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Ukraine: the Orange Revolution and its Aftermath

The purpose of this article is to discuss the causes of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and find out how changes in the political regime have influenced the course of Kiev's foreign policy. The first part of the article tries to clarify what internal and external factors determined the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. The answer to the question why the Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place is provided. It is based on the assumption that the transformation of the political regime was influenced not only by internal circumstances (first of all a crisis of the oligarchic political regime) but also by external ones. The West and Russia treat Ukraine as a strategically important state; therefore, it is becoming a special object of competition for the influence between Western institutions and the East. It should be pointed out that such overlapping of interests is a dynamic process: it can determine the tendencies of stability and cooperation between the West and the East or confliction. The author comes to the conclusion that in the near perspective future, Ukraine might become a hotbed of tension and conflicts between Russia and the West (primarily the USA). The second part of the article answers the question how the political crisis of September 2005, the splitting of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko's alliance, the gas conflict of Russia and Ukraine can affect tendencies of foreign policy of the country before the Rada elections in March 2006. The article points out that in spite of a complicated social and economic situation and political crises, Kiev attempted to adhere to a pro-Western course of foreign policy. Cooperation of Ukraine with NATO and Kiev's regional policy experienced particular impetus. Such tendencies in foreign policy of Ukraine are actively supported by the USA which is hoping to establish, in the western part of the CIS, a counterbalance for Russia's ambitions to restore its influence there. On the other hand, such Kiev's activity makes relations with Moscow even more strained. The author of the article claims that further cooperation of Ukraine and Western institutions will depend on the Rada elections in March 2006.

Introduction

In previous studies on the development of Ukraine after the Cold War, the greatest attention was paid to issues of statehood consolidation and implementation of economic-political reforms emphasizing that foreign and security policy of Ukraine is determined not only by specific internal factors (regionalism, specific "oligarchic political" system) but also by the circumstance that the coun-

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try is at the junction of two “overlapping integral spaces”. It is pointed out that Ukraine is influenced by the “neighbourhood” of Western institutions that have expanded to Central and Eastern Europe and manifest themselves by the so-called Eastern policies of the European Union and NATO, meanwhile being directly affected by Russia.¹

Lately, the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005 has been receiving ever growing attention. According to optimists the Orange Revolution made favourable conditions for political and economic reforms in the country as well as for faster integration of Ukraine into Western organizations. Those tending to be more cautious believe that the Orange Revolution encounters ever increasing challenges within the country and this has a negative impact on the policy for the integration into Western bodies. (By the way, such a standpoint is confirmed by the emerging crisis in power and the splitting of pro-Western democratic forces.) Assessments that the Orange Revolution has not achieved its primary objectives are being more often expressed.²

This article has two essential objectives. First, to ascertain what internal and external factors have determined the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Thus the answer to the question why the Orange Revolution became possible in Ukraine is sought after. It is based on the assumption that the transformation of the political regime was influenced not only by internal circumstances (for example peculiarities of the political system) but also by the nature of *structural overlapping*. In other words, the West and Russia treat Ukraine as a strategically important state; therefore, it becomes a special object of competition for the influence between Western institutions and Russia. It should be pointed out that the structural overlapping is a dynamic process: it can determine tendencies of stability and cooperation between the West and Russia or confliction.

Second, the article aims at answering the question about what implications the September political crisis have had and what is more important. The article also addresses what the splitting of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko’s alliance could have for the tendencies of foreign policy of the country in the near perspective, i. e. before the Rada elections in March 2006.

¹ See: Bugajski J., *Cold Peace. Russia’s New Imperialism*, West-Port: Praeger Publisher, 2004, p. 79-95 Brzezinski Z., *The Grand Chessboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, 1997, p. 126-138. Also by Lithuanian authors Laurinavičius Č., Motieka E., Statkus N., *Features of the geopolitics of the Baltic States 20th century*, Vilnius, LII Publishing House, 2005, p. 357-374.

² Compare with Kuzio T., “From Kuchma to Yushchenko. Ukraine’s 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52, no.2, March/April 2005, p.29-42 and D’Anieri P., “What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the implications of Orange Revolution”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 52, no.5, September/October 2005, p.82-91.

1. “Orange” Transformation of the Regime: Internal and External Causes

The problem to be discussed in this part could be briefly be stated as thus: why did the process of the political power “transfer” in Ukraine fails? In other words, why did the dominant political elite and its leader fail to retain (in transferring the power to their henchman) their influence in the political system even taking advantage of the possibilities provided by the so-called administrative resource and manipulation of “democratic elections”. By the way, in other CIS space countries this political “operation” used to be generally implemented with sufficient success. It is obvious that the presidential elections held in Ukraine had only to cover and camouflage the “transfer of power”. It was this “power transfer” failure process that analysts called a revolution.³

In the theories which by the causes and nature of revolutions are explained, it is usually emphasized that their development (success or failure) is determined by a combination of internal (structural) and external (impact of international environment) factors. A similar explanation is attempted in the case of the events in Ukraine. For example, Dimitrij Trenin claims that “bourgeois democratic revolution” in Ukraine could not be prompted by the impact of the external factor alone: influence from the West or errors by the Kremlin. Important internal causes also existed: Kuchma’s ambition to retain power at all costs, regime crisis, splitting of the political elite, tactics correctly chosen by the opposition, mobilization of the middle class in Kiev, impact by the mass media, and finally the inability of the regime to resort to coercion and neutralize opposition leaders.⁴

A similar explanation only dubbed “the Orange Revolution” is presented in studies of Western analysts. They emphasize that the revolution in Ukraine was a continuum of “democratic revolutions” in Central Europe and later in Serbia and Georgia. Essentially they can be considered as a “rebellion of societies”, albeit peaceful, against corrupt, undemocratic regimes.⁵ Below we will discuss several structural factors which, in our opinion, had a significant impact on the dénouement of the revolutionary political crisis in Ukraine.

³ Pipes R., “In “Borderland”. The Struggle for Ukraine” *National Review*, December 27, 2004, p. 20.

⁴ Тренин Д., “Внешнее вмешательство в события на Украине и Российско-Западные отношения”, *Московский центр Карнеги. Брифинг*, 2nd ed., vol.7, 2005, p. 1-6.

⁵ Karatnicky A., “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution”, *Foreign Affairs*, March-April, 2005, vol.84 Issue 2.

