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Transatlantic Relations and Challenges to US – EU Cooperation

This article analyzes the transatlantic relations and cooperation challenges between the U.S.A. and the EU. The first part of the article covers the conditions for the functioning of transatlantic relations, the main actors and their roles in contemporary world order, and also the international system and the placement of the EU and U.S.A. within it. Other factors which have an essential influence on a successful relationship between these 2 actors are discussed as well. The second part of the article is dedicated for the assessment of factors and presumptions about the U.S.-EU contest and cooperation. The article concludes with remarks highlighting the economical presumptions to developing transatlantic relations and turns the audiences attention to necessities in which to strengthen this political model, by making a review of the political and ideological relationship, evaluating requirements of the world order, image and also aspects for future visions. Changes in the role of international organizations, more clearly expressed EU member states sovereignty and U.S. unilateral politics, remain potential sources of challenges for the US-EU relations.

Introduction

After the terrorist attacks of 11 September against the U.S.A., political scientists turned their attention to transatlantic relations. Transatlantic partners and the international community saw that dangers for international security are far more complex and severe than was previously presumed. So the solidarity of the transatlantic community in the fight against terrorists in Afghanistan, the split of views on intervention in Iraq and the U.S.A. “Coalitions of the Willing”¹, and politics, lead to a review of transatlantic relations from an academic point of view.

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¹ “Coalitions of the Willing” or “*Ad hoc* alliances” could be formed by several nations willing to participate in a certain operation.

According to Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, different understandings about the new challenges and dangers can cause a “transatlantic split,” and the dissatisfaction of Europeans about the U.S. war on terrorism can develop into an anti-American European integration model.² One can notice that in the context of new dangers, the U.S. position and conceptions towards the states and regions, and also allies and enemies was changing. The tensions in these transatlantic relations (recently becoming more apparent) are explained by the predominance of unilateral and imperial tendencies in the nowadays U.S. foreign policy.

In the context of transatlantic relations, disagreement about the war on Iraq has caused the most major crisis in these transatlantic relations, since the end of World War II. According to Andrew Moravcsik, the transatlantic community is in crisis and disagreements cannot be hidden under common member states’ statements and photos. Nowadays the U.S. policy, especially its official discourse, infringe on the fundamental norms of transatlantic communication which was a grounds for establishing a transatlantic security community. This because the U.S., while resolving world problems, appeals to the “Coalition of the Willing” but not to international institutions.

The current situation is influenced by differences in various points of view between the U.S. and Europe towards the international system. According to Robert Kagan,³ due to unequal power distribution transatlantic partners do not share a common strategic culture, so therefore a new transatlantic deal⁴ is required. However there is a wish to believe that the transatlantic community itself is more than political, military, and economical alliance and disagreements do not overwhelm common values and objectives. Europe, together with the U.S., are interrelated through mutual economical interdependence, and different political and economical interests.

One of the main factors that determined the weakness of Europe as a transatlantic relations partner was incapacity of the EU to frame a concerted and consistent EU foreign and security policy (CFSP). CFSP was has been more of the purpose so far, then a fact. However in 2003 the EU intergovernmental conference made a big step towards the consolidation of an EU security policy. The heads of the EU member states, along with the candidate states, were in favour of a common vision. “The world according to Europe” was drafted by the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, it is a clear set of political objectives, priorities and means to achieve it. European Security Strategy constitutes to be the first official EU document dedicated to formulating a common security policy among the member states.

The two main actors of contemporary international order are – the U.S.A. and EU. Their place in it, along with other factors that have an essential influence on the successful relationship between these two actors is analyzed in this article. It could be presumed that if both actors will successfully conform

² Solana J., “The Transatlantic Rift”, *Harvard International Review*, 24(4), 2003.

³ Kagan R., *Paradise and Power*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003

⁴ Moravcsik A., “Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2003, 82(4), p. 74-90

to the requirements of today's world order, there will be a precondition for their further cooperation. This article assesses that the initiative for creating the world order belongs so far to the U.S., but the EU understands the importance of "survival in the game" and thus seeks with the help of all possible means to limit the U.S. influence in the international environment, in order to equalize the opportunities of both actors.

The difference between European and US approaches to international security and challenges facing transatlantic relations will be also discussed while assessing two key documents: European Security Strategy – "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy"⁵ (hereinafter – ESS) and the "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (hereinafter – NSS), issued by G. W. Bush administration in the beginning of March 2006.⁶ Taking into consideration the political context, that they were drafted in the shadows of 11 September and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the above mentioned documents are powerful political tools carrying specific messages for both – domestic and international audiences.

