EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and Lithuania

The controversial war in Iraq has revitalized the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union (EU), which has been stagnant since Maastricht Treaty and the failure in the Balkans. The development of the CFSP is accumulating acceleration: the EU will soon have not only a common market, common institutions and a single currency, but also a common constitution, minister of foreign affairs and even a common army. The leaders of the larger states are especially enthusiastic about a stronger CFSP as a counterweight to the US dominance in the international security affairs. The authors of this article contend that clearly articulated and globally projected CFSP will not be possible unless common European interests stemming from as common European identity and implemented by common supranational institutions will emerge.

The impact of the CFSP on Lithuanian foreign and security policy will depend on the pace of European integration in this area and the strength of European identity within the political elite of Lithuania and the society itself.

Will this impact be of a positive nature? It will depend on the way Europe will choose: creation of an independent defence structure as an alternative to NATO or development of a cohesive strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case, Lithuania will have to constantly seek for a subtle balance between her commitments to NATO, implications of the EU membership and the strategic partnership with the US. In this process Lithuania will need not only impressive indicators of a rapid economic growth or modern military capabilities but especially excellent diplomatic skills to maneuver among the rifts of transatlantic relations in order to safeguard national interests of Lithuania.

Introduction

The simple and at the same time genius plan of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman to merge the steel and coal industries of two eternal rivals, Germany and France, in the beginning of the 50’s has launched the ambitious European integration project. This project initially had to prevent a new war but outgrew this purpose and

---

* Algirdas Gricius*  
Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius  

Kęstutis Paulauskas*  
Lithuanian Military Academy  
Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius

---

* Doc., Dr. Algirdas Gricius - Associate Professor of Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Vokiečių 10, LT-01130 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2514130, e-mail: algic@itis.lt  
* Kęstutis Paulauskas - Lecturer of the Political Science Department of the Lithuanian Military Academy, Ph.D. candidate of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of the University of Vilnius. Address: Šilo 5a, LT-10322 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370-5-2103569, e-mail: kestutis.paulauskas@pastas.kam.lt
eventually turned into an economic and political union encompassing 15 countries. In spite of 50 years of successful economic integration that led to a single market, single currency and supranational institutions, in the security and defence realm the achievements of the European Communities and later the European Union (EU) were rather modest and sometimes even underwent complete fiascos.

In December 2002 in Copenhagen, Lithuania was invited to the EU to take effect on May 1, 2004. What will be the foreign policy of the enlarged Union? How will the future membership affect the security policy of Lithuania, which so far was balancing between support to sometimes completely diverging policies of the US and those of the EU towards crucial issues of international security such as the disarmament of Iraq or the International Criminal Court? In Lithuania there are numerous articles, op-eds and books written on the subject of eurointegration, economic union, common foreign and security policy, EU institutions and decision making mechanisms. Among the most recent works on these topics are the books: by Klaudijus Maniokas “Enlargement of the European Union and the Europeanization: accession of the Central and Eastern European states to the EU”1; Gudijus Vareikis “Europe turning into a dinosaur”2, Ramūnas Vilpišauskas “Integration in Europe: Baltic States and the European Union” (“Integracija Europoje: Baltijos šalys ir Europos Sąjunga”)3. Authors of this article have also previously written on the matter4.

In spite of the huge body of literature available, many empirical and theoretical problems remain unresolved. After all, the dynamics of the policy of the EU and its members is in a constant state of flux triggered by an ever-changing international environment. Therefore it presents a nearly bottomless source for academic research. The most recent material for such research are the results of the work of the Convention on the future Europe that ended in July 2003. The Convention that lasted a year and a half and gathered representatives from the EU Parliament, Commission and members of parliament of the current and the future members of the EU concluded with the drafting of the EU Constitutional ‘Treaty’5. The Draft Treaty has foreseen rather significant changes in the functioning of the Union’s institutions and the CFSP in particular. The Constitutional Treaty has yet to be approved by the Intergovernmental Conference that starts in Autumn 2003. In the context of the future EU membership of Lithuania all these questions gain additional meaning and significance.

The authors of this article seek two objectives. Firstly, we will try to explain why despite the success of economic integration the EU was not able to achieve anything similar in the sphere of CFSP: having become an economic giant the EU

---

1 Maniokas K. Europos Sąjungos plėtra ir europeizacija: Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybių įs jungimas į Europos Sąjungą., Vilnius: Eugrinas, 2003
2 Vareikis E. Dinozaurėja E. Europoje., Vilnius: Strofa, 2002
remains a political dwarf. Secondly, what is and what should be Lithuanian policy
towards the CFSP in the future: unconditional support for the CFSP ("pro-European
politics"), ignorance of the CFSP ("pro-American" position) or balancing between
the two and search for compromises ("euro-atlanticist" policy).

The main assumption of the authors of this article is that clear articulation and
global projection of the EU's CFSP will not be possible until clear-cut common
tenetns based on common European identity and implemented by efficient supra-
national institutions will emerge. Accordingly, the influence of the CFSP on the
security policy of Lithuania will depend on the pace of European integration in this
sphere as well as on the strength of European identity within the Lithuanian political
elite and society itself.

In the following paragraphs we will review the theoretical framework existing
with regard to EU integration in the sphere of CFSP.

1. Problem of European security identity

Various international relations theories differ in explaining the phenomenon
of European integration by attaching different weight to the variables discussed above: identity, interests and institutions. However some authors conclude that all these
efforts are usually not very successful⁶. Different international relations theories
rather successfully explain separate aspects of the phenomenon of EU integration –
economic benefits, social welfare, peace or security; however to tackle the essence of
the entire process one needs a synthesis of different theoretical approaches.

1.1. European integration and theories of international relations

European integration has become a huge challenge to the realist paradigm
that has dominated the international relations theory throughout the Cold War. The
dynamics and logic behind this phenomenon have contradicted all the main assump-
tions advocated by realists. For example, one of the most prominent realists, K.
Waltz, contended that economic cooperation leads to interdependence which consti-
tutes a threat to the national security of states⁷, therefore the states as rational actors
seeking to ensure their national interests should avoid such interdependence. The
reality of eurointegration neglected this assumption: European countries not only
expanded their economic cooperation to a single market, but also delegated a part of
their national sovereignty to supranational institutions.

European integration has become a central focus for the liberal paradigm⁸. The
liberal school of thought asserts that nation-states are not the only actors of

⁶ See: Kelstrup M., Williams M. C. (red.) International Relations Theory and the Politics of European
⁸ The following works can be associated with the liberal tradition: McCormick M. The European
international relations – international organizations are no less important. Moreover, economic cooperation among countries that for ages were engaged in wars did not threaten their security but became an indispensable condition for prolonged peace in Europe.

However these liberal assumptions cannot explain why successful economic integration of European countries did not lead to political-defence integration. If economic interdependence diminishes the likelihood of war to a minimum, common security and defence policy would enable better protection of EU interests from external challenges. In a certain sense, the realist could explain the latter phenomenon better by arguing that national security is the main attribute of a state, the ultimate expression of its sovereignty and therefore the states are not willing to abandon their historical prerogative in favor of common security interests of the EU.

If the liberal paradigm can successfully explain economic integration, the realist paradigm is better at explaining why similar integration did not take place in security and defence affairs. However neither paradigm could pull both trends into one consistent integration theory.

Some authors contend that post-positivist social constructivism can offer a more viable European integration explanation. Constructivists maintain that material structures only have meaning in a certain social context through which we can interpret them. In other words one cannot understand the EU as merely an international organization carrying out certain functions that were provided by the member states. A number of social factors must also be considered: European history, political geography, norms, values and even ideas that influence and form thinking of the Europeans themselves. Positivist realist and liberal paradigms simplify social reality therefore rational explanation models cannot explain the influence of these less rational yet no less important factors of EU policy.