1.1. Internal premises of the regime transformation

1.1.1. Pluralism of the political regime

Without denying the circumstance that Leonid Kuchma's regime was undemocratic, it would be necessary to point out that it remained sufficiently *pluralistic and open*. In other words, the opposition, though restricted through administration measures, enjoyed relatively adequate conditions of political activity. This circumstance enabled various, frequently ideologically opposing parties and organizations, essentially united under the sole objective – a change of Kuchma's regime – to rally around the popular ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko removed from office by Kuchma in 2001. Thus the block "Our Ukraine" consisting of ten political parties and organizations was created. The nucleus of the block electorate was Western and partly consisted of Central Ukraine. Within the spectrum of political parties and organizations "Our Ukraine" made efforts "to take over" the niche of pro-Western political force.

The positions of the movement "Our Ukraine" became stronger when it was joined by the Yulia Tymoshenko-led coalition of political parties. Both Yushchenko and Tymoshenko were ex-members of close-to-Kuchma power nomenclature. (Tymoshenko belonged to one of the branches of the Dnepropetrovsk Clan headed by the then Prime Minister Pavel Lazarenko.) However later they became estranged from the regime and eventually turned their fight against Kuchma and the so-called oligarchic power system into the utmost goal of their political struggle. This alliance of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko proved very productive during the presidential elections in Ukraine; both leaders of the anti-Kuchma opposition supplemented each other well: Yushchenko demonstrated a more moderate, evolutionary line whereas Tymoshenko a more radical and revolutionary one.

In general, about in the middle of 2004, two "political blocks" competing between themselves and representing two different visions of country development were definitely created in Ukraine. The first one was a power-opposing Yushchenko and Tymoshenko's tandem with "Our Ukraine" rallying around it, and the second block united behind the Kuchma-supported aspirant to the presidential office, the Head of the Ukrainian Government Viktor Yanukovich and the political block "For the United Ukraine" led by him. The basis of this political alliance was the Party of Regions representing the interests of Donetsk industrialists. If Yushchenko and political forces supporting him represented themselves as a rather pro-Western force, Yanukovich and political institutions standing for him were for closer relations with Russia. Generally creation of two sizeable political blocks or alliances, declaring opposite directions of country development, politicizes and polarizes society and in this sense produces pre-conditions for a "revolutionary situation".⁶

⁶ Tilly Ch., *European Revolutions 1492-1992*, Blackwell, 1993, p.29-51.

It is also important to note the circumstance that Ukraine under Kuchma's presidency remained not only pluralistic but also *open* to influences of Western democratic organizations. This circumstance played a very important role during the presidential elections.⁷ The presidential elections, particularly the second round of voting was under scrutiny of an unprecedented number of observers from various foreign democratic organizations and institutions. It was their assessment of the election results that shaped the overall attitude of the West (the EU and the USA) and the Ukrainians themselves to the second round of voting at the presidential elections as being not transparent, undemocratic and rigged. Finally, in Ukraine, primarily in major cities, particularly Kiev, civil organizations (e.g. "Pora") functioned actively with the main aim to oppose the ambitions of the power to legitimize fraudulent elections.

1.1.2 Peculiarities of Oligarchic Politics

In analyzing peculiarities of the Ukrainian political system and "deficit of democracy" characteristic of it, it is often stated that the "shortage" of democracy is also determined by direct merging of large business-financial or in other words oligarchic groups with political power. Without deeper discussing this assumption we will note that around the year 2000 a crisis of the oligarchic system emerged consequently "leading" the country to the revolutionary transformation of the regime.

In Ukraine several major oligarchic groups competing among themselves for influence on the supreme political power are generally singled out. They are the Dnepropetrovsk group (L. Kuchma's son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk belongs to it), the Kiev group (the most influential representative of this group Viktor Medvedchuk was also the Head of Kuchma's administration), the Donetsk group led by Rinat Akhmetov was also closely linked with Yanukovich.

Apart from these largest oligarchic groups Ukraine hosted a lot more of smaller, politically and economically not so influential groups and informal unions. Overall growth of the Ukrainian economy made premises for the formation of such smaller groups.⁸ At first the influence of these groups was more manifested in regions. For example, one of the main financial Yushchenko's supporters Piotr Poroshenko had strong economic and political positions in the western part of Ukraine. Having consolidated their influence in regions such groups and their leaders became dissatisfied with the "closed" oligarchic system which increasingly hindered the development of their business and political influence. The presidential elections created "political possibilities" for such groups to gain more influence in the centre of the political system and this had to open new possibilities for the development of their business.

⁷ Chand k. , "Democratisation from the outside in: NGO and international efforts to promote open elctions", *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 18, no.3, 1997, p. 543-550.

⁸ In 2002 the GDP of Ukraine increased 5.2 per cent, in 2003 – already 9.4 per cent, and in 2004 – 12.5 per cent. Overall from 1999 to 2004 the GDP of Ukraine doubled. See Karatnycky (note 5) p.87.

Another feature of the oligarchic system crisis was linked to changes in the role of the president. Within the Ukrainian oligarchic system, the president *de facto* played the role of a coordinator or intermediary of interests among different groups. Until the beginning of 2000, Kuchma succeeded in executing these functions; he was both a sufficiently active and strong president, able to at least formally keep a certain distance from oligarchic groups. However, around 2000-2001, the prestige of the president and confidence in him deteriorated and, in turn, his actual power decreased. This was prompted by political scandals (G. Gongadze assassination) and practically completely transparency-lacking privatization which caused discontent of smaller business groups and society in general. Thus the oligarchic system based on president's balancing between largest business groups hit a critical stage. (In 2004 L. Kuchma's popularity completely deteriorated, only 3 percent of the population had confidence in him.)

Seeking security, primarily protection of his own interests, Kuchma was forced to more closely adhere to one oligarchic group, thus still further increasing discontent and pressure from the society. The object of public criticism and discontent became not only the person of the president, one or another oligarchic group, but the entire system. Opposition forces made good use of this situation, presenting themselves as fighters against the corrupt "oligarchic" political and economic system.

1.1.3 Regionalization and politics

The course of the presidential elections demonstrated that regional specificity of the country, geopolitical orientation, and gravitation of Ukrainian regions have considerable implications on the choices and behaviours of the electorate. Throughout the three rounds of the presidential elections Yushchenko was granted the greatest support in western regions of Ukraine, whereas Yanukovych – in the eastern and southern parts.⁹ Therefore, in our opinion, of no less importance for a successful revolution was the fact (which from the geopolitical point of view most probably played a decisive role) that Yushchenko and his supporters gained victory in the central Kiev region and in the capital of the country itself. Data for comparison: during the three election rounds in Kiev region Yushchenko collected 59.72, 76.36, 82.70 percent of vote respectively while in the city of Kiev itself – respectively 62.3, 74.36, 78.37 percent.¹⁰ This circumstance helped the opposition not only to rapidly mobilize its supporters and execute mass resistance actions, but was also unexpected for Yanukovych who found himself in complete isolation in the country capital and could neither perform his functions effectively nor assemble his supporters.

