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Collective Security Treaty Organization: Military Integration Problems and Perspectives in the CIS Space

The article is focused on military integration and its influence on the post-soviet space. The main object of the research is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which connects a part of the territory of the former Soviet Union. The organization in itself, its functions and military activities have not been discussed and analyzed. This is one of a few organizations that forms military forces and tries to respond to security challenges at a regional level. The article is divided in two main parts. The first part explains the phenomenon of military integration and its influence on the political-military cooperation between national states. Military integration is a new element in political science therefore the research attempts to give details on the subject and to divide it into stages. This might serve well for future research or studies on military alliances. The second part places an heavy emphasis on the Collective Security Treaty Organization, its formation, legal basis and military structure. By using the model of military integration stages, the article comes to the conclusion that the organization has entered the last stage of military integration, which it identifies as functional dependency. Military forces have become inter-operable and a joint command system ensures further credible integration.

Introduction

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergej Lavrov, noted that "Although the NATO wants to cover the eyes against the Collective Security Treaty Organization (hereinafter CSTO) and its role in the regional matters, its issue has already been decided. The CSTO is a reality and a serious reality. The NATO has defined its interests in Transcaucasia and Central Asia, and no one denies that the NATO may have its interests in these regions. Yet I would like to remind our partners from the NATO that the Central Asia and Transcaucasia is a CSTO responsibility zone."[1] This rhetoric statement of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs defines the objective of study of this article

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[1] Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: www.mid.ru, 8 December 2005 press release, 08-12-2005

to some extent and reveals the range of problems and topicality of the article itself. The regional security and defence policy issues in the post-Soviet space are among the most interesting investigation objects in the studies of international relations. The representatives of political sciences and international relations experts pay great attention to the NATO development and the spread of security using the euro-transatlantic stability instruments that essentially prompted the investigation of security issues in the Eastern Europe. They left, however, a very interesting niche in the former Soviet Union territory with a diversity of security issues. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation attempted to occupy the remaining vacuum in military issues and to reanimate and preserve the existing military structures. On 14 February 1992 a decision was adopted by the Commonwealth of Independent Sates (hereinafter – the CIS) to create a Council of Defence of Ministers and the basic CIS Joint Armed Force Command.[2] At the same time the formation of national forces was started, also armed conflicts sprung up. It also became clear that the concept of joint armed forces is doomed for failure, whereas an attempt to reanimate or transform the Soviet army failed. In September 1993 the joint command was replaced into the CIS headquarters for coordination of military collaboration, and only in nine years a new military structure was created that embodies and reflects the hegemonistic goals of Russia in the East. On 7 October 2002, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia, Tadzhikistan and Belarus signed a Chisinau Charter on which basis the Collective Security Treaty Organization was established. The establishment of this organisation is associable with the strengthening of Russia's power in the Eastern zone that not only enhanced its impact in the CIS space, but also acquired additional levers when solving the issue of security with the NATO, and affected the USA's impact in the Central Asian region. This organization is the main driving force that promotes and generates military integration between the member states by developing new structures, objectives of the armed forces and impacting the regional security situation. The goal of this article is to assess the CSTO as a military integration instrument that affects the balance of forces and security situation in the CIS space. The depth of the CSTO military integration, its objectives, goals and further development are the main objects of study answering to the main question of the article – what the military integration problems and perspectives exist in the CIS. The statement of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, which was quoted in the introduction of this article also defines the guidelines as to why this structure should be analyzed and an answer to a question about the perspectives of this structure should be found.

Military integration in the CIS proceeds in three chains – by using the CIS structures, strengthening bilateral relations and implementing the CSTO tasks. The CSTO is the main instrument; therefore this article analyzes namely the structure of this organization, its goals and objectives by paying some

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[2] Минасян С. Процесс формирования системы коллективной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве [Process of formation of collective security system in post-soviet system]   http://caucasus. rau.am/doc/MinasianS.pdf , 05-08-2007 (in Russian)

attention to the military integration of Russia and Belarus that undoubtedly affects the internal CSTO integration process too.

All these issues are analyzed in two main chapters of this article. The first section mainly focuses on the term of military integration, its significance to the state policy and the formation of military alliances. Military integration has never been used as an object of investigation in the political sciences, therefore with its novelty, this chapter will help theoreticians and practicians to analyse the problems of military alliances and envision their perspectives. The second chapter analyses the CSTO, the stages of its formation, legal basis, and the military structures set up under the CSTO flag. The third section contains conclusions stating that the CSTO entered the final military integration stage defined as the dependence of functions. The developed common command structure and common actions of the military forces consolidate the CSTO and make suitable premises for the development of military integration.

1. Military Integration and its Stages

There have been no political researches that are related to military integration and the forming stages of military alliance. The military integration can be defined as a multi-stage process, during which military potential in one country gains maximum interoperability degree with other military potential of the other country and their command is transferred to one structure.

Up to now political scientists have not attempted to sort out military integration stages and apply them in researches. There are theoretical issues related just to the possible military dependence of states and national capabilities that are associated to the main postulate of realists for national interests and supremacy suggesting ephemeralness of military integration[3]. Low level military integration saves manoeuvre freedom for national states that can withdraw from alliance or restrict cooperation. For instance when NATO was created, France offered that NATO territory had to be divided into front ward and rear ward zones. Only the front zone (together with Western Germany) forces would have been integrated, and the rear ward zone (together with France) would have remained in the boundaries of national responsibilities.[4] Such decisions and offers indicate that deeper integration can usurp national decisions related to the usage of military force and total autonomy in security politics. Integration of a higher level would influence the reforms of the armed forces, the creation of new units, and initiation of joint programs. Putting aside theoretical considerations about national states' objectives to retain autonomy in military matters, the question arises asking of how a deep integration should be, in order to prevent members of the alliance

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[3] See more: Liska G. Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962

[4] Liska G. Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962.- 144p.

