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Information Security in Lithuania: The Problem of May 9th and the Crash of the Russian Fighter

In this article, two Russian information campaigns occurring in Lithuania, in 2005 are analyzed. The first one is related to the May 9th celebration in Moscow, the second one is related to the crash of the Russian fighter in Lithuania. The question is - how and why this diplomatic visit and military incident became information threats and what consequences have they caused. In explaining the reasons for Russian information pressure and its consequences, and in evaluating if it could pose a threat to Lithuania, the perspective of social constructivism is used. In applying the securitization model article analyzes, how did Lithuania and Russia understand the above mentioned events, what kind of behaviour did this understanding provoke and what impact did it make to information security.

Preface

Russia tries to keep Lithuania and the other Baltic States in its zone of influence regardless of their membership in euro-Atlantic organizations. In order to control its perceived zone of influence, Russia uses a means of indirect control. It can be noticed that over the past several years, Russia exerts its influence in the economical and also especially the energy sectors.[1]. In their relations with these countries, Russia is also prone to use diplomatic pressure and new forms of power, namely information power. First, by using informational power, Russia seeks to interfere with Lithuania's information sphere through the media, cultural and educational spheres.[2] Second, it also seeks to voice its viewpoint about issues related to Lithuania in the international arena, which can be called the global information sphere. This sphere becomes a new place of competition between countries. The influence – ability to impose their point

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[1] Janeliūnas T., "JAV ir Rusijos įtakos persiskirstymas Vidurio ir Rytų Europos regione" ["Division of influence between USA and Russia in Central and Eastern Europe," paper presented at TSPMI and LPA conference]. Pranešimas metinėje VU TSPMI ir LPA konferencijoje "Lietuva po Prahos." Vilnius, 2002 m. lapkričio 29 d. http://www.tspmi.vu.lt/files/mokslkonfer/janeliunas.doc, 15 01 2006. (In Lithuanian).

[2] Žalys L., "Lietuva iš Rytų jaučia smarkų informacinį spaudimą" [Lithuania feels powerful information pressure from East]. *Kauno diena*, 2006 m. vasario 27 d. Maliukevičius N., "Lietuva – Rusijos informacinė kolonija" [Lithuania as an informational colony of Russia]. *Atgimimas,* 2006 m. kovo 14 d.

of view – can be established with the help of information and communication technologies. In the global information sphere, the opinion voiced by Russia very often contradicts the official position of Lithuania, thus international community is misinformed about Lithuania. This allows for an assumption that Russia is waging an information/psychological war against Lithuania and because of that it becomes very important to identify information threats and raise the issue of vulnerabilities in Lithuania's information security.

There is no consistent and comprehensive research on Russia's informational pressure against Lithuania. Among Lithuania's political scientists, the information war was analyzed by Nerijus Maliukevičius, but he was mainly interested in information war operations exercised during military conflict.[3] Tomas Janeliūnas pays more attention to information threats.[4] Janeliūnas proposes to analyze information security by using the communication sector which is based on an objectivist methodology. According to him, the securitization model is not consistent because it analyzes how problems become a threat but it does not offer a mechanism on how to evaluate security policy.[5] However Janeliūnas does not try to solve this problem. The author of securitization model, Ole Waever, asserts that although the securitization approach study's "the processes whereby issues are turned into security concerns or purged of this quality (…) this does not mean that the securitization approach is without the possibility of criticising existing or suggested policy or in other ways advising, warning, or suggesting."[6]

Considering the relevance of the topic and lack of comprehensive analysis, new confrontations between Lithuania and Russia become important from the information security point of view; they are analyzed in this article. There were two important information campaigns against Lithuania in year 2005 by Russia. The first event is the May 9th celebration, which marked the anniversary of the Second World War's end and was held in Moscow. In this situation it was possible to see Russia's active information pressure to Lithuania. The second event emerged after the crash of the Russian fighter "Su-27" on the 15th of September in Lithuania. This event is interesting in respect to the fact that it looks like a military threat at first. However, if we make a deeper analysis of the whole incident, we can see that it was more important as a threat to Lithuania's information security.

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[3] Maliukevičius N., *Informacinio karo koncepcija: JAV ir Rusijos požiūriai* [*Concept of information war: Views of USA and Russia*]. Vilnius: Eugrimas, 2002. Maliukevičius N., "Karinis konfliktas informacijos amžiuje ir Lietuvos pasirengimas" ["Military conflict in information age and Lithuania's preparedness"]. *Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga, 2003.* Vilnius, 2004, 53-72. In his last publication he analyzed informational-cultural expansion from East – Maliukevičius N., "Ekspansijos iš Rytų apraiškos Lietuvos informacinėje erdvėje" ["Looking for clues of expansion from East in Lithuania's information sphere"]. *Politologija*, 2006/2 (42). (In Lithuanian).

[4] Janeliūnas T., "Saugumo studijos – grįžimas prie objektyvistinio analizės modelio" ["Security studies – returning to objectivist analysis model"]. *Politologija*, 2004/2 (34). Janeliūnas T., "Gegužės 9-osios problema saugumizavimo teorijos ir komunikacinio saugumo požiūriu" ["The May 9th problem from viewpoints of securitization and communication security"]. *Politologija*, 2005/2 (38). (In Lithuanian).

[5] Janeliūnas T., "Gegužės 9-osios problema …", (note 4) 27.

[6] Wæver, Ole, "Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen. New 'Schools' in Security Theory and their Origins between Core and Periphery." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17th -20th, 2004. Panel Geo-Cultural Epistemologies in IR: Thinking Security Differently, 23.

In analyzing the process of these events, the question that comes about is, why and how the diplomatic visit and military incident grew in to the threats pertaining to the information security sector and what the consequences might have caused. In this research, I first define the theoretical framework of analysis based on the social constructivist, which is based on social constructivist perspective. Second, by analyzing the May 9th issue and the fighter's "Su-27" incident, the main aspects of confrontation between Lithuania and Russia are shown, which are important from an information security point of view. And by doing this, the question about which country won in each of these information confrontations will be answered.

1. Frameworks of Information Security Analysis

1.1. Information Security Researches

Information security indicates the protection of information, information and computer systems, and of processes based on information. Considering the nature of threats, it is possible to distinguish two types of information security. First, it is psychological information security. In this type of security psychological and information threats are relevant. They come from propaganda, restriction of information flows, making sure whosesoever viewpoint the dominant one is in the information sphere. Second, technological information security is related to threats of a technological character, like hacking into computers. In this research I will first analyze the type of information threats that are psychological threats, and also related to psychological information security. In this article they will be called simply, information threats and information security.

