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The Security Studies: the *Status Quo* and the Trends

Security Studies are undergoing a true upheaval in Europe and have become an unlikely cradle of new theories, new ideas, and new methods for the entire International Relations discipline. Three European schools of security studies – Copenhagen, Paris, and Wales – have produced a serious challenge to the orthodox canons of the US security /strategic studies on the understanding and explanation of security problems, as well as the very nature of the “security” phenomenon itself. Despite the active international academic battles, security analysis is in a firm grasp of geopolitics in Lithuania. An occasional critical article has not been able to launch a serious alternative to the strong school of Lithuanian geopolitics. Such an alternative, however, is necessary and could potentially bring a fresh impulse to the Lithuanian security policy itself. This article discusses the contemporary state and the most significant trends in Security Studies. Particular attention is given to the analysis of differences between the traditional, American security studies, and the critical, European schools. The main aim of this article is to present the possibilities inherent in critical security studies, which could present a strong alternative to the rationalist approach.

Introduction

What is security? Is absolute security possible? Why and how do security problems or security threats emerge? The Security Studies, one of the sub-disciplines of the International Relations, which was founded more than fifty years ago - is still searching for answers to these questions. Despite the constant and rapid growth of the body of literature devoted to the analysis of theoretical and practical problems of security, the same theme is always present in the public debate – that mankind lives under the conditions of constant insecurity. The state of insecurity allegedly is caused by numerous factors – the change of climate, natural disasters, industrial accidents, and epidemics of deadly diseases, armed conflicts, terrorism, and other natural or human-made causes. On the theoretical level, Security Studies are constantly evolving, becoming ever more sophisticated, bringing up new hypotheses, developing new, more advanced

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tools of analysis and forecast, and yet all of this does not help to overcome the omnipresent - mass and individual – sense of insecurity. Moreover, some schools of the Security Studies believe that the attempts of the academics to propose solutions to security problems often only trigger new ones.

Presumably, there is a rather strong relationship between security *theory* and security *practice*. Unlike in the case of the social science disciplines or sub-disciplines, this relationship may have existential consequences to individuals, entire social groups, or even states. In the case of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the academic play¹ with the rational choice theories helped lead the world to the brink of self-destruction, when Nikita Khrushchev and John F. Kennedy started to play the nuclear “Chicken’s game.”

During the Cold War, the link between security theory and practice has gained a paradoxical form: Security Studies have served the politics of the Great Powers: the centres of security studies were generously financed by the state (and especially in the United States) for the efforts to scientifically substantiate and legitimise the security policies pursued by the same state. Security *theory* did not simply intertwine with security *practice* – it became part of it. There were no Security Studies autonomous from political realities.

The current trends in Security Studies are quite opposite – some of the streams have diverted exclusively into theoretical realm, detaching completely from the practical, material analysis of the consequences of (in) security phenomenon. The outcome of this trend seems logical; the scientific battles taking place in academic journals are not interesting to the political elite and incomprehensible to the society at large. The current status quo of the Security Studies is thus not very promising: the representatives of the traditional security studies are too preoccupied with *explaining* security and are therefore not able to gain deeper *understanding* of security, whereas representatives of the new, critical security studies pursue *understanding* so vehemently that they are unable (and often unwilling) of *explaining* security. The efforts to link these two academic work strands do exist and are necessary at least for the sake of the Security Studies keeping the status of a serious sub-discipline of the International Relations and avoid becoming pseudo-scientific genre of belletristic.

The aim of this article is twofold – to discuss the current state of the Security Studies and their trends in Lithuania and the world, and to point out the existing opportunities to use the “security” concept as a *variable* (and not a static, fixed given) in the analysis of international relations/foreign policy. To that effect, the article discusses ontological and epistemological problems of Security Studies, the level of analysis and the unit of analysis problems, normative aspects, the distinction between the security “writing,” and also the security “practice”.

¹ Interestingly, the “beautiful mind” of John Nash – the laureate of the Nobel Prize – has greatly contributed to the development of the game theory.

1. Lithuanian Security Studies: The State of the Art or the Art of the State?

In Lithuania, institutional limits of Security Studies are rather clear: strategic studies, geopolitics, other disciplines devoted to the analysis of international and national security problems are taught at the Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IIRPS), Lithuanian Military Academy, the Vytautas Magnus University, Institute of Political Science and Diplomacy, even the Klaipėda University, Social Sciences Department.

There are also two strategic studies centres: in 2001, the Lithuanian Military Academy has established Strategic Research Centre (director – Jūratė Novagrockienė), and in 2004 the Strategic Studies Centre was established (headed by Egidijus Motieka). Both centres are financed from the state budget, thus they can hardly be considered completely independent. Even when they undertake scientific analysis, they first of all carry out the taskings of state institutions. The Strategic Research Centre carries out research of acute importance to the Ministry of National Defence, whereas the Strategic Studies Centre works in accordance with the requests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Security Department, and the Ministry of National Defence. Undoubtedly, the latter institutions have some analytical capacities of their own, but their analytical work however, usually is not accessible to the society at large. It is obvious and arguably natural that under the given circumstances fundamental, theoretical security research receives less attention and resources than analysis of actual security policy problems, which is in high demand. Accordingly, the two main journals devoted to international relations – *the Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* and *Lithuanian foreign policy review* – also focus almost exclusively on foreign and security policy practice.

At a theoretical level, the security concept in the Lithuanian International Relations discourse is almost completely usurped by the representatives of geopolitics (Jonas Daniliauskas, Tomas Janeliūnas, Laurynas Kasčiūnas, Česlovas Laurinavičius, Motieka, and Nortautas Statkus)² and security studies (Gediminas Vitkus, Vaidotas Urbelis, and Egidijus Vareikis).³ The critical security perception is represented by very few authors (first and foremost

² These authors have taught or still teach disciplines related to security studies or geopolitics, they have written scores of articles on the subject. For example, see: Laurinavičius, Č., Motieka, E., Statkus, N., *Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai. XX amžius*, Vilnius: Lietuvos Istorijos instituto leidykla, 2005 (in Lithuanian); Daniliauskas J., Janeliūnas T., Kasčiūnas L., Motieka E., *Šiaurės šalių geostrateginė svarba Lietuvai*, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2005 (in Lithuanian).