to act separately. In the case of economic integration it is easy to weight inter-dependence and benefits. Economical rates, common external taxes, absence of market barriers and similar indicators demonstrate the consolidation of states and preferred integration, which helps implement obligations using fewer resources. In the case of military integration, the process is complicated and its stages can be distinguished considering the criteria of military interoperability that make na-tional states adjust to the common military force concept and unite them to make the practical usage together more effective. The interoperability is described as the ability of systems (units, or forces) to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.[5] The main goal is practical cooperation and compatibility of task implementation that later can be moved to further stages of integration when there is a functional dependence among national military forces. The interoperability process can be achieved in several stages, the most important of which is general force planning, plans that are prepared together to achieve interoperability and to assure a military preparedness. As the aim of integration is to form a joint unit of separate elements that is able to perform tasks that were set, hence practical military integration stages would be related to the rapprochement of national armed forces to pursue common tasks. This should be implemented through common defence planning, the establishment of a joint command and headquarters, common training, bigger military units' training, the creation of joint military units and the participation in joint operations. There is a need for a gradual approach identifying the first step to be taken to move forward towards integration including various instruments and tools to achieve the desired result. The process in itself can be divided into 4 stages.


Figure 1. **Stages of military integration**

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[5] Faughn, Anthony W. Interoperability: Is It Achievable? Boston: Harvard University, 2001.-5p.

1.1. First Stage of Military Integration

The first stage can be defined as a legal one. At this stage national states begin legal cooperation and form military integration base that defines strategic tasks, aims, military integration ambitions and requirements. One signs the military collaboration documents, foresees military cooperation spheres and forms thereof i.e. the Ogdensburg Declaration of August 1940, signed between US and Canada, authorized the creation of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence and provided the fundamental condition for military cooperation: a full and systematic exchange of military information upon which joint plans, operations and logistics could be based.[6] In similar documents one usually fixates on what level of integration this will be and if generally two states pretend to get their armed forces integrated i.e. according to the military cooperation agreement of Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania and the Armenian Defence Ministry, the parties strive to develop military cooperation between the Republic of Lithuania and Armenian Republic armed forces in the following spheres: exchange of experience that is related to the participation in the program "Partnership for Peace"; exchange of experience in democratic control in armed forces; a creation of a legal base for armed forces, defence policy and strategy; etc. (1 and 2 articles of the agreement)[7]. In this case the agreement clearly defines the ambitions of military cooperation and boundaries that states will not overstep and does not suggest further integration elements.

1.2. Second Stage of Military Integration

The second stage of military integration is institutional during which states realize the provisions foreseen in agreements and work towards military integration. They establish common working groups that identify the needs of interoperability / military integration and foresee possible drawbacks. Inter-institutional relations are strengthened and they start coordinating the defence policy on a strategic-international level and plan actions at the tactical and operational levels. Planners of defence policy prepare common documents setting out guidance for military cooperation and further actions. The main step on this stage is to evaluate and determine instruments that will be used in further integration. The preparation of military strategies and doctrines and their equal interpretation become an important task for planners of national defence ministries. Military integration traditionally is a problem found in smaller states that actually participate with smaller capabilities and their national structures

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[6] Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020. http://www.cds.dnd.ca/pubs/strategy2k/s2k08_e.asp , 05-09-2007
[7] Lietuvos krašto apsaugos ministerijos ir Armėnijos gynybos ministerijos karinio bendradarbiavimo sutartis [Lithuanian and Armenian military cooperation agreement] (KAM Tarptautinių ryšių departamento archyvinė byla „NVS sutartys"), (in Lithuanian)

have to be integrated into structures of bigger states. Danford W. Middlemiss and Denis Stairs underscore that the US has been able to devote a much larger proportion of its overall military expenditures than its allies have to equipment modernization and training improvement. This in turn has made it increasingly difficult for the other partners to keep pace with the qualitative improvements in American capabilities. The holy grail of interoperability within NATO is thus becoming notoriously hard to achieve.[8]

1.3. Third Stage of Military Integration

The third stage of the military integration is instrumental; it is divided into parts consisting of common training, operations and united military potential. At this stage a state starts concrete actions to make cooperation practical and tangible. First of all there are common training and instructions. During the training, one traditionally checks and improves the command and control of military units, individual preparations of soldiers, standing procedures, and the means of ones communication systems that can be used in joint operations. For instance, there was an international training "Amber Hope" in Lithuania in 2005. More than 2 thousand soldiers from 12 members of NATO and PFP countries took part. During the training, soldiers of land forces were trained performing peace keeping tasks in the international unit.[9] Intensive participation in trainings internationalizes military forces and gradually integrates. Training helps to harmonize actions of different military capabilities and assures sufficient individual military preparation levels, which help to overcome obstacles related to the national military components inner procedures and task interpretation that inevitably appear using military force in particular actions. Training gives possibilities to make one more step towards military integration and to implement common operations both in the national state and abroad. At the present time multi-national units participate in military operations, therefore the harmonization and interoperability of procedures as well as essential elements that assure successful end of the operation are in need. For instance in the Province reconstruction team that is led by Lithuanians in Afghanistan, Lithuanian soldiers work with Icelanders, Danes, Croats, and Americans.

The third phase of the institutional stage is focused on creating joint military units. This process is multi-stage and includes the integration of separate military forces components (land, sea and air forces) and the creation of united command and control elements (united headquarter). States that integrate their military units must agree upon the structure, personnel, logistics, command, jurisdiction and aims. For instance, the Baltic States established tripartite battalion (BALTBAT) in 1994. In the establishing agreement they foresaw that in order to

[8] Danford W. The Canadian Forces and the Doctrine of Interoperability. The Issues June 2002 Vol. 3, no. 7 http://www.irpp.org/pm/archive/pmvol3no7.pdf, 05-09-2007
[9] Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania: www.kam.lt , 05-09-2007

prepare and train soldiers of BALTBAT and assure the work of battalion in the future, the countries would need to form national peace keeping detachments of such a structure and size that they would secure a permanent functional BALT-BAT structure, considering the changes in personnel and continuous supply of equipment. Until the national peace keeping detachments were transferred to BALTBAT commanding officer they are dependent on national command.[10] This has been a good example paving the way for integration in other spheres. The BALTNET project (Air Surveillance Network for the Baltic countries) was created on the initiative of the USA.[11] Regional Airspace Surveillance Co-ordination Centre (RASCC) was established in Air Force Management Centre in Karmelava. The RASCC creates an integral airspace view over the region of the Baltic States and transmits this view to national centres in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This presents a possibility to observe the airspace in an effective way and assure its invulnerability and safe movement of aircrafts. For united preparation of military officers they established a common teaching institution - Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL)[12]. There are three teaching programs in the college: Joint Staff officers, Civil Servants, and Higher Command Studies Course. The naval forces cooperate in a BALTRON (Baltic squadron) scheme[13]. According to the intergovernmental agreement, every country has to appoint at least one ship to squadron and officers to common staff. There are 3-4 ships permanently patrol in the Baltic Sea that have control of the territorial waters and economic zone, perform mine-clearing operations, and liquidate ammunition that is left in the Baltic Sea.