Information security research, as a new aspect of security studies analysis, has not been developed yet. By integrating the information security topic into the security studies, the method for information security analysis must be chosen. Considering possible methodological assumptions, there can be identified two main streamlines of security studies. They differ in the way they evaluate security – objectively or subjectively. In first case, security is understood as an objective predetermined condition, meaning that it is possible to identify and analyze threats objectively, and security is a concrete appearance that can be reached. In the second case, security is understood as dependent from an individual and inter-subjective perception. Security is treated as a socially constructed phenomenon. The securitization model is based on this social constructivist perspective. It will be first analyzed in this article. The objectivist viewpoint will be shown by analyzing the communication sector.

1.2. Securitization Perspective

The main aim of the securitization perspective is to explain the logic of securitizing actors, according to how it behaves when some problems are uttered to be existential threats.[7] When security questions are analyzed through the securitization perspective, it is not important if the threat is real. The most important point is how the problem is perceived or what is considered to be a threat. Security is treated as a socially constructed phenomenon, meaning that the problem becomes a threat when the securitizing actor names it as a threat. Successful securitization happens when the audience accepts the securitizing act – that the problem should be regarded as a threat. What is the audience depends upon the political system or nature of the problem.[8]

When a certain problem is presented as a threat the intent is to stress that it can not be compared to any other problems and must be solved by exceptional measures breaking normal procedures. Thus any question can be[9]:

• Non-politicised – the states does not solve such a question, it is not made of public debate;

• Politicised – the question is part of public policy and is solved by the government decisions and resource allocations or other form;

• Securitized – this question is presented as an existential threat, it is transferred from the usual political agenda to the one which is regarded as more important and which allows to use extraordinary measures for solving it.

There is one more important term – desecuritization. It means that the problem which was securitized is returned to the regular political agenda or was not securitized. It is important to evaluate if the problem was securitized or not, because in any of these cases, this makes an influence on how actors keep behaving and what security policy they implement.

1.3. Evaluation of the Security Policy

Waever stated that the securitization model can help criticize security policy and give recommendations, but it did not explain how this can be done. In order to evaluate the consequences of securitization and desecuritization, that is the actions undertaken by countries according their perception about May 9th issue and fighter crash, certain evaluation criteria must be introduced.

In this article it is stated that in evaluating the security policy we can invoke statements from security and foreign policy strategies, official statements that were presented earlier (before the celebration and military incident). These notions are not considered as stating real threats (in objectivist point of view).

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[7] Buzan B., Waever O, and de Wilde J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder USA, London UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
[8] *Ibidem*, 11-12.
[9] *Ibidem*, 10.

They are the result of the previous securitization processes and they show how security and threats were perceived. Therefore it can be analyzed if countries acted according their previously stated interests and perceptions of security and threats to security.[10]

The assumption is that the two events that are analyzed could not change Lithuania's and Russia's national interest or what they regard as threats. Celebration is related with the historical and fundamental aspects to the state idea. The perception of state idea is not fixed; it can be changed in what is considered a long-term process. The crash of the fighter as an unexpected event that lasted for a very short time (from the time of the crash till the announcement of the conclusions of the incidents investigation) could not change the previously established perception of security. Therefore Lithuania's and Russia's reaction to the events should match previously stated notions about security and threats. If actions of the two countries do not match the notions in their national security and foreign policy strategic documents, there are two reasons for this that can be mentioned. First, it might be that the security conception and threat perception, that is how security is defined and what is held as posing a threat, has been changed. But if the conception and perception is changed this must be clearly stated. Second, if actors who successfully securitize threats do not act according the aims, stated in national security strategy, and they do not declare the change of security policy, then the assumption can be made that they are not making consistent foreign and security policy decisions.[11] This may happen because of three reasons. First, actors can securitize and overestimate dangers regarding them as a threat to those problems, which do not really pose threat to security (according to existing security conception, but not how *real* those threats are). Second, actors can desecuritize and regard dangers as ordinary problems, although according to existing security conception they are regarded as threats). Third, not to securitize – to decide to regard a problem as not a serious danger (not an issue of security), although according to existing security conception it should be regarded as a threat that should be securitized. Incorrect security policy decisions can be made not only because of the incidental mistake. It might also occur because of the information manipulations pursued by a foreign country. Then the manipulated country can behave according not to its interests, by not knowing that. To encourage such behaviour – to obey to alien interests and commands – seek the creators of these information attacks. That is why it is important to evaluate the state behaviour from this point of view, which is important to the information security.

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[10] It can be noted, that the securitization analysts can fall into a trap – by offering security policy recommendation they become securitizing actors. But this can happen only if they had enough power, and this is very rare. It is not enough to voice a problem in order to securitize it. Also an acceptance of the audience and power to take extraordinary measures to solve the problems are needed.

[11] This criterion does not mean that only *status quo* in security policy would be consistent. The emphasis is that the change of security policy should be clearly voiced, i.e. purposeful (this is called consistent position). Reverse position is when without realizing the opposite security policy then the one, that has been declared, is implemented. The aim of information attacks is exactly the same – to change the behavior of an opponent without him to realize this.

2. The May 9th Issue from the Perspective of Information Security

2.1. Russia's Attitude Towards the May 9th Issue

First, information security in the context of the May 9th issue is analyzed and the following relative questions will be answered: (1) how the May 9th issue was perceived by Lithuania and Russia; (2) what actions of these countries did this perception cause; (3) and what consequences followed. Second, it will be evaluated if the decision to participate in the May 9th celebration could cause a threat to Lithuania's information security.

In Russia the celebration of May 9th was regarded as an important historical celebration – the anniversary of Russia's victory in Second World War. Before the celebration, Russia's media was full of patriotic topics, stimulating patriotic feelings nationwide. Therefore the questioning of this date and everything what was related to it has been viewed by Russia as highly hostile. Russia's political scientist, Sergey Markov, who is held to be advocate of Kremlin position, claimed that "this is the best, of what we made in the 20th century and if someone wants to devalue what we are proud of, there can be no talk about rational relations."[12] A Deputy Speaker of the State Duma and leader of the ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, asserted that the "only in Baltic States the importance of the Victory is deemphasized and a parade of fascist movement took place there." He also emphasized that together with Russia, that all of Europe is indignant with this.[13] Hence he has highlighted that views of Russia and Europe are common and the posture of Baltic States is different. This aspect of Russia's information pressure on Lithuania is important because of the two reasons. First, in this way officials of Russia tried to create a negative image of Baltic States in the eyes of Western countries. They did this by stimulating the differences between Western countries and the Baltic States, this would allow Russia to preserve the Baltic States in its zone of influence. Second, they made pressure on Baltic States, prompting them that they should behave like their Western partners.

