųjų kariuomenių“ galia ir paramilitarizmas. Tarpukario Lietuvos atvejis. Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universiteto leidykla, 2014p. 420–425; Jokubauskas V., Vygantas V., Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos XX Klaipėdos rinktinė 1923–1939 metais. Klaipėda: Druka and Lietuvos kariuomenės Karo kartografijos centras, 2016.

Note: Prepared with reference to the plans of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and to the comprehensive archival database; it is not a copy of a specific situation.

¹¹³ Įsakymas XV (Kretingos) šaulių rinktinės 6 Kartenos šaulių būrio vadui [1939–1940 m.]. LCVA, f. 511, ap. 1, b. 579, l. 18.

¹¹⁴ XV Kretingos šaulių rinktinės sudėties ir ginklavimo žinios, 1940 m. sausio 1 d. LCVA, f. 511, ap. 1, b. 576, l. 48.

Should the enemy attack from the west and reach the first defensive limit (the Dubysa River), the units, headed by riflemen partisans and composed of the local population, had to approach *territorial resistance* in the area occupied by the enemy.¹¹⁵ In essence, it was partisan activity that one placed a huge emphasis on in interwar Lithuania. Here it is necessary to stress that Lithuanians relied on their own experience of 1918–1923; historical cases and theoretical concepts were studied and other states' experiences in the interwar period were closely examined. One must point out that partisan activity has two concepts: 1) it is a movement that often emerges spontaneously while reflecting on a situation whose participants have a clear political agenda; 2) these are the planned and coordinated actions inspired by military forces: a) whose units comprise volunteers from regular forces operating especially in the rear of the enemy (raids, landing-parties); b) soldiers/riflemen, intentionally or accidentally remaining at the enemy's rear, assemble and operate in the back of the enemy and co-opt new members among local people into their units. And this can be flexible. For instance, a spontaneous movement (that of the Riflemen's Union in 1919) can be combined and coordinated at the national level. Regular units can operate simultaneously to carry out combat tasks in the back of the enemy where partisan units constantly operate. In all cases, what was needed, first and foremost, was motivated fighters, intelligent commanders, the comprehensive support of the local population – in short, the people's will to resist.

Third, the nature and continuity of territorial defence – *protection* depends on the enemy's actions as well as on the capabilities of self-defence forces to withstand. In the interwar period, their spectrum of functions was broad and embraced not only the physical protection of objects¹¹⁶ but also fighting against espionage, enemy disinformation, rumours, the spread of panic,¹¹⁷ etc. In addition, security units should always be prepared to pass on to the resistance and vice versa; forces that had undergone resistance were to provide protection after their own regular forces had returned (e.g., the uprising of June 1941), thus eliminating the remaining enemy troops, ensuring public safety and the protection of objects, and keeping the soldiers of regular units deprived of the function of protecting their own rear.

In addition, six infantry battalions (one battalion in Plungė and one in

¹¹⁵ For more information about partisan tactics in the interwar period, see: Jokubauskas V., Vygantas V., *Lietuvos šaulių sąjungos XX Klaipėdos rinktinė 1923–1939 metais*, Klaipėda: Druka ir Lietuvos kariuomenės Karo kartografijos centras, 2016, p. 66–92.

¹¹⁶ 1940 m. gegužės 3 d. kariuomenės štabo įsakymas LŠS vadui. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1097, l. 41.

¹¹⁷ See: Jokubauskas V. (footnote 72), p. 673–689.