All in all, in creating joint military units, states should agree upon and coordinate weapons, means of communication, host nation support, strategic air-lift and sea-lift, etc.. Often there arises the question regarding whether national contingents can be oriented towards niche capabilities. According to G. Liska, military integration can take place just on the operational level and the Alliance is stronger when there is a specialization in interoperability. Then one can transfer a part of the resources to other spheres and prefer just a certain sphere (for instance, strategic transfer by air).[14] National states that create just niche capabilities actually are ready for the maximum military integration levels because national security issues are subordinated to multi-national interoperability. At this time there are states that are oriented towards niche interoperability[15] and treat alliance as a guarantee of national security

[10] Estijos Respublikos, Latvijos Respublikos ir Lietuvos Respublikos sutartis "Dėl jungtinio taikos palaikymo dalinio kūrimo ir formavimo" [Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian Treaty on Baltic Batallion]. Valstybės žinios: 1997 04 30 Nr.37-895, (in Lithuanian)

[11] Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Lithuania: www.kam.lt, 05-09-2007

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Liska G. Nations in Alliance: the Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1962.-118-119 p.

[15] I.e. The defense planning of the Baltic states reflect niche capabilities though its attempt to develop some additional capacities in other fields.

and this merely confirms the statement that when military integration is deepened, states cannot function separately and this guarantees a long lasting of the military union.

1.4. Fourth Stage of Military Integration

The fourth level of military integration is functional dependence, during which there are already formed common military units where the command and control is transferred to a joint command. In this stage, military integration is a continuous process and because of changes of geopolitical environment different tasks are given to national/integrated forces. New requirements appear and international operations become more complicated. Total military integration is possible, but it is difficult to reach this stage in multinational alliances. For example, NATO unites many countries with different geo-strategic background and following democratic principles it is difficult to achieve a unified result. In authoritarian states, decisions are taken in a more effective and quick way, hence it is likely that military alliance can be created more quickly in undemocratic states.

2. CSTO Military Integration

2.1. Legal/Contractual Stage

The lowest stage of military integration establishes the legal/contractual grounds of military collaboration and determines the ambitions and boundaries of a future alliance. The general political aspects of military integration are noticeable in the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States of 8 December 1991, which article 6 states[16] that "The Commonwealth member states will cooperate in ensuring international peace and security, implementing effective measures, reducing armament and defence costs." The initial CSTO military integration stage should be associated with the Collective Security Treaty of 15 May 1992[17]. This treaty was extended by the Protocol of 2 April 1992, on the Extension of the Collective Security Treaty establishing that the treaty will be rene-

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[16] Шаклеина М. Внешняя политика и безопасность современной России [Foreign and security policy of current Russia], 1991–2002. Хрестоматия. В 4 т. / Моск. гос. ин-т междунар. отношений (ун-т) МИД России, 2002. Т. 4. С. 12 , (in Russian)
[17] Договор о коллективной безопасности [the Collective Security Treaty] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

wed automatically[18]. This is the first multilateral defence agreement that laid down the foundations for the security and defence policy and determined the guidelines for further cooperation in this field. The provisions of this treaty are essentially based on common defence that determines further military collaboration between the states and military integration. Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that an assault on one state will be treated as an assault on all participants of the alliance, and that other states will provide all kinds of support, including military. Seeking to combine and coordinate common actions, a Collective Security Council and other bodies will be formed (articles 3 and 5). It is also noted therein that the Joint Commonwealth Armed Force Command will coordinate common actions until the institutions envisaged are set up (article 5). By this clause an emphasis is made that already at the present time some common military structures are in operation and that their close integration might be expected in the future. Although the treaty itself does not concretize and define any objectives or plans of military integration, this is implied in the fourth article of the treaty wherein common reaction and common actions are set forth. Seeking to prepare a common military reaction, it is necessary to ensure common plans, training, staff preparedness, compatibility of armaments, etc.. These are issues that will be solved in the second and third stages of military integration. Sergej Minasjan noted that the primary goal of the treaty was to serve the strengthening of the CIS state integration, and the document itself was to reflect the military attention of commonwealth states.[19]

It should be noted that in Alma-Ata on 10 February 1995, the Collective Security Council adopted a declaration[20] wherein it was declared that the states will seek deeper mutual cooperation (clause 1) and will try to unite their efforts while creating the collective security system (clause 4). The legal framework is defined in additional documents of the tactical and strategic level. During the CIS summit on 24 May 2000, a Memorandum on Enhancing the Efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty and Its Adaptation to the Current Political Situation[21] was signed. The states agreed that practical measures have to be implemented by creating a collective security system and establishing new control structures (clause 3). The main turning-point took place on 7 October 2002. The states signed a Chisinau Charter on which basis the Collective Security Treaty Organization was established and the CSTO statute as well as

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[18] Протокол о продлении ДКБ от 15 мая 1992 года [Protocol of 2 April 1992 On the Extension of the Collective Security Treaty] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[19] Минасян С. Процесс формирования системы коллективной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве [Process of formation of collective security system in post-soviet system]   http://caucasus.rau.am/doc/MinasianS.pdf , 08-08-2007, (in Russian)

[20] Решение о Декларации государств-участников ДКБ [Decision on Declaration made by CST State-parties] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[21] Меморандум о повышении эффективности Договора о коллективной безопасности от 15 мая 1992 года и его адаптации к современной геополитической ситуации [24 May 2000, a Memorandum on Enhancing the Efficiency of the Collective Security Treaty and Its Adaptation to the Current Political Situation] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

an agreement on the CSTO legal status was approved.[22] The preamble of the CSTO statute sets forth that the states are ready to continue and expand their military/political collaboration and to become prepared against any threats. These strategic level documents actually defined the scope of military integration that is associable with the development of the regional collective security system. A detailed analysis of the interim and tactical level documents will help disclose the peculiarities of the collective security system and military integration measures.