⁹ Data of the Central Election Commission of Ukraine. See www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/wp0011, 2005 02 14.

¹⁰ Ibid.

1.2. Orange Revolution and Geopolitics

Yet in explaining the dénouement of the political crisis in Ukraine, the *influence of external factors* i.e. geopolitical causes of the Orange Revolution are most often emphasized. First of all it is claimed that Ukraine, having found itself at the particular junction of geopolitical interests of the West and Russia, was affected by both the influence of the West as well as Russia and also in the “participation” in the elections. The West, first of all the USA, and Russia had their preferred candidates. The West acted more effectively and therefore, won thus consolidating their influence in the western part of the CIS and dealing a severe blow to Putin’s regional ambitions. On the basis of such geopolitical logic Yushchenko’s election was often interpreted in Russia as a “special operation” well planned and executed by the West.¹¹

Even disagreeing with such reasoning typical of the logic of the conspiracy theory, it would be necessary to acknowledge that the *external impact* or a sharper *competition* in Ukraine between the West and Russia was an important factor that influenced the political crisis and its dénouement in Ukraine. We believe that this happened due to several key reasons. *First*, the West (rather the USA) and Russia considered the presidential elections in Ukraine as strategically significant i.e. capable of determining further geopolitical orientation of the country. *Second*, with respect to Ukraine the most important “external actors” (the USA, the EU and Russia) followed different policies. Putin, taking advantage of the elections, sought to directly strengthen Russia’s influence in Ukraine whereas the West aimed at accelerating democratization processes in Ukraine and thus expanding their influence. *Third*, it is necessary to have in mind that the so-called overlapping of interests of Western institutions and Russia in the CIS space is a dynamic process, which predetermines a continual competition. True, because of mutual interests it does not escalate into direct conflicts. Consequently both the West and Russia, by making use of internal political conjuncture of the countries, are attempting (and will attempt in the future) to compete for influence in them.

1.2.1 Putin’s Ukrainian Project

It is possible to state that the Kremlin tried to exploit the presidential elections in Ukraine as a means of consolidating Russia’s influence in Ukraine and accelerating formation of the United Economic Space (UES) framework. The establishment of such a structure would have not only strengthened Moscow’s positions in the post-Soviet CIS space, but what is still more important would have increased Putin’s international prestige.

¹¹ Turbakov I., “Wanted: Compatative and Attractive Social Model to Help Russia Retain its Crumbling Sphere of Influence”, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, vol. 2. Issue 10, (January 14) 2005; Жовер В., “Творцы революций”, www.archipelag.ru 2005 05 27; Шайхудинов Р., “Демократия в условиях спецоперации: как убить государство”, www.archipelag.ru 2005 05 27.

While the attitude of Kazakhstan and the more so that of Belarus to the UES project was in essence positive, the official Kiev hesitated and manoeuvred for a long time expecting to gain concessions from the West. However, as early as 2003, Kuchma enhanced his cooperation within the format of the UES organization. Cooperation within the framework of the UES also provided for establishment of joint political bodies. It is obvious that deepening of economic and eventual political integration would have finally isolated Ukraine from Western institutions.

It seemed before the elections that Moscow's calculations, which were favourable for its completion of the presidential election campaign, had a very solid political, economic and social basis. The Ukraine enjoyed a presence of strong business groups and political forces, maintaining close relations with Russia, a significant part of Ukrainian population considered relations with Russia or with the "union of Slavic states" a priority. The Kremlin had good informational and financial possibilities to influence the election process and finally, in the fall of 2004, personal popularity of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine was indeed great (he was considered to be the most popular politician¹²). In the Kremlin's opinion the international situation for expanding its influence in Ukraine was favorable: the USA was busy with the presidential elections and the war in Iraq, and the EU – with the integration of new members and Constitution adoption issues.

When evaluating the strategic importance of the elections and available resources, the Kremlin decided on a sufficiently simple policy – to support one possibly more preferable candidate. In the program speeches the candidate to the president's post Yanukovich promised to denounce Ukraine's objective to become a member of NATO, offered to grant the Russian language the status of the official language and to introduce a double citizenship.¹³ An unconcealed favour for this candidate was demonstrated by the official mass media of Russia. The president of Russia himself manifested his personal support for the candidate by visiting Kiev at least twice and communicating exceptionally with Yanukovich (later, after the second round, Putin even congratulated him with the victory though official results of the presidential elections had not been announced yet¹⁴). At the same time Russia rejected the possibility to cooperate with Yushchenko. (It is asserted that as early as spring of 2004 Yushchenko's staff tried to establish personal contacts with Putin yet the Kremlin did not respond to this initiative.¹⁵) This might have been influenced by the circumstance that Moscow perceived Yushchenko as a candidate preferred by the West.

Therefore, it is completely understandable that Yushchenko's victory was interpreted in Moscow as a strategic, geopolitical and finally personal defeat of the president of Russia Vladimir Putin. *First*, a real threat to the UES project favoured by Russia and alongside it to the dominance of Moscow in the CIS

¹² Trenin (note 4) p.2. Мошес А., "Двойное расширение и российско-украинские отношения", *Московский центр Карнеги. Между Востоком и Западом. Украина и Белорусия на Европейском пространстве*, Москва, 2003, p.12-16.

¹³ "Украина выбирает президента и место на карте мира", www.korespondent.ua 2004 10 04

¹⁴ Zarakhovich P., Calabresi Y., etc. "The Orange Revolution", *Time*, 06 12 2004.

¹⁵ Trenin (note 4) p. 2.

space emerged. *Second*, the presidential elections campaign in Ukraine and its finale demonstrated that Russia's influence in the CIS region keeps weakening. In other words, the new model of CIS countries' integration (UES), put forward by the Kremlin, loses competition against cooperation forms suggested by the West. *Third*, the political crisis in Ukraine demonstrated incompetence of both the Kremlin and the president of Russia himself. Though apparently enjoying more favourable conditions of operation in Ukraine, Moscow failed to properly exploit them. Eventually, Putin was forced to pull back and agreed on the crisis management scenario presented by the West – to arrange a second run-off election round.