1. Modern Transatlantic Relations

Current transatlantic relations can be best illustrated by various international forums binding the partners on both sides of the Atlantic. National interests and defence are carried out through alliances and international coalitions.⁷ It is considered that unilateral actions, which negatively influence other actors of international framework, would have a strong influence on the character of the security relations within the system, thus countries quite often hide such actions via concentrating assistance to other countries and using political, economic, and other balanced bilateral actions. Michail Mastanduno stresses that the U.S.A. is in the centre of the current unipolar international system.⁸ No one and nothing can equal out to the four-dimensional U.S. power being: "global military capacity, global economic influence, global cultural, and an ideological attractiveness, and the result of it all – global political power."⁹ Such understanding allows the U.S. to undertake the role as the most important actor and shaper in modern global politics. Other countries are either trying to adjoin to the U.S. or to keep their independence. The author, after an in-depth analysis, has determined that it is the unipolar model which best characterizes the current state of international relations.¹⁰

It has been noticed that the most successful "transatlantic projects" cover

⁵ Council of European Union, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf>

⁶The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, 01 09 2006

⁷ Riordan S., *The New Diplomacy*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, p. 32

⁸Mastanduno M., "A Realist view: three images of the coming international order" in Paul T.V., Hall A.J., *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 28.

⁹ Brzezinski Z., *Nebevaldomas pasaulis: Globalinė sumaištis XXI amžiaus išvakarėse*, Vilnius: Tvermė, 1998, p. 87.

¹⁰ See: Mastanduno, (note 8) p. 28-37

aspects regarding the economy and security. Such close economic and military cooperation, which has occurred over the last sixty years between transatlantic partners, did not pass by without tracks. Peter Gowan notes that the foreign political culture of Atlantic powers has the characteristics of realistic authority politics.¹¹ The remaining understanding of the state, as the most central character of international relations, and idea of a balance of powers shows that a (neo)realistic understanding of modern international relations exists.

Transatlantic relations in the context of NATO and the EU have even crystallized common core values, an understanding of identity, and the like. During the time of the Cold War Era, a more egocentric and homogeneous system directed towards fighting a common outside enemy, and inner competition as well as economic capacity, has formed the alliance of integral, tied together, and ready to resist sorties of external enemies. Barry Buzan suggests defining this security complex as a subject of geographic proximity with a friendly / adverse relationship structure.¹²

1.1. To be or not to be for the Complex of Transatlantic Security

The concept of a security complex emphasizes interdependence, which shows as much via the competition as via mutual interests. As an analytical tool, the concept mentioned concentrates attention to a regional analytical level and helps to “exclude autonomic regional security dynamics from local and systemic level dynamics” and, what is most important, “clarifies the reciprocity effect between the big powers and local states.”¹³

Buzan recommends analyzing regional security sub-systems through the friendship and hostility structure, when the friendship and hostility of the states is expressed in a certain geographical territory. “The structure of the states’ friendship and hostility”¹⁴ is the outcome of this balance of power, and the nature of the relationship between the states varies depending on the changes in the balance of power. In the mean time, the historic dynamics of friendship/hostility is just partly related to the balance of power. Hostility can be very much long term, when in the relationship of states it obtains a historic character. For that reason, friendship/hostility aspects have to be considered as separate elements in the security topic arena.¹⁵ Helga Haftendorn¹⁶ enriches these studies of regional security by stating

¹¹ Gowan P. *The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance*, London: Verso, 1999, p. viii-x

¹² Buzan B., *Žmonės, Valstybės ir Baimė* [People, States and Fear] Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997, p. 243 (in Lithuanian) - “Security complex is a group of states that close share the main interests and their national security cannot realistically be separated from each other.”

¹³ Ibidem, p. 243-244

¹⁴ Ibidem, p.242

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 243

¹⁶ Haftendorn H., “Das Sicherheitspuzzle: Die Suche nach einen tragfähigen Konzept Internationalen Sicherheit” in Moltmann B., Schmidt C., eds., *Regionalisierung der Sicherheitspolitik*, Baden-Baden, 1993, p. 23., quoted in Venckus A., “XX a. Tarptautinės krizės”, *Jaunųjų politologų almanachas*, 2006, Nr.2, p. 18 (in Lithuanian)

that these regions emerge because of social reciprocity, when it is the condition and the outcome of individuals, groups, and social institutional relations in the regional space. Such regional identification is not limited to the definition of geographic regions and thus is more acceptable.