2.2. Institutional Stage

During the institutional state, the states seek to create national and joint institutions aimed at implementing the development of military integration enshrined in the strategic documents, as well as to draw up and approve additional documents concretizing the implementation of strategic documents. The legal framework of the states is supplemented with the military planning documents reflecting the implementation of bilateral/multilateral military integration and its place within the framework of the national defence policy, and defining the guidelines for further integration stages.

On 10 February 1995, the CST states adopted a Collective Security Concept and the Main Military Collaboration Directions, also the Plan of their Realization.[23] According to Minasjan[24], this document established the main cooperation principles of the states in the military-political field. The collective security concept is actually the main object of investigation at this stage that defines the directions of military integration between the member states and divides the process itself into stages. Also, an institutional structure is set up. Part III of the concept sets forth that the collective security system is being created gradually:

- Stage 1 – to create armed forces of the CST member states, to develop military and technical cooperation programs and start their implementation, to accept and approve legal acts regulating the functioning of the collective security system.
- Stage 2 - to create allied-joint military groups and plan their usage, to create a joint antiaircraft defence system and to assess a possibility of forming common armed forces.
- Stage 3 - to finish the establishment of the collective security system.

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[22] Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, Соглашение о правовом статусе Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности [CSTO statute, agreement on the CSTO legal status] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007 (in Russian)

[23] Решение СКБ о Концепции коллективной безопасности государств-участников ДКБ [Collective Security Concept of CST made by CST State-parties] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[24] Минасян С. Процесс формирования системы коллективной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве [Process of formation of collective security system in post-soviet system] http://caucasus. rau.am/doc/MinasianS.pdf , 08-08-2007, (in Russian)

The concept reveals in great detail the CST projects associable with military integration, and even supplements their initial integration plans. The states will assess a possibility to create joint armed forces and will create different defence systems. Although the Concept itself does not regulate in detail what systems will be created (except for antiaircraft), yet having assessed a clause of III chapter stating that "allied forces will have an antiaircraft defence system and other systems" a conclusion could be made that there are no practical barriers for creating common logistics, conducting common training, creating general defence industry products and forming common bodies of troops. The Concept also envisages an initial institutional structure comprised of three bodies. The Collective Security Council is a supreme super-state institution that coordinates and ensures the implementation of the CST agreement. The Council consists of the state presidents, ministers of foreign affairs, defence ministers and Secretary General of the Council. Also two consultative bodies – the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Defence Ministers is formed. The ministers of foreign affairs coordinate foreign policy between the member states, and meanwhile the defence ministers coordinate military policy and the creation of military structures. These institutions are serviced by the CST secretariat that draws up documents and coordinates positions between the states. Even though the Concept was adopted, its practical activity, however, was limited and the member states implemented only several common actions in the Central Asia.

The CST establishment history is divided into two stages.[25] The first stage covers the period from 1999-2000, during which general type political documents without practical obligations were adopted. The second stage is based on the institutional changes and practical activity. Until 2000 a sufficient normative/legal framework had been formed that established the conditions for a broad scope military collaboration. After implementing these documents, the CSTO was created. On 7 October 2002, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia, Tadzhikistan and Belarus signed an Accord on the CSTO Status and the CSTO Statute on which basis the Collective Security Organization[26] was set up. The documents came into effect on 13 October 2003. Article 7 of the CSTO Statute sets forth that the organization assumes obligations to create a collective security system, allied (regional) military (armed forces) groups and their control bodies, military infrastructure, also to prepare military specialists and staff and to supply them with necessary armaments and military weaponry. It is noteworthy that the CSTO members may adopt decisions on the presence of non-CSTO military forces or military objects of other states only after a consultation or agreement with other CSTO members. The structure of cooperation

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[25] Николаенко В. Десять лет договору о коллективной безопасности [10t years to CST] Международная жизнь. 2002. № 4. С.62, (in Russian)
[26] Устав Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности, Соглашение о правовом статусе Организации Договора о коллективной безопасности [[CSTO statute, agreement on the CSTO legal status] http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

between the countries was improved by leaving the Collective Security Council, as the supreme body of the organization. It is only comprised of the heads of states. The Council adopts the main decisions associated with the implementation of the CSTO goals and objectives, ensures the interstate coordination of actions and the harmonization of common decisions. Work between the sessions is held in the CSTO permanent council comprised of authorised representatives of the states. The consultative/executive elements of the structure remained (the Councils of foreign affairs and ministers of defence) and a new formation - a committee of security secretaries was added. The committee of security secretaries is a consultative/executive body that coordinates issues associated with national security between the member states. The secretariat and the joint organization headquarters became the working bodies. During a meeting of council members of the CIS assembly held in St. Petersburg on 16 November 2006, a decision was taken to establish a new CSTO administrative structure – parliamentary assembly headed by Boris Gryzlov. The main task of this parliamentary assembly was the reconciliation of the legal framework appertaining to the security of particular states.

It may be summed up that during this military integration stage, the states assessed the military integration, differentiated the elements of suitable interoperability and integration, and formulated specific tasks for its realization. This included the formation of the CSTO national armed forces, implementation of the military and military/technical collaboration programs, and reconciliation of the legal framework governing the functioning of the collective security system. It was also decided upon to create allied-joint military groups and to plan their usage, as well as to create a joint antiaircraft defence system and assess a possibility of forming common armed forces. The implementation of these plans will be facilitated by a well institutionalized structure that has overgrown into an organization with a separate status, members and projected plans of deeper integration.