One of the most important variables in the constructivist approach is the identity of the subject of international relations, which to a large extent determines its interests and preferences. In other words, in the term “European Union” the word “European” is no less important than the word “Union”; accordingly in the term “American hegemony” the word “American” is as important as “hegemony”. Identity is a priority value and a normative construction having specific political, social, cultural and other qualitative features that distinguishes a subject of international relations among other actors. There is a qualitative difference between such concepts as “European Union” and “Soviet Union” or “American hegemony” and “European hegemony”.

Although the authors of this article do not intend to disregard the theoretical concepts of traditional international relations theories such as sovereignty, national security or power, in the analysis of the current EU CFSP the authors take into account these rather new and important insights about the social nature of the EU and its influence on Lithuanian security policy.

---

10 See: Checkel J. T. “The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory”, World Politics, 50(2)
1.2. One Europe or many Europes?

What is “Europe”\(^2\)? It would be wrong to assume that Europe lacks identity. On the contrary: Europe has many identities. One can draw different but closely interrelated maps of European identity: political, geographical, security, economic, cultural or religious\(^3\).

The simplest map of Europe is the political one – it is a map of more than 40 countries of various sizes from tiny Malta and Liechtenstein to France and Germany. Out of these 40 states 15 are members of the EU with 10 ten more due to join in 2004. From the ethnic perspective it is more than 100 ethnic communities\(^4\). Geographical boundaries of Europe are usually drawn around the Mediterranean in the South, Atlantic in the West, Arctic in the North and Ural mountains in the East. Thus countries like Russia, the Ukraine, Turkey and even Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan can have legitimate claims of being a part of Europe. Nearly 270 million people in Europe live outside the EU and it is without 150 million Russians. It would be incorrect to identify Europe solely with the EU. In terms of culture and religion Europe is also far from being a homogenous entity: Europeans speak in 36 different languages\(^5\) (excluding dialects); there are Catholics, Protestants, Pravoslavs and Muslims living in Europe.

The security map of Europe is even more complicated. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) encompass more than fifty countries of Europe, North America, Caucasus and Central Asia. NATO and the EU are carrying out rapid expansion to Central, Eastern and Southern Europe. Even the Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia are contemplating the possibility of becoming NATO members. The king of Morocco has also applied for EU membership\(^6\). It all boils down to a question how far will the EU and NATO expand and will the membership in these organizations ultimately decide the boundaries of Europe?

The definition of European identity also depends on the perspective. During the Cold War the concepts of the “West” and “Europe” were synonymous although Greece and Turkey (southeast Europe) belonged to the “West” and Czechoslovakia was in the “East”. The future member of the EU Cyprus is only 200 km away from the coast of Lebanon and it is further south than Tunisia and Algeria and further east than Kiev. French president De Gaulle had a “certain idea of Europe”\(^7\) – he envisaged Europe as a political union of sovereign states stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural. NATO “Europe” covers the area from “Vancouver to Vladivostok” (in comparison to the EU “Europe from Lisbon to Liubiana”)\(^8\). Partnership for peace

---

\(^2\) For deeper analysis of “mental maps” of Europe see: Walker M. “Variable geography: America’s mental maps of a Greater Europe”, *International Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 459-475

\(^3\) See: McCormick M., op. cit., p. 92

\(^4\) Ibid.

\(^5\) Wallace W. “From the Atlantic to the Bug, from the Arctic to the Tigris? The Transformation of the EU and NATO”, *International Affairs*, vol. 76, no. 3, 2000, p. 477


\(^7\) Walker M., op. cit., p. 452
exercises were carried out in Kazakhstan which is in Central Asia. One could conclude that Europe seen through the windows of Washington seems bigger than the one seen from the windows of Brussel. It is possible to speculate that NATO enlargement would not have taken place if the US had left the whole responsibility to Europeans themselves. Rapid expansion of NATO in turn prompted the eurobureaucrats to hasten EU enlargement as well. To conclude, any definition of “Europe” is unavoidably subjective and depends on the historical, cultural and political perspectives of the observer.

The current Iraqi crisis reaffirmed that it is impossible to talk about any common political identity of Europe under the flag of the EU. Some politicians and observers also announced a new partition of Europe – this time between the “Old Europe” – France and Germany – that try to counter American global dominance and the transatlantic “New Europe” that supports American policy18.

On the other hand, having in mind the huge political and cultural varieties and hundreds of years of wars that tore apart the European continent again and again, the current level of European integration is unbelievable. Such symbols of European unity like the EU flag, anthem (Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy”), single currency and finally draft Constitutional treaty are signifying the development of a common European identity. After all, as M. McCormick contends, the development of European identity depends on Europeans themselves and the pace with which they will be able to break the historical myths and forget the past of wars19. The latest polls of the Eurobarometer indicates that more than 50% of EU citizens claim to be not only German, Italian or Finnish, but also Europeans; 10% claim to be only Europeans20. If the proportion of such thinking will grow in the future the logical next step would be a true European citizenship.

In conclusion, it is difficult to envisage a common EU foreign and security policy in the absence of a clear-cut identity of Europe as such. On the other hand the identity of Europe is best defined by variety and pluralism rather than unity and homogeneity. It is highly unlikely that the EU will ever behave in the international arena as one single and supranational state. After all, social reality is way more difficult than the sum of relations among nation-states and international organizations – as the realists and liberals would have us to believe.

1.3. European dimension of Lithuanian security identity

How does he European identity unfold in Lithuania? “Return to Europe” was a credo of Lithuanian foreign policy since the recreation of the state. During the referendum on the EU membership in May 10-11, 2003, nine out of ten citizens of Lithuania that came to vote said “yes” to the EU while in Estonia, allegedly the most pro-European country out of the three Baltic states, only 63% voted in favor.

18 For example, see: “New Europe, Old Europe”, Wall Street Journal, 24 Jan. 2003
19 See McCormick M., op. cit., p. 73
A question rises whether such desire of Lithuanian society to join the EU erupted due to European self-identification of Lithuania or due to the hopes that the rosy promises of the politicians will come true. It would be naïve to conclude that the citizens of other European countries voted in favor of EU membership only out of European solidarity. On the other hand, it is legitimate to ask what constitutes the content of “European identity”? Is it the history which saw many wars, radical nationalism and xenophobia; is it culture and language which have more differences than similarities; is it the EU symbols – the flag, the anthem, the Euro and the EU passport, which trigger less emotions for the Europeans than their national symbols? Or maybe it is the social welfare and security provided by the EU, the freedom to travel, work and do business in any country. Apparently the right answer is somewhere in between as the former ultimately led to the latter

Today nobody would argue that Lithuania belongs to Europe. However the contents of the European identity of Lithuania are not clear, especially in the sphere of security. Yet it is no doubt that the process of eurointegration itself and the formal requirements for membership and preparation for it had a very strong impact on the “europeanisation” of Lithuania. On May 1, 2004, Lithuania will become a part of the EU’s political map as a full-fledged member.

Lithuanian identity at the regional level is very complicated. Lithuania is the most southern country of Northern Europe and the most northern country of Central and Eastern Europe. Lithuania is also one of the countries of the Baltic Sea region. Belonging to one or another region implies rather different aspects of Lithuanian security and defence policy. Lithuanian presence in Northern Europe is first of all manifested through a rather elaborate network of political, economic, cultural and military bilateral and multilateral ties in the format of 5 (Nordic countries) + 3 (Baltic countries) which recently started to transform into more cohesive NB 8 format. This format will likely be exploited within the framework of the EU to facilitate conciliation of interests and policies among these countries.

In the Central and Eastern European regions Lithuania has emerged as one of the leaders especially due to the success of the Vilnius group, which has coordinated the efforts of the NATO hopefuls in their preparation for NATO membership. Finally the Baltic Sea region is institutionalized in the format of the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), which encompass Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Russia and Germany in addition to the Baltic states. The agenda of the CBSS consists of economic, social and environmental issues.