Žemaičių Naumiestis and from one regiment in Tauragė and one in Marijampolė) carried out the cover tasks. On the basis of calculations conducted by the Lithuanian army, units ensuring cover (henceforth referred to as CUs) would not reach the main boundary of the Dubysa and Neman rivers and would be destroyed by the enemy. The northern flank was 35 km, the central one 55 km, the southern one 39 km, Kaunas defensive stretch 14 km. It was calculated that at least three CUs were needed for defending the northern sector; four CUs for protecting the central sector; four CUs for the southern sector with Kaunas; and there were three CUs in the reserve – overall, 14 CUs. In the rear, there must remain one to two CUs, and under cover there must remain two CUs; hence, a minimum number of infantry regiments were calculated which comprised 17–18 CUs. CUs in the northern flank were planned for defending 17.5 km in the main positions and 18.3 km in the centre. One regiment was ordered to protect the Neman River in the southern flank, from the Dubysa River to the Neris River; a 39 km front would have been assigned to this regiment for protection. In the vicinity of Kaunas, each unit had to defend a 7 km zone. To protect Kaunas from the east, a battalion was set up within the eight-kilometre sector.¹¹⁸ Thus, infantry units had to operate in very wide sectors, ranging from 7 km to 39 km, while the sector's length was determined by what natural barriers there were and by the importance of where combat operations took place. The regiment was tasked to 'reliably umbrella' 39 km along the Neman River, from the Dubysa to the Neris, where there was not a single bridge. On the edge of the Dubysa, each unit had to protect 17–18 km, and only 7 km for the fortified suburbs of Kaunas. There was a greater concentration of forces near Kaunas for the following reasons: 1) Kaunas was considered to be the central point of resistance, and it was crucial to protect it for as long as possible; 2) the city was the *de facto* capital in which there were central government institutions and a large centre of military mobilization and ordnance storage, and therefore it was essential to withhold it for at least several days. A part of the military assets had to remain in Kaunas to supply its defensive divisions, and some of the assets were planned to be distributed in a decentralized way between the Nevėžis and Šušvė rivers. These military pieces were to be allocated to the forces in the area of the Dubysa River and should suffice for a week.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ Priedangos uždaviniams vykdyti, 1940 m. kovo 23 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 591, l. 34–36.

¹¹⁹ Evakuacijos reikalai, 1940 m. balandžio 1 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1020, l. 10.




Figure 4. Plan of the Lithuanian army's territorial cover, military forces and defence in 1940, according to the operation plan 'G'

Compiled along: Šaulių panaudojimo reikalai [1940 m.]. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1097, l. 8–11; Šaulių priedangai panaudoti nurodymai 1940 m. kovo 12 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 608, l. 16–23; Lietuvos kariuomenės štabo I skyriaus referavimas, 1939 m. spalio 10 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1152, l. 11–18; Kariuomenės dislokacijos reikalai, 1940 m. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 607, l. 26; Priedangos uždaviniams vykdyti, 1940 m. kovo 23 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 591, l. 34; Evakuacijos reikalai, 1940 m. balandžio 1 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1020, l. 8.

At the end of 1939 and in the first half of 1940, if Germany was to launch offensive operations four defensive lines of regular forces were to defend by retreating and manoeuvring (Figure 4).¹²⁰ In the event of war, the German military forces were expected to firstly achieve the boundary of the Daugava River – Baranovičiai.¹²¹ In April 1940, the Lithuanian army headquarters provided in the cover instructions that “one must bear in mind that there may emerge a gap between our army and the Latvian army if the Latvians withdraw from the Dubysa River.”¹²² In April 1940, the 1st Department of the Lithuanian Army's Headquarters wrote that the agreement with the Latvian army on its

¹²⁰ Lietuvos kariuomenės štabo I skyriaus referavimas, 1939 m. spalio 10 d. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 3, b. 1152, l. 11–18.

¹²¹ Kariuomenės dislokacijos reikalai, 1940 m. LCVA, f. 929, ap. 5, b. 607, l. 26.