³ Vitkus is a chief editor of *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review* and author of a number of articles. For example, see: Vitkus, G., “The Russia – USA – EU “triangle” and Smaller States in 2003-2004”, in *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004*, p. 115-140. Urbelis teaches strategic studies in IIRPS and is an author of numerous articles on strategy and security. For example, see: Urbelis V., *Lietuvos vieta JAV didžiojoje strategijoje*, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005 (in Lithuanian). Vareikis teaches a discipline on national and international security in the Vytautas Magnus University, he has also written some articles on the subject, see: Vareikis E., “Kas yra nacionalinis saugumas?”, *Skaitiniai apie nacionalinį ir tarptautinį saugumą*, Vilnius: 2000, p.7-12 (in Lithuanian).

Gražina Miniotaitė and Dovilė Jakniūnaitė)⁴. The author of this article together with Statkus also have attempted to polemise on the issues of security studies and Lithuanian security policy.⁵ Apart from these authors, a number of other Lithuanian political scientists, journalists, political analysts, and also politicians often comment on various aspects of Lithuanian or international security policy aspects.

Despite such a significant number of security experts and analysts, in the main institution that prepares international relations specialists – IIRPS – only one dissertation devoted exclusively to security studies has been prepared and defended throughout the entire independence period (work by Tomas Janeliūnas “Communication security concept in security studies”)

A rather narrow outlook of Lithuanian security experts, an often limited to national security problems, and also the lack of English language skills, causes a very insignificant representation of Lithuanian scientific thought in international security discourse, meaning that there is hardly a handful of articles by Lithuanian authors in the key international relations journals. The outcome of such (self)isolation is clear – geopolitics, which represents the state of the art in Lithuania, in the context of European security studies seems to be an anachronism. On the other hand, geopolitics are very popular in Russia (first and foremost in the personality of Aleksander Dugin,⁶ there is also an almanac *Geopolitika* published in Russian), China (Chinese together with Italian scientists publish a journal *Heartland*), and France (there is a French Geopolitics Institute), partially also in the US (journal of *Geopolitics*), however in this context of the great powers, geopolitics in Lithuania is a strange phenomenon. It would be possible to accept the assumption that the dominance of geopolitics in Lithuania was caused by a difficult geopolitical situation of the country. On the other hand, the representatives of geopolitics were the ones who introduced the thesis that the geopolitical situation of Lithuania is difficult, therefore Lithuania needs a strong school of geopolitics, which could explain what it does entail in practical terms. Although such logic seems to be a tautology, today it is deeply engrained into the security discourse of Lithuania and has gained a dogmatic nature. The dominant narrative of this discourse maintains that Lithuania has a lot of internal and external security problems, which relate in one way or another with the threatening, hostile, *other* – Russia. Academic efforts of the school of geopolitics, and security experts, are thus devoted to suggest practical solutions to these allegedly real and objective problems.

⁴ Miniotaitė is an author of some interdisciplinary works; she actively takes part in the European discourse on security studies. Jakniūnaitė teaches and researches in the field of social constructivism. Pvz., žr.: Miniotaitė G., Jakniūnaitė D., “Lietuvos saugumo politika ir identitetas šiuolaikinių saugumo studijų požiūriu”, *Politologija* 3, 2001, p. 21-43 (in Lithuanian); Miniotaitė, G., “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A decade of transformation in the Baltic states”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16 (2), 2003, p. 209 – 222; Miniotaitė G., “Search for Identity in Modern Foreign Policy of Lithuania: between the Northern and Eastern dimensions?”, *Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 2004, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2005, p. 69-85*.

⁵ Statkus N., Paulauskas K., “Lietuvos užsienio politika tarptautinių santykių teorijų ir praktikos kryžkelėje”, *Politologija* 2006, nr. 2, p.12-60 (in Lithuanian).

⁶ Dugin A., *Osnovy geopolitiki*, Moskva: Arktogeja-centr, 1999 (in Russian).

Under the given conditions, at a theoretical level, the security concept is simply not problematic in Lithuania. Therefore, security is explained/written and practiced in a traditional, positive sense – as the state security from external political, military, economic, and other threats.

The following chapters discuss the evolution of this traditional security concept and address the challenge presented to it by the alternative, critical schools, while contending that their insights may enrich Lithuanian security discourse.

2. The Development of Security Studies

Security is one of the main concepts in the field of International Relations. At the same time, it is an “essentially contested concept,”⁷ its definition and content is still a subject of disagreement. Moreover – disagreement is much deeper than ever before.

From the Westphalian treaty of 1648, the concept of security was linked to the state. Security meant *defence* from organized violence coming from outside, i.e. the threatening *others*. A territorial state became the organising principle, which enabled separation and distinction between “us” and “them.” An accumulation of military might have helped with consolidating the state: instruments of violence – military capabilities in particular – effectively turned the state into the main provider of security while at the same time remaining the main interpreter of its meaning. For the better part of world history the security meant whatever the rulers wanted it to mean.⁸

Security acquired its current, modern meaning – that of a state attribute, which is ensured by military and diplomatic means – in the end of the 18th century. The social contract theories of Rousseau, Locke, and Montesquieu helped embed the concept of security into the political discourse.⁹ “Social contract” had to emancipate the individual from the state of anarchy, in which everyone is fighting everyone, and provide him with freedom and security. The Great French Revolution entered some corrections to the noble goals of the philosophers – individual security had been mechanically subordinated to the security of the nation.

The concept of “national security” has emerged quite recently. Until the end of the World War II the concepts of “security” and “defence” have often been used interchangeably. The declaration of war usually was (and still is) publicly masqueraded as defence. Conceptualising the security of the state in peacetime did not make much sense. Pioneers of national security became the Americans by adopting the 1947 National Security Act. The concept of defence

⁷ More about essentially contested concepts see: Gallie W.B., “Essentially contested concepts” žr.: Black M., ed., *The importance of language*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1962, p.121-146

⁸ Del Rosso, Jr., S. J., “The Insecure State (What Future for the State?)”, *Daedalus* 124 (2), 1995, p.183

⁹ McSweeney B., *Security, Identity, and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 19.

and its strict territorial and mental limitations was becoming to weak a force to mobilise the American society for the Cold War. "National security" became the *alma mater* of the Security Studies.