Buzan and Ole Weaver in their book "Regions and Powers,"¹⁷ which was published in 2003, identify the existence of separate security complexes for North America and Europe. It is stated that the North American security complex is a type of central superpower, which means that the complex is unipolar and conditioned by the interests of superpower security. In the mean time the EU is central institutional type – meaning a region which acts in international relations via the help of institutions.¹⁸ The authors propose that in central regions, global security is influenced by one or a few members of the security complex.¹⁹

An institutionalized central regional security complex, under the Bjorn Hetthe scale, would take the level of regional community, which is one step higher than regionalism.²⁰ In the institutionalised complex the major role is played by formal organisations and institutions, inducing member cooperation, establishment, and nurturing of common values, as well as the formation of civil society. The analyst noticed that such a region can grow into a regional institutionalised order, which has an independent identity, institutional capacities, and legitimisation. This enables the region to become a functioning subject of international relations.²¹ Hence, until the U.S. ensured European security the EU states recognised NATO as a sole security guarantee, and also that there was a basis for envisaging the existence a transatlantic central institutionalised security complex.

In the transatlantic region characterised by NATO membership, one could have a realistic foundation on which to see a regional security complex, because in the world of power under the arms race and ideological confrontation, major security interests of the NATO states were so closely bound that their national security could not be comprehended individually. Furthermore, the group of transatlantic security relations can be characterised by a relatively inbound character (e.g. Article 5 guarantees in the North Atlantic Treaty) and relative weakness of interaction with their neighbours. Existence of an institutionalised Alliance within a transatlantic security complex would determine a central type of institutional security complex. This means that the global security could be influenced by one or a few members of the transatlantic security complex. Up till now the U.S.A. was the major contributor to the Alliance, nevertheless, there is a possibility that other members of the Alliance could gain the same footing as well.

¹⁷ Barry B., Waever O., *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 62

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 55

²⁰ Hetthe B., "Communication and Non-communication in a Regional System: the Pathological Cleavage Pattern of South Asia", *SASNET Workshop on Global Networking in South Asian Studies*, 2002, <http://www.sasnet.lu.se/hettne.pdf>, 10 09 2006

²¹ *Ibidem*.

1.2. The U.S.A. and EU in Contemporary World Order

The U.S.A. was not always such a major player in the international system. Since the doctrine of James Monroe, until the beginning of World War I, the U.S. pursued an isolationist policy and its influence on Europe was a minimal one. After World War I, the U.S. indulged into a resolution of important global questions, because the war gave an opportunity to acquire a stronger global economic position. And after World War II, the U.S. became a global actor, having interests in many parts of the world. During the bipolar system of the Cold War the two blocks had their clear enemies and threats that made them cooperate within and pool, together, their joint resources. The collapse of the bipolar world order influenced a further chain of changes in the international system. After the Cold War, when the U.S. became the only superpower, the priorities of foreign policy had to be revised and adapted to the new system.

After the collapse of the bipolar international system and the balance of power of the Cold War, the U.S. as the most powerful super state had a great chance to use the security vacuum that had emerged. Therefore U.S. foreign policy architects decided to implement the “*go global*” vision and initialise the setting of a new world order²². Chris Brown argues that in 1990, the most powerful state of the world has started to form the new framework of the world order, which had to “put a basis... for the legitimisation of the priorities of the U.S. policy.”²³ During the last decade of the 20th Century, the American government elite and businesses tried to develop the U.S. (“*go global*”) as a power that would control major economic and political events in the Twenty-first Century²⁴.

The strategic interest of the U.S.A. is to prevent any other state from dominating in the world or strategically important regions. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski²⁵, while aiming to gain ground in Eurasia the U.S. must understand that Germany and France are the major actors in Europe. Second, Brzezinski noted that a consensus with China, a state that is growing in power, has to be found in the Far East, because it is the only way for it to become a keystone for the U.S.. And third, according to the author, one must understand that in the centre of Eurasia between enlarging Europe and more powerful China there is a “black hole” – Russia still cannot create a post-imperial identity, hence the regions south of Russia threaten to become “Eurasian Balkans.”

B. Buzan supposed that the world powers have to consolidate regional powers around them, so that they do not become rival powers. Hence, the U.S.A. has to try to indulge itself into global and regional relations in various fields as much as possible, so it attracts to itself as many satellites as possible.²⁶

²² World Order – some particular rules of the game for states and other international players, by which players attempt to prevent conflicts or other means that could destroy international stability.

²³ Brown C., *Understanding International Relations*, London: Palgrave, 2001, p. 224

²⁴ Gowan, (note 11) p. vii

²⁵ Бжезински З., *Великая шахматная доска*: [Brzezinski Z., *The Grand Chessboard*], Москва: Международные отношения, 1999. p. 231 (in Russian).