1.2.2 The West and the Democratization Project of Ukraine

Essentially the West (rather the USA than the EU) also considered the elections as strategic, i.e. capable of influencing not only the perspectives of the development of Ukrainian state or Russia's dominance in the CIS region, but also relations between the West and Russia in general. We think that the West (first of all the USA) were apprehensive about both the Kremlin's ambitions to strengthen its influence in Ukraine or consolidate the dominance in the CIS and changes in Russia's home policy. Putin's attempts to expand presidential powers, strengthen the "power vertical" became increasingly assessed in the West as a withdrawal from democracy. The West, first of all the USA, and also the new EU members shared the attitude that such internal tendencies in Russia as well as Moscow's ambitions to consolidate its influence in Ukraine meant no other than attempts of the Kremlin to restore its dominance in the entire Central East region of Europe. In Washington's opinion, development of such tendencies would destabilize the situation among the new EU and NATO members which in its turn would pose a threat not only to Euro-Atlantic relations, but eventually could considerably strengthen the tendencies of the establishment of continentalism in Europe.

Alongside strategic and geopolitical arguments shaping the attitude to the elections in Ukraine, an ideological imperative was also present – democratization of the post-Soviet space. The establishment of democracy could contribute not only to Ukraine's stabilization and thus make premises for its integration with Western institutions, but could also have an overall positive, stabilizing impact on the entire region of Central East Europe.

Therefore, it is completely understandable that Washington, notwithstanding the Iraq crisis, "got involved" in the presidential elections in Ukraine. True, officially George W. Bush's administration supported not a single candidate (unofficially – Yushchenko) and were for the organization of transparent, fair and democratic elections expecting, in case of such elections, Yushchenko to win. According to reports of the USA State Department to Congress, Washington had been following this very strategy since the beginning of 2004. The main financial support was allotted to non-governmental mass media, various Ukrai-

nian Non-Governmental Organizations that had to guarantee election transparency. Washington directly allotted a lot of means to maintain observers. By the way, the major part of the American support in general was assigned from and through various non-governmental funds and organizations, the primary task of which was to promote development of democracy in the post-Soviet space. According to the State Department approximately 13.8 million dollars was assigned for these causes in 2004.¹⁶

With approaching elections, the USA started more actively pressing the official Kiev to guarantee fair elections. At the beginning of October 2004, the House of Representatives adopted a special resolution on Ukrainian elections demanding the official Kiev to ensure fair and honest elections.¹⁷ In the middle of October and in November, the State Department made several statements regarding the elections in Ukraine warning the Ukrainian authorities of the consequences of violations. It was for the observation of the elections that the White House sent the Senator Richard Lugar to Kiev. By the way, after the second round of elections (22 November), the Senator stated that the Ukrainian authorities were involved into the forgery of election results and were incapable of ensuring honest elections. Finally, on 25 November, the USA State Secretary Collin Powell, on the basis of conclusions by various international (first of all OSCE mission) and Non-Governmental Organizations that observed the elections and reported numerous violations, stated that Washington would not acknowledge the election results in Ukraine. The EU made a statement albeit less strict on the same day. According to the then EU Chairman, the Prime Minister of Holland Jan Peter Balkenende, the presidential elections did not reflect wishes of the Ukrainians.

When mass protest actions of Yushchenko's supporters started, Washington applied further pressure on the official Kiev warning it not to use force against protesters, to start negotiations with the opposition and urged it to organize genuinely democratic elections. The attitude of the EU was essentially the same. (On 1 December, Balkenende reiterated to Putin the same demands as Washington had done.) Doubtless such principled commonness of the EU and the USA positions made Ukrainian authorities seek compromise in political decisions and negotiate with the opposition. Eventually, on 3 December, the Supreme Court of Ukraine annulled the decision of the Central Election Commission on the victory of Yanukovych and announced that a second run-off round of the presidential elections would be held. It was namely this that the opposition had demanded. This Court decision was also welcomed by Washington. On 26 December, a second run-off presidential election watched by approximately 12 thousand observers was arranged. Yushchenko collected 52 per cent of vote and Yanukovych – 44 per cent. Yushchenko won in 17 regions in Western and Central Ukraine and Yanukovych in 10 southern and eastern regions.

¹⁶ Tefft J., Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Testimony Before the House of International Relations Committee, December 7, 2004.

¹⁷ "The George Marshall Fund of US in co-operation with Center for European and International Studies, Kiev", Ukraine and the Euro-Atlantic Community: Startery Dialogue. Summary Report of the First Session, Kiev, 24-26 09 2004.

1.2.3 Regional actors: the tandem of Poland and Lithuania

Though the West agreed that it was necessary to regulate the crisis in Ukraine by political peaceful means, the actual decision on how to resolve the political situation was proposed by Poland and supporting it was Lithuania, the new EU members and Ukraine's neighbours. It should be pointed out that in the beginning Brussels did not demonstrate greater enthusiasm to get directly involved into the crisis management. (Researchers even note that formal EU foreign policy "mechanisms did not play their role in resolving the crisis": the EU Trio (Troika) did not participate in this process at all and the then chairing Holland played a secondary role.¹⁸) Only after long-lasting persuasions by Warsaw, Javier Solana agreed to ask the leaders of some EU states about their attitude towards sending an EU mission to Ukraine. It seems that the German Chancellor gave the idea his reserved agreement whereas the attitude of the president of France was more sceptical. However, Poland's initiative was supported by Washington.¹⁹ The initiative and participation of the new EU and NATO members – Poland supported by Lithuania – in crisis management were important in several aspects. *First*, participation of foreign mediators (apart from the President of Poland Kwasniewski, the President of Lithuania Adamkus, the mediation mission was performed by Solana and the Chairman of Russian Duma Gryslov) strengthened the conviction that the political crisis could be settled peacefully, without bloodshed. *Second*, the activeness and initiative of Poland and Lithuania indicated that the new EU members could make a substantial practical contribution to the Eastern policy of the EU. *Finally third*, foreign mediation again demonstrated limited possibilities of Russia to resolve political conflicts in the CIS space.

The plan, suggested by Warsaw and Vilnius for management of the political conflict (other mediators finally also supported it), was a compromise coordinating interests of both conflicting parties: to organize a second run-off round of the presidential elections and make amendments to the law on elections. An agreement on the principles of the political reform was also made at the same time. The essential provision of the planned political reform was to decrease presidential powers and influence in the political system of Ukraine and to strengthen the powers of the Parliament and the Head of the Government. These suggestions satisfied both Yanukovych and Yushchenko as well as laid the groundwork for the democratization of the Ukrainian political system. (The political reform should come into effect after the elections to the Rada in March 2006.)

¹⁸ Gromadzki G., Sushko O., Vahl M., Wolczuk R., Will the Orange revolution bear fruit? EU-Ukraine relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006. Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw, 2005, p. 15.