Paradoxically the largest influence on Lithuanian foreign and security policy is exerted by an outside non-European factor – the US. It is impossible to disregard the role of the US when talking about Lithuanian security identity especially in the context of NATO membership. The Baltic – US charter of 1999 has reinforced this role. In the beginning of this century this cooperation expanded into a 5 + 3 + 1 format, which is aimed at retaining US interest in the regional affairs of North East-

21 One of the most interesting accounts of European identity is: Delanty G. Europos tiesinimas: ideja, tapatumas, realybė. Vilnius, Lietuvos rašytojų sąjungos leidykla, 2002
ern Europe and coordination of efforts to expand the zone of security eastwards. Although some Lithuanian authors assert that the US impact on Lithuanian foreign policy was and still is overestimated, while the influence of the big EU countries, especially Germany, is underestimated,23 the authors of this article argue that belonging to Europe should be the one and only factor and option for Lithuania in setting its security policy priorities. These priorities must be determined not by sentiments to one or another country but by objective geostrategic calculations.

2. Global role of the EU

The formation of the EU identity as a pluralistic community is no doubt an important factor defining the exceptionality of the EU and to a certain extent determining its place in the world. However to define the identity of one or another subject of the international system is not enough to explain its practice of external relations. In other words, the role and power of the EU in the world is determined by two other variables – interests and the instruments of their implementation – institutions and appropriate economic, demographic and military resources.

2.1. EU interests: the problem of common denominator

Although the European identity is very difficult to grasp, all EU countries have one thing in common – they are all in Europe. After all it is the essential criterion beside democracy and a market economy to qualify for EU membership. Without any common identity it would be simply impossible to even contemplate about some common interests. Therefore the presence on the continent of Europe itself is a certain lowest common denominator for common interests to emerge.

However the constructivist approach to international relations has one backdrop – while explaining the importance of the social context of the international system it tends to disregard the actors of this system – states and international organizations. Preferences, motives, intentions and interests of these actors are the building blocks of the social reality and not vice versa, although there is a certain feedback. Of course it is important to realize that, for example, the humanitarian endeavors of the EU are an organic part of its own identity rather than pragmatic policies and other countries do expect the EU to behave like that. It is a different story how this interest is implemented in practice and how it affects the relations between the actors. The solution to the latter question is a matter of politics and has little to do with identity.

European integration itself started from a common interest – to avoid another war between Germany and France. Another important common interest was determined by the Soviet threat. In other words, in the beginning of European integration the common denominator of interests was rather high. After the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet aggression faded away, the spectrum and variety of national interests have widened greatly and they have become increasingly contradicting: therefore the

23 For example, see: Nekrašas E. “NATO ir Europos Sąjungos santykių transformacija bei Lietuvos užsienio politika” in Šiaurės Atlanto erdvė ir Lietuva., Vilnius: Egrimas, 2001, p. 35
common denominator went down. However it would be wrong to assume that the EU does not have any common interests. On the contrary: the growing economic power and economic interests of the EU requires a strong common policy in the world arena. This understanding was embedded in the Maastricht treaty J.1 article outlining the objectives of the CFSP, which could be also considered as the "common interests" of the EU:

- to protect the common values and fundamental interests of the Union and its independence;
- to strengthen security of the EU and its members;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security;
- to foster international cooperation;
- to consolidate democracy and the respect for human rights and freedoms.

Hardly any EU country would disagree with these objectives. The problems arise due to diverging perceptions of how to implement these noble goals. For example, when the EU was trying to solve the crisis in the Balkans in the beginning of the last decade, all EU members agreed that the main EU interests were restoration of security and peace in the region; however different countries had different views towards the strategy of implementation of these interests. The CFSP ended up being not at all common, not security, and not policy.

2.2. Challenges of the CFSP Implementation

It is obvious that wishful thinking will never be sufficient for a truly common CFSP. The opportunities for implementation of interests and therefore the success of the EU in external affairs are affected by several factors.

First is the strength of the link between France and Germany: today this link seems stronger than ever – common sittings of the Parliaments of both countries are the best proof of this. The Paris – Berlin axis actually is the main driving force behind the CFSP. However the Iraqi crisis has indicated this axis may lose its grip if it disregards the views and interests of other big EU countries, especially the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain and will try to shut out the future members of the club. After all, any consistent CFSP would not be possible without the involvement of the United Kingdom – the most prominent European military power beside France. In 1998 the British and French Prime Ministers T. Blair and J. Chirac signed the St Malo declaration which expressed the belief that Europe needs autonomy from the NATO security and defence dimension was a step forward in this respect but the events surrounding the war on Iraq was definitely a step back.

The experts of the daily Financial Times came to conclude that Europe today faces three problems: a British problem, a German problem and a French problem31. It remains to add that all these problems are related not only to the problem of

31 See: Ash T.G., Mertes M., Moisi D. "Only a club of three can bring European unity", Financial Times, 11 July 2003, p. 11
compatibility of interests but also with the problem of identity. For the past 30 years of EU membership London has been lost between its “special relationship” with Washington and Atlanticism on one side and euro-scepticism and actually belonging to the EU on the other. The French political elite adhere to a slogan that everything that is bad for America is good for France. Paris tries to apply the same slogan to the rest of Europe. It is therefore natural that J. Chirac's proposal to the EU candidates that supported the US to keep quiet was met by frustration in the capitols of these countries. The problem of France is not as much its historical antagonism towards the US as the attempt to shape the European identity on the basis of anti-americanism, which is in itself a destructive strategy. Such strategy not only failed to achieve any positive results but also further deepened the rift between the “old Europe” and the “new Europe”. Finally Germany seems to struggle in its search for identity within Europe, haunted by historical traumas, unrealized political-military potential of leadership and fading euro-enthusiasm. Experts of the Financial Times prescribe a rather simple recipe to cure these ills: a more European United Kingdom, a more modest France and a more bold Germany.

Another important factor or constraint of the CFSP is political crises within the EU and the ability or disability of the EU to handle them. The principle of consensus on CFSP decisions breaks apart every time the EU faces a serious crisis. This was the case with the Balkans when Germany „forgot“ to consult other EU members and recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, while the efforts of the EU to manage the crisis was a total fiasco and engagement of the UN and later NATO became necessary. A very similar situation emerged during the second Iraqi crisis: instead of a firm single EU position, there were: the Letter of Eight, the declaration of the Vilnius 10 group, and the staunch resistance from Germany, France and Belgium. On Iraq the EU not only did not a common policy but also failed to even coordinate actions of separate member states. Crises like these are the best test to the viability of the CFSP. Until now, the EU always failed to pass it.

Yet another important factor is the transatlantic link that seems to be at its lowest point since the end of World War II. On one hand, after the crises in the Balkans and especially the Kosovo war, the US became increasingly disillusioned about the ability and willingness of the EU to share the burden of security. Washington seems to rely on unilateral military action reinforced by “coalitions of the willing” when it comes to handling serious international crises. Ungrounded EU political ambitions and an unwillingness to invest accordingly into its own security and defence had opposite consequences: the influence of the European allies in Washington decreased with regard to solutions of main international security issues (examples include the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). On the other hand, growing American unilateralism prompted some of the most important NATO allies to distance themselves from Washington’s policy choices. If the anti-American mood of the French government was hardly surprising, the analysts did not forecast the fierce resistance of Germany to war on Iraq assuming that it would melt down eventually and Berlin would join the coalition. One can draw a paradoxical assumption that the EU's aspirations for more multilateralism in solving international problems only diminished the actual ability of the EU to influence the actual decision-making and its outcomes.

Last but not least is the role of the European Commission (EC) in the EU’s external relations. The EC is the most effective tool of decision-making and imple-
mentation within the institutional framework of the EU as it is not binded by the
principles of intergovernmentalism. The problem so far is the limited functions and
competency rendered to the directorate general on external affairs led by Ch. Patten.
The functions of this DG are limited to political aspects of external economic and
trade relations, while security and defence remained under the auspices of the second
pillar - CFSP. Obviously, the EC sometimes does employ its weight in order to re-
concile the positions of the member states on various issues of international politics,
however EU members cautiously observe that the EC would not abuse its powers. The
result is evident – the EC can only express its regrets. However the planned institutio-
nal reforms of the EU, which shall be discussed in the following chapters, may in-
crease the weight and power of the EC in international affairs.