Security Studies can be catalogued in a variety of ways. Some authors argue that there is one discipline of Security Studies, which constantly evolves (e.g. Barry Buzan, who himself contributed to the evolution of the field). Other authors (e.g. Ken Booth) distinguish between two periods – the traditional security studies (the Cold War) and the period of the critical security studies (after the Cold War). According to Bill McSweeney, the security studies, as well as entire International Relations, have undergone 4 cyclic periods – political theory, political science, political economy, and sociology. In all these periods, however, two main ideas have been re-emerging – that of "national security" and that of "common security."¹⁰ Security Studies face the same problem as the entire field of International Relations, instead of the accumulation of "knowledge," which was usual to "normal sciences," changes take place only in the composition of the participants of the "great debates" and "schisms," while essentially contested problems remain unresolved. In the field of Security Studies different theories and schools come and go, but there advance towards accumulation of knowledge is piecemeal at best.

In any case, the chronology of the Security Studies is short. The first period of Security Studies to a large extent coincide with the era of idealism in the International Relations. Before World War II and shortly after it, the idea of "common security" was floating around. Its origins lie with Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. The Charter of the United Nations was also an attempt to rehabilitate that same idea. Edward H. Carr¹¹ and especially Hans Morgenthau¹² gave rise to realism theory, which became the basis for the "golden age" of the security studies. Neoliberal school (Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye¹³) tried to challenge the realists with the "interdependency" thesis, which, in essence, was a more sophisticated version of "common security" idea. Finally, after the unexpected end of the Cold War undermined the authority of traditional security strategists, a number of new schools began proposing different project of widening and deepening of the concept of security. However, proliferating new schools were unable to remove the apologists of traditional security studies from the most prestigious academic institutions, research centres, and the pages of the key international relations journals. In the US, the "middle way" constructivists (Emmanuel Adler, Alexander Wendt) did manage to engage into a constructive dialogue with the (neo)realists and become a legitimate authors of the mainstream American IR discourse. More radical, post-modern thinkers, however, remained outside the margins of this discourse.

In Europe, non-traditional approaches traditionally fair much better. It is

¹⁰ Ibid, p.28-30.

¹¹ Carr E. H., *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, London: Macmillan 1946.

¹² Morgenthau H., *Politics Among Nations*, New York, Knopf, 1948.

¹³ Keohane R., Nye J., *Power and Interdependence*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1977.


even possible to contend that constructivism is becoming more dominant than the neo-neo synthesis in European IR. Yet, neither in the US nor Europe, due to a variety of reasons the representatives of the new security studies schools have not found ways to influence the *practice* of international politics and some critical schools revoke the attempts of academics to influence politics altogether.

Nevertheless, today the Security Studies is one of the most dynamic sub-disciplines of the IR. Some authors believe that Security Studies – traditionally a conservative and closed field – is giving new impulse to the entire IR discipline and is the ground on which the most active academic debates are taking place.¹⁴ Moreover – the Security Studies have been considered the citadel of realism therefore even modest victories of the constructivist camp in this field are extremely sweet.

The differences between the debates taking place among the American schools and European schools of security studies are noteworthy. In the American security studies the main frontline is between the “offensive” and “defensive” realisms. At the margins of this central debate there are post-classical realism, the “middle ground” constructivism, world system theory, which is akin to the ideology of neoconservatives, and partially the traditional liberalism. In Europe, beside the traditionalism (realism), active debates are taking place among critical schools – Critical Security Studies, Copenhagen School and Paris school. At the margins of these debates one can also find radical postmodernism and feminism. Under the conditions of such proliferation of security concepts, the apologists of the tradition security studies are losing the security of the intellectual monopoly they once had.¹⁵ The contemporary map of security studies is indeed colourful, as the Scheme 1 attests to.

¹⁴ Williams, M.C. “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and World Politics”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 47 (4), p. 511-531.

¹⁵ For example, see: Smith S. “The Increasing Insecurity of Security Studies: Conceptualizing Security in the Last Twenty Years”, in Croft S., Terriff T., eds., *Critical Reflections on Security and Change*, London: Frank Cass, 2000, p. 72-101



Scheme 1. Security studies in the context of IR theory

3. Security as Everything and Nothing

There are four key questions at the centre of debate among the different schools of the contemporary security studies¹⁶:

- What is the object of security? In other words, whose security? Depending on the theoretical approach, the security object can be an individual, group, community, state and even the whole world – anything from nothing to everything.
- What is the nature of threats? Security from what/whom? Answers can vary from military threats to cultural and environmental factors to mere discursive, social constructions.
- What/who is the subject, the provider of security? Individuals, army, state, or alliances?
- By what means can security be ensured?


These questions would presume that a given school already has answers to the essential question *what is security?* A postmodernist author R. B. J. Walker asserts that “national security” not only suggests a certain “reality” and “necessity” that everybody must accept - it also entails a very trivial definition

¹⁶ Aggestam L., Hyde-Price A., ed., *Security and Identity in Europe. Exploring the New Agenda*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000, p. 3-6.

that can mean *everything* and *nothing*.¹⁷ This author maintains that the uncertainty of certain things is the main problem.¹⁸ The palette of security concepts is indeed very wide – from a narrow, clearly defined traditional security concept to everything, “what we make security.”

3.1. Traditional Security Concept

The security concept is not a problem in the traditional security studies. Security is not even conceptualised – it simply has one clear definition. According to Stephen Walt, the aim of security studies – accumulation of knowledge about military power. Security studies researches threats, the use of military force, and its consequences to the states and societies, states’ politics in preparation for a war or when fighting one.¹⁹ Security is defined in tautological terms – security is a state’s security from external (mostly military) threats and state security and security of its inhabitants is provided by... the state itself. It is effectively an anti-theoretical, positivist thesis. The neorealist ontology of security is well-known: states are the main subjects of international politics and anarchy is the constant feature of international system, therefore, the states seek to increase their power in order to ensure their security. The international system, national interests, and security policy are all tied up by cause relationships: anarchic international system triggers rational, egoistical search for power and security, and states pursue their policies to that effect, which, in turn, may impact the balance of power in the international system.