¹²² See: Priedangos uždaviniams vykdyti (footnote 118), p. 34.

military operations in the northern part of Lithuania was being prepared.¹²³ Already living in the United States, Commander of the Lithuanian Army Divisional General Stays Pundzevičius recalled that it was back in 1939 when he went to Riga to coordinate plan ‘R’;¹²⁴ he therefore may have discussed plan ‘G’ too. The army’s headquarters considered that the USSR’s military forces would support Lithuania in the event of Germany’s offensive operations, and it was expected that in the future Lithuania would have to coordinate its own plans of operations with the RA: “On the basis of the plans of military operations there must be a ‘G’ variant – that is, an operation plan against Germans.”¹²⁵

4. In the Event of the Loss of Statehood: Resistance in 1941 and 1944-1945

The Soviet occupation of Lithuania occurred in June 1940, and it happened like in a textbook where the principles of Sun Tzu’s art of war are enshrined. The Lithuanian government itself eliminated the threat of military resistance by political decisions; the leaders provided the army and riflemen with succinct and stringent instructions – do not resist but amiably accept the Soviet occupying forces. Yet according to the plans, the riflemen had to gather quickly in the pre-planned places where the weapons were kept in the event of war. In the case of an unexpected attack, “the riflemen should assemble and perform the tasks automatically without waiting for an order.”¹²⁶ Notwithstanding several incidents (the killing of a frontier guard, shootings from an ambush), Lithuania was occupied without great bloodshed, and Latvia and Estonia were cut off from Germany by land. The riflemen, whose mission was to resist any aggressor without orders, were instructed not to act and even tried to show loyalty to the new government. On June 15, during a night-time meeting, having actively called for the unconditional acceptance of the USSR’s ultimatum, the last Prime Minister Antanas Merkys and his deputy Kazys Bizauskas were immediately arrested by the Soviets: one was exiled, the other was shot. But there prevailed an air of incomprehension in society. Society did not receive any adequate information about the situation in the country and the three-

¹²³ See: *Evakuacijos reikalu* (footnote 119), p. 8.

¹²⁴ Eidintas A., *Gyvenimas Lietuvai. Vincas Mašalaitis ir jo darbai*, Vilnius: Mokslo ir enciklopedijų leidybos centras, 2015, p. 249.

¹²⁵ See: *Kariuomenės dislokacijos reikalu* (footnote 121), p. 26.

¹²⁶ Šauliams mobilizacijos ir operacijų metu panaudoti nurodymai, 1939 m. balandžio 5 d. LCVA, f. 1326, ap. 1, b. 320, l. 10–11.

ats it was exposed to. On 15 June 15 1940, Lithuanian newspapers appeared with headlines about Paris' capitulation – European events simply shadowed the occupation of Lithuania and other Baltic states. And in the first days, the Soviets did not undertake any actions that could have provoked public anxiety, indignation or resistance. Even the VMU professor and historian Zenonas Ivinskis in his diary began to reflect on the Soviet occupation only from 21 June 1940, that is, only after a week. And, according to the historian Artūras Svarauskas, “One can only presuppose what attitudes Lithuanian society being not so literate and not so quick in apprehending political events had.”¹²⁷

In 1939, Stasys Šalkauskis, rector, educator and philosopher at VMU, reasoned, “And today we have citizens who – due to real or imaginative offences – long for a foreign government. In recent times, certain factors have increased the number of such citizens; meanwhile, they had to be morally disarmed and, most importantly, re-educated. But this requires at least some knowledge of social education methods. What we need is antislavery protection to the same extent as air defence: in the last instance, we are to maintain our physical life; in the first instance – to save our moral life; but unfortunately, neither the first nor the second has evolved. Further, I would rather not speak but scream...”¹²⁸ In February 1940, the agronomist Vytautas Vazalinskas, heavily reprehending the government for poverty and social exclusion, stated directly: “The general population, farming and labour do not much care about national affairs due to the lack of reasonableness; therefore, in them predominate passivity and an absence of interest.”¹²⁹ Director of the State Security Department Augustinas Povilaitis emphasized the importance of social issues in the context of security and defence. The existent situation was precisely described in the then press: “When there is no gap between rich and poor, between the satiated and the hungry, between the loafers and the overtired, between the educated and the less educated, then it will be beneficial for the motherland and all her children.” It was emphasized that “the key determiner of independence deals with the implementation of *social justice* or, in other words, with the fair distribution of wealth and earnings throughout the country.”¹³⁰

In this context, in 1940, defence concepts and plans would not work. However, during the year the Soviet authorities managed to make a large part

¹²⁷ Svarauskas A., „Valstybinė opozicija ir politinė krizė Lietuvoje 1940 m. okupacijos išvakarėse“, *Istorija*, t. LXXXX, 2013, p. 32.