The fact that the May 9th has been securitized – Russia employed extraordinary measures after Lithuania refused to participate in the celebration – has shown the beginning of Russia's information pressure on Lithuania – blaming

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[12] BNS, „S.Markovas: Lietuvos prezidentui neatvykus į Maskvą, šalių santykiai gali blogėti" [„S.Markov: If Lithuania's President does not come to Russia, relations between countries can worsen"]. 2005 m. balandžio 15 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6484259&categoryID=7&ndate=1113573243, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[13] BNS, „V.Žirinovskis kaltina Baltijos šalis siekiant sumenkinti pergalės Antrajame pasauliniame kare reikšmę" [„V.Zhirinovsky blaims Blatic States for depreciating the meaning of victory in the Second World War"]. 2005 m. balandžio 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6536167&categoryID=8&ndate=1114203673, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

Lithuania of being hostile towards Russia and supporting fascism. Russia perceived the refusal to come to the celebration in Moscow, as disrespectful of historical events, which contribute to the identity building of Russia as a Second World War winner and world power. Identity, national values, and ideology, compose what can be called the state idea. Therefore Russia securitized the refusal of Lithuania as a threat to Russia's state idea. The May 9th celebration can be understood as Russia's information campaign. With the help of this event Russia sought to establish the image of Russia as a world power. Also Russia's officials sought to deny the viewpoint of the Baltic States about historical events. They claimed that the Baltic States were not annexed and joined Soviet Union by free will.

Thus it can be noted that, first, Russia securitized Lithuania's refusal to participate in the celebration and perceived the refusal as a threat to its state idea. Reacting to the refusal to participate in the celebration, as a threat to state idea, Russia began to pursue new information campaigns against Lithuania such as: information pressure to come to the celebration was changed to information pressure by which it was sought to discredit Lithuania's image in the international arena.

Hence, secondly, Russia brought pressure upon Lithuania to participate in the celebration and after Lithuania refused to come Russia criticized it and sought by hostile statements to discredit. Russia's pressure upon Lithuania and other Baltic States revealed an often-noticed attitude of Russia towards them as its zone of influence, and not as an independent and sovereign country. Russia also sought to present its viewpoint about historical facts, which were not favourable and acceptable to Lithuania. In both of these cases Russia sought to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere.

2.2. Lithuania's Viewpoint about the May 9th Issue

It should also be noted that there were two attempts based on different arguments to securitize the May 9th issue in Lithuania. This determined different suggestions how this issue should be handled such as: to participate in the celebration, or not to. First, considering aspects in relation to the preservation of values and ideas, it was sought to avoid the indirect agreement on Russia's viewpoint about how the end of the Second World War should be seen and to strengthen its positions in the information sphere. Participation in the celebration was securitized as a threat to the state idea, which is: participation would mean Lithuania's agreement with interpretation of historical events stated by Russia. Accordingly it was proposed that Lithuania should not participate in the celebration. Second, there were some remarks, that the May 9th issue is important for the pragmatic interests of Lithuania. It was thought that the refusal to come to Moscow will pose a threat to Lithuania's economic security. Thus by securitizing the May 9th issue it was prompted to go to the celebration. Third, the idea to participate in the celebration was motivated by saying that Lithuania should voice its opinion about how it sees the May 9th issue. But these two last securitization attempts were not successful. It is interesting that ordinary

people did not mind that the President of Lithuania would go to Moscow,[14] and disagreed with the decision not to participate in celebration.[15]

Arguments on why the decision not to participate in the celebration was made show that Lithuania securitized the celebration of May 9th and Russia's viewpoint about it as a threat. It was thought that Russia can make use of Lithuania's participation in the celebration and provoke doubts about historical facts (participation could be interpreted as an acknowledgement of occupation). In Lithuania, Russia's pursued questioning of the historical facts was seen as Russia's doubts about Lithuania's statehood, wish to keep Lithuania its zone of influence. Therefore this issue was securitized as a threat to state idea. It should also be noted that according to the discussions that arose in the public sphere, it can be seen that the possibility to agree with Russia's interpretation about history, by participating in the celebration, was seen as a more serious threat then the possibility that Russia will be able to escalate Lithuania's image as a pro-fascist and Russia-phobic country if Lithuania decides not to go to Moscow.

2.3. Outcomes of the Securitization of the May 9th Issue

In the case of the May 9th issue, a confrontation between Lithuania and Russia arose because of different interpretations of historical facts. For Russia, the end of the Second World War is an event of victory and pride. This event is important for constructing Russia's identity as that of a great power. Yet for the Baltic States it means the beginning of new occupation. Lithuania and Russia blamed each other for misinterpreting the historical events, thought that in one way or the other this poses a threat to the state idea. Russia sought to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere. Lithuania sought that Russia's viewpoint did not become the dominant one and by opposing Russia's position it declared its own viewpoint about historical facts.

From the perspective of information security, it is important to draw attention to the fact that Russia, by questioning historical facts, sought to raise doubts about the already universally acknowledged facts. Discussions about facts would mean that there is no agreement on them, or this agreement is not substantial. The evaluation of these facts that would be reached in new discussions and could be different from the one that was before the discussions had started. Actually this is what the initiators of these discussions would seek. But on the other hand if Lithuania stayed aside from the discussions this would let Russia escalate its viewpoint about these historical facts. Thus one of Lithuania's victories in countering Russia's information pressure can

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[14] Delfi, "V.Adamkus į Maskvą nevyks, teigia šaltiniai" [Sources tell, V.Adamkus will not go to Moscow]. 2005 m. kovo 7 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6190753, 15 09 2005.

[15] ELTA, "Visuomenė pasidalinusi dėl V.Adamkaus sprendimo nevykti į Maskvą" [Public opinion is divided because of V.Adamkus decision not to go to Moscow]. 2005 m. kovo 31 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6369915, 15 09 2005.

be its decision not to become involved in discussions that were meaningless and useful for Russia. But Lithuania also denied the interpretation of historical facts presented by Russia and put a question about acknowledgement of Lithuania's occupation.[16] The fact that the occupation is not acknowledged by Russia is perceived by Lithuania as the main threat to the state idea. Raising this question is useful for creating an opposition against Russia's viewpoint and how it interprets historical events.