¹⁹ Босацкий М., Войцеховский М., "Закулисная история революции", <http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/218911/html> 15 04 2005.

2. In the Aftermath of the Orange Revolution: Perspectives of the New Foreign Policy

Literature analyzing Ukrainian security and foreign policy usually points to the fact that Yushchenko's victory formed preconditions for a more pro-Western foreign policy of Ukraine.²⁰ The new President of Ukraine himself tried to confirm such preconditions made by analysts. On 26 January 2005, during his visit in Strasbourg and speaking at the Parliamentary Assembly of the EC, Yushchenko emphasized that the main objective of the country's foreign policy was to join the EU. On February 22, at the NATO summit in Brussels he stated that foreign policy of Ukraine had two priorities: to integrate both into the EU and NATO. However, the implementation of this policy is connected with several dilemmas.

First, Ukraine's aspiration to accelerate its integration into the West might cause tension in the East. In other words, while pursuing the policy of integration into the West, Kiev would inevitably aggravate its relations with Russia, and this aggravation of relations with Moscow can block out Kiev's pro-Western policy. Second, Western institutions are neither politically nor ideologically ready to propose to Ukraine a faster plan of integration. The internal indecisiveness of the West, reluctance to aggravate relations with Moscow and, ultimately, the objective fact that Ukraine is not prepared for the integration influence this. In other words, after the Orange Revolution, Kiev will have long to face the inertia that is typical of the West with regards to Ukraine. This circumstance can weaken the support of the Ukrainian society for the pro-Western orientation of the new authorities and push the elite in power towards "the multi-vector policy" which was characteristic of Kuchma's term in office. (By the way, sociological polls indicate that the support of society for the country's membership in NATO, for example, remains fairly inconsiderable.²¹)

In our opinion, the ability of the new Ukrainian authorities to deal with these dilemmas will depend on internal and external circumstances. The internal circumstances are whether the bloc of Yushchenko and Y. Tymoshenko will manage to consolidate political forces and win the elections to the Supreme Rada in 2006. The victory of pro-Western and democratic forces would be a signal to the West that political and economic reforms will be carried out. At the same time, this would also imply the continuum of the pro-Western foreign policy course. The external circumstances cover the stance Moscow and the West are going to take in respect of the new Ukrainian authorities and the policy they are going to pursue.

²⁰ Kuzio T., "From Kuchma to Yushchenko. Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution", *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol.52, no.2, March/April 2005, p.29-42.

²¹ Shamsur O., "Ukraine between the Major International Players", roundtable seminar "Neighbours or Relatives?" organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Embassy of Finland in Ukraine, Kiev, 04 26 2005. In general, throughout Ukraine, the support of the population for NATO is well under 20 per cent. For example, according to the data of the polls conducted at the beginning of 2005, only 15 per cent of the Ukrainian population are for joining the Alliance, while 48 per cent are strongly against. See: Gorska A., "NATO mowi "tak" Ukraine", *Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich. Komentarze*, Warszawa, www.osw.pl 2005 10 27.

2.1. The September Crisis of the Government and the New Political Situation in the Country

Unfortunately, already in September 2005, the tandem of Yushenko and Timoshenko broke up. At the beginning of September, supporters of the Head of the Government made allegations of corruption against politicians close to President Yushchenko (first of all, against Piotr Poroshenko). Eventually, the President decided to announce the dissolution of the Timoshenko Government and part with some of his political associates. Thus, the political bloc of Timoshenko formed opposition to the President. This circumstance only further aggravated the political crisis in the country. The Rada approved the new Head of the Government Yuriy Yechanurov only on 22 September. Yechanurov was approved only after the Yanukovich-led Party of Regions supported his candidacy. (The first time, Yechanurov lacked deputies' votes.) Seeking to get out of the political crisis and form the Government, Yushchenko signed an agreement with Yanukovich according to which the new authorities pledged not to judicially persecute Yanukovich's supporters. This pact led to the formation of the Government and, consequently, stabilization of the situation in the country; however, at the same time it divided the ranks of the supporters of the Orange Revolution. Actually, it became clear that Yushchenko and Timoshenko would go to the Rada elections in March 2006 in separate political blocs. This circumstance adds to Yanukovich's prospects for winning the Rada elections. True, gaps between the main political forces in the would-be Rada should not be significant and this can cause difficulties in the formation of a stable government.²² It can be assumed that an unstable government with a narrow majority will not be capable of carrying out necessary, yet often painful economic and social reforms, or propose ambitious pro-Western integration projects.

It is possible to maintain that the winners of the Orange Revolution did not manage to take an effective advantage of their victory. Their words often differed from their actions. In fact, no structural reforms were being made in the country, the fight against corruption was not effective enough, there were no administration, court reforms, due to the constant and contradictory statements made by representatives of the authorities concerning re-privatisation, the country's investment conditions deteriorated, the Government did not keep its promises given to the main supporter of the Orange Revolution – small and medium business. In essence, the Timoshenko Government continued the policy of its

²² Surveys indicate that the Party of Regions led by Yanukovich has the strongest possibilities to win the coming Rada elections. Approximately 20 per cent of electors would vote for it. "Our Ukraine", whose Chairman of Honour is Yushchenko, would get 12.5 per cent of votes. The bloc led by Timoshenko would win approximately the same number of votes. In total, three more parties can expect to exceed the 3 per cent barrier: Communists led by Simonenko – 6.2 per cent, Moroz's Socialists – 5.7 per cent and the National Party headed by the Chairman of the Rada Vladimir Litvinov – 3.4 per cent. The sociological survey was conducted by an independent Razumkov Economic and Political Research Centre during the political crisis in the country. See: "Опрос: на выборах в ближайшее время победила бы Партия регионов", www.korrespondent.net 2005 10 20.

predecessor Yanukovich: he had increased pensions before the Presidential elections, and Timoshenko came up with as much as 57 per cent of the pay rise to state employees. In general, the economic policy she chose to pursue was assessed by analysts as “socialist and populist”²³. It did not take long for the results of such policy to manifest themselves: the economic situation of the country started considerably deteriorating. If in 2004 the rise of the GDP was 12 percent, in the spring of 2005 it dropped to 5 per cent, whereas the inflation grew 15 percent. In the autumn of 2005, the increase of the GDP went down to 3.7 percent.²⁴ Economic recession became obvious in different fields ranging from agriculture to building industry. The economy of the country was in severe oil, meat, sugar and similar “crises”. Negative social and economic processes undermine confidence in Yushchenko and his new Prime Minister. (According to opinion polls, about 50 percent of Ukrainians think that after the elections of Yushchenko as President, their living conditions have deteriorated, and only 11.5 percent think that they have improved.²⁵) It is hardly probable that the new Head of the Government would manage to fundamentally change the economic and social tendencies in the country which implies that the forces striving to retaliate for their loss in the presidential elections of 2004 have rather favourable conditions for that. In fact, it is not yet clear whether they will be able to make political capital out of the dissatisfaction of the major part of the population with their social and economic situation. What is more, certain signs of optimism can already be witnessed in the economic space of Ukraine. The new authorities succeeded in efficiently and transparently completing the case of re-privatisation of “Krivorižstal”: a foreign investor paid an impressive price of 24 mln. grivnas, or 4.8 million US dollars for this plant. (It should be noted that in 2004 the Ukrainian budgetary revenue made up 70 million grivnas.)