¹²⁸ Šalkauskis S., „Gerbiamašis pone redaktoriau [Lietuvių tauta ir jos ateitis]“, *Naujoji Romuva*, 1939, Nr. 14–15 (428–429), p. 316.

¹²⁹ Vazalinskas V., „Tautos gerovės besiekiant“, *Naujoji Romuva*, 1940, vasaris, Nr. 5 (473), p. 77–79.

¹³⁰ See: Jokubauskas V. (footnote 72), p. 673–689.

of the population snap out of their lethargy. Arrests, repressions, nationalization of property and dismissals from work electrified society, and the final point was – the exiles that took place on June 14–18 in 1941, just a few days before the German invasion began; 17,500 people were deported to the depths of the USSR (Siberia). In June 1941, an uprising occurred¹³¹ when Germany launched Operation Barbarossa and the Wehrmacht invaded the USSR. During the upheaval, one could draw on a two-century territorial structure of riflemen although the Riflemen's Union itself was abrogated in July 1940. The Soviets were, however, not able to destroy or effectively control the social fabric. Virtually, during the uprising, fighting units operated in accordance with the defensive concepts of interwar Lithuania; it was not the Lithuanian but the German regular army that operated nearby. Such territorial defence units quickly and effectively took over the protection of important objects and captured the remaining soldiers of the Red Army. In the depths of Lithuania and in eastern regions they also participated in more active armed clashes with Soviet soldiers.¹³² These rebel forces were not concentrated in one place, and they did not draw their actions toward a particular direction as the manoeuvring units of regular forces did. The rebel groups were allotted throughout the whole territory of Lithuania (e.g., Figure 5, Kretinga region's case), and their nuclei incorporated the former members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union.

¹³¹ Jankauskas J., *1941 m. birželio sukilimas Lietuvoje*, Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2011. 540 p.

¹³² Girdžiūtė Ž., „Šauliai – 1941 m. birželio sukilėliai: Kretingos apskrities atvejis“, *Istorija*, 2014, t. 94, nr. 2, p. 5–22; Noreika D., „Šauliai, Birželio sukilimas ir partizaninis karas: Šiaurės rytų Lietuvos atvejis“, *Lituanistica*, 2015, t. 61, Nr. 3 (101), pp. 221–234; Noreika D., „1941 m. Birželio sukilimas: fenomeno pažinimo ir vertinimo problemos“, in *Transfers of Power and the Armed Forces in Poland and Lithuania, 1919–1941 = Valdžios transferai ir ginkluotosios pajėgos: Lenkija ir Lietuva 1919–1941 metais* (Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis, Vol. XXXII). Ed. by V. Jokubauskas, V. Safronovas. Klaipėda, 2016, pp. 144–178.




Figure 5. Allocation of units participating in an uprising in Kretinga region in 1941

Note: Of 534 rebel units identified in the territory of Kretinga region there were 194 or 36.33 percent of the members of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union.

Compiled using: Girdžiūtė Ž., Šaulių vaidmuo 1941 metų birželio sukilime: Kretingos apskrities atvejo tyrimas [bakalaurinis darbas], Klaipėda: Klaipėdos universitetas, 2012. 74 p.