In spite of many mentioned above problems of common denominator the EU
does have very clear interests in one area of external affairs - economy. The economy
is probably the most prominent source and expression of the EU’s global role.

2.3. Economic dimension of the external relations of the EU

Article I-3 of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe defines
the principles of external relations of the EU as follows: “In its relations with the
wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests. It shall
contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the earth, solidarity and
mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and protec-
tion of human rights and in particular children’s rights, as well as to strict observance
and development of international law, including respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter.”

Today the EU has its missions both at major international organisations and
more than 120 third world countries to carry out its external affairs, the CFSP and
foster bilateral and multilateral relations worldwide. In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty
gave way to the European Council to prepare long-term common strategies for sepa-
rate countries and regions25. The EU posseses quite a few political and economic
tools to increase its global influence. These are technical and economic cooperation
programs with third world countries, humanitarian assistance funds, common diplo-
matic actions, conflict prevention means, common positions and actions in various
international organizations and multilateral forums. Although 4/5 of the trade volu-
me of the EU is internal trade and trade with other non-EU European countries it is
still the main actor of global trade. The share of the EU in global trade is highlighted
in graph 1.

---

25 Common strategies for Russia and Ukraine were approved in 1999, and a strategy for the
Mediterranean in 2000.
1. **GRAPH: Global trade.**

![World trade in goods in 2000](chart1)

![World trade in services in 2000](chart2)

Source: http://trade-info.ccc.eu.int/doclib/cfm/doclib_section.cfm?sec=110&lev=2&order=date

The data provided in the graphs above indicate that the EU is in a position to employ its economic relations to pursue its political goals. However, EU relations are not always very smooth vis-à-vis the World Trade Organization (WTO), especially because of EU agricultural policy. The EU position with regard to trade in agricultural goods is opposed by the US, Australia, Canada and many developing countries. Disagreements between the EU and other members of the WTO sometimes arise over admission of new members like Russia or China.
Today the EU is the biggest provider of international assistance. Although the EU itself accounts only for 10% of global international assistance, together with separate member states it accounts for 55% of the overall assistance to developing countries. The annual portfolio of EU external assistance amounts to 9.5 billion. The EU also pursues its international authority by actively participating in multilateral environmental protection programs. While in the beginning the European Communities were focused on helping the former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific areas, today 2/3 of the EU’s assistance flows to Central and Eastern Europe, the former Soviet States, the Balkans, the Near East, the Mediterranean countries, Asia and Latin America. This support to regional development encompasses institution building, macroeconomic programs and protection of human rights.

Among different regions North America is the most important partner of the EU. Cooperation encompasses a lot of spheres from trade, intensive people-to-people contacts to security and defence. The EU-US relations are based on the Transatlantic declaration of 1990 which set bi-annual summits; the “New Transatlantic agenda“ of 1995, which prescribed further enhancement of world trade and bilateral relations; the document on the transatlantic economic partnership of 1998, committing both sides to remove technical obstacles to trade and foster multilateral liberalization; and the Bonn declaration of 1999 which calls for a comprehensive and equal partnership in economic, political and security realms.

The EU and the US are the main actors, partners and competitors of the global economy. Together they amount for almost half of the global capital and trade flows, their investment constitutes almost one billion euros a day. To each other they are the main partner for foreign investment. Graph 2 on EU trade in services illustrates one of the aspects of this importance – the US amounts to 2/3 of the EU trade in services. Business communities and their “transatlantic business dialogue“ also contribute to bilateral relations. In 2000 and afterwards the volume of trade and investment between the EU and the US exceeded one trillion euro. In 2002 the EU imported from the US goods worth €174 billion and services worth €120 billion euro. The export of EU goods and services to the US amounted to €238 billion and €116 billion respectively.

---

26 Information of the European Commission delegation in Lithuania, see: http://www.eudel.lt/lt/ es_pasaulys/isparcigijmai.htm
GRAPH 2: EU trade in services in 2002

Source: EUROSTAT

In spite of these impressive numbers close economic cooperation does not prevent the EU and the US from substantial disagreements on a number of different issues: the European countries criticise the US for not ratifying the Kyoto protocol on environment protection, for the death penalty, tariffs on steel imports and non accession to the International Criminal Court; whereas the US is not pleased with EU agricultural policy, the import embargo of genetically modified goods and a too modest military contribution to NATO. Finally the Iraqi crisis shed some light on some fundamental differences with regard to the perception of the international security order.

One of the strategic priorities for the EU is to bring peace and security to Southeastern Europe and involve the countries of the region to European political and economic life. During the 1999 EU summit in Cologne the heads of state adopted the stability pact for Southeastern Europe. This document focused on regional cooperation initiatives that would foster business, environmental protection and the fight against corruption and organized crime. The process of stabilisation and creation of common structures is the main policy tool that the EU employed with regard to Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia. The ongoing process encompasses economic and financial assistance, political dialogue, promotion of the free trade area and adoption of the EU legal system and practices. The EU is providing the countries of the region with substantial financial and technical assistance. During the last decade the EU injected €4.5 billion to the rebuilding of the region with the projected aid for 2000-2006 being even bigger.

20 The document is available on-line, see: http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactegi/catalog/cat_desc.cgi?prod_id=1806
21 Information of the European Commission delegation in Lithuania, see: http://www.eudc.lt/lt/es_pasaulye/isipareigojimai.htm
The EU maintains rather close relations with countries of the Mediterranean that are based on the 1995 Barcelona declaration. In the spirit of this declaration the EU has already signed bilateral association agreements with Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Palestine and Israel. The aim of this process is by 2010 to create a free trade zone of Europe and the Mediterranean. The European investment bank provides the countries of the region with €1 billion worth subsidies and €1 billion worth loans in order to help overcome difficulties associated with free trade. There is already an active economic exchange going on between the EU and the region (the volume of this exchange amounted to €2.2 billion in 200030).

The EU is a long-standing participant of the Middle East peace process albeit a not very succesfull one. The policy of the EU abides by the principle that only regional cooperation and economic development of the countries in the region can be the way to peace. Obviously such a commitment requires substantial financial support. The EU is a chairman of the Regional economic development group. The EU assistance to Palestine in particular stands out – from 1994-1999 the EU has provided Palestine with €1.6 billion aid or 60% of the total international assistance31. In 2003 the EU together with Russia, the US and the UN finally drafted the long awaited peace plan - the Roadmap - that allegedly satisfied all interested sides, however the never ending mutual bloodshed destroys all hopes for peace.

EU economic relations with Russia and other CIS (Commonwealth of independent states) countries are based on the TACIS program. This program seeks to transfer the experience of transition to a market economy, the strengthening of democracy and rule of law. The current seven year-program focuses on public administration reform, expansion of the private sector and social consequences of transition to a market economy. Russia plays a rather important role in the EU external economic relations. Of particular importance is the EU import of energy resources (oil and gas) from Russia. In 2001 EU trade with Russia amounted to €65 billion.32

The EU also pursues more extensive economic relations with Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea, Malaysia etc.), Africa and Latin America.

### 2.4. EU economic relations with Lithuania

It would be naive to think that Lithuania is an indispensable trade and investment partner for the EU, however a rapid expansion of economic relations between the EU and Lithuania throughout recent years do indicate a very positive trend. In 2002 the EU accounted for 48% of foreign trade of Lithuania (see Graph 3). In 2002 the biggest trade partners of Lithuania by country were: Great Britain – 2.73 billion Lt, Germany – 2.1 bn Lt, Denmark – 1.04 bn Lt, Sweden – 0.85 bn. Lt, France – 0.83 bn. Lt, Netherlands – 0.64 bn. Lt, and Italy – 0.57 bn. Lt. These data indicate that currently Lithuania enjoys rather wide economic relations with the major EU members.

---


31 Ibid.

European countries (CEFTA) and EFTA members account respectively for 7.3% and 3.4% of Lithuanian foreign trade (see Graph 3). It is noteworthy that the trade relations with the CIS countries were constantly diminishing during the last decade: in 1996 the CIS accounted for 38% of Lithuanian foreign trade, in 2002 this indicator dropped to 23%.