Scheme 2. Traditional security concept

In the traditional sense, security is a *material quality*. There can be *more* or *less* security, but the states will *always* feel insecure and will seek to increase their security. The proponents of “offensive” realism agitate in favour of increasing a state’s power and influence vis a vis other states.²⁰ The proponents of

¹⁷ Walker, R.B.J. “The Subject of Security”, in: Krause K., Williams M., eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 63.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 76.

¹⁹ Walt S. M., “The renaissance of security studies”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 35, 1991, p. 212.

²⁰ For example, Mearsheimer J.J., *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: Norton, 2001.

the “defensive” realism recommend only balancing against the other powers²¹ or threats.²² Security is a *negative* category; absolute security is impossible and the main problem of security is *insecurity*. A classical realist, Arnold Wolfers, contends that security is the absence of insecurity, a negative value.²³

The geographical/geopolitical location of a country and its power are the main independent variables and security, and status, in the international system are the main dependent variables in the realist epistemology. Realists assert that weaker actors of the international arena can strengthen their security by pursuing a policy that would trigger hostile intentions on behalf of the other actors, or they seek to increase their power and prevent the hostile states from attaining their goals. The states can increase their power in two ways – by accumulating resources via internal balancing (resource mobilisation, arms acquisitions, etc.) or via external balancing, by aligning with the other states against a common enemy. The stronger actors are more likely to rely upon autonomous pursuit of power (internal balancing), although they do not avoid forming alliances by attracting weaker states to their side. Small and medium states are more likely to pursue external balancing – bandwagon with the great powers (including the revisionist ones) or the hegemon.

All these, in the traditional security studies, are objective “truths” and “facts.” Critical schools, on the other hand, see those “facts” being nothing more than assumptions and beliefs, which, in addition, have a strong normative or even political agenda behind them. In other words, tradition security concept is a *political solution*, which would seem logical in the context of the world history of constant wars, if only it would not have contributed significantly to the very writing of this history.

It is easy to trace the “strategy” of the creation of the traditional security concept. In the 16th - 17th century feudal system there were numbers, subjects, and objects of security: landlords, monarchs, churches, knights – whoever could afford his own private army and defend his territory or another source of power (e.g. religion, throne, etc.). The Westphalian system effectively curtailed security – state has become the guarantor of internal security and order, separating its inhabitants from the external dangers. This system functioned perfectly until the very end of the 20th century, therefore, the proponents of the critical security studies, who seek to expand and deepen the traditional security concept, face a trap: they either need to have a conscious political agenda, or their unconscious academic efforts will have eclectic, unplanned political consequences.

(Neo)realists themselves could not disregard the changing realities of international politics and did try to expand their security concept. The classical work in this respect is Barry Buzan’s “People, states, and fear.” In its first edition in 1983, Buzan has mechanically expanded the concept of security by adding four new sectors of security – political, economical, ecological, and social –

²¹ Waltz K., *Theory of International Politics*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.

²² Walt S., *The origins of alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.

²³ Wolfers A., *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1962, p. 153.

to the traditional one (military).²⁴ Security subject (what provides security) and objectives (what has to be secured), however, remained the state. Buzan's approach to security has further evolved and expanded (see Table 1).

		Sectors				
		Military	Political	Economical	Ecological	Social
1983*	Security object	State				
1993**		State				Identity
1998***		State	Sovereignty	National economy	Environment, climate	Identity

* 1983 edition of *People, states and fear*

** Waever O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*

*** Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*

Table 1. Evolution of Buzan's security analysis: security sectors and objects

In 1993, Buzan became a member of the Copenhagen school, which has made "social identity" a security object equal to the state sovereignty. According to this school, if a state loses its sovereignty, it ceases to exist as a state. Accordingly, if a society loses its identity, it ceases to exist as a society.²⁵


The "middle ground" constructivists promulgated identity into the centre of a state's foreign and security policy formation: changes in a state's identity directly influence its interests and policy²⁶ (see Scheme 3). In other words, the actors would not be able to define their interests, if they would not know who they are in the first place.

However, these attempts to develop security concepts resulted in mechanically expanded definition by including a new variable – identity – rather than deepening the understanding of the phenomenon itself. A new concept – "national security culture" – has thus been born, but the concept of security did not become less "national" and more "cultural."

²⁴ Buzan B. *Žmonės, valstybės ir baimė*, Vilnius: Eugrimas, 1997 (in Lithuanian).

²⁵ Waever O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London: Pinter, 1993, p.25.

²⁶ Jepperson R. L., Wendt A., Katzenstein P.J. "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security", žr.: Katzenstein P. J., eds., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University, 1996, p. 33-78.



Scheme 3. Security concept of the “middle ground” constructivism²⁷

3.2. Critical Security Concepts

The end of Cold War has delivered a big blow to the (neo)realist citadel of security, but did not destroy it. Although critical schools started attacking the traditional security concept from every possible corner and trying to widen and deepen it, the traditionalists themselves were stubbornly declaring the “renaissance” of traditional security studies.²⁸ Three schools of critical security thought have emerged in Europe²⁹: Critical Security Studies (CSS), also known as the Wales School or Aberystwyth School; the aforementioned Copenhagen school and the Paris school. All three schools made problematic the concept of security, but also look cautiously towards expanding the concept because of the potential political consequences of such expansion, but there are also significant differences. The next chapter presents a brief discussion of the main ideas of the three schools – by no means does it attempt to do justice and provide an objective, comprehensive, and final analysis. There are much better and more authoritative sources available to that effect – the ambition of this article is limited to singling out and interpreting subjectively those strands that the author considers to be central in the thinking of each of the schools.

²⁷ Source: Jepperson et al., (note 26).