²⁶ Buzan, (note 12) p. 199

As far back as in the early seventies European and U.S. leaders agreed upon so-called *Gymnich* formula, according to which European countries undertook an obligation to inform the U.S.A. about their decisions on policies that could have negative impact on the interests of this state. The formula came to life when disagreements between the U.S. and European leaders for the Middle East policy broke out.

It should be noted that the U.S. had started to prepare for the world leader status (*Pax Americana*) in the seventies, starting an American-British *Dollar - Wall Street Regime*. This international economic regime was aimed to fortify the role of the U.S. national currency in international transactions and take away a possibility for others to fix a stable dollar interest rate, in order to control the process.²⁷ The regime tied up the currency market to Wall Street, which could unilaterally change the rates of the dollar and other major currencies, which reflected the political and economical interests of the U.S. The Richard Nixon administration urged OPEC to raise oil prices and paralyse Japanese and European economies, which were basically dependent on the oil of the Middle East.²⁸

Furthermore, historically the U.S. was interested in the rise of loyal and regionally competitive European powers, and therefore used various measures to limit the growing power of other states. The dollar-Wall Street regime implanted by the Nixon administration "slowly became a common Atlantic (U.S. and EU) project against the rest of the world."²⁹ This common project was challenged by third world countries: in November 2000 Iraq started selling oil for euros and challenged the dollars' – Wall Street hegemony. Later, in the year 2003 China changed a part of its reserve into euros. These changes caused a big confusion for the U.S. elite.³⁰

The U.S.A., and its claim for global hegemony, is predicating on the responsibility it took on itself for the preservation and spread of democratic values. According to Jonathan Monten, the U.S. is following a common hegemonic logic – "our values are universal values, the worlds' matters are our matters, by meeting our interests we are meeting the worlds' interests."³¹ According to the way this was formulated using realistic approach, any great power would try to become the only power.³² Moreover, the U.S.A. has a strong belief in its' oneness and its' noble mission. In the 19th Century the U.S.A. was acknowledging itself as a country of freedom, equality, and possibilities in contrast with constrained, backward-looking and full of controversy Europe.

Contemporary U.S. foreign policy is also a little idealistic. The U.S. NSS is showing a distinct moral dimension in strategic discourse: it emphasizes its support for freedom and democracy and makes strong statements in respect

²⁷ Gowan, (note 11) p. 4

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 21

²⁹ Gowan, (note 11) p. 126

³⁰ Prashad V., "Primacy", *ZNet*, October 30, 2005, <http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2005-10/30prashad.cfm>, 20 10 2006

³¹ Monten J. "The roots of Bush doctrine", *International security*, Vol. 29, Issue. 4, 2005.

³² in. Mastanduno, (note 8) p. 28-37

of “others”. The president of the U.S.A., President Bush, in his speeches is also using idealistic and high-sounding rhetoric. Critics across Europe doubt his “sacred mission” in Iraq where the regime was being changed through the use of a military campaign. It’s rather a pandering of the U.S. security and influence expansion interests in a geopolitically important region.

If Clinton’s administration was well known for its not signing of international agreements, Bush and his neo-conservatives are well known for unilateralism without precedent. There is an obvious swing in U.S. foreign policy from selective multilateralism to aggressive unilateralism – Clinton’s administration acknowledged the principle: “together when it is possible – alone when we have to” versus Bush’s which is “together when we have to, alone when it is possible.” Overall, superpowers think that the principle of multilateralism is constraining their freedom.

U.S. foreign policies, led by the Bush administration are some kind of mix of idealism and realism – Americans believe in some sort of speciality of their ideas and want to spread them through the use of their power and military advantage not taking into consideration the opinions of other countries. According to Samuel Huntington, relying only on itself and behaving in such a way like the world is unipolar, the U.S.A. might be left alone as a “lonely super-power.”³³ The U.S.’s and Europe’s views on using their power, and on the effectiveness and acceptiveness of the power, are getting more and more diverse. Moreover the U.S.A.’s claim to global hegemony is tearing transatlantic partners apart.

Tod Lindberg is stressing, that till 11 September 2001, the relationship between the U.S.A. and Europe was not safeguarded. After the attack of *Al-Qaeda*, the routine was replaced by friendliness. In the face of crisis the U.S.A. and Europe once again consolidated their positions, but the sense of solidarity wasn’t felt for too long. After the events of 11 September, a new U.S.A. dominant world power started emerging³⁴. The rhetoric of the U.S.A. administration was clear – “*either with us or against us.*”³⁵

2. Concentric Forces in Transatlantic Relations

The terrorist attacks of 11 September had a huge impact not only on the foreign policy of the U.S.A., but also on the international system. It strengthened the commitment of the U.S.A. to dominate in the world, and war against terrorism led by the Bush administration was announced as the main priority of their foreign policy³⁶. For a few decades now terrorism has been identified as a threat to a country’s safety but after the incidents of 9/11, the initiative of

³³ Huntington S. “The Lonely Superpower”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 78, no.2, 1999.