**GRAPH 3: Foreign trade of Lithuania 1996 – 2002 m.**

![Graph showing foreign trade in Lithuania from 1996 to 2002.](image)

Source: The Statistics Department of the Republic of Lithuania, 2003

In 2003 direct foreign investment of the EU countries in Lithuania constitute 7840 bn. Lt or 60% of all investment (see Graph 4). During the last three years the attention and activity of the CIS investors, in particular Russian companies, was significantly growing: the volume of investment increased from 153 million Lt in 2000 to 702 million Lt in 2003. It is also important to note that these numbers do not reflect the privatization of Lithuanian companies where the Russian capital is also very active.

**GRAPH 4: Direct foreign investment in Lithuania in 2003**

![Graph showing direct foreign investment in Lithuania in 2003.](image)

Source: The Statistics Department of the Republic of Lithuania, 2003
A very general overview of EU external relations allows asserting that the EU is a major actor in the world economy. Huge economic potential, wide international links with all regions in the world, assistance to developing countries and humanitarian aid in cases of natural disasters of armed conflicts do provide the EU with certain weight in international relations and peace and security building not only in Europe but in the whole world. However the economic achievements of the EU did not “spill-over” to the CFSP – security policy of the EU failed to meet quite a few crises, which prevented it from becoming an indispensable actor of the international security system. One could attribute the difference between the economic success and the failure of CFSP to the very nature of the market economy, which is driven by profit and the security realm, which is driven by national interest. However the EU did achieve rather considerable progress towards defence integration as well in recent years. Yet it would be difficult to prove a direct correlation between successful economic integration and processes in the defence sector although such a correlation could not be counted out as well. In any case these processes affect and reflect in the Lithuanian policy towards the CFSP.

3. Evolution of Lithuanian approach towards
CFSP: challenges and opportunities

Gediminas Vitkus maintains that even prior to the negotiations on the EU accession, which started in February 2000, Lithuania was an active participant of multilateral political dialogue within the CFSP framework. Lithuania on a regular basis has supported EU positions and declarations. Until 2001 Lithuania joined 611 common positions of the EU, including those made in the UN and OSCE. Only 10 times Lithuania decided not to support EU decisions and all of them were related to OSCE missions in Latvia and Estonia and the question of minorities in these countries. Moreover, Lithuania closed the negotiations chapter on the CFSP the moment they started – on May 25 2000. Lithuania did not ask for any transitional periods in this area and fully complied with all legal acquis requirements. In 2001 Lithuania joined 605 EU positions, in 2002 – 471 and during the first three quarters of 2003 – 80 EU positions.

The tremendous impact of EU enlargement on internal and foreign policy of Lithuania raises no doubts. The author of one of the most recent books on EU enlargement K. Maniokas maintains that “the impact of the EU on the candidate countries is extremely significant both in terms of intensity and volume”. K. Maniokas has thoroughly analyzed the consequences of European integration and the adjustment or the so-called euromanization for Lithuania in the general context of Central and Eastern Europe. Having evaluated the influence of implementation of the Copenha-
genic criteria in Lithuania, the author concluded that, “the EU enlargement has contributed to democratic consolidation, regional and internal political stability, economic growth and the state institution building”[37]. Yet it is important to note that this influence is more clearly apparent within the internal policy of Lithuania (as much as one can separate internal and foreign policy in the context of Europeanization and globalization).

In spite of the rather obvious and empirically tangible positive impact of European integration on Lithuania, the authors of this article argue that the Lithuanian relationship to the CFSP is way more controversial than the easy closure of the negotiation chapter on CFSP or support to the EU positions would imply. The successful outcome of accession negotiations illustrates only the formal side of the Lithuanian approach towards the CFSP. It is not challenging to support EU policy of violations of human rights or genocide in some authoritarian country at stake. However the Iraqi crisis has demonstrated that Lithuania may face much deeper dilemmas when the most important issues of international security are on the agenda. To make a resolute decision in the case of Iraq was relatively easy because the EU itself did not have a unanimous opinion on the issue. In the future such dilemmas will become sharper if the “second pillar” will move closer to the first pillar and acquire more features of supranationalism – at least this is what the draft of the EU Constitution envisages.[38]

The latter question is related to the problem of the duality of the Lithuanian security identity. Since the very beginning of the Euroatlantic integration process in the mid-90’s the following unofficial integration formula became popular among the Lithuanian political elite: membership in NATO should guarantee a long-term security for Lithuania in its toughest form – article 5 collective defence commitments. At the same time membership in the EU was supposed to bring economic welfare and social stability – the so-called “soft security”. Some Lithuanian authors maintain that, “de facto membership in NATO was for quite a long time – at least until 1999 – number one priority of Lithuanian foreign policy”[39]. The authors of this article consider such a proposition too bold and argue that both processes should be seen as equal in importance to Lithuania although different in their content and their consequences. The alleged fact that until 1999 when accession negotiation with the EU started (in fact, in the same year NATO also adopted the Membership action plan for prospective candidates) the Lithuanian political elite put more effort into NATO integration aspirations can be attributed to a rather objective cause: fading albeit persistent fear of resurgence of Russian expansionist claims and search for long term “hard security” guarantees that the EU would not be able to provide. In the official speeches of Lithuanian diplomats and politicians the formula of Euroatlantic integ-

---

36 The following “Copenhagen criteria” were introduced during the EU summit in 1993: political or democracy criterion, economic or freem market criterion and full adoption of acquis communauté.
38 The Draft of the EU Constitution abolishes the three pillar structure.
ration was rather ambivalent: “Membership in the EU is not a substitute for NATO but they supplement each other”. However one could hardly argue that the impact of membership in the EU on the internal and foreign policy as well as international status of member states have much further reaching consequences than membership in NATO. In this sense one should be cautious while assuming prioritisation of one or another organization in a certain period of time. Apparently other countries that sought membership in both organizations also made similar calculations, although in some cases there were certain preferred leanings towards NATO or the EU. Even among the oldtimers of the EU throughout the Cold war there was a rather strong consensus that NATO is the main collective security safeguard while the European Communities were supposed to bring welfare. However the end of the Cold War and the launch of the CFSP followed by the ESDP brought certain changes to this equation.

3.1. ESDP and its impact on Lithuania

After the euroscerosis of the 80's the beginning of the 90's was very promising for the European continent: the Soviet Union disappeared, the “Iron curtain” came down and the frontiers of Eastern Europe opened up, Germany was reunited, but the turmoil was starting in the Balkans. In the ocean of changes the EU looked like an island of stability. The status of the EU as a civilian power, a club of rich liberal states seemed to be well suited to take up the role of the leader in the emerging “new world order” where the role of military might seemed to be diminishing and NATO seemed to be a relic of the past. Even the US supported a stronger EU role in its own security affairs. However this euphoria soon melted away – the gap between EU ambitions to become an important actor of the international security system and its capabilities became apparent right after the Maastricht Treaty. Europe was not prepared to deal with crises in its own backyard – the Balkans. Only NATO managed to stop the bloodshed and achieve the Dayton peace treaty of 1995. The EU efforts to handle the Middle East peace process were a continuous failure. Even the process of EU enlargement seemed to be the result of rapid NATO enlargement. In addition the Kosovo crisis revealed a clear and hopeless gap between military capabilities of the EU and the US. All of this led to the launch of ESDP – European security and defence policy in 1998.