In sum, it can be stated that after the splitting of the coalition of Yushchenko and Timoshenko, the political situation in the country became complicated. The possibilities of all key political groups in the Rada elections in March became, in essence, equal.

2.2. Perspectives of the Ukrainian-Russian Relations

Until about the spring of 2005, it was likely that the Kremlin would pursue a moderate policy regarding its relations with Ukraine. This strategy is based on the assumption that Kiev’s integration into Western institutions is, at least in the immediate future, hardly possible, whereas economic, social and

²³ Аслунд А., “Предательство революции”, <http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/222224.html> 2005 05 18; Кохен А., “Украине пора пересмотреть свою экономическую политику”, <http://www.inosmi.ru/translation/222224.html> 2005 08 16; D’Anieri P., “What Has Changed in Ukrainian Politics? Assessing the Implications of Orange Revolution”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, vol. 52, no. 5, September/October 2005, p. 82-91.

²⁴ Найденов В., “Чюда не будет”, <http://www.grani.kiev.ua/> 2005 09 01.

²⁵ “Почти половина украинцев считает, что при Ющенко они стали жить хуже”, www.rosbalt.ru 2005 10 20.

cultural positions of Russia in Ukraine remain fairly strong despite the pro-Western course declared by Yushchenko. Therefore, it would be inexpedient for Moscow to escalate the political situation in Ukraine. On the contrary, attempts should be made to maintain good neighbourly relations, and this would eventually strengthen political ties between Moscow and Kiev.

This tendency surfaced immediately after the political crisis during the first meeting of Putin and Yushchenko on 24 January 2005 in Moscow. The meeting demonstrated that the Kremlin (by the way, similarly to Kiev) was not interested in escalation of the relations. At the meeting, the countries agreed to continue their economic cooperation and political dialogue. This policy was extended by Putin's visit to Kiev on 19 March. During the visit, the President of Russia declared that Moscow and Kiev had to "eliminate problems existing between the countries" (in the original this phrase sounded more impressive – "zachistit problemy").²⁶ It was important for Vladimir Putin to elucidate the perspectives of Ukraine's participation in the UES, whereas for Yushchenko to find out whether Russia was ready to create a free-trade zone. No concrete agreements on the mentioned bilateral issues were made. True, in place of the inter-governmental commission, Kiev and Moscow agreed to establishing a "Putin-Yushchenko" commission which would consist of four committees: defense, international cooperation, economic cooperation and humanitarian issues".²⁷

Trying to ensure the support of a part of the electorate (especially Russia-oriented) and trying not to aggravate its already rather complicated relations with Moscow, the official Kiev was pursuing a "pragmatic" policy regarding the UES. (By the way, an opinion was held in the West that in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian authorities would publicly declare their refusal to participate in the activities of the UES.) Yushchenko did not refuse to participate in UES activities, however tried to limit his participation in different ways. The fact that in the new Government of Ukraine there were politicians whose business interests are closely related to the United Economic Space also had an impact on the determination of the new authorities to maintain limited relations with the UES. Promoting the idea that Ukraine should take part in the UES, they, in fact, seek their own economic benefit. On the other hand, Kiev tends to more frequently emphasize that within the framework of the UES they are mostly interested in the development of bilateral relations with Russia. These tendencies were confirmed by the UES summit meeting held at the end of August in Kazan, the Russian Federation. During the meeting, Ukraine did not strain the situation, but prepared a dozen of various initiatives and tried hard to stress the importance of bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine.²⁸

It should be noted that in the Kremlin's stance regarding Ukraine there was yet another policy that could relatively be called *revanchist*. Its objective would be restoration of political influence in Ukraine and, in general, strengthening of Russia's influence within the western part of the CIS. This policy was probably most clearly identified by Gleb Pavlovskij, "a political consultant" of

²⁶ "Путин " зачистит" российско-украинские проблемы", Известия, 2005 03 21.

the Kremlin. According to the analyst, Russian authorities had made a fatal mistake in Ukraine because they “were working” with the political elite only, ignoring “the social factor”, i.e. different non-governmental organizations. He claimed that after Yushchenko’s victory, Moscow should more actively cooperate with institutions that were in opposition to the new regime, employing them for the implementation of its interests. (According to G. Pavlovskij: “... Mr. Yushchenko cannot be considered a person having exceptional rights to voice the interests of society, political and non-governmental organizations of Ukraine”.²⁹) Thus, the immediate aim of Moscow would be to achieve that in the Rada elections in March 2004 pro-Russian forces that are in opposition to the new regime would win.³⁰

The conflict between Yushchenko and Timoshenko, the mounting tension between political forces create conditions for Moscow to further intensify its policy in Ukraine. On the other hand, it seems that in their attempts to consolidate political positions, at least a part of the Ukrainian political elite are doing their best to take advantage of “the Moscow factor” (it is likely that as the elections approach, this will be done still more actively). This political logic is dictated by the conviction that in order to win the elections (primarily in the Russian regions of the country), it is necessary to ensure support from the Kremlin. Apparently, such or similar considerations prompted the ex-Prime Minister Timoshenko to almost secretly go to Moscow as well as induced the Public Prosecutor’s Department of Russia to drop the case against the ex-Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, the most effective instrument of Russia’s influence in Ukraine remains in the energy sector. The gas conflict that occurred between the countries at the end of 2005 and its consequences testify to this. The conflict not only ended in a not transparent agreement between Moscow and Kiev, but also gave rise to another political crisis in Ukraine. Political forces in opposition to Yushchenko in the Rada accused the Yechanurov Government of inability to negotiate with Russia and, on the grounds of the political reform that had come into force, dissolved it. Yanukovich’s and Timoshenko’s political blocs voted for the dissolution of the Government in corpore.