The other victory of Lithuania was its decision to securitize the participation in the May 9th celebration, because by not going to Moscow Lithuania received an exceptional amount of attention of the international media. This allowed Lithuania to present its viewpoint about the end of the Second World War and the events that followed, and not to let Russia's viewpoint to be the dominant one in the global information sphere. Thus Lithuania's decision not to participate in the celebration was more successful than Latvia's decision to go to Moscow.[17] Russia was not in appropriate place where it was possible to express an opinion that is crosscurrent to the opinion of Russian officials. Lithuania, by staying aside from the epicentre of the celebration, had more possibilities to voice its position. Therefore in Lithuania's case the May 9th issue can be regarded as a solved security problem or problem that did not become a threat because the decision was made not to participate in the celebration.

Pressure by Russian officials to participate in the celebration and the stiffening of their speech after Lithuania rejected the invitation shows that by organizing this event, Russia had particular aims to make use of the May 9th issue against the Baltic States. Russia was very active in proclaiming its viewpoint about May 9th in the international arena. Thus Russia raised doubts of the international community and its own society about historical facts and made pressure on Lithuania to participate in the celebration. Through these actions Russia sought to dominate the information sphere, and to embed its own viewpoint about historical events, along with making an influence on the opinion of Russian, Lithuanian, and the international society. According to the information security definition, all this can be evaluated as the premises of Lithuania's information insecurity and information campaign against Lithuania's information security.

However it can be noted that Russia did not manage to bring into effect all the aims it wanted to when Lithuania and Estonia started to doubt and finally decided not to come to the May 9th celebration. This means that Lithuania by securitizing participation in the May 9th celebration behaved in the opposite way than Russia wanted it to behave. And to the contrary if it did not securitize participation it would become an object of Russia's manipulations. But it

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[16] BNS, "JAV lietuviai raginami bylinėtis su Rusija dėl sovietų okupacijos žalos atlyginimo" ["Lithuanian's of USA are encouraged to litigate with Russia about compensation for soviet occupation"]. 2005 m. gruodžio 28 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=8355193&categoryID=7&ndate=1135750895, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[17] ELTA, "V.Vykė-Freiberga gerbia Lietuvos ir Estijos sprendimą" ["V.Vykė-Freiberga honours decisions of Lithuania"]. 2005 m. kovo 7 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6198325&categoryID=8&ndate=1110226458, 15 09 2005 09 15].

is important to notice that Russia might seek for Lithuania (and other Baltic States) to securitize the May 9th problem. In this case it would behave in an opposite way then the Western countries: it would look Russian-phobic, hostile to Russia, not only having with her unsolved problems, but also solving them not with the help of a dialog (this could be seen when Lithuania refused to come to the celebration that was very important for Russia). Different attitudes of Lithuania and other Western countries towards the May 9th issue could cause disagreements in NATO and European Union. The ability to provoke such disagreements would be useful for Russia, because this would reduce the ability of countries belonging to the Euro-Atlantic organizations make joint agreements, act together and create balance to Russia in international arena. The premise that Russia sought Lithuania to securitized the May 9th issue or the conclusion that this was useful for Russia is confirmed by the fact that when Lithuania rejected the invitation to Moscow, Russia started to show it as a Russian-phobic and pro-fascist country. Thus Russia created the image of Lithuania as a country which is different from other Western countries because of its political decisions. These actions by Russia can be evaluated as unsuccessful, because Lithuania's decision not to participate in the celebration was understood and justified by Western partners. The support for Lithuania was very clearly expressed by the USA. The ambassador of USA in Lithuania, Stephen D. Mull, reassured that Lithuania will stay in good relations with America even if Lithuania's president decided not to go to Moscow.[18] US politician and diplomat Richard Holbrooke confirmed that the decision of President Adamkus will not change friendly relations between Lithuania and the USA that have lasted since 1940.[19] The president of the USA, George W. Bush, affirmed that he respects the decision of Lithuania's president not to participate in the May 9th celebration and understands that for Western Europe, the end of the Second World War denoted liberation, yet for the Central and Eastern Europe this meant soviet occupation and communism.[20]

In evaluating this, Russia's information campaign against Lithuania was not successful. It did not succeed to seize the dominant position in global information sphere. The image of Lithuania as a pro-fascist and Russian-phobic country was not established, likewise this was the same with the interpretation of historical facts voiced by Russia. But on the domestic level, the Russia information campaign was more successful. The negative opinion of Russian society about Lithuania was formed. Although this aspect is not very important in case of the securitization of the May 9th issue, it is important considering the consequences of Russia's implemented misinformation campaigns against its society in the long-run perspective. Such manipulations of society have become

[18] Kristina Aleknaitė, "Lietuva išlaikys JAV paramą ir atsisakius vykti į Maskvą" ["Lithuania will sustain support of USA even if it will refuse to go to Moscow"]. 2005 m. vasario 10 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6021511&categoryID=7&ndate=1108045665, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[19] Aleknaitė, (note 12).

[20] BNS, "G.W.Bushas: Lietuva – JAV draugė" ["G. W. Bush: Lithuania is friend of USA"]. 2005 m. gegužės 5 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6610500&categoryID=7&ndate=1115274015, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

common in Russia. The results of them can be seen in the polls: 60 percent of Russians think that foreign policy of the Baltic States is hostile towards Russia.[21] That is why in the eyes of Russian society aggressive politics by Russia towards the Baltic States looks legitimate. This politics of Russian officials creates external enemies that are needed in order to control their society.

Thus according the way the May 9th problem was securitized, it is possible to evaluate if the decision about participation in the celebration could cause a threat to Lithuania's information security. In evaluating the effectiveness of Russia's information assault against Lithuania it should be noted that the crucial consequences on it had Lithuania's decision not to participate in the May 9th celebration. Thus Lithuania treated participation as a threat to its security and prevented it from possible damage to security. The securitization of participation was Lithuania's consistent objective in securing its state idea as a referential object of security and it also matched Lithuania's interest to avoid potential threats to security. Considering Russia's expectations, it can be concluded that Lithuania's actions did not match Russia's interests or the plan of information assault.

3. Perceptions of Russian Fighter's "Su-27" Crash

3.1. The Main Stages of the Incident

In the second case study – the crash of the Russian fighter "Su-27" in Lithuania – by invoking the securitization perspective, Lithuania's and Russia's perceptions of the incident and how they securitized problems that were perceived as posed threat are analyzed. It should also be noted that the crash of the fighter was first understood as a threat of military nature. Therefore in analyzing the incident not only information threats will be taken notice of, but also threats to military security. This will allow the evaluation of the importance of information security compared to the military security during this incident.