In 1998 in St Malo (France) the British Prime Minister T. Blair and the French President J. Chirac signed a declaration stating that, “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to international crises”48. This statement of two main European powers gave way to the decisions of the European Council in Cologne (1999/06) and Helsinki (1999/12) that led to a common ESDP. Until St Malo European defence policy was based on several uncontested principles: 1) European security and defence identity had to be developed under the auspices of NATO and with the support of the US; 2) the Western European Union (WEU) had to be the organizational structure for European defen-

48 See: Joint declaration issued at the British-French Summit, St-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998 / Howorth J. European Integration and defence: the ultimate challenge? Chaillot Papers 43, 2000
ce cooperation, closely tied to NATO; 3) the EU and its CFSP was excluded from any deliberations about European defence. A bilateral British and French declaration for the necessity of European defence autonomy challenged all these principles. Not accidentally the ESDP was initiated by the UK and France: only these two countries in Europe have a certain strategic vision which is projected beyond the boundaries of Europe and enough military, political and economic means to support this vision. In addition, both countries posses nuclear weapon and are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Therefore any independent European defence plans would be impossible without the military resources of France or the UK. Until now the UK was the biggest “euroskeptic” that opposed any common defence plans that could infringe on its “Special relations” with Washington. On the other hand France was always a most passionate supporter of European autonomy from the US and obviously could not reject the “Blair initiative”.

Indirectly the launch of the ESDP could be related to the establishment of a single European currency in the beginning of 1999, which indicated an unprecedented appogey of economic integration. It became clear that to safeguard EU interests a common foreign policy is necessary that would have adequate institutional, political and military tools instead of abstract and not-very-binding “common positions”. Common foreign policy in turn is hard to imagine without the security dimension and the latter without the defence element. Finally the Kosovo war that revealed European dependence on American teconology and assets facilitated the political and legal establishment of the ESDP during the European summits in Cologne and Helsinki. The very idea of ESDP rests on two mutually reinforcing assumptions: the US will not always be able or willing to engage in every crisis in Europe or in its periphery therefore if the European countries fail to modernize their military and pool together adequate crisis management capabilities Europe may find herself vulnerable. As the NATO Secretary General George L. Robertson once noted, it would be disastrous for Europe to have only two options – NATO or nothing.

The European Council in Cologne established an institutional framework for ESDP which in many respects resembles that of NATO. The following political and military institutions were created: the former NATO Secretary General J. Solana became the first High representative for CFSP, which would also serve as head of the Political and Security committee; European military committee – the highest military authority of the EU and European military staff which would provide military advise and expertise for the EU-led operations. These reforms signified political will of the EU to establish a single political-military planning and analysis center with a single phone number of the High representative. However creation of new institutions does not guarantee effective decision-making or implementation. To make ESDP viable, creation of effective military forces was instrumental.

During the EU Helsinki summit the heads of states declared the Headline goal – to create a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force to carry out Petersburg tasks (i.e. humanitarian, peace keeping and crisis management operations), able to deploy with 60 days notice and sustain for at least one year. Defence analysts raised three questions about this ambitious European plan: what are these new forces needed for; how will they affect US and Europe / NATO and EU relations and finally are the Europeans ready to spend enough money?
The EU countries agreed in Helsinki that the new forces will act where NATO as a whole would choose not to. Where would that be: in Europe or elsewhere? The EU decisions did not set geographic boundaries for EU crisis management operations however one could assume that the prerogative would be crises that rise in the “unintegrated periphery” of Europe. In 2003 the EU took over the NATO mission in Macedonia, and sought to take over the SFOR mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However J. Solana has noticed in one of his speeches that crises may erupt in any part of the world and therefore the EU should be ready for any contingency. In other words, the EU must be ready to act globally. The first such mission for the EU was the Artemis operation in the Congo Democratic Republic.

Another question – are the Europeans ready to pay for the new forces? At first glance the Helsinki goal is not all that ambitious if one takes into account that EU countries together have 1.8 million troops (in comparison the US has “only” 1.3 million) and for defence the EU members together spend 1/5 of world’s global defence expenditure annually. However willingness of the Europeans to invest in their own security comes into question if one looks at the post-Cold War trend in Europe – most EU members made sizeable cuts in their defence budget and only recently expenditure stopped diminishing. In 2002 France devoted 2.5%, the UK 2.4% and Germany 1.5% of GDP for defence (in comparison the US spent 3.3%). A real reason for optimism is a wide public support of EU citizens for the autonomous ESDP. As much as 79% of Germans and French support common ESDP; the EU average is 73%.

Experts assert, that implementation of Helsinki goal requires the following capabilities: 200 000-230 000 land force troops; some 300-350 combat aircraft, 60-80 frigates. In the capabilities planning conference in 2000 EU members and partner countries identified 100 000 troops, 400 aircraft units, 100 vessels to the pool of rapid reaction forces. Having in mind the overall number of the armed forces of EU countries, personnel pool will not be a major issue. The real challenge is acquiring real capabilities instead of paper ones. In certain sense the oversized armed forces of the EU puts a break to modernization of weaponry and equipment that is crucial for modern warfare and operations. By the end 2003 the EU still does not seem to be ready to handle alone such demanding operation as NATO military campaign in Kosovo or “Iraqi freedom”.

In a 2001 capabilities planning conference in Brusselss EU members and partner countries updated their contributions to rapid reaction forces supposedly narrowing the remaining capability gaps. EU officials even came to conclude that the EU would be able to carry civil policing operations – something that NATO was not very active in. In the beginning of 2002 the EU undertook its first independent civilian police mission – 500 policemen were deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was the first EU operation since the launch of the ESDP.

41 In 2002 the US spent 350 bn $, and in 2003 – 396 bn $ or half of the global defence expenditure.
43 For detailed contributions by country and analysis see: Paulauskas K. “Europos gynbos politika po St. Malo deklaracijos”, Krašto apsauga, nr. 4(7), 2002, pp. 7-11
As one should expect, France, the UK and Germany bear the lion’s share of commitments to the common EU forces. Lithuania has also identified a rather tangible contribution which is one of the biggest among the future EU and even some current EU members. Lithuania has identified one mechanized and one motorized infantry company-sized and platoon-sized unit, one section of military medics, one engineer platoon, a special operations force unit, 1 An-26 transport aircraft, 2 Mi-8 helicopters, 2 mine countemerge vessels and 2 training poligons. One must have in mind that Lithuania will also have to contribute a battalion-sized unit with supporting elements for NATO-led operations. The official policy line of Lithuania is a rather principal position that she has only one army and only one set of standards – NATO standards. Due to financial and material restraints Lithuania cannot enjoy the luxury of having two separate sets of forces for the EU and for NATO. Nevertheless a situation may emerge when Lithuania will be asked from both NATO and the EU to contribute forces and Lithuania will be able to choose only one.

Until now Lithuanian contribution to the EU-led operations was minimal (see Table 1). It is noteworthy that in the second half of 2003 the biggest portion of Lithuanian troops abroad were deployed not in NATO operations, but with ad hoc coalition in Iraq and the US-led operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan – a total of 147 troops. 130 Lithuanian troops served in NATO-led operations.

**Table 1: Participation of Lithuania in International operations in 2003**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATIONS</th>
<th>LITHUANIAN CONTRIBUTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR, Kosovo</td>
<td>100 troops in HALTSON-8 mission with Danish forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30 troops in KFOR-8 mission with Polish forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR, Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1 officer in Joint Forge operation with US forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAF, Afghanistan</td>
<td>2 military medics with German hospital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Concordia, Macedonia</td>
<td>1 officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Artemis, Congo democratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER OPERATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Iraq Freedom, Iraq</td>
<td>54 troops with Danish contingent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45 troops in Polish sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 cargo specialists with.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan</td>
<td>40-strong special operations force unit with US forces.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 3.2. Future of the ESDP and the transatlantic relations

The process of ESDP development is not as smooth as one could conclude from the determination of some EU members to contribute troops to the EU crises management forces. Although officially Washington welcomed the Helsinki decisions as a step that would strengthen the European pillar within NATO, the US administration was rather suspicious about the 1998 St Malo/ESDP process. The US
State Secretary of the time M. Albright expressed fears that ESDP would decouple European security from that of North America, would duplicate existing NATO assets and would discriminate non-EU NATO countries. In spite of skeptical American evaluation of the project, NATO Secretary General George L. Robertson noted that this initiative could also bring a positive effect – boost European military capabilities and European contribution to international security.