A new phase of fighting started in 1944 – when the Red Army reached Lithuania again, and the second Soviet occupation began. At that time, Lithuanian society was of the opinion that the geopolitical situation was similar to that of 1918-1919, when the defeated German forces were retreating and the

Red Army was moving slowly after it. Tomas Sabaliauskas, who was in charge of the Kriaunai unit of the Lithuanian Freedom Army (LFA) and took part in the June 1941 uprising, was tasked with “organizing the LFA’s section in the Kriaunai township of Obeliai district and co-opting ‘white partisans’ [who had participated in the June uprising], riflemen and others. In addition, I [T. Sabaliauskas – V.J.] was ordered not to mention the LFA’s name when enlisting people in the LFA but to say that volunteers wishing to fight for an independent Lithuania were elected, as in 1918-1919.”¹³³ Similarly, as in 1919, the Soviets in 1944 began to mobilize people into the ranks of the Red Army.¹³⁴ However, in 1944 it was a completely different army, not like the one from the east in 1919, which reached Lithuania. Tens of thousands of Lithuanians became involved in a partisan war during which small partisan units that had been formed in Lithuania started to join larger formations – later, districts. A district consisted of two to five teams which were divided into companies, units and sections. An area was comprised of two to three districts (Figure 6).¹³⁵

So the territorial structure was functioning. The existence of the partisans’ underground state can be observed although this question requires comprehensive research.¹³⁶ In 1944-1953, the Lithuanian partisan war was a widespread phenomenon; it can, however, be stated that not only did the Soviets seeking to achieve victory fight against the partisans, but they also contended against Lithuanian society as a whole. Massive deportations of civilians, terror, sabotage and collectivization shattered the Lithuanian people’s determination to support the militant partisans. An atmosphere of fear and mistrust was created, and finally the economic potential (farmers), indispensable to providing partisans with the necessary supplies, was also destroyed.

¹³³ Noreika D., „Partizano asmuo ir kova“, in *Balys Vaičėnas. Partizano sąsiuviniai. Lokio rinktinės vado dienoraštis, laiškai, manifestiniai tekstai*. Parengė K. Driskius, R. Mozūraitė, P. V. Subačius. Vilnius: Tautos paveldo tyrimai, 2013, p. xi–xii.

¹³⁴ Tininis V., *Prievartinė mobilizacija į Raudonąją Armiją*, Vilnius: Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos tyrimų centras, 2014. 312 p.

¹³⁵ Antisovietinis pasipriešinimas 1944–1953 m. [žr. 2017 09 25] <http://genocid.lt/centras/lt/1486/a/>

¹³⁶ Petrauskienė A., „Lietuvos partizanų pagrindžio valstybės bruožai“, *Tautosakos darbai*, t. 53, 2017, p. 155–174.




Figure 6. Territorial structure of partisan resistance against the Soviet occupation in 1944-1953

Compiled using: *Lietuvos nacionalinis atlasas*, t. II, Vilnius: Petro ofsetas, 2015, p. 78.

Note: The Lithuania partisan movement did not occur or manifested itself weakly in the territories designated by letters A and B due to the composition of civilians.

Conclusions: 20th century Experiences in Response to the Challenges of the 21st Century

Historical analysis reveals that Lithuania in the first half of the 20th century was faced with a wide range of military threats, when it had to fight not against the regular forces of other countries under the conditions of conventional warfare. In addition, *de jure* 'military forces' without their state, that is, the Bermontians and the Želigovskininkai, also operated against Lithuania. Moreover, symmetry was indispensable to military actions; Lithuania had to contend with the more powerful forces of the enemy. Geographical borders and the direction of actions remain the same and are urgent up until today. In

this context, one can therefore envisage the vastness of applicability of partisan tactics. These were the armed forces of riflemen and partisans or of spontaneously organized civilians and the military units of regular forces remained or were deployed to attack the enemy's rear by military leaders. Furthermore, these were also the momentary actions of local communities in response to external threats and the pre-planned operations that had been foreseen or even coordinated by the central authorities, the military headquarters. Their totality is a certain *partisanism*;¹³⁷ in other words, the aggregate of partisan movements and that of applicability of partisan tactics – a symbiosis of regular and irregular units.