Three main stages of incident can be outlined: first, the accident (the crash of the fighter); second – an investigation of the incident; third – announcement of the investigation's conclusions. The events that followed – the returning of the fragments of the crashed fighter to Russia and the investigation of accident in Russia – did not raise significant reaction in either country, hence they are not analyzed. From the point of view of information security, it is not important what the *real* reason of the incident was, for example an accident, or a provocation (an objectivist perspective would be interested in *real* reasons of the incident). The most important questions are - what reactions did the countries express and what problems actualized.

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[21] Česlovas Iškauskas, "Jokių diskusijų apie sovietinę okupaciją!" ["No discussions about soviet occupation!"]. 2005 m. balandžio 18 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=6495387&categoryID=2997120&ndate =1113803841, 15 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

3.2. Lithuania's Reaction to the Incident

Reacting to the fighter's crash, Lithuania's officials mentioned various reasons for the incident, often contradicting what they said and did not present a clear attitude towards the incident. Right after the fighter's crash, Lithuania's National defence minister, Gediminas Kirkilas, claimed that Russia participates in espionage in Lithuania all the time and the crash of the fighter "Su-27" was another provocation by Russia. This statement was confirmed by the information in Lithuania's media that the pilot of the Russian fighter took part in training where he performed the role of an air space boarder's violator.[22] Yet later, the National defence minister asserted that the "widely discussed possibility that Lithuania's air space was violated deliberately can be pretty much denied."[23] The fact that Lithuania's officials did not formulate a clear attitude which could be presented to the audience as an official position, allowed the appearing of various interpretations of the incident in the media. It was thought that the incident could be both an accident, and a well, a planned Russian provocation in order to test NATO's defence capabilities for example: to check how does the air space monitoring and the defence system work; how well are NATO's fighters that take care of the air space of Baltic Sates prepared; and how they react in a crisis situation. The fact that without clear evidence the idea that the flight of the fighter was a deliberate provocation gains lots of support in Lithuania, it shows that Russia is perceived as a source of threat and similar actions are expected from it.[24] A similar flight of a Western fighter in Lithuania's air space would not be so dramatized and securitized, i.e. it would be perceived as a problem, but not as a threat (according to securitization model and classification of problems into non-politicised, politicised and securitized as mentioned before). Thus the confrontation between Lithuania and Russia in information sphere started when each country tried to present its viewpoint about crash of the fighter. Russia asserted that this was an accident, and Lithuania – that this was provocation *or* an accident. Whereas Lithuania's position was not clear and unambiguous, Russia by pursuing one firm conviction gained advantage in the information sphere. Russia's version about the incident could be more easily understood by the audience and spread by the media.

When the investigation of the incident started, Lithuania's side claimed that Russia had made pressure and obstructed the investigation executed by Lithuania. It blamed Russia for suppressing information about fighter's munitions, not submitting information to the investigation commission. Thus the opinion that Russia was a hostile country towards Lithuania and as a potential threat to its security was reinforced. Meanwhile, as Russia from the very beginning

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[22] ELTA, "V. Trojanovas imituodavo oro erdvės pažeidėją" [V. Trojanov was an imitator of air space violations]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 20 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7521492&categoryID=5995&ndate=1127200854, 27 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[23] Krašto apsaugos ministerija, "Krašto apsaugos ministras pateikė savo preliminarias išvadas" ["Minister of defence presented his tentative findings"]. Pranešimas žiniasklaidai, 2005 09 23. http://monitoring.press.lt/docs/4130.doc, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[24] Russia can be seen as a factor that makes securitization process easier, a factor that has been related with threat for a long time – Waever, (note 5) 14-15. Thus the historical past of Lithuanian – Russian relations makes that Russia is easily understood as a threat.

claimed that the incident was an accident, later it could reasonably demand that the wreckage of the crashed fighter and the arrested pilot would be returned to her. These Russian claims sounded reasonably, as Russia always asserted that the crash of the fighter was an accident and that no investigation was needed. Lithuania also at one moment claimed that this was an accident and then it had to agree on Russia's demands and return wreckage of fighter and the pilot. Yet Lithuania also claimed that the incident was a provocation and by referring to this it could not return what Russia asked and had to start an investigation of the incident. In this case, an unsubstantial position of Lithuania was saved by legal acts, that Lithuania backed its position on Lithuania's constitution. According to it, Lithuania uses its sovereignty and implements justice in Lithuania's territory. Also, in the case against the pilot of the crashed fighter, a national criminal code was employed and not the international convention to which Russia referred.[25]

After Lithuania rejected to return to Russia the wreckages of fighter and the pilot, Russia started active information pressure on Lithuania. Thus Lithuania began to securitize a hostile position of Russia. Lithuania's foreign affairs ministry, reacting to the pretences of Moscow to hand over the fighter "Su-27" and its pilot, declared a protest against Russia because of their propaganda campaign and also attempts to discredit Lithuania as a member of NATO. The Speaker of the Parliament, Artūras Paulauskas, asserted that with propagandist statements and demands Russia is trying to hide the essence of incident.[26] Information presented by Russian officials and in the media was perceived as a threat to Lithuania's information security. It was noticed that Russia's statements become more and more hostile and they attempted to dominate in the information sphere by presenting their viewpoint about the incident.

In the conclusions made by the commission investigating the crash of fighter a bad situation in Russia's air military capabilities was emphasized and this was perceived as a threat to Lithuania.[27] Lithuania's military vulnerabilities and Russia's military threat, because of the problems in its military sector, was seen as problems to Lithuania's security. It was argued that a serious and strong response must be given to Russia's actions that Russia has to explain its actions to NATO. The NATO air policy mission in Baltic States must be strengthened and become permanent and the Kaliningrad region must be demilitarized.[28]

[25] ELTA, "G. Jasaitis: Rusijos naikintuvo pilotui galioja Lietuvos baudžiamasis procesas" ["G. Jasaitis: Against pilot of Russian fighter national criminal code can be employed"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi. lt/archive/article.php?id=7550038&categoryID=7&ndate=1127458028, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[26] ELTA, "Propagandiniais pareiškimais apie naikintuvo Su-27 sudužimo tyrimą Rusija stengiasi paslėpti šio incidento esmę, spėja A. Paulauskas" ["A.Paulauskas guesses that with propaganda statements about crash of fighter "Su-27" Russia attempts to hide the essence of the incident"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d. http://www. paulauskas.lt/index_2005.asp?DL=L&TopicID=60&ArticleID=1163&Page=4&SearchTXT=&iDay=&iM onth=&iYear=, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[27] Justinas Vanagas, "Naikintuvo avarijos priežastys: organizacinių, techninių ir žmogiškų veiksmų visuma" ["The reasons of the crash: the sum of organizational, technical and human acts"]. 2005 m. spalio 4 d. http://www.delfi. lt/archive/article.php?id=7631465&categoryID=7&ndate=1128430828, 08 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[28] Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, "Rezoliucija dėl incidento su Rusijos kariniu orlaiviu Su-27" ["Resolution on the incident with Russian fighter "Su-27""]. 2005 m. spalio 13 d. http://www3.lrs.lt/cgi-bin/preps2?Con dition1=263491&Condition2=, 19 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