2.3. Instrumental Stage

After a military collaboration base was established and specific objectives were identified, the implementation of the military integration plan was started. Taking into consideration that the needs are identified, a general military exercise is carried out, common training is conducted, common bodies of troops are created, collaboration in military acquisitions, staff, logistics, military industry, and particular military forces is deepened along with the unification of the legal framework in the military field, scientific field, and the mobilization and standardization fields are expanded. Efforts are put to unify the armaments and the level of individual/collective preparedness to ensure the fulfilment of joint tasks. The CSTO states act in these fields employing both, bilateral and multilateral instruments. The CSTO Secretary General Nikolaj

Bordiuzh noted[27] that during last years a lot has been achieved, starting with an informational campaign in the CSTO treaty territory and finishing with practical steps by implementing common operations.

The second plan for implementing the collective security system was approved in 1999. It envisaged the establishment of three military groupings in three regions: Eastern European, Caucasus and Central Asia.[28] In 2000, at the meeting of the Bishkek Collective Security Council (hereinafter – CSC), a decision was adopted to create a centralized collective security control system based on regional sub-systems (Eastern European, Caucasus and Central Asian). The Bishkek session has been defined as a crucial moment that prompted a new dynamics of the CSTO. A decision on the allied forces, their control systems and mobility by moving them to another state was adopted. The creation of regional sub-systems reflects a different understanding of threats. If the main threat for the Central Asian states is posed by Islamic terrorism, a range of problems faced by Belarus is associated with the NATO east-bound expansion.[29]

At the time of creating these joint military units, a common exercise is of immense importance. Military interoperability is deepened by the strengthening collaboration between the military airborne, seaborne and land based forces encountered with compatible armaments, and by regular training helping to achieve compatibility during the procedures. The CSTO exercise takes place on bilateral and multilateral level, e.g. Russia and Belarus regularly conduct exercise that is not officially acknowledged as the CSTO exercise, yet attended by the body of troops attributed to the Western military group. During the seminar of the Russian-Belarus parliamentary meeting held in Pskov on 27 January 2007, where the participants discussed the perspectives of bilateral military/technical collaboration, the Chairman of Russian Duma Boris Gryzlov declared that it is necessary to enhance the combat efficiency of a regional grouping of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. According to him, common military exercise with combat shooting and rocket launching should be held more often to this effect.[30] Within the CSTO framework, military exercise called "Rubezh" is held each year. The exercise is attended by Russia and Central Asian states, also observes from the CSTO are invited. Each session of training is aimed at specific gaols and objectives. During the Rubezh-2004 training, the Kirghiz Minister of Defence noted[31] that trainings are attended by Russia, Ta-

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[27] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: 22-23 июня в столице Белоруссии - городе Минске состоится саммит Организации договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2009

[28] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (Информация) http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2009

[29] Минасян С. Процесс формирования системы коллективной безопасности на постсоветском пространстве [Process of formation of collective security system in post-soviet system]   http://caucasus.rau.am/doc/MinasianS.pdf , 08-08-2007, (in Russian)

[30] Interfaks-AVN press release, B.Gryzlovas pasisako už Sąjunginių pajėgų karinio efektyvumo didinimą [B.Gryzlov supports the increase of united forces efficiency], 2007 vasario 27 d. (in Lithuanian)

[31] Стрешнев Р. Коллективные силы выходят на новые рубежи [Collective forces go for new borders] Красная звезда, 7 Августа 2004 г , (in Russian)

dzhikistan and Kirghizia that have successfully coped with the combat tasks, since these states have uniform armaments and military weaponry. The CSTO states have already solved the issue of armament compatibility since their armed forces are equipped with the Russian weaponry and armament. Russia's Defence Minister Sergej Ivanov[32] even stressed that it is necessary to strengthen the fitness of collective capacities, that Russia is ready to provide technical/military assistance to the CSTO members and that all members are procured with armament and military weaponry on a preferential basis. Common armament is being strengthened and deepened. The Deputy Commander of the CSTO Joint Headquarters Vladimir Zavgorodnij informed[33] that next year the collective forces will be procured with a compatible space communication system and will start the training of staff according to one methodology. The Rubezh-2005 exercise was aimed at preparing and adopting decisions on the use and control of collective forces, and bringing the coordination of actions and interoperability with other security structures (border services, special services, law enforcement bodies) into line. The scenario was developed taking into consideration the assessment of Russia's experience in the Chechnya war during which separate Russian units were able to communicate using the same communication means.[34]

On 24-29 August 2006, the Rubezh-2006 exercise took place in Kazakhstan. The Deputy Chief of the CSTO Joint Headquarters Igor Babichev emphasized[35] that at the time of this exercise interoperability between the land based, seaborne and airborne military forces would be adjusted, also that an airborne and seaborne assault will be used. According to the exercise scenario, the President of Kazakhstan appeals to the CST pursuant to CST article 4 and requests to be provided with assistance since terrorist organizations are not satisfied with the results of presidential elections and seek to seize power. During the exercise, common CSTO capacities consisting of different military force units were used. Rubezh-2007 was focused on the work of the headquarters. The main task of this exercise was to identify the role of Joint Headquarters and its functions within the collective security system in the Central Asian region, to define the aspects of practical interoperability with the CSTO structures and armed forces of the member states. According to Babichev,[36] if last year the work was carried out on the tactical/operative level, this year it will be focused on command/headquarter issues. In Bordiuzh's opinion[37], this exercise contributed to preparing a peacekeeping contingent that could also be used for the UNO operations both, in the CSTO territory and outside its boundaries.