²⁸ E.g., Walt (note 22), also Mearsheimer J., “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War”, *International Security*, 15(1), 1990, p. 5-56.

²⁹ Waever O., *Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen New “Schools” in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery*, paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004.

3.2.1. Wales School

*Critical Security Studies*³⁰ (Wales School) were first by the 1991 article by Booth³¹ and later developed in the 1997 anthology *Critical Security Studies*, edited by Keith Krause and Michael Williams.³² The central thesis of this school is Booth's assertion that security is to be understood as *emancipation* of people – individuals or groups – from physical or other constraints – poverty, violence, political oppression etc. Security analysts should avoid eyeing security through the lenses of the state – the state itself is often the root of the problem and not its solution, as it is implied by the “national security” concept. The best way to conceptualise security is to link it with individuals, people and explain it in terms of emancipation.

It is noteworthy that the ontology of this school has more in common with objectivism than reflectivism – this school, just as with the realists, asserts that it knows the “true” meaning of security. Ole Waever contends that this school seeks to analyze “real” threats to “real” people.³³ The representatives of the school themselves, however, explain their normative agenda differently. Waever seems to fail to capture the key difference between his own Copenhagen school and the Wales school. The security concept of the latter is *positive* in its nature. McSweeney – one of the key figures of CSS – see an analogy between the positive and negative ideas of freedom of Isaiah Berlin and the negative and positive concepts of security. Just as with freedom, security may gain a negative meaning (“security from what?”), and a positive one (“security for what?”). In the latter case, the notion of threat is absent. The Wales school considers this security concept to be the real, ontological one. In its very primary meaning, it is the relationship between a mother and a child, a primordial sense of security of a human being, a category of social relationship – a security of one in another.³⁴ The semantic meaning of “security” also had a positive genesis from Latin “se cura” - “without care”, in other words, “secure” - this is quite an opposite meaning to the contemporary one. Ignoring the human dimension in security, conceptualisation contradicts logic – for security to have meaning at an international level it first has to make sense at an individual level.³⁵ “Ontological security” is a natural, subconscious impulse, inherent in every individual from his very infancy in the form of necessity to feel security and be in control in his social relations.³⁶

The Wales School does not hide its normative agenda – it seeks to offer a security concept, which would help improve the life of people and maximize their security via integration instead of isolation, and via opportunity instead of

³⁰ Sometimes this term is used to define all the streams that oppose the traditional security studies. Within the confines of this article, the CSS acronym will be used only when referring to the Wales school.

³¹ Booth K., “Security and emancipation”, *Review of International Studies*, 17, 1991.

³² Krause K., Williams M., eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London, UCL Press, 1997

³³ Waever (note 29).

³⁴ McSweeney (note 9), p. 13-15.

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 16.

³⁶ *Ibid*, p. 154-156.

necessity.³⁷ The role of academics should not be restricted to a mere unbiased observance, but rather an active engagement. In this respect, CSS is reminiscent of Johan Galtung peace research. For Booth, the goal of theory is practice. If a theory pretends to explain international relations, it should be able to answer questions about the security of people in the streets of Baghdad. Thinking about thinking is important, but thinking about doing is more important.³⁸ According to Booth, theory is a form of practice, and practice is a form of theory. It is impossible to separate the two.

3.2.2. Paris School

Another critical direction of security studies is headed by Didier Bigo³⁹ and Jef Huysmans and their Paris school. The main inspiration of this school comes from the ideas of Bourdieu and other sociologists, also partially from Michel Foucault. The main thesis of this school maintains that there is a very tight link between security studies and security policy, and security analysts and theorists had a direct impact on states' policies from the very conception of the field.

Representatives of this school seek to *empirically* explore the activities of various state, non-state, and other agencies, which have to do with security. In particular, they are interested in those practices and processes that take place beyond the confines of the official discourse. The characteristic feature of this school is questioning the distinction between the "internal" and "external" realms of security. With territory increasingly losing its previous importance in the contemporary world, various security agencies - be it policy, the military, border patrol or other - start to compete for security functions. Thus, the narrative of "new," "trans-national" threats is conceived. What was known as international threats - immigration, terrorism, and organised crime - allegedly, has now transgressed borders and threatened the internal way of life in a given society. The insecurity that society feels is a direct result of the security narrative and security policy perpetrated by the security agencies. Differently from the Copenhagen school, Paris school is interested in *empirical practice of security*, not discourse. From a methodological point of view, it is no doubt an extremely complex approach, which, on the one hand, comes close to an experimental, inductive mode of science, but on the other dangerously balances on the brink of "conspiracy theory."

³⁷ Booth K., "Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist" in Krause K., Williams M., eds., *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases*, London: UCL Press, 1997, p. 105.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

³⁹ For example, Bigo D. "When two become one: internal and external securitisations in Europe", in: Kelstrup M., Williams M. C., eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration. Power, Security and Community*, London, Routledge, 2000, p.171-205; also Huysmans J., "Defining social constructivism in security studies. The normative dilemma of writing security". *Alternatives*, 27, Supplement, p.41-62.

3.2.3. Copenhagen School

Probably the most established school of critical security studies is the Copenhagen School, which has united intellectual powers of the vanguard constructivists (Wæver) and neorealists (Buzan) under one roof.⁴⁰ The three main concepts of this school are securitisation, security sectors, and regional security complexes. This school in many respects is close to the ideas of the “middle ground” constructivism.

This school believes that the term “security” implies inability to solve problems in the vane of “normal politics.” A special nature of security threats warrants the use of extraordinary means to quell them. Securitisation means that a certain problem contains an existential threat, which needs to be stopped. Accordingly, desecuritisation means the return of certain issue from the “threat-defence” discourse to the regular sphere of public policy. According to this theory, the key question is not how to ensure security, but rather who, how and why turns certain problems into security issues. It is noteworthy that the representatives of this theory do not deny the possibility that in certain cases securitisation of a problem is inevitable (for example, in the case of an imminent threat to a state) or necessary, when it is important to draw attention to a complex problem (for example, environmental degradation).⁴¹ However, even when the “hostile tanks are crossing a states border,” the threat (“hostile”) is an attribute of a social relationship, and not of the tanks *per se*.