There is a clear provision in the main EU documents that ESDP is not aimed at replacing NATO or the creation of a European army and NATO is to remain a cornerstone of European defence. Duplication of institutions and assets is unavoidable and in a certain sense necessary. It is not as much a transatlantic issue, as an issue of misunderstanding and mismanagement of defence planning processes among EU countries themselves. The EU countries do not have any military technologies that the US would not already have. Paradoxically the idea of ESDP itself is to duplicate the assets of the US in the areas where the EU backwardness is the most glaring: the strategic air and sealift, satellite reconnaissance, precision guided munitions, etc.

The problem of discrimination is related to the merging of the WEU with the EU. Six NATO countries – Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Iceland, Norway and Turkey – were associated WEU members. However after the merger the EU did not adopt the system of membership and association of the WEU. Therefore the six countries were left outside the ESDP process. The countries that will soon enter both NATO and the EU (Lithuania among them) will not face this issue. Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary will also join the EU. The biggest problem is related to Norway and especially Turkey. The feasibility of membership of Turkey in the EU is rather distant. Turkey strongly opposed the plan to allow EU access to NATO assets. Only after a principal agreement between Turkey and the EU did a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU become possible. This partnership was established and strengthened by a number of agreements signed in 2002 and 2003. Permanent mechanisms and procedures for cooperation and consultations between NATO and the EU were established and both organizations hold regular meetings on various issues. In accordance with the so-called “Berlin Plus” arrangement, this partnership encompasses the following elements:

- EU has access to NATO operational planning assets;
- EU can use NATO capabilities and assets;
- DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) commands EU-led operations that use NATO assets;
- NATO planning system is adapted to include EU-led operations.

The first “Berlin +” operation was the mission in Macedonia that the EU took over from NATO. One could go even further and conclude that an informal division of labour is emerging between NATO and the EU: NATO carries out collec-

---

tive defence and demanding peace enforcement and crisis response operations while the EU carries out humanitarian, peace support and civilian crisis management operations.

However it is difficult to estimate in what direction will NATO and EU relations evolve. The Iraqi crisis was a new item on a lengthy list of disagreements between Europe and the US. There is a glaring gap between the worldview of G.W. Bush and his conservative unilateralist entourage and center-left European leaders J.Chirac and G. Shroeder manifesting social welfare domestically and multilateralism internationally. Yet to paraphrase Mark Twain the rumour of the death of the transatlantic link is exaggerated. Europe and the US remain the most important partners to each other in the contemporary world.

What are the preconditions of indivisibility of the transatlantic link? First of all, a rather stubborn position of some European countries to link European security to American military commitment instead of hazy plans of “eventual common defence”. These countries with the UK at the front would resist any attempts to replace the transatlantic link with the ESDP. The new invitees to NATO and the EU (including Lithuania) adhere to the same policy. Furthermore, staunch support of the new members for the preservation of transatlantic link should play an important positive role in this context. Secondly, strategic calculations of Europe: deterrence and defence against nuclear or other major military conflict and high intensity wars beyond the limits of Europe (primarily in the Middle East). In both cases, the EU remains dependent on the military and political might of the US. Third, the special nature of the “transatlantic link”: despite certain frictions within NATO, it is one of the few institutions that EU members can influence US policies. In the new security environment voluntary abandoning of this special relationship would be dangerous for both sides. After all, the terrorist acts of September 11 and the subsequent war on the Taliban regime had a significant impact on the European defence policy agenda. If prior to 9/11 the major issue was reconciling the ESDP with NATO without unnecessary duplication, today the main challenge is to transform NATO into an effective global power that could be employed to counter threats to international peace anywhere in the world. In this context ESDP could become a historical opportunity for the EU to acquire a status of an important international security actor without undermining the role of NATO and capable of more than extinguishing a forest fire. If the development of ESDP is successful the Euroatlantic community would finally achieve the 1962 vision of J.F Kennedy of two equal pillars of the great Atlantic Alliance. On the other hand, if ESDP remains an ambitious illusion aimed at removing NATO from Europe, the very existence of the Euroatlantic community would come into question. Who needs NATO if only the US, the UK and a few smaller Central and Eastern European countries can act together in the face of severe crisis while other European countries remain passive observers not capable, not willing, or not able to agree among themselves and adequately invest in a common European defence policy?
3.3. EU reform: the opportunities and limits of the CFSP institutionalisation

The negative image of a chaotic and uncoordinated CFSP partly stems from the gap between the expectations of the EU and capabilities to fulfil them. In other words, the power of the EU is largely overestimated and therefore inadequate to the tasks it is supposed to carry out. One can define “capabilities” as a set of foreign policy tools: military might, diplomacy, economic means and cultural influence. The very potential of the actor is also important: the population, territory and level of technological advancement. It is also an ability to make collective decisions and implement them. “Expectations” is what one expects from the EU. It is both an internal and external pressure to the EU to carry on with the EU enlargement, solve developmental problems of third world countries, provide economic and humanitarian aid, apply preferable trade regime vis-à-vis its partners etc.

One hardly can have any doubts about the potential of the EU. There 370 million people living in the EU and its GDP amounts to $15 trillion. In comparison the US have 290 million inhabitants and a GPD of $10 trillion. The 10 new members are bringing an additional 75 million inhabitants, while Bulgarians, Romanians and Turks await in the queue with another 100 million. In 10-15 years there will be 550 million inhabitants living in the EU. The volume of EU trade is unsurpassed in the world and it is also the world leader in terms of humanitarian aid and development assistance. On the other hand, the EU has not been able to transform its economic power into political and military might. The development of the European defence dimension remains rather stagnant in spite of all the hassles surrounding the draft Constitution and the ability of the EU to take part in crisis management to a large extent depends on the good will of NATO.

“Common positions” and “common actions” have so far been the best and most realistic achievement of the EU as a center of global power. Some European-only initiatives and actions were indeed successful: the Pact for Stability in Europe, Mostar administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, efforts to establish democracy in South Africa, monitoring of elections in Russia, etc. Yet all of this may not be considered “High politics” but a secondary league. Material support to Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean is also a projection of “soft security”. At the end of the day, economic sanctions of the EU may appear to be the most compelling tool at the disposition of the EU.

One of the main reasons of such a discrepancy between the expectations and the capabilities is rather severe institutional obstacles within the EU. Weak institutionalization of the CFSP is a chronic EU problem. First of all, the CFSP is based on principles of intergovernmentalism which heavily infringe on the ability to make rapid and effective decisions. The ambitions of the EU as an organization to gain more weight in the international arena clashes with the unwillingness of its member states to sacrifice sovereignty in favour of common interests. The principle of acting by consensus paralyzes an organization of 15 states and if this mechanism would not be changed, after the enlargement the EU may stop making any decisions in the sphere of

---

the CFSP. Even NATO may have to review its 50-year-old consensus principle to take into account the stalemate in the case of Turkey’s defence and increased necessity to take rapid decisions in times of crisis. The EU decision-making mechanism was improved by the Amsterdam treaty that introduced the constructive abstention clause.

Institutional weakness of the CFSP is especially evident when compared to the economic and monetary union of the EU. In this sphere there are clear common interests with regard to a single market and economic relations vis-à-vis the rest of the world. These interests and relations are maintained and protected by a supranational body, the European Commission, which has enough power to compel the members that disregard its decisions. There is no such authority within the framework of the CFSP. After all, the benefit of political integration for all the members is not all that clear as it is in the case of economic integration. Prestige and global role of the EU may not be attractive enough reasons for a truly common CFSP to emerge. Presumably the EU needs a strong external impulse similar to the threat of the Soviet Union or the shock of its own 9/11 that would facilitate transnational consolidation of a security and defence policy.

The question of financing of the CFSP also remains unresolved. A truly autonomous security and defence dimension of the EU would require 4.7% of the EU budget which is hardly attainable with the current defence spending in the EU countries at below 2% of GDP. Currently only administrative expenditure is covered from the EU budget (less than 1%) while the willing countries finance international operations in an ad hoc manner.