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Пермяков С. Контратака с "РУБЕЖА-2007"[Counterattack from „RUBEZH-2007] http://www.dkb. gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: 22-23 июня в столице Белоруссии - городе Минске состоится саммит Организации договора о коллективной безопасности (ОДКБ) http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007

The CSTO is not limited only to the organization of common exercise, and since 2003 it has pursued the "Kanal" operations intended for stopping the distribution of drugs from Afghanistan. In 2004 this operation was also observed by non-CSTO members (Azerbaijan, Iran and Uzbekistan[38]), whereas in 2005, China, Pakistan and Ukraine participated as observers. These operations are attended by law enforcement bodies and special services that intercept drugs, investigate financial machinations associated with terrorism, etc.. An International Coordination Headquarters were established for attaining the goals of operations comprised of the representatives of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Russia and Tadzhikistan, also of representatives of the national and regional headquarters and special services. The 2005 operation was aimed at forming an anti-drug security network around Afghanistan.[39] During the operation some interoperability was achieved among different structures of the states, and the law enforcement forces were consolidated. 66,000 officers from the special services, security, interior, customs and border guard services took part, and 8 tons of drugs were confiscated.

Common exercise and operations laid good foundations for deepening the military integration and creating common bodies of troops. As it has already been mentioned, a decision to create three military groups based on the regional basis has been adopted. The greatest progress was achieved while creating a Western regional security grouping. Russia and Belarus acknowledge it as one of the most successful projects both, within the bilateral and multilateral military collaboration framework. This group covers the CSTO western borders, and if necessary, may provide assistance to the Kaliningrad region. Quite big resources are allocated for its mobility, technical and logistical supply, the development and expansion of military infrastructure, general technical (aviation, armoured weaponry, motor vehicle and antiaircraft defence) servicing. On 25 December 2002, an Agreement of the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and Russian Federation on common vehicle logistic support to the regional grouping of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus and Russian Federation was signed.[40] The agreement is attended by lower military units - logistics boards of both states responsible for implementing the provisions of the agreement. Article 4 of the agreement states that in the case of a threat, logistics support/material resources will be deployed in Belarus; whereas if a conflict starts, the Belarusian logistics base will be used in conjunction. Belarus undertakes to supply the

[38] Uzbekistan renewed its membership with the CSTO in 2006.

[39] Website of the Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности и Республика Беларусь http://www.mfa.gov.by , 19-09-2007

[40] Agreement came into effect on 4 November 2003. Соглашение между Правительством Республики Беларусь и Правительством Российской Федерации о совместном тыловом обеспечении региональной группировки войск (сил) Вооруженных Сил Республики Беларусь и Вооруженных Сил Российской Федерации [Agreement of the Governments of the Republic of Belarus and Russian Federation on common vehicle logistic support to the regional grouping of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus and Russian Federation] http://pravo.by/webnpa/text_txt.asp?RN=H10300238 , 05-09-2007 (in Russian)

Russian military forces with at least 18 tons of bread on a 24 hour basis (article 6 of the agreement). The significance of this grouping has especially increased after the NATO expansion. Aleksandr Lukashenka noted[41] that changes in the military political situation in the region require qualitative changes in the military collaboration field. The main line of Belarus is a partnership with Russia that is implemented in practice by establishing a regional grouping, the performance of which these obligations will be ensured. The Eastern European regional military forces consist of 200,000 thousand officers. Presently Minsk and Moscow unify their legal acts regulating common actions and the usage of this grouping.

The Caucasus military grouping is deployed in Armenia and is responsible for the protection of the CSTO borders southbound. The compatibility of this military group may be questionable since the guarding of the borders is essentially carried out by the Russian forces, and the role of Armenia is insignificant. An essential progress in the establishment of the Central Asian collective forces is noticeable. Presently, the collective rapid reaction forces consist of 11,000 thousand troops from Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Russia and Kirghizia. N. Bordiuzh states[42] that collective rapid reaction forces will be subordinated on the national level only during the peace time and in case of military actions the forces will be subordinated to a particular grouping. Within the CSTO framework a dialog on the strengthening of military units and the development of their functions is going on. A regular session of the CST Defence Ministers took place in Moscow on 22 June 2005 during which a "Plan for the development of CSTO allied military capacities up to 2010 and further perspective" was discussed. In Yerevan the CST Collective Security Council adopted a decision on the fast deployment of collective forces in the Central Asian region. It is noteworthy that these forces should merge with the Russian-Belarus and Russian-Armenian bodies of troops. On 14 June 2004 a CST session took place in Astana where "the main directions of dialogue and collaboration with the NATO" and "the formation and functioning of the CSTO peacekeeping mechanism" were approved.[43]

The establishment of common military groupings is strengthened by bilateral obligations in the field of military airborne forces. Yet the integration of airborne forces with the CSTO develops only westbound between Russia and Belarus. Collaboration is based on the agreement of defence ministries on the procedure of common actions of antiaircraft defence measures and forces

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[41] BNS press release: A. Lukashenka strengthens collaboration with Russia, 3 August 2006.
[42] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Бордюжа: необходимо создать Коллективные силы чрезвычайного реагирования ОДКБ http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007
[43] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (Информация) http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007

that was entered into on 25 February 1994.[44] The air space is protected by Russia and Belarus by the joint forces using a common antiaircraft system, training the staff, conducting training at the level of headquarters and being on guard. An issue of the development of a common regional Russian-Belarus antiaircraft defence system has been nearly solved. A package of documents was prepared that has already been approved on the national level. The creation of an anti-aircraft defence (AAD) system westbound is strategically important, since it will simplify the protection of air space of the union state and will reduce the time of reaction in case of breach.[45] Already now Russia and Belarus strengthen their air defence system westbound and have deployed a complex of S-30 zenith missiles in Belarus.[46] It has also been agreed that until 2010 Russia will transfer its operative/tactical missile launch complexes ISKANDER-E with a shooting distance up to 280 km over to the Belarusian military forces. These complexes will be deployed in one of the two key brigades Radanovich or Osipovich that are presently armed with the TOCHKA-U tactical missiles. Each year military airborne forces of both states organize training in the Belarus firing range in Ashuluk.[47] In 2006, military airborne exercise involving AAD and a Russian radiolocation intelligence A-50 aircraft took place[48]. The commander, Colonel Igor Izarenka of the western operative/tactical AAD headquarters in Bara-novichi noted[49] that the Russian and Belarusian partnership in the AAD field is the only one that is actually functioning in the CIS space and forms close relationships not only between the two states, but also involves other republics of the former Soviet Union. Although the AAD strengthens military integrati-on of Belarus and Russia, issues associated with the system management still persist. Presently, Belarusian military officers may not adopt decisions on the