The securitisation theory provides clear responses to the aforementioned problems: 1) The security object is determined by the securitising actor. Such an object can thus become a group of individuals, population of rare species, or starving children of Africa. Not all attempts at securitisation (“securitising speech acts”) are successful: a certain problem becomes a security problem when the audience of the given “speech act” accepts it as such. 2) The objective threats do not exist – they are socially constructed by the securitising actors, who indicate a certain factor as “an existential threat.” 3) A state is the “ideal security actor,”⁴² which historically occupies a privileged position as is best equipped to carry out security tasks. 4) The main postulates of securitisation theory direct at a paradoxical conclusion that the best way to solve a security problem is desecuritisation. If a problem can be solved by means of normal politics, the basis for conflict between “identities” and use of force to stop the threat is removed.

Wæver and Buzan reject the possibility of an objective definition of security meaning. They contend that the meaning of security is determined by the actors, therefore, security is inevitably subjective concept. These authors,

⁴⁰ The key sources are: Wæver O., Buzan B., Kelstrup M., Lemaitre P., *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, London, Pinter, 1993 Wæver, O., “Securitization and Desecuritization”, in: Lipschutz, R. D., ed., *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J., *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*, London, Lynne Rienner, 1998.

⁴¹ Miniotaitė, Jakniūnaitė (note 4), p. 9.

⁴² Buzan B., Wæver O., de Wilde J., (note 40), p. 37.

however, as well as the constructivist school at large, have not found a way to escape the trap of “double hermeneutics”. While asserting that a certain security meaning is constructed via speech acts by social actors, Waever and Buzan, however, indicate what kind of “specific rhetorical structure” one needs to look for in the texts – the one, in which there is a reference to “existential threat” and the necessity to quell it. They run away from the ontological, objectivist definition of security, but they fail to avoid *a priori* conceptualisation of security, which rejects any other understanding of security that does not entail references to “existential threats.”

McSweeney is a particularly ardent critic of this gap in securitisation theory.⁴³ As it was noted earlier, he maintains it is possible to perceive security not only in negative terms (security from what?) but also in positive terms (security for what?). Security can only have meaning when its primary subject is an individual. Copenhagen school and the “middle ground” constructivists in general reject this kind of “methodological individualism.”⁴⁴ According to Wendt, to study international relations without studying the states would be the same as studying a forest without paying any attention to trees. In this sense, the “middle ground” constructivism remains in a firm grip of rationalist ontology, in which a state is *alfa* and *omega* for any analysis of international relations.

The constructivist “political” agenda has a certain normative basis – they aim at seeking “de-securitisation” of problems, i.e. their return to the realm of normal politics. As it was argued, in certain cases problems must be “securitised” to draw public attention (e.g. the Darfur crisis). Some constructivists use the concept of “positive securitisation to explain such cases. It is also possible to trace some constructivist attempts to influence the decision makers by publishing policy papers with recommendations for the best course of action. It is possible to expect that the constructivists will be able to engrain the terminology of “identity,” “norms,” and “de-securitisation” into the mainstream international relations discourse and eventually – practice, just the way the American strategists of 1940s and 1950s established the concepts of “national security,” “deterrence,” “power politics,” and “security dilemma” in the public discourse.

The securitisation concept has a certain explanatory analytical value, which helps to take a fresh new look at the international politics from an unconventional angle. The military power or economic resources are not the sole determinative factors in the international relations – values, culture, and mentality of the society (including that of the political elite) also count. Moderate constructivists do not reject the importance of power, even to the contrary: for a securitising speech act to succeed, an actor should occupy a certain authoritative position. Practical consequences to international politics would be

⁴³ McSweeney B., “Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School”, *Review of International Studies*, 22, 1996, p. 81-93; McSweeney B., “Durkheim and the Copenhagen School: a Response to Buzan and Waever”, *Review of International Studies*, 24, 1998, p.137-40.

⁴⁴ Buzan B., Waever O., “Slipper? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable? The Copenhagen School Replies”, *Review of International Studies*, 23, 1997, p. 241-250.

different if Tony Blair or George W. Bush would depict HIV in Africa as an international security problem, said a member of “Greenpeace” making that same statement.

3.2.4. Radical postmodernism and feminism

Radical postmodernists, who draw their inspiration from the philosophy of Derrida, Foucault, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, do not propose their own security theory – they question and criticize security phenomenon as such. James Der Derrian, Walker, and similar authors undertake “post-modernisation” of security by asking why security should matter to anybody in the first place – it is much better to live an interesting and unpredictable life.⁴⁵ In the context of the currently dominant security narrative (flooded by such scary threats and images as international terrorism, the falling towers of 9/11, Weapons of Mass Destruction, the avian flu, and many others) such postmodernist ideas would seem to be naive and even ridiculous. On the other hand, a radical postmodernist position may indeed have an impact on the implications of the debates taking place within the traditional security studies on the world after the 9/11. The question is simple – how far one can go in “securitising” terrorism as a total threat (i.e. by curtailing human rights, perpetrating universal, “Orwellian” surveillance, putting armed policemen or even the military on the streets and thus perpetuating the constant sense of fear) until the quality and meaning of the Western way of life will change. The total war on terrorism perpetrated in accordance with the principles of traditional security concept may lead to apocalyptic consequences just as in the aforementioned Cuban crisis case, when amazingly rational Game Theory brought the world to the brink of nuclear self-annihilation. The influence of the postmodernist insights, however, remains limited because the postmodernists stubbornly refuse to abide by the conventional rules of the IR discipline and relate their ideas to policy research, or write utterly unreadable texts written in self-invented postmodernist language. One of the few exceptions one could consider works of Der Derrian, which do have a quite direct relevance to world affairs.⁴⁶

Feminists devote quite a significant amount of attention to security studies.⁴⁷ A significant part of their work is close to the ideas of the Aberystwyth School. According to the feminists, the main object of security should be an individual, while traditional state-centric security studies are the product of men’s world. Sex, no doubt, is one of the main variables in security studies. This school, however, has yet to elaborate a more clear research agenda to warrant more attention of “the men’s” academic and policy communities.