The EU Constitution may resolve some of the problems mentioned above. The Constitution envisages a prominent role for the ESDP, enabling the willing states to form coalitions that would act in the name of the EU. Rather significant changes are proposed with regard to the decision-making procedures, namely the increase of the number of spheres eligible for qualified majority voting, including some aspects of the CSFP. Qualified majority voting will require the majority of states that together have more than 60% of the EU population. The projected post of an EU Minister of Foreign Affairs would be provided with more powers and functions than the current post of “High representative for the CFSP”. He would also act as deputy chairman of the European Commission.

The draft of the Constitution also contains an expanded list of Petersburg tasks that would include joint disarmament and anti-terrorism operations in addition to the traditional crisis management and peace operations. The concept of “structural cooperation”[46] on security and defence matters implies the possibility for certain states to make more binding commitments to each other if they so wish. The EU Council could entitle such a group to carry out international operations in the name of the EU. One of the most worrisome provisions in the Constitution is the clause on mutual defence similar to that of NATO’s collective defence – such a provision would be a clear duplication of NATO functions and could eventually undermine the role of the Alliance in the Euroatlantic security system. The Constitution also contains solidarity clause committing countries to aid each other by all possible means in the case of terrorist attacks. To enhance European military capabilities a provision on the establishment of a European armaments, research and capabilities agency is also embedded in the Constitution.

[46] For a detailed analysis, see an article by R. Vilpišauskas on structured cooperation concept and its implications on Lithuania in this review.
All these changes in formation and implementation of the CFSP are aimed at improving its effectiveness and strengthening the EU role in international politics. It is obvious that a union of 25 countries will hardly be able to make timely decisions and act unilaterally if the principle of consensus would be retained. However one should forget that security and defence policy is ultimately a matter of prestige and a symbol of sovereignty in the international system and no state regardless its power and size would be willing to easily abandon this symbol. Another old issue is the responsibility for decisions made, actions taken and their consequences. The deficit of democracy and publicity has plagued the EU governance system for a long time. The draft Constitution does not foresee any significant oversight rights for either European Parliament or the national parliaments over the decisions made by the EU Council and the EU Commission. They are only entitled to have access to the information about the ongoing processes while the real power will remain in the hands of the EU and national executive institutions.

The near future will reveal if all these provisions on the CFSP and the ESDP will be implemented. However it is already possible and important to project their impact on Lithuania as the decisions in the sphere of the CFSP may not always be compatible with the interests of Lithuania. Table 2 represents the analysis of the possible impact of the main Constitutional provisions concerning the CFSP on Lithuanian security and defence policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION</th>
<th>PROJECTED IMPACT TO LITHUANIA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs  
"The European Council, acting by qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. He shall conduct the Union's common foreign and security policy."  
Qualified majority  
"When the European Council or the Council of Ministers takes decisions by qualified majority, such a majority shall consist of the majority of Member States, representing at least three fifths of the population of the Union." | More coordination in the CFSP would not harm Lithuanian interests. Lithuania as well as other countries will be able effectively communicate their foreign policy through the European Commission.  
More flexible decision-making on the CFSP issues is a positive development as long as the main political and military decisions that could infringe on the interests of separate members remain a matter of consensus. Lithuania will still be able to secure its own national interests, in other cases Lithuania will also have the right to abstain without infringing on the EU action. |
| Updated Petersburg tasks  
The EU may employ its military and civilian resources to carry out the following operations:  
- Joint disarmament;  
- Humanitarian and rescue;  
- Military assistance to third countries;  
- Conflict prevention and peace keeping;  
- Crisis management, including peace enforcement;  
- Post-conflict stabilization | If the EU is to undertake a wider spectrum of tasks from humanitarian to combat operations the requirements for the EU forces will increase. Eventually Lithuania may be asked to review its contribution the EU pool of forces. |
| European armaments, research and capabilities agency  
"A European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency shall be established to identify operational requirements, to contribute to identifying and implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, to participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy." | The consequences of the establishment of such an agency could be twofold: standardization of armaments, coordination of research and development efforts would increase interoperability of the EU forces and would have a positive overall effect, whereas negative impact would result if the Agency would gain supranational authority to set procurement priorities for the member states and implement “buy European” strategy. |
To conclude, the EU Constitution, if approved by the heads of states in the Intergovernmental Conference, will not have major negative consequence for Lithuanian security and defence policy. Some provisions aimed at enhancing decision-making efficiency and policy coordination may only be evaluated as positive. The most sensitive issue for Lithuania will remain the future relationship of the ESDP with NATO both in terms of structure and functions.

Conclusions

Undefined “European identity”, a wide diversity of interests and weak institutionalization are the three main factors that prevent the EU from acquiring a more prominent role in global politics. Neither the Maastricht Treaty nor the Amsterdam Treaty provisions on developing and strengthening the CFSP significantly improved the EU international standing. Meanwhile the results of the Intergovernmental Conference and the Constitutional Treaty are yet to be seen. After the enlargement the efficiency of the CFSP may become even more limited if substantial reforms envisaged in the Draft Constitution prepared by the Convention for the Future of Europe were not implemented. On the other hand, institutional reform of the EU cannot resolve more fundamental issues determining the global role of the EU – the problem of European identity and common interests. European identity cannot be established in a top-down manner but will have to arise from the bottom-up. In other words the strengthening of European self-identity of ordinary EU citizens will be the major precondition for the EU members to abandon their national ambitions in favour of the common European interests. The European Commission will also fail to impose “common interest” without the consent and permission of the member states.

While federalist ideas inside the EU will not disappear, a structural problem also persists: the efforts of some EU members to provide the EU with more efficient tools in the sphere of the CFSP require a more flexible decision-making process; but “flexibility” unavoidably clashes with the primacy of national interests in the realm of foreign and security policy cautiously observed by the big states as well as small ones. At the end of the day the question of a federal Europe is, in essence, a question of the convergence of national foreign policies and a bigger common denominator. It is doubtful that this dilemma will be resolved any time soon.

What is the place and role of the EU in the contemporary world? The EU did not fill the vacuum of power left by the dismantling of the Soviet Union. The EU still is not an equal partner of the US in the oversight of international security and the new world order. The EU has not even been able to manage crises on its own continent – its efforts to mediate the Middle East peace process, dialogue with North Korea and especially efforts to bring peace in the Balkans have been a failure. Yet lately the EU has substantially increased its activity in peacekeeping missions: European troops constitute the majority in the Balkans and Afghanistan and the EU took over the mission in Macedonia from NATO and started an independent operation in the Congo Democratic Republic. Due to a unique network of multilevel and multidimensional dialogues the EU has become a bridge between the poor and the rich, the
North and the South, and this sense plays an indispensable role in strengthening global peace and stability. Finally the EU is a major actor and watchdog of the global economic system, effectively taking part in the activities of the World Trade Organization.

Accession of Lithuania to the EuroAtlantic institutions – the EU and NATO – coincides with a period of major transformations inside these institutions, encompassing their structures and functions. Lithuania joins qualitatively different organizations that she applied to join 10 years ago. The period when Lithuania was able to support one or another position of the EU in the area of the CFSP without directly taking part in the implementation process and sharing the responsibility is over. The Iraqi crisis was a good showcase for Lithuania, that some of the old members of the EU will be expecting more solidarity from Lithuania on major foreign and security policy issues. It is no doubt that the impact of the CFSP on Lithuania will grow in the future. The nature of this impact will depend on the way Europe will choose: a way of an independent European defence structure as an alternative to NATO or a way of a close strategic partnership with the US and NATO. In any case Lithuania will have to search for a balance between its commitments to the EU and those to NATO. In this process diplomatic skills will be of utmost value compared to military capabilities or economic growth.

To conclude, today one could hardly speculate about any attempt by the EU to counter the global US hegemony. Yet at the same time it is possible to perceive Europe as a certain political and normative alternative to the American global domination. Europe has not exacerbated its potential yet and it is not time to write her off as a dinosaur destined to extinction. The Maastricht treaty that established the EU is only 12 years old. Integration is a powerful phenomenon albeit difficult to explain. It remains to believe that this potential will not be exploited for destructive purposes against transatlantic relations.