³⁴ Lindberg T., “Introduction: the limits of transatlantic solidarity” in Lindberg T., ed., *Beyond Paradise and Power*, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 4

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p.4-5

³⁶ Hirsh M., “Bush and the World”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2002, September/October, p. 36

the U.S.A. gained a new dimension and may be interpreted not as an attack against one country but as an attack against Western political structure and its virtues. Taken into consideration its past experiences, the U.S. not only initiated but also took an active part in the political campaign in Afghanistan. In the year 2002, in his yearly report, U.S. President Bush called Iraq, Iran, and North Korea the "axis of evil" countries and promised to take all of the actions needed for combating such evil.³⁷ The ex-parte of the U.S.A. had an impact on NATO, which was a transatlantic relations institution during the Cold War. The phrase of Donald Rumsfeld became the slogan of Americans in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: "mission determines coalition, not the coalition mission." Many countries wanted to start a coalition with the U.S.A.. The unilateralism of the U.S. has had a negative impact on foreign policy of countries which do not belong to the transatlantic community. It is possible, that such countries as China, Pakistan, and or Russia will start copying the preventive actions of the U.S. and start their intervention into other countries (as if they have a precedent excuse).

2.1. The U.S.A. and EU on the Way to a Bipolar World

The split of opinions in the transatlantic security complex appeared relatively early. Probably France should be named as to be first bellman in search of a European identity as the country withdrew from the NATO military segment. Several states, constituting the nucleus of the European Community became more active individually within the European part of transatlantic security complex. The threat of direct and ideological confrontations with the states of Warsaw pact withered in Europe after the end of the Cold War. The threat forced states to hold the egocentric approach orientated for inside the transatlantic security complex. Thus, it is possible to argue that after the decrease of outside threats to the transatlantic security complex, the growing political and economical power of European States, and due to that strengthening the concurrency between the U.S. and states of European Community, the links among those nations started to lose their strength.

In the shadow of the invasion to Iraq, it was possible to identify two security complexes and even more so we could identify the day when European and North American security complexes were separated. This day is in March 2003, the official beginning of Iraq war. The Western world has split into two camps: the U.S.A., the UK, Spain and "New Europe" are on one side, which missed their chance to remain silent according the president of France, and France together with Germany, opposing the war are on the other side.

The majority of "old European" states have opposed the U.S. intervention in Iraq, not because they had some objections concerning the overturn of the political regime, but due to the fact that not all diplomatic means and capabilities were used to. Those countries also opposed the U.S. intervention to Iraq without

³⁷ *State of the Union Address*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>, 12 10 2006

the resolution of the UN Security Council. It is most likely that the accusations on unilateral actions would not have been so loudly expressed if France and Germany would have supported the intervention. According to Kagan, that which some critics call the U.S. unilateralism in Iraq, is just the wish of the Bush administration to act without the support which was provided by traditional European allies.³⁸

From a power perspective, the contemporary international system is so diverse because the power is distributed among several strong and many weak members³⁹. The presumption might be drawn that the days when the U.S. is dominating within the contemporary world order are over. Some scholars argue that other states are attempting to counterbalance the U.S.A.'s influence in the world. One of the aims of the EU is to develop a competent economy, create a political counterbalance (or the centre of political influence) and by adapting the common currency counterbalance the dollar's influence on international trade. This was also noticed by Jack Donnelly, who argued that in the light of rising hegemony, other states will be forced to balance because capabilities concentrated in one hands creates the threat of imperial dominance.⁴⁰

The strategic provision, that the U.S. must not only consolidate the military and economical power gathered during the Cold War, but also must guarantee that all its competitors at all sectors would be demolished.⁴¹ According to Huntington, such position is a key one for the security and liberty of the U.S..⁴²

Condoleezza Rice, at that time a representative of the U.S. administration, was visiting the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London in July 2003. At that time, Rice has told that multipolarity is the theory of competing powers and values, and that the .A has already used it before, but that led to the Second World War.⁴³ By the way, the provision that unipolarity is the best position from all available in anarchy due to the fact that it provides the best conditions to develop national interests, is illustrated by public discourse of one of the U.S. strategic oversights fixed in Pentagon political planning guidelines in 1992 – “now our strategy must refocus on the prevention of the emerging of any other global rival in the future.”⁴⁴

Kagan points out that the U.S. withholds the unilateral approach due to enough power to act independently in international relation, and Europe has tied itself by agreements and the rule of law and multilateralism because it is weak and a little bit *wishful thinking*. Europe has no ambitions to become a world superpower and no wish to return to times of power balance, and ac-

³⁸ Kagan R., “America’s Crisis of Legitimacy”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2004, March/April, p. 65-88.