⁴⁵ E.g.: Der Derrian J., “The Value of Security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard”, in: Lipschutz, (note 40), p.24-45; Walker (note 17).

⁴⁶ See, for example, Der Derrian J. *Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War*, Cambridge: MA: Blackwell, 1992.

⁴⁷ P vz., Tickner J. A., *Gender and International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1992.

To conclude, security has many faces – to solve the problem of the “essentially contested concept” seems impossible, but it may well be “employed” for the purposes of academic research by using it for what it is – a variable.

4. Security as a Variable: Parameters for Analysis

The Ontological nature of the “security” concept. According to the realist perception, security is objective, “thing-ish” and measurable – it can be acquired, sold, downsized or enlarged. According to the reflectivist conceptions, security first of all signifies a social relationship – in the case of securitisation theory, a negative relationship, in the case of critical security theories – positive, emancipatory relationship. In both cases, two actors are necessary to give meaning to security: when security is “thing-ish”, one actor may increase security at the expense of other actor’s security, i.e. a zero sum game takes place. In the second case, the social relationship is a presumed relationship, which, according to “middle ground” constructivists, may be interpreted as a “socially constructed reality”, which does have a material basis. One can also trace down a third ontological meaning of security in the works of postmodernists and poststructuralists – security, in this case, has only a discursive meaning within the limits of concrete discourse/text.

The problems of epistemology and methodology. In the US, rationalist epistemology is firmly entrenched in the security studies and the IR discipline at large. Research that does not apply to the Game Theory, or does not use quantitative or statistical methods, or at least does not follow the cannons of a positivist social science as presented in the textbook of Gary King, Keohane and Sidney Verba,⁴⁸ have little chance to get onto the pages of the main journals – *American Journal of Political Science* or *American Political Science Review*. In the European tradition of IR, anarchy of reflectivist epistemology prevails – the number of different schools and researchers match the number of analytical approaches and methods used in research. The most popular methodological tool of the critical security studies is discourse analysis. In a very general sense, discourse analysis can be defined as a qualitative and interpretative attempt at recreating the meaning of the language used by actors to explain and understand the social phenomena. Discourse is a sum of texts, speeches, documents, and social practices, which helps creating meaning and organise social knowledge. Unlike quantitative methods, statistics, programming, or modelling this method is very demanding towards the researcher himself. The author must persuade his audience that his interpretation of the meaning of a social phenomenon is useful to explain relevant empirical consequences.⁴⁹

For example, to study securitisation means to study discourse. Security

⁴⁸ King G., Keohane R. O., Verba S., *Designing Social Inquiry*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994

⁴⁹ Abdelal R., Herrera Y. M., Johnston A. I., McDermott R., *Identity as a Variable*, Harvard University, 2005, p. 21.

concept is determined by a textual criterion – specific rhetorical structure, which must be found in a text by searching for certain features. Analysis of discourse and official texts allows determining who, how, and when securitising various problems. Discourse analysis is a clear methodological instrument, which enables processing of empirical data, which, for the researcher, comes in the form of texts and public discourse. On the other hand, despite the logical consistency of the securitisation theory, certain gaps in applicability of this theory to the practice of international relations remain.

First, official texts often differs from the actual policy of a state, while the most important decisions in world politics are often taken behind the closed doors – within David Easton’s “black box.” It remains to be seen whether the ambitious agenda of the Paris school to get inside that box and empirically research its contents will bear any fruit. Representatives of the Copenhagen school acknowledge that discourse analysis is of little help in identifying the actual motives of actors.⁵⁰

Second, constructivists, while emphasising the social, subjective nature of reality and thus problematising the ontological assumption of realism, tend to forget to problematise their own tools and first of all language. For example, constructivists accept a “speech act,” which securitises a certain problem, as a social fact, which can be analysed by using tools of positivist epistemology. For more radical constructivist, this kind of “objectivisation” of language is not acceptable – language is only one of the building blocks of the constructed social reality, which is no more, no less subjective than any other category, first and foremost nonverbal practice of international relations.

Level of analysis: depending on the theoretical approach, the nature of the problem or the research question, analysis in security studies can be carried out “top-down” (beginning with the international system) and “bottom-up” (beginning with the analysis of individual actions). In the traditional security concept, strategic studies, the conventional level of analysis is international system and the unit of analysis is a state. A state is the subject of security, which ensures internal security to its inhabitants and external security to itself, as the main object of security. Individual security is subordinated to state security. Critical security studies seek to expand the number of security subjects and objects. The proponents of the idealist, emancipatory theory believe that a human being should be the main object of security. Other theories suggest expanding to encompass other security objects, such as environment, economic and financial systems, cyberspace, etc. Proponents of securitisation theory content that security object is determined by the subject, who occupies a certain authoritative position, and names the given object or problem a security problem.

The normative aspects. Due to its objectivist nature, the traditional concept of security is beyond the realm of morality. But this is the case only in the worldview of proponents of this concept – most reflectivist authors would contend that any theory has a normative, subjective basis, which originates d in the author’s conscious or subconscious, but in any case motivated choices.

⁵⁰ Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilde J., (note 40), p. 176.

According to the realist worldview, anarchy of international system is an *objective reality* therefore every state is insecure and seek to increase its power, thereby increasing the sense of danger/insecurity in the fellow states. Realists can *explain* how international relations function, but they claim it is impossible to improve the state of affairs, because the security dilemma is irresolvable. The representatives of the critical security studies do not deny their normative inclinations and idealist efforts, to search for global peace by helping the international actors to *understand* how security dilemma can be overcome. Finally, proponents of the securitisation theory criticise both views because of their subjective normative stances and suggest an allegedly more “objective” method of analysis: to observe impartially the very process and aim at explaining how and why security problems emerges and help the actors to understand when it is important to avoid this process, and when to foster.