In planning Lithuania's defence, it is worth seeking a synergy between the efforts of the civil authorities, regular forces, militarized formations and civilians at all levels and striving for the territorial decentralization of planning activities and military operations. Territorial forces must have the support of the local population and aim not to lose. Overall, the success and outcome of a war depends on the success of manoeuvring regular forces and eventual allies, as well as on the geopolitical situation in the region. In 1919-1923 and 1941, the territorial formations (employing partisan tactics) in Lithuania were successful, and excellent results were achieved when the regular forces fought alongside them. Meanwhile, in 1944-1953, in spite of the effectiveness of the Lithuanian partisans' activities and their ability to survive for a long period of time, they did not succeed in achieving victory (regaining Lithuania's independence). Therefore, in the 21st century, one is to consider a similar model. The purpose of the regular forces is to concentrate, preserve and protect the supreme political leadership; wait for allies; and counterattack. Co-operating with the territorial administration and having ensured public support, the territorial forces aim to survive and not to lose, and this would deprive the aggressor from the ability to establish his victory and supremacy of his government and would also force him to withdraw a significant part of his military forces from military actions with the regular units of Lithuania and its allies so as to protect its communications, resources and headquarters in the already occupied territory of Lithuania.

It is equally important to point out that in employing partisan tactics, territorial defence will inevitably lead to the point where a broad section of

¹³⁷ Partisan war, partisan resistance, tactics of partisan activity, etc., often have a completely different content. On the one hand, it can be a spontaneous movement of the local population, resistance, or self-organization-based resistance against a more powerful aggressor. On the other hand, it can be even an expedient activity (raids, airborne landing) of regular military forces units in the enemy's rear by employing partisan tactics. Partisan movements and their activities can emerge both momentarily and can be planned at the national level, organized, and supported. Hence, it is a wide spectrum of activities, and therefore it is paramount, in every instance, to define the object.

Lithuanian society will become a target for an aggressor aiming to undermine the will of the partisans and society to resist. Historical experience suggests that there is always a risk that part of the Lithuanian population will be prone to actively collaborate (especially those who are detached and feel disappointed), while some will try to remain only passive observers. In addition, one cannot but notice that even a deliberate decision to cooperate (for example, the cases of Bizauskas and Merkys in 1940) cannot guarantee that the enemy is inclined to accept collaborators and ensure their safety. It is also likely that if part of the territory is occupied, the aggressor may start mobilizing the Lithuanian population to join its military formations. Lithuanian regions and towns – where ethnic minorities and other social groups little integrated into Lithuanian life live densely – present some distinction and risk to the planners of national defence. Having not created a civil society in which the absolute majority of citizens can feel full members and in which the central government trusts its citizens, and, for example, voids allowing members of the paramilitary organizations to keep weapons at their homes, those responsible for the national defence of the country inevitably need to identify and determine which parts of Lithuanian society (both in geographical and socioeconomic terms) are treated as a priority when planning the armed defence of the country.

In the 21st century, and especially in recent years, Lithuania has highlighted an increase in the citizens' motivation to oppose external aggression, but unlike the situation in the interwar period, less attention is being paid to the formation of competences: when, where, what and how to act to make resistance yield the desired results. In Lithuania, the conditions that prevailed in the 20th century differ from those of the 21st century. So it is impossible to transfer the concepts and plans of the first half of the 20th century and simply apply them to today. Several important aspects can be taken into account: a) a guarantee of loyalty and support of civil authority and local people, as well as their involvement in the resistance; b) the necessary preliminary theoretical and practical preparation of those partaking in the resistance (especially commanders) and the creation of detailed plans; c) social networks established in peacetime, and sociality will be crucial; d) preparedness enabling part of society to collaborate or stand apart and remain observers in the event of armed conflict or especially when partisan warfare and territorial defence methods are utilized.