³⁹ Buzan, (note 12) p. 203

⁴⁰ Donnelly J., “Beyond Realism and its Critics: The Decline of Structural Neo-Realism and Opportunities for Constructive Engagement” in Lawson S., ed., *The New Agenda for International Relations*, JK: Polity Press, 2002, p. 190

⁴¹ Prasad, (note 31).

⁴² *Ibidem*.

⁴³ Rice C. Speech given at Institute of International Studies in London in 2003., <http://www.iiss.org/conferences/recent-key-addresses/condoleezza-rice-address>, 02 12 2006

⁴⁴ Tyler E. P., “U.S. Strategy Plan Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop”, *The New York Times*, 8 March 1992., p. A1

ording to Kagan, restrict itself to declarations, agreements, treaties, and some contribution to peace keeping after that when the U.S. has already used their military power.⁴⁵

There are open concerns about the effectiveness of the use of force in solving problems of international security concern. One of the common aspects of critics is the effectiveness of military power as a long-term stability guarantee and reconstruction element. Marta Dassu, a year after the Iraq war has started, considered the price of war: "Hussein is overturned, that is undoubtedly well. But nevertheless, rogue state overturning to lose is equal to losing". Europeans are not supporting democratisation "by force" and considers that human convictions and settled norms are changing gradually, and also that an institutional system can not be imputed from aside.

One of the EU foreign and security policy makers Robert Cooper has noticed that it is not true that in general Europe has no wish to use force. The UK and France forces (as quick reaction forces) were used in Bosnia, and German troops actively perform in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the author agrees that European capabilities in foreign missions are very limited. In that sense, it is the most likely that the U.S. could independently conduct a war, in Balkans and Afghanistan, but it needs the support from other states to keep peace and in that way legitimise its actions⁴⁶. The author stresses that behind the peaceful development of Europe, in second part of XX Century, were standing the NATO and U.S. military power. Today it seems that nobody would attempt to attack Europe, but it would be useful to know how the EU would act in the face of such a troubling threat. While the U.S. guarantees the security of the European states, according to Cooper, asymmetry in European and the U.S. attitudes towards a common defence would exist.⁴⁷

Ivo H. Daalder after assessing the contradictions between the U.S.A. and Europe concerning war issues in Iraq, argues that the "changing structure of relations between the U.S.A. and Europe means, that those relations need a new basement, otherwise they can end up in restraints or even divorce"⁴⁸. Strategic European priorities haven't changed dramatically because the main European foreign policy focus is given for elimination of possibility to return back to inter-conflicts. Daalder argues that "the EU expansion has a possibility to become a more and more united actor of international relations in foreign and security policy – the one which it is already in economics." The author noticed that the costs of the EU expansion are huge and most probably, Europe will remain concentrated on its biggest project at least for decade, while U.S. has turned aside from the Europe, Europe has just even more focused to itself.⁴⁹

This divergent attitude by the U.S.A. and Europe leads to other pre-

⁴⁵ Kagan R., *Paradise and Power*, London: Atlantic Books, 2003.

⁴⁶ Cooper R., *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Atlantic Books, 2004, p. 156

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 166

⁴⁸ Daalder I.H., "The End of Atlanticism", in Lindberg T., ed., *Beyond Paradise and Power*, New York, London: Routledge, 2005, p. 40

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 43

sumptions – a hegemonic power can have a tendency to value international organisations, regimes, and treaties sceptically. Europe, in contrast from the U.S., conducts such a global foreign policy which is based on international cooperation and used as a tool to act in face of various challenges and possibilities provided by globalisation. The EU considers that multilateralism and cooperation could be the best correspond to the challenges of the global world, because changing political agendas and the rise of nongovernmental actors means that even the most powerful states lose a capacity to control everything that goes in the world.⁵⁰

It is possible to agree that Europe has a lack of military power and reliable forces that is not a secret that the decision on Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are taken in Washington. But one must keep in mind the current international system, European security starts far more than at the external EU borders. According to Cooper, the EU does not conduct even the half of foreign policy related with war issues, but just little one related with peace, because it performs active development assistance politics and represents *soft power*.⁵¹

The EU, and states of its nucleus, attempt to counterbalance the EU to the U.S.A.. As it was noticed before, the U.S.A., in order to occupy and hold the dominant position must involve itself in all parts of the world in order to prevent the appearance of a strong independent and disloyal to U.S. ideology, rival state. Thus if the EU intends to compete with the USA, it must attempt to get other regional powers to gravitate to its side.