Security writing vs. security practice. For the analysts of the traditional security studies writing about security and practice of security are two completely different endeavours: the analysts can only explain international relations and, based upon their arguments, provide some policy recommendations (numerous research centres and think-tanks in the US and Europe practice this kind of entrepreneurship) but practice of security itself is exclusively the prerogative of the state and its statesmen.

The representatives of critical security studies face an ethical dilemma: security analysts by writing security take part in the process of formation of security policy and thus can influence security practice (in the case of securitisation theory – a theorist himself can become a securitising actor if he will perform the “speech act” - write/define a certain issue as a security problem, which must be solved by extraordinary means). This dilemma is still unresolved in the critical security studies: while criticising the traditionalist “writing” for their negative influence on “practice,” reflectivist avoid the responsibility to pinpoint what are the security problems and how they should be resolved.

On the other hand, Booth himself admits that a better part of research consists of books about books, and papers about papers, while people continue to be tortured and killed. If the academics want to go beyond firing at each other from their ivory towers, they need to engage reality.⁵¹ The sense of insecurity in the streets of Baghdad or London is not merely a subjective social construction – for the inhabitants of those cities these are objective, material conditions of life. Discourse analysis cannot solve this security problem, let alone change those conditions of life. In conclusion, it is impossible to completely separate security theory and security practice - “fundamental” security studies would not make much sense if they were not applicable to the street-wisdom security.

The parameters of security analysis, as discussed above, are summarised in Table 2.

⁵¹ Booth (note 37), p. 107, 113.

Table 2. Matrix of security concepts

International relations paradigm	Rationalism		Constructivism		Reflectivism		Radical postmodernism
	Neorealism	Neoliberalism	"Middle ground" constructivism	Securitisation theory (Copenhagen school)	Critical security studies (Wales school)	Paris school	
Ontology	Objectivist: security is <i>material</i> /power relation between actors		Inter-subjective: security is <i>social</i> relationship between actors		Objectivist: security is emancipation		Security is everything and (especially) nothing
Epistemology	Explaining						
International system	Anarchical	Controlled anarchy	"What states make of it", i.e. inter-subjectively constructed		Hierarchical, elitist		Security is criticised as such, as inherently negative phenomenon under any circumstances
Main security object	State		Identity	Determined by securitising actor	Individual		
Security subject	State		Securitising actor		Individual	Security agencies (military, police)	
Means of security	Power, military might	Economic power	Desecuritisation		Emancipation		
Security dilemma	Irresolvable: zero sum game	Resolvable via international regimes, positive sum game	Solvable via integration and collective identity	Solveable via emancipation		Not relevant	
Security perception	negative	positive	negative		positive		negative
Intellectual influences	Morgenthau Waltz	Herz	Berger, Luckmann	Durkheim, Austin		Bourdieu	
Current representatives	Measheimer, Walt	Keohane, Nye	Adler, Wendt	Waever, Buzan	Booth, Wryn Jones, McSweeney		Foucault, Derrida, Heidegger Der Derrian, Walker

Conclusions

- Security studies are undergoing resurgence. European schools of security studies have presented a serious challenge to the orthodox American security/strategic studies tradition. The security concept in this tradition is a material, a-theoretical given. Copenhagen, Paris, and Wales schools are digging at the essence of the "essentially contested concept": what is security? This question is of no relevance to the American rationalist apologists. Renaissance of otherwise rather conservative sub-discipline has given a fresh new impulse to the European IR.

- Geopolitics, to a large extent, shapes the worldview and understanding of security by political science students and the political elite in Lithuania. Only a very few Lithuanian academics attempt to breakthrough the rather narrow limits of national security/geopolitics discourse and take part in the European security studies discourse. A wider and more diverse debate exists between security theorists, analysts, and practitioners and would be a healthy and welcome development, which could significantly enrich the Lithuanian security policy itself.

- The orientation of strategic research centres towards the analysis of practical security problems seems natural and logical. At the same time, Lithuanian academic institutions, political scientists and sociologists, students of political science could devote more attention to the fundamental security studies, including the development of security theory. As discussed in this article, the parameters of security analysis provide ample opportunities and space for theoretical, practical, and especially interdisciplinary research.

- In the contemporary security studies, an author can choose between two normative positions: positivist, whereby the researcher relies upon objectivist security ontology; constructivist, whereby the author of a text understands his role in constructing a certain security narrative. In the first case, an unconscious contribution of the author to the escalation, securitisation of a certain problem, as well as consciously intended solution – in any case the author loses a secure claim at academic neutrality. In the second case the latter danger is well understood, therefore the author will either exploit his text to influence practice (as in the case of the Wales school) or consciously will try to avoid such an impact (Paris, Copenhagen schools). In any case, normative bias towards the object of analysis is inescapable, and the securitisation theory can only partially amortise this subjectivity.

- Security can be researched as either an objective, materially measurable phenomenon, or as an inter-subjective social relationship between two actors, or as a reflective specific rhetorical structure within a certain text. It is important that a researcher would accept security as a variable and would not try to claim security as an inevitable, existential given.

- In security studies, as well as in the entire IR discipline, the level of analysis and the units of analysis are at the jurisdiction of the researcher and to a large extent depend on the theoretical or practical problem at hand: "security"

can gain a certain meaning at an individual, group, state, or international system level. This provides space to interdisciplinary research – psychological and sociological insights about individual consciousness and collective behaviour have already made an impact on the European security studies.

- There is not much new in the front of security epistemology: authors, who seek to explain security, cannot offer such an understanding of security; and vice versa authors, who seek to understand security, cannot offer an acceptable explanation. Mitigation of the tension between these two poles should be one of the main challenges for the critical security studies. It is possible to challenge the traditional security studies on their own turf of epistemology. In other words, the main methodological tools of constructivists – discourse analysis, interpretation, and sociological methods – need to be incorporated into a positivist research design if they are to be used to turn the gained *understanding* of security into the *explanation* of security.

- Security *practice* is undoubtedly influencing security *writing* and vice versa: *writing* security may have and often has consequences for security practice, but not necessarily positive ones. The *raison d'être* of security studies should be finding an answer to the essential question being how to help solve the problems of security *practice* via security *writing* and not only to try to understand or explain them.

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