So, “the settlement” of the gas conflict did not enhance President Yushchenko’s prestige, contradictions between the allies in the Orange Revolution became even sharper, while the positions of Yanukovich and the Party of Regions strengthened. In general, it can be stated that with the approaching elections to the Supreme Rada, Moscow consolidated its positions in Ukraine. On the other hand, in spite of whatever government will be formed after the Rada elections in March, it will be forced to resolve the issues of gas price and gas supply in the first place. (According to the agreement, the “compromise” price of gas for Ukraine is valid only until July 2006.) We suppose that it is the energy sector that in the nearest future will be the most important instrument of Russia in maintaining its political influence in Ukraine.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ “Ющенко:Украина будет участвовать в ЕЭП”. www.Korrespondent.net, 2005 08 22.

²⁹ Sokor , “Kremlin redefining policy in “post-soviet” space”, Eurasia daily Monitor, February 8, 2005.

³⁰ Even sharper in his attitude was a well-known representative of the Russian Eurasian geopolitical thought Aleksandr Dugin. According to him, the Kremlin should not only try to politically isolate Yushchenko, but also promote separatistic tendencies in the east of Ukraine.

2.3. Ukraine and the West: Towards Closer Integration?

It is usually claimed that before the Orange Revolution, Western institutions, especially the EU, considered relations with Russia within the CIS space a priority. Immediately after Yushchenko's victory, considerations whether there might be a turning point in the relations between the West and Ukraine were voiced. We might assume that similarly to Yushchenko's attitude towards the West, the attitude of the West towards Ukraine faces a dilemma: expanding and strengthening their cooperation with Ukraine, the EU and NATO are simultaneously trying to develop cooperation relations with Russia and would like the cooperation with Kiev not to complicate their relations with Moscow.

In our opinion, the EU tends to give in to such political and geopolitical logic. Yet one should bear in mind that by no means the positions of all key institutions of the EU and member-states on the issue of cooperation with Ukraine and its membership in the Union coincide. Soon after the revolution, new members of the EU (primarily Poland) tried to raise the idea of Ukraine's membership in the EU. (Scandinavian countries were also in favour of the development of closer relations with Ukraine.) The European Parliament actively supported the strengthening of cooperation with Ukraine. On 13 January 2005, the Parliament passed a special resolution providing for concrete measures for strengthening cooperation between the EU and Ukraine, implying a possibility of its membership in the European Union.³¹

It should also be stated that in their relations with Ukraine, the European Council and Commission took a far more cautious position. Although Brussels welcomed the new "strategic choice of Ukraine to reform and democratize"³², it was inclined to further "slow down" the Euro-integration enthusiasm of Ukraine and refused to treat Kiev as a potential member-state of the EU. First of all, Kiev was implicitly informed that it was too early to raise the membership issue or have discussions "whether the EU door was open or closed". According to Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissary of the European Commission of External Affairs, the EU could negotiate granting the status of privileged membership to Ukraine but not its membership in the EU. This stance of the EU was undoubtedly determined not only by and maybe not so much by the Kremlin's response, but by important internal reasons, i.e. institutional indeterminateness of the European Union and objective non-preparedness of Ukraine. Therefore, it is completely understandable that the EU suggested that the new authorities of Ukraine should return to the idea of the Action Plan. In Brussels' opinion, in this way the format of cooperation with Ukraine would be defined for at least a three-year period and the "irksome" questions about Ukraine's membership in the European Union could be avoided.

The Action Plan was completed already in December 2004. It provided for key directions of the EU-Ukrainian cooperation, but did not refer to the perspec-

³¹ Gromadzki G., Sushko O., Vahl M., Wolczuk K., Will the Orange revolution bear fruit? EU-Ukrainian relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006. *Stefan Batory Foundation*, Warsaw, 2005, p. 17-18.

³² Gromadzki G., Lopata R., Raik K., Neighbours or Relatives? Finnish, Lithuanian and Polish perspectives on the EU's policy towards its new Eastern neighbourhood. Draft paper, p. 26.

tive of the membership. True, taking into consideration democratic changes in Ukrainian politics and approving of them, the EU supplemented the EU Action Plan (31 January). The Action Plan was supplemented by measures that should further enhance cooperation between the EU and Ukraine. These supplements provide for granting the status of market economy to Ukraine, support for the membership in the WTO, liberalization of trade regime. Also foreseen is the beginning of negotiations on the establishment of a free-trade zone in 2006 and simplification of the visa regime. Although the Action Plan did not fully meet Kiev's expectations, on 21 February 2005 the EU and Ukraine did sign it.

Seeking to strengthen cooperation with the EU, the Government of Ukraine established a post of a special vice-Prime Minister for the European integration and drew up a concrete schedule for the implementation of the Action Plan. At the same time, the officials of the new authorities point out that Kiev is still a long way off to the practical implementation of the schedule: the order of communication between different agencies and decision-making is not clear yet, they lack qualified personnel and, finally, there are apprehensions that practical performance of some part of "homework" in the sphere of Euro-integration will have a negative impact on the election results in March 2006.³³ President Yushchenko has repeatedly spoken about the necessity to intensively perform "homework". According to the President, in its attempt for the membership, his country must pass 350-400 new laws or their amendments, whereas membership negotiations should start only after the implementation of the Action Plan.³⁴

No more significant changes in the relations between the EU and Ukraine are expected until the spring of 2006. True, on 1 December 2005, at the summit meeting of the European Union and Ukraine in Kiev, Ukraine was acknowledged as a market economy country. Support was expressed for as prompt as possible Ukraine's membership in the WTO, which would enable to implement an important provision of the Action Plan: to proceed to negotiations on the establishment of a free-trade zone. It is not yet clear though when these negotiations could start. Political crises and other disagreements between different business groups prevented the adoption of documents necessary for joining the WTO. This implies not only that Ukraine's Euro-integration schedule will have to be made more exact, but, what is more important, at the time of the elections President Yushchenko will not be able to boast of any concrete achievements concerning relations with the EU.

The EU is likely to pursue a cautious policy in relations with Ukraine. The EU's position during the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine testifies to this assumption. The EU took, in essence, a neutral stance of non-involvement in the conflict and eventually congratulated Moscow and Kiev after they reached a "compromise" agreement. Referring to the nearest perspective concerning relations between the EU and Ukraine, it should be noted that mutual relations and "cooperation enhancement" will be influenced by the results of

³³ Rybachuk O., "Domestic Challenges to Ukraine's Europeanisation", April 26, 2005, Kiev Roundtable seminar "Neighbours or Relatives?" organized by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in co-operation with the Embassy of Finland in Ukraine.