While possessing no military resources to counterbalance the U.S., the capabilities of the EU are related to attempts of their own goals by other means. The EU is not indifferent to the “go global” principle, as it shows ambitions to extend cooperation with China, participate in conflict resolution in Africa and South Caucasus, regulate crisis in Balkans, and withhold values in confrontation with Belarus authoritarian regime. In case of success, the balance of power could be achieved and then the U.S. Hobesian understanding would balance with the EU’s Kantian understanding of the world. Due to their inconsistency, contemporary transatlantic disagreements appear and that brings a lot of challenges to U.S. and EU cooperation.

Americans’ explain the U.S. refrain from participation in an international regime by national interests and the goal to secure its sovereignty, which they perceive as key and unquestionable. The U.S.A. constitution establishes the principle of national law which is higher than any international one. Despite frequent critics on the U.S. due to ignorance of international law, the majority of disagreements between the U.S.A. and EU have appeared earlier than 9/11, or the beginning of the performance of the Bush administration. During the Clinton administration period, Europeans were expressing their dissatisfaction of U.S. power and arrogance, but dissatisfaction reached its peak in 2001 when Bush had taken post in the U.S. Neoconservatives tended to behave in a way that the world was unilateral. It is possible to draw a conclusion that the

⁵⁰ Ibidem, p 46

⁵¹ Cooper, (note 50) p.156 - 165

framework of events of 9/11 gave the U.S.A. the chance to direct their foreign policy towards unilateralism.

The fight against international terrorism was based on huge power projection abroad and the enforcement of military capacities. The war against terrorism, and fight for democratic values, points out a new phase of U.S. global expansion. Within this context it is possible to come back to the U.S. intervention in Iraq. It was not the last war for democracy establishment, and even not even the war for the future of Middle East – in reality it was a fight for U.S.A. role fortification in the international system. It is possible to state that the U.S. administration hasn't properly studied the lessons learned from Afghanistan, and unilaterally decided to go for another risky and not well prepared step – a military campaign in Iraq. This campaign, as it is known, became a huge challenge for not only the U.S., but for their other allies participating in the coalition.

2.2. Perspectives of Cooperation

The ESS appearance was influenced by a natural attempt by Europe to gain more influence in the international system, thus documents containing insights on how Europe could contribute to fight against threats, become more active, stronger and persistent global player appeared. By the way, the first sentence of the ESS states that Europe has never been so prosperous, secure, and free. It is also mentioned that the violence that lasted in Europe in first part of the 20 Century led the way for a place for peace and stability. The EU is the global player of twenty five constituting nations, containing more than four hundred fifty million inhabitants, producing one fourth world's GDP, bearing a whole complex of measures and prepared to share the responsibility for global security and creation of a better world.

The ESS states and discusses the aspects of EU and U.S. relations, stressing that by acting together it is possible to become a powerful force. And even more, Europe was named as the only one reliable global partner for the U.S. and vice versa. It is stated that Europe so far is confronted with threats and challenges to security. New security challenges are less visible and hard to predict: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state collapse and organised crime. Due to majority of conflicts appearing in other regions, Europe must locate its frontal defence line far beyond its borders.

The ESS stresses close cooperation with partners and most importantly – a continued irreversible transatlantic partnership. The necessity to take decisive preventive actions is established in the ESS. Thus, one of the tightest links to the NSS can be found, as NSS foresees the preventive strike and *pre-emptive actions*. U.S. administration announced an updated version of the NSS in March 2006, which focused on the fight against terrorism. By the way, the U.S. global strategy perceives Europe as a priority for U.S. strategically important regions. The NSS points out that “there are few long-term works, which could be done by

the U.S. alone, without their Allies in Canada and Europe. And two of the most important international organisations: NATO and EU are located in Europe.”⁵²

Europe is perceived as a democracy establishment guarantee and the main U.S. ally in the military, economical, and cultural sphere. But the status as an ally does not mean that Europe will be allowed to become strong and possibly create a challenge to U.S. domination. It is possible to state that, according to the opinion of the NSS authors, only a strong, secure, and democratic Europe could guarantee the U.S. domination and interests in the world. With most of close cooperation trends between Europe and U.S., universal western values mean that the U.S. is just “a little bit like another Europe.” Thus EU and U.S. cooperation within various fields is unavoidable and of course understandable. But nobody can guarantee that interests of the U.S.A. and Europe will always fall together. This is the reason why Cooper suggests thinking about a united strategy instead of creating a separate ESS.⁵³

The base for EU-US cooperation remains not only due to common national security interests, but due to tight links based on democracy, human rights, and a liberal market established within various institutionalised and informal forms for national states and in daily processes of internal policy making. By the way, the NATO Riga Summit declaration⁵⁴ envisages that NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. Organizations paid attention to successful cooperation in the West Balkans, including that through the Berlin Plus arrangements, which contribute to peace and security. Also, it is pointed out that in order to strive for improvements in the NATO-EU strategic partnership, to achieve closer cooperation and greater efficiency, and avoid unnecessary duplication, it is necessary for a spirit of transparency and respecting the autonomy of the two organisations. The declaration states that a stronger EU will further contribute to common security.