3.3. Russia's Reaction to the Incident

Russia's officials consistently and united proclaimed one reason for the incident - that it was an accident. In the Russian media the viewpoint proclaimed by the government dominated. Hence at the beginning Russia did not perceive the incident as a threat and did not seek to securitize it. Russia could do this by claiming that Lithuania shot-up the Russian fighter. In this case, Lithuania's abilities to do this would not be important because such a claim by Russia would be designed for foreign or domestic audience. The audience is unable to evaluate Lithuania's military capabilities and it could be convinced by the fact that the fighter was shot-up (in this case the logic would be similar to this: the incident happened in Lithuania, most Russians perceive Lithuania as hostile towards Russia, thus idea that Lithuania shot-up fighter, which lost course, would sound for them convincing).

Russia's campaign of propaganda and diplomatic pressure against Lithuania began with Russia's dissatisfaction about the investigation of the incident. It began to grow when they started to treat some problems as security threats. Russian diplomats in Vilnius delivered a note to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) offered compensation for any damages caused by crash of the fighter and also urged Lithuania to return the wreckages of fighter "Su-27" and the pilot. They asserted that the pilot and the fighter, which is the property of Russia's military forces, according to the international law are legally immune from Lithuania's jurisdiction and must be returned to Russia.[29] As bilateral relations worsened because of the incident, Russia unilaterally cancelled a one and a half year ago planned session of an intergovernmental commission, which had to take place on 22nd-24th of September, 2005. The Russian MFA motivated this decision by indicating circumstances which appeared during solving problems caused by the crashed fighter and Lithuania's actions towards the pilot. Lithuania's Minister Counsellor from the embassy in Moscow was called to the Russian MFA where there were concerns about delaying the return of the fighters wreckages and the pilot, and also dissatisfaction about Lithuania's doubts that the incident could not be an accident, were expressed for him.[30]

In informational competition, states seek to make their viewpoints dominant. Lithuania's declaration, about Russia's planed provocation, was different from the way Russia saw the incident. Thus the domination of Lithuania's viewpoint was seen by Russia as a threat to its information security. Lithuania's viewpoint about the incident was perceived by Russia as a problem, posing threat to its information security. Thus after Lithuania refused to return the fighter and pilot, Russia started its information attacks against Lithuania. The

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[29] BNS, ELTA, Lietuvos radijas, "Rusija paragino Lietuvą grąžinti lakūną ir lėktuvą" ["Russia urged Lithuania to return the pilot and plane"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 19 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7515121&categoryID=5995&ndate=1127121827, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[30] DELFI, ELTA, BNS "Maskva plečia diplomatinio puolimo prieš Lietuvą frontą" ["Moscow escalates diplomatic attacks against Lithuania"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7532582&categoryID=7&ndate=1127298207, 24 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

Russian media, subordinate to the Russian government, strained the information about the fighter and pilot, and actively criticized Lithuania. The headlines of Russian newspapers announced: "As it could be expected, Lithuania's government provoke and international scandal," and "Lithuania's national defence minister claims, that crash of the fighter is planed provocation by Russia," and also that "Lithuanians became defiant," etc..[31]

Konstantin Kosachov, president of the foreign affairs committee in Russia's Duma, speaking about Lithuania's and Russia's relations asserted that Lithuania did not want Russia to participate in the investigation and did not let objectively and properly investigate the incident, which was only an accident: "in analysing information coming from Lithuania I notice that there are a lot of attempts to show these relations as hostile which might not be the truth."[32] Lithuania was perceived as a country hostile towards Russia.[33] It was thought that by starting the investigation of the accident, Lithuania took revenge on Russia for its agreement with Germany on the Northern European gas pipe. In the Russian media the pilot of fighter, Trojanov, was depicted as a hero who directed the falling fighter from a village or a martyr caught in to enemy's prison.[34]

It is interesting that Russia embraced the incident for desecuritizing the threat of NATO. General Vladimir Mikhailov, Russian Air Force and Air Defence Commander-in-Chief, criticised NATO's mission in the Baltic States, which controls their air space, he asserted that Russia did not plan to test the abilities of the NATO defence, but the incident showed shortcomings of air-defence.[35] Additionally in the Russian media it was asserted that the Commander of the Lithuanian Air Force, Colonel Jonas Marcinkus, was dismissed because of the gaps in Lithuania's air defence system, which were revealed by the accident (in Lithuania dismissal of Marcinkus was explained by his unlicensed contacts with representatives of the Russian Air Forces). Thus the violation of air space was made a convenience by deemphasizing Lithuania's entrance to NATO and NATO's power, which caused great worries for Russia during the NATO enlargement.

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[31] Birutė Vyšniauskaitė, Aleksandras Procenka, "Iš Rusijos sostinės - įniršio ir melo purslai" ["Rage and lies from capital of Russia"]. *Lietuvos rytas*, 2005 m. rugsėjo 21 d. (In Lithuanian).

[32] ELTA, "K. Kosačiovas: nuo naikintuvo avarijos tyrimo priklausys, ar Lietuva ir Rusija liks draugiškos valstybės" ["K. Kosachov: wheteher Lithuania and Russia will remain friendly states will depend from the investigation of the crash"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7550004&categoryID=7&ndate=1127422800, 02 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[33] Павел Аксенов, "Необъяснимая авиакатастрофа" ["Unexplainable plain crash"]. 19.09.2005. http://lenta.ru/articles/2005/09/19/su/, 05 10 2005. (In Russian).

[34] "Пилот российского Су-27 спасал литовскую деревню Йотишкиу?" ["Pilot of Russian Su-27 was saving Lithuanian village Iotyshki"]. 19.09.2005. http://news.pravda.ru/abroad/2005/09/19/81490.html, 05 10 2005; Владимир Ворсобин, "Супруга пленного летчика получила персональный Ту-134" ["Wife of pilot in confinement got personal Tu-134"]. 18 сентября 2005. http://www.kp.ru/daily/23580.5/44588/, 05 10 2005. (In Russian).