³⁴ "Ющенко уверен о вступлении в ЕС", www.Korrespondent.net, 2005 05 13.

the elections to the Supreme Rada. With a possible victory of pro-Russian forces, the dialogue between Brussels and Kiev can lose dynamism altogether.

In the analysis of the perspectives of the USA and NATO's relations with Ukraine after the Orange Revolution, several circumstances should be taken into account. First, within the Alliance there is no unanimous opinion regarding the perspectives of Ukraine's membership. However, worth noting is the fact that from the formal point of view, joining NATO is not as complicated as joining the EU. Second, the issue of Ukraine's NATO membership is complicated by the fact that the membership is supported by approximately 15-20 per cent of the Ukrainian population, whereas at the beginning of 2005, 44 per cent of the population was for membership in the EU. Third, it is necessary to point out that the USA supports Kiev's aspirations to join the Alliance.

This tendency came into light during President Yushchenko's visit to the USA in April 2005.³⁵ George W. Bush promised support to Ukraine in joining not only the WTO, but also NATO. (By the way, during Yushchenko's visit in Washington, intensive negotiations between highest military officials of both countries were taking place.) True, the Bush administration associates perspectives of cooperation with Ukraine with strengthening of democracy and free market development.

The standpoint of the USA on enhancing cooperation between the Alliance and Ukraine was also reflected at an informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of NATO countries that was held on 21 April 2005 in Vilnius where Ukrainian representatives also participated. At the same time, the NATO-Ukrainian Commission had a meeting in which an intensive dialogue with the Alliance was suggested to Kiev in October of the same year, during informal NATO-Ukrainian consultations held in Vilnius, the USA Defence Minister Donald Rumsfeld again supported the Ukraine's aspiration to join the Alliance.³⁶ After the meeting representatives of the Ukrainian authorities declared that next year the plan of Ukraine's joining NATO (MAP) could be prepared and adopted.³⁷ Also, the concrete date of joining – the year 2008 – came to be mentioned more often. (In fact, in Vilnius both parties agreed that both the efficiency of reforms being carried out in Ukraine and, of course, the results of the Rada elections would have an impact on the tempo of joining.)

In our opinion, this policy of the USA is determined primarily by geopolitical logic: while strengthening cooperation between Ukraine and NATO, Washington is seeking to limit Russia's influence not only in the western part of the CIS, but in Central and Eastern Europe in general. The same geopolitical reasons

³⁵ On the eve of Yushchenko's visit to the USA an influential Republican political committee of the Senate released a special analytical note in which the Bush administration is urged to actively discuss the issue of Ukraine's NATO membership, increase economic assistance to the country, etc. The document states that the future of Ukraine is important to the West from the standpoint of security, political and economic interests. See: Укринформ, Украинцы заслуживает немедленной поддержки Америки, 2005 04 04.

³⁶ Силина Т., "Поверь в мечту – и в путь", <http://www.zerkalo-nedeli.com/>, 2005 10 29 – 11 04.

³⁷ Ibid.

make the USA take interest in the increasing role of Ukraine in the region. Unlike the EU, Washington actively backed up the attempts of Ukraine to revive the so-called GUUAM, an organization comprising Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova. (After Uzbekistan left the organization, it became GUAM.) This tendency was also confirmed by the so-called Kishinev summit held on 22 April 2005, where alongside members of the GUAM, Presidents of Lithuania and Romania as well as representatives of the USA State Department took part. (It seems that trying not to complicate its relations with Russia that considered the GUAM to be a geopolitical project of the USA, the EC chose not to participate at the summit.) The issues dealt with at the summit meeting included strengthening of cooperation primarily in the field of energy; also, a special declaration was adopted stating that the ultimate goal of its signatories is the establishment of democracy in the Baltic-Black Sea Region. The USA gave active support to one more joint regional project of Ukraine and Georgia, i.e. the establishment of the Association of Democratic Choice (ADC). An idea to create such a body was first raised in August 2005. Formally, the organization was set up on 1-2 December of the same year, i.e. at the same time when the EU and Ukraine summit meeting was held in Kiev (Again, neither the EC nor the old members of the EU participated in setting up the association.) Alongside Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Macedonia, Slovenia took an active part in the establishment of the ADC. (Russia was also invited to participate in the activity of the organization, yet in the role of an observer.) All these countries delegated their presidents to the summit. The association announced that its goal was to promote democracy in the Baltic-Black-Caspian Sea Region. In fact, the ADC was conceived by its founders as an alternative to the Russia-dominated CIS.

In conclusion, it can be stated that the G. Bush administration grounds its policy in Ukraine mainly on a realistic perspective and geopolitical logic. According to it, democratic and pro-Western Ukraine is considered a geopolitical factor that could balance Russia's domination in Central and Eastern Europe. This fact would lead to the assumption that Washington will demonstrate more political activeness in Ukraine than the EU.

A Few Remarks in Lieu of Conclusions

It is possible to maintain that the Orange Revolution in Ukraine was determined by both internal (the crisis of the oligarchic regime, the ability of the opposition to mobilize society, etc.) and external (the competition for the influence in Ukraine between the West and Russia "revolutionized" the society) circumstances. It is evident that democratization of the political system was the ultimate goal of the Orange Revolution. Therefore, it was supported by both a considerable part of the Ukrainian society and numerous supporters in the democratic West. The Orange Revolution not only predetermined the democratization of the political system of Ukraine, but also formed a perspective of qualitati-

vely new relations between Ukraine and the West. A pro-Western, Atlantic trend became increasingly dominant in Ukrainian foreign policy.

The further, already post-revolution development of Ukraine demonstrated that the implementation of such a vector in foreign policy encounters various difficulties. First, seeking a closer cooperation with Western institutions, it was necessary to make economic and political reforms in the country. Second, in order to implement political and economic reforms, consent among the political elite as well as support for such reforms from at least a major part of society are required. It seems that the new political elite of Ukraine failed to achieve these and, in our opinion, principle goals. The situation got complicated by the splitting of the alliance between Yushchenko and Y. Timoshenko, decrease in the President's, clearly manifesting pro-Western line in foreign policy, influence within the political system and, finally, the gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine which ended in an agreement far from being transparent.

Assessing the situation in Ukraine, politicians and analysts often claim that the results of the Rada elections in March 2006 will be of utmost importance to further development of Ukraine, to the direction of its foreign policy. If "Western" forces won the elections, this would consolidate the achievements of the Orange Revolution and its new foreign policy direction; if, however, "pro-Russian" forces won, changes in foreign policy would become inevitable. These considerations can be generally agreed with. Nevertheless, democratic, transparent, complying with Western standards elections in Ukraine will imply that the country is advancing according to the political development model different from that of Russia.

November 2005