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[44] Website of the Belarussian Ministry of Defence: Соглашения между Министерством обороны Республики Беларусь и Министерством обороны Российской Федерации о порядке взаимодействия дежурных сил и средств противовоздушной обороны от 25 февраля 1994г [agreement of defence ministries on the procedure of common actions of antiaircraft defence measures and forces] www.mod. mil.by/sotrud.html , 05-09-2007

[45] Стрешнев Р. В боевом братстве — наша сила. Красная Звезда [Our power is in combat brotherhood]. 30 Августа 2005 года http://www.redstar.ru/2005/08/30_08/3_02.html , 11-08-2007, (in Russian)

[46] On 10 September 2005 a contract was signed in the state Belarusian and Russian military/industrial committee. Based on this contract Russia undertakes to transfer a new zenith missile complex S-300 over to Belarus. "Land-Air" self-propelled missile complexes S-300PS may reach a target located at a distance of 150 km, informed the Krasnaja Zvezda newspaper of the Russian Ministry of Defence while briefing on the visit of the country's Minister of Defence Sergej Ivanov to Minsk. S. Ivanov paid a visit on Friday, on the very same day when the first complex of missiles was delivered. http://www.redstar. ru/2005/08/30_08/3_02.html , 11-08-2007

[47] Interfax press release E.g. on 15-19 August 2006 in Ashuluk firing grounds, Astrakhan region, an active stage of exercise of the antiaircraft defence units took place. The exercise was attended by more than 10 antiaircraft missile systems S-300, over 30 aircrafts Mig-29, Su-27, Su-24. During exercise a launch of S-300 system missiles was performed, besides fighter planes Mig-29, Su-27 and front bomb-carriers Su-24 also launched missiles and threw bombs. 15 August 2006.

[48] На страже союзного неба [Securing allied space]   http://www.soyuz.by/second.aspx?document=1222 0&type=Qualifier&uid=5&page=5 , 05-11-2005, (in Russian)

[49] Ibid

use of Russian military forces.[50] The Chief of Russia's General Staff Anatolij Kvashnin noted that *de facto* this AAD already exists since it had already functioned in the Soviet times and has not been destroyed, whereas *de jure* we are still solving particular legal issues.

During this stage of military integration close cooperation in the military industry field takes place. Necessary mechanisms have already been created by the CSTO seeking to successfully integrate the defence/industrial complexes. This collaboration goes on the multilateral and unilateral basis. The key element of this multilateral collaboration became an "Agreement on the main principles of military technical collaboration between the CSTO members" that was signed in Moscow on 20 June 2000.[51] The agreement sets forth that the states will supply production to the contingents responsible for the implementation of collective security objectives of the CSTO member states on a preferential basis. This agreement was expanded by the Dushanbe decisions of 2003. According to the opinion of Vitalij Shlikov,[52] the links between the defence complex and the economic capacity have been obvious since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the deformation of the military industrial sector caused social-economic problems in Russia as well as in other countries. The present-day collaboration compensates the losses. The collaboration of military industry complexes has a positive effect on the defence potential of these states. Military plants carry out a quite a lot of common orders and monopolize the market in the CIS states. For example an armament and weaponry exhibition "MILEKS-2005" took place in Minsk in May 2005 during which the Russian side displayed an exhibition emphasizing military/technical integration of the union state. The majority of technical components were manufactured in Belarus, yet the final assembly of completing units was performed in Russia.[53] According to the Rosoboron Director General Sergej Chemezov, the collaboration of both states in the military technology field could serve as an excellent example in the post-Soviet space. One third of the military technology complexes and research centres were concentrated in Belarus and they have been retained.

Close collaboration in the military industry field ensures integration of the CSTO states, introduction of the uniform weaponry standards and mutual dependence. The distribution of industrial complexes (the manufacture of military components in different states) serves the integration purposes which efficiency may be justified by the economic gain laws.

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[50] Матвеев А. Кремль инициирует военную интеграцию в СНГ [The Kremlin initiates military integration in the CIS], 2003-07-21 http://www.moldova.ru/index.php?tabName=articles&owner=16&id=114 , 09-09-2007, (in Russian)

[51] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности (Информация) http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007

[52] Шлыков В. Оборонная экономика в России и наследие структурной милитаризации [Defense economy in Russia and heritage of structural militarization]. Под редакцией Стивена Э. Миллера и Дмитрия Тренина. Вооруженные силы России: власть и политика. Американская академия гуманитарных и точных наук, 2005.- 191-221 с., (in Russian)

[53] Стрешнев Р.В боевом братстве — наша сила. Красная Звезда[Our power is in combat brotherhood]. 30 Августа 2005 года http://www.redstar.ru/2005/08/30_08/3_02.html , 08-08-2007, (in Russian)

2.4. Functional Dependence Stage

Intensive military integration may be very ambitious and broad content-wise, yet each process has to have some points of distinction and possible limits. In case of military integration, the maximum ceilings may be achieved – (1) when military forces are combined and (2) when a uniform or joint force command structure is introduced. A combined military unit is subordinated to a joint command and carried out the directions of this command. This is associable with a wider integration of the states in the economic, social and political fields that supposes the conditions for strengthening military integration and surrendering some part of autonomy in security issues. This stage may be named the functional dependence stage. Military forces of the states may not act severally, otherwise their autonomic actions will become inefficient and incapable (in military respect). The functional dependence may become a serious argument to both, politicians, military strategists while controlling the integration process itself, since security, as a dominating instrument, may not be subordinated to other interests (e.g. economic).