[35] ELTA, "Rusijos KOP vadas: skrydžio iš Sankt Peterburgo į Kaliningradą organizavimas – gėdingas" ["Russian general: the organization of flight from Sant Petersberg to Kaliningrad region is shameful"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 26 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7572085&categoryID=7&ndate=1127682000, 05 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

4. The Consequences of the (de)securitization of Problems caused by the Incident

4.1. Evaluation of Lithuania's Performed (de)securitization

Membership in NATO was one of the main aims of Lithuania's foreign policy and security policy. After the entrance in to the Alliance new aims were raised this being: to entrench in NATO and secure a full-fledged and active participation of Lithuania in the Alliance.[36] Lithuania's attempts after the incident to securitize the military aspects created the image of Lithuania as a militarily weak country. Also this strengthened perception (which had been weakened after Lithuania entered NATO), that Lithuania is not military safe. This emboldened radical assertions, that investments in national defence are too big and do not stand up. After the crash of the fighter "Su-27" the Russian media and officials presented a lot of negative information about NATO, thus strengthening the doubts of Lithuania's society about the security guaranties promised by NATO and provoking some of Lithuania's officials to express concerns about NATO's position after the incident.

In Lithuania, NATO was criticised for three reasons. First, because NATO allowed the Russian fighter to invade Lithuania's air space. Second, because NATO did not contribute to the investigation of the incident. Third, NATO did not present the political evaluation of the incident and did not provide Lithuania with any support against Russia's information pressure. Thus the mistrust of NATO was created and the feeling of insecurity strengthened. By securitizing the incident in the military and information sectors (asserting that a reaction to the incident is needed and problems that arose must be solved by extraordinary means) Lithuania partly discredited NATO, because NATO did not regard this problem as a very important security issue. By criticising the alliance that it did not accomplish the functions it had to, and by evaluating its positions after the incident as dormancy, Lithuania securitized the alliance. Lithuania started to perceive NATO's attitude as a threat to its security, because the alliance did not secure the air space and did not offer much support when Russia put pressure on Lithuania. Appealing to this incident, Lithuania started to solve air defence problems. From the point of view of information security, the propelling and securitization of Lithuania's military problems brought more benefit for Russia then Lithuania. The incident revealed that membership in NATO does not *per se* guarantee security. The escalation of military security problems minimized the psychological security feeling of society, which appeared when Lithuania became a NATO member. Also this downgraded NATO's image and reliance

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[36] Only those aims are mentions which are related with Lthuania's membership in NATO. URM, "Lietuvos Respublikos politinių partijų susitarimas dėl pagrindinių valstybės užsienio politikos tikslų ir uždavinių 2004-2008 metais" ["Agreement of Lithuania's political parties on primary foreign policy aims and goals in 2004-2008"]. http://www1.urm.lt/data/2/LF914183242_partijususitarimas.htm, 15 10 2005. (In Lithuanian).

upon NATO's provided security guaranties: 60 percent of respondents said that they trust less in NATO then they did before the incident.[37]

Although Lithuania's military officials did not perceive the incident as a military threat, in public discussions, attention was drawn at the urgency to improve air space security, ask for a permanent NATO mission, and demilitarize the Kaliningrad region. From the viewpoint of military security securitization of military threat, it was useful for Lithuania's security. However because of the before mentioned negative influence on information security the assumption can be made that problems of military security would be solved more effectively by not securitizing them (by solving them in the ordinary political agenda, just the way NATO did).

It should be noted, that Lithuania has seen the incident as a threat to the whole NATO: national defence minister Kirkilas declared that "what happens and what had happened is an obvious threat to our, NATO's, and the EU's security."[38] It can be noted that a major part of Russia's disseminated information about the incident was not favourable to NATO. But neither in a single country, nor at the NATO level, was this information not called to be a threat, even if unofficially it was held to be a problem. This means it remained desecuritized. Thus NATO did not securitize problems caused by the incident as military or information threats.

In its official position towards Russia, NATO emphasized that Russia is a NATO partner and cooperation with it is very important. Lithuania, by securitizing the incident as a threat and strengthening Russia's image as a hostile country, strengthened its own image as a country which quite sensitively reacts to Russia and thus might undermine good relations between NATO and Russia. Thus Lithuania's reaction contradicted the official position of NATO. By commenting on the incident the Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, emphasized that Russia is NATO's partner. Meanwhile Lithuania's officials spoke about the hostile disposition of Russia. With reasonable reaction, NATO sought to keep pragmatic relations with Russia. By evaluating the position of the West, on one hand, it can be said that NATO's reaction was too weak and inadequate in order to solve problems emanating in the relations with Russia and especially to prevent them. The fact that the incident did not boost Western reaction could possibly encourage Russia to voice more aggressive reaction towards Lithuania and to seek to dominate the information sphere. On the other hand it might be that the desecuritization of problems in relations with Russia (and especially from the point of view of information security) could be a better solution for them. Russia bases its relations with the Baltic States on confrontation. It needs "outside enemies" in order to mobilize domestic resources, to draw attention from domestic problems, or to blame for them. Thus involvement into Russia's organized provocations brings more benefit for Russia. Also the West always looks sceptically to the fact that there

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[37] "Sumenko pasitikėjimas ir šalies kariuomene, ir NATO" ["Trust in national military and NATO has declined"]. "*Lietuvos rytas,*" 2005 m. lapkričio 2 d. (In Lithuanian).

[38] Krašto apsaugos ministerija, (note 18).

will be a country, confronting with Russia, in Western organizations. It can be considered that the praise told by the USA ambassador Mull to Lithuania's officials "for their professionalism and quiet reaction"[39] in investigating the incident was also an indirect reference to what kind of reaction from Lithuania that the Western partners request.

By securitizing Russia's informational attacks Lithuania pointed to Russia's pressure on Lithuania and reacted to this by using diplomatic means. Lithuania's decision not to become involved in Russia's provocations can be assessed positively. Yet Lithuania's offensive capabilities in information confrontation should be evaluated negatively - substantially Lithuania only defended itself, that is it reacted to interpretations presented by Russia instead of clearly stating its position on concrete questions.

4.2. Consequences of Russia's Performed (de)securitization

Russia's hostility towards Lithuania (and other Baltic States) is often transferred into the information sphere. For example, Russia's officials assert that Russia's image abroad is spoiled by the Baltic States and Poland: "their entrance to the EU and NATO did not raise living standards of their people. Thus with the current anti-Russian campaign they seek to draw attention of the population from their social, economic and political problems."[40] By treating the Baltic States as its zone of influence and interests, Russia regards their independence and orientation to West as contradicting its national interests. Also as it was mentioned that Russia needs "external enemies" in order to mobilize domestic resources, and direct the attention of society from domestic problems or even to blame for them. It is critical, that this information is disseminated not only to domestic, but also to an international audience.