Within possible context of intensified cooperation between the U.S. and the EU it is possible to agree with C. Fred Bergsten and Caio Koch-Weser, insights that just only by performing together can the EU and the U.S. be able to protect themselves from the erosion of transatlantic relations, refrain U.S. from unilateral foreign policy decisions, and EU – from orientation to inside. By the way those authors paid attention to the fact just only by performing together, can those actors safeguard leadership in the world’s political, social and economical life - to reach a more efficient bilateral relations (indicating the strategies of the both players) and more efficient economical order of the world.⁵⁵

Precisely economical interests could become a good catalyst for bilateral transatlantic relations because the U.S. and the EU are the main inter-trade partners.⁵⁶ They present more than half of the GDP of the world, as well as the fact that they are very comparable in direct investments and the labour force.

⁵² *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (note 6), p.25

⁵³ Cooper, (note 50), p. 165

⁵⁴ NATO Summit, *Riga Declaration*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>, 01 12 2006.

⁵⁵ Bergsten C.F., Koch-Weser C., “The Transatlantic Strategy Group on Economics, Finance and Trade” see.: Weidenfeld W., Koch-Weser C., Bergsten C.F., Stutzle W., Hamre J., eds., *From Alliance to Coalitions – The Future of Transatlantic Relations*, Gutersloh: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 2004, p.238-240

⁵⁶ According to EUROSTAT data, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/QueenPortletized/>, 15 11 2006

Moreover, the inter-trade between the U.S.A. and EU presents more than 1/5 of the total world trade. Among other international players the size of trade is just one third of EU-US trade level.

However, it is important to notice that only 2% of the trade disputes directly could be related to the inter-trade. Therefore, intensive trade, investments and less restriction are very useful mutually. According to the G-8 logic there are some suggestions to form informal G-2 regime⁵⁷ on an economical basis, which cover two main politically and economically strongest international relations players today.

Concluding Remarks

Contemporary international relations are marked by new battles for political, economic, and ideological influence. The U.S. and EU remain among the most powerful economies in the world. Therefore, the constantly increasing economical potential of China may misbalance the U.S. and EU markets of international trade and investments. If the attractiveness of the U.S. and EU markets fell, and it could happen, and if the inter-trade barriers grew, then the inter-competition would increase in the growing markets.

It is very important to underline that from those relations between Brussels (in essence Berlin – Paris axis) and the main associate of the Cold War in the other side of the Atlantic Ocean rise a lot of questions.

When analysing the changes nowadays in the international system, it is possible to identify the features confirming certain ambitions of particular EU countries to force the EU to become a super-power and be able to compete with the USA globally.

In the meantime, the U.S. is striving to expand, or at least to keep, its' domination and influence in Europe in different ways. The U.S. will try to block the EU's opportunity to grow as independent power centre. However, the EU will not be able to become a global power centre and an independent international player until its security depends on the U.S., or is strongly influenced by regional powers.

The changes in the world order – intensify or weakening of the international organizations - proportionally will correct relations between the USA and EU. It looks like in order to achieve the U.S. and EU common position of world order, it will be complicated in as much as the EU expresses its own sovereignty.

Remarkably, there are still possibilities to form the united security complex because of US-EU common values. Transatlantic relations could be positively influenced by divided areas of action and encouraging cooperation between NATO and the EU.

It is possible that in this field a very important role belongs to the states

⁵⁷ Bergsten, (note 59) p. 237-249

government's and even to some particular political leaders. Therefore, if the French political elite would change partly, and democrats come to the government in the U.S., it could be more seriously researched the possibility for transatlantic connections.

It is necessary to strengthen the attractiveness of the political model for saving the advantages of the G-2. This could be done by using already existing multilateral forums and reducing visibility of individual states in the international arena. A common reciprocity validates G-2 participation in the international relations and would lead to the desirable institutionalised order of the world.

The compromises of the G-2 realized within a framework of valid international agreements, would lead not only to rehabilitation of the transatlantic relations but also to *win-win* relations of USA and EU cooperation in the international arena.

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