Thus, first by using the incident, Russia's officials formed an image of Lithuania as country which is hostile to Russia and strengthened anti-Lithuanian opinion of the Russian population. They sought to present the incident as if Lithuania was guilty for the incident, to depict it as a conflicting country. Constantly presented accusations to the Baltic States for being not friendly makes an influence on Russian society. Polls show that the Russian population holds Latvia and Lithuania as two out of three most hostile countries towards Russia.[41]

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[39] BNS, "S. Mullas: Lietuva ne viena katastrofos akivaizdoje" ["S. Mull: Lithuania is not alone in the event of the catastrophe"]. 2005 m. rugsėjo 23 d. http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=7555153&categoryID=7&ndate=1127422800, 24 09 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[40] Arūnas Spraunius, "Šizofreniški Baltijos šalių ir Rusijos santykiai" ["Schizophrenic relations of Baltic States and Russia"]. Savaitraštis *Laikas*. 2005 m. rugpjūčio 8 d. http://www.delfi.lt/news/daily/comments/article.php?id=7244902, 12 08 2005. (In Lithuanian).

[41] The poll was organized on 13-18 of May, 2005. ELTA, "Apklausos duomenimis, rusai priešiškiausiai nusiteikusiomis šalimis laiko Baltijos valstybes" ["According to polls, Russians hold Baltic States as mostly hostile"]. 2005 m. birželio 9 d. http://politika.lt/index.php?cid=695&new_id=4301, 12 08 2005. (In Lithuanian).

Second, by securitizing information which was unfavourable, Russia behaved according to its Information security doctrine, in which an objective to secure Russia's "national interest in the information sphere" is stated.[42] This means that official position of Russia's government must be effectively presented to the international society seeking to secure national patriotism, values, etc.

Third, the desecuritization of the NATO threat had to make an influence on Russia's population. The image of NATO as an enemy was sustained by presenting the NATO member Lithuania, as a hostile country towards the Russian country. But on the same time it was depicted that this enemy is weak because NATO did not prevent it from an incident, and did not express clear support to Lithuania. Paradoxically, the unsuccessful flight of the Russian fighter was successful because it showed that the NATO enlargement closer to Russia does not pose such a big threat in as it was thought at the beginning. When Russia desecuritized NATO, relations with the alliance were transferred from the security agenda to the political agenda. This can show Russia's aspirations to strengthened cooperation with NATO and lessen possible confrontations with it. The fact that Russia seeks to cooperate with NATO could be seen when Russia stopped opposing the NATO enlargement. For a long time Russia did not consider NATO as an actor of international arena, with whom it could cooperate. But later this viewpoint began to change, Russia deepened contacts with NATO, and strengthened the political dialogue through NATO-Russia Council. Russia's behaviour in the case of the incident with the fighter, confirms that it seeks to gain more regard from NATO countries and deepen their relations with the Alliance.

Conclusions

Both the May 9th issue and crash of the fighter revealed that in analysing information security it is more important how information (in this case about the May 9th, occupation of the Baltic States, reasons of the fighters crash, etc.) was perceived and not if it represented real facts.

Thus according to the securitization model and by evaluating how states perceived the May 9th issue and what they securitized and then by comparing their actions with their declared national security and foreign policy interests, such conclusions can be made. First, the decision about the May 9th event could pose a threat to Lithuania's information security and its referent security object state idea. But by securitizing participation in the celebration, Lithuania avoided indirect acceptance of Russia's viewpoint about historical facts and possible manipulations that Lithuania agrees on them. Second, although Lithuania's decision not to participate in the May 9th celebration did not match the decision of Western countries, Lithuania got confirmation from them that they

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42 Совет Безопасности Российской Федерации, "Доктрина информационной безопасности Российской Федерации." ["Doctrine of Information Security in Russian Federation"] № Пр-1895, 9 сентября 2000. http://www.scrf.gov.ru/Documents/Decree/2000/09-09.html, 05 10 2005. (In Russian).

understand and support Lithuania's decision. Third, by securitizing informa-tion about historical facts voiced by Russia, Lithuania did not allow Russia to establish its viewpoint in the global information sphere. Lithuania's resistance to Russia's information pressure was strengthened also by not involving itself in discussions about historical facts initiated by Russia and by regarding the occupation as an obvious fact and thus demanding compensation of the dam-age made by occupation. All this shows that Lithuania's behaviour and the decisions made had matched its security interests.

In Russia's case it can be asserted that its information attack against Lithuania on the May 9th issue was not effective. Russia did not achieve its aims to raise doubts of the international community about the occupational facts and to discredit Lithuania. Russia sought all this in order to strengthen its influence on the country, which it regards as its zone of influence. But it should be noted that the Russian disinformation campaign was successful against the Russian population in creating an image of Lithuania as of an external enemy.

In the case of the fighter "Su-27" crash the following aspects should be em-phasized. First, viewing from the Russian point of view, the way it perceived the incident, what problems were securitized, and then by comparing its actions with national interests, it can be concluded that by (de)securitizing problems it behaved according to the previously declared interests, how it defined its national security, and the threats to it. Second, by viewing how Lithuania perceived the incident and what problems were securitized, it can be concluded that this did not match its na-tional interests. Lithuania's behaviour (quite opposite from the position of NATO towards Russia and the criticism of NATO, which strengthened insecurity feeling) was more useful for Russia, then for Lithuania. Third, this allows the making of a conclusion that the information security analysis based on an objectivist method, which would investigate national interests of countries (without investigation of their perceptions), would only explain Russia's behaviour. In the case of the Lithuanian analysis of national interests, it would not be suitable because Lithuania did not follow them and consequently its actions contradicted previously declared foreign and security policy aims.

Finally, according to this it can be assumed that the securitization actions – when the decision is made to treat certain problems as a threat – can be regarded as an information threat. A country which organizes information attacks could seek that its opponent securitized a concrete problem and thus it destabilized the situ-ation in the country which is attacked. In this case the mistrust about Lithuania's membership in NATO was created and problems to which the population reacts very sensitively were actualized (being NATO, and its provided defence was dis-credited in Lithuania). Also the prominence of Lithuania's insecurity and criticism of NATO contributed to creating a negative viewpoint of Western countries about Lithuania. This means that the crash of the fighter was more important from the viewpoint of information security, then military security, because the most important consequences were created not by the incident, but how it was perceive and what information about it was escalated.

Vilnius, May 22, 2006.