The CSTO already creates joint and common structures that partially match the elements of the final military integration stage, and is probable that the organization will gradually move in this direction. During the Dushanbe meeting in April 2003, the CST adopted a decision to set up Joint Headquarters since 1 January 2004.[54] By the CST decision, the first commander of the Joint Headquarters was appointed the Tadzhikistan Defence Headquarters Commander, major general Ramil Nadyrov. In 2005, the Joint CSTO Headquarters staffed with 55 officers started operation. According to the military experts[55] the new headquarters will essentially differ from the amorphous structure of the CIS Headquarters since this will be a new control system of the allied forces functioning within the framework of General Staff structures of the Russian Federation. The headquarters will command the collective security rapid reaction forces, regional headquarters in the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia. The headquarters have already been used in exercise and its activities are expected to expand in the future. The development may be affected by the examples of bilateral military collaboration between Russia and Belarus. The Russian Minister of Defence Sergej Ivanov stressed that one cannot doubt the strategic partnership of Belarus and Russia that is becoming a locomotive of integration processes.[56] It is probably, that the Russian-Belarusian military integration will move into the CSTO. The military doctrine of the union state

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[54] Official website of the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Объединенный штаб ОДКБ http://www.dkb.gov.ru/start/index.htm , 05-09-2007

[55] Ibid.

[56] Утвержден проект Концепции основ законодательства Союзного государства об обороне [Approved a Concept of defense of the union state] 20/10/2005 http://www.soyuz.by/second.aspx?document=9890&type=Qualifier&uid=5&page=5 , 05-09-2007 (in Russian)

sets forth[57] that one of the grounds of the military organization being formed is the unification of command over the Belarusian and Russian military forces (clause 1.11). It is difficult to make a judgement about a progress in this field since no declaration about the establishment of permanent common headquarters has been officially made. Hints about the joint command are noticeable in the article of the Belarusian Minister of Defence general-colonel Leonid Malcev "The algorithm of the 21st century."[58] The minister stressed in the article that priority attention will be devoted to the military training and control issues. In June 2006, the Russian and Belarusian "Union shield-2006" training took place during which a joint control, usage and planning system was checked. Adequate compatibility in the joint control over separate military forces, operative and tactical bodies of troop was achieved between Russia and Belarus. This indicates that specific military elements of both states are already controlled by common efforts using general subordination and implementing common tasks. On 28 January 2007 the Belarusian and Russian military officers organized common exercise of the headquarters during which attempts were made to coordinate actions seeking to ensure military security of a Union state. During the exercise representatives of other ministries and departments associated with the general security issues were invited to participate too.

The Belarusian and Russian military integration in the military air force field may achieve the highest degree. While commenting upon the possibilities of this state to defend itself against possible airborne attacks, the Belarusian Minister of Defence Malcev[59] declared that the Belarusian antiaircraft defence system is reliable and it may detect and exterminate even minor aircraft. The Minister also added that after the Belarusian AAD was armed with the Russian zenith artillery complexes S-300, efficiency of the latter considerably increased. According to the Deputy Commander of the Russian military air forces, general-lieutenant Aleksandr Bizhev,[60] an agreement on common Russian and Belarusian regional antiaircraft defence is intended to be signed in October of this present year. All necessary documents have already been drafted and should be discussed in the near future at the meeting of the boards of Defence Ministries. According to the general, the signing of the latter agreement would enable to enhance the efficiency of the Russian-Belarusian anti-aircraft defence, since based on the draft agreement, both Russia's and Belarus' fighter aircraft were allowed to enter one another's territory after the receipt of approval from the Joint Headquarters. No political decision on this issue would be necessary.

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[57] Постановление Высшего Государственного Совета Союзного Государства 26 декабря 2001 г. № 8 Военная Доктрина Союзного Государства [Military doctrine of the union state] http://pravo.kulichki.com/zak/megd/meg00869.htm , 05-09-2007 , (in Russian)

[58] Мальцев Л. В алгоритме XXI века [The algorithm of the 21st century]. Красная Звезда. 28 Февраля 2007 года http://www.redstar.ru/2007/02/28_02/1_12.html , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[59] Создание единой системы ПВО Беларуси и России вступило в завершающую фазу [the formation of joint aircraft defense system of Russia and Belarus has reached the final stage] http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2007/03/05/ic_news_116_267722/ , 05-09-2007, (in Russian)

[60] Ibid.

Within the CSTO framework, bilateral projects and the development of integration between Belarus and Russia are frequently assessed as exemplary and suggestions are made to take them into consideration while improving the CSTO military integration. The Joint Headquarters were created by the CSTO and joint military units are being developed. The establishment of the Joint Headquarters reflects a uniform instrument that coordinates or will co-ordinate activities of the CSTO Headquarters among separate military forces and enhance military integration. The antiaircraft defence system is expected to cover all CSTO members, and this will serve as a positive instrument in furthering military integration.

Conclusion

After assessing the stages of military integration and empirical data, a conclusion could be made that military integration dominates and usurps the CSTO formation process that could neutralise the shortcomings and achieve the results. The states have defined their goals and ambitions of military integration, which are fixed in the strategic level documents. An agreement on the collective security of 15 May 1992 became one of the first impetuses in the military integration field in the post-Soviet space. The agreement is based on common defence, cooperation between the states, institutional structure and common actions. Afterwards this agreement grew into an organization that is associated with a new geopolitical formation and establishment of the collective regional security system. The process of internal military integration itself was regulated in the plans on military collaboration and tactical level arrangements.

On 10 February 1995 a Collective security concept was adopted covering the formation of national armed forces of the CST member states, implemen-tation of military and military/technical collaboration programs, adjustment of the legal acts regulating the functioning of the collective security system. It was also decided to create allied-joint military groups and plan their usage, to create a joint antiaircraft military system and assess a possibility of forming common armed forces. A well institutionalized structure will help implement these plans that has outgrown into an organization with a separate status, members and projected deeper integration plans. During the third stage of mi-litary integration, regular exercise and RUBEZH training are going on, and also common KANAL operations focused on the coordination of common actions between the security structures are being carried out. The CSTO has decided to create three military groupings in the direction of Eastern Europe, Central Asia and Caucasus that should form a broad defensive/offensive alliance. The CSTO states have already solved the technical aspects of military collaboration since their armed forces are encountered with compatible armaments and are provided by one supplier – Russia. So far it is not clear as to the capacities of

the military units since the exercise is being held and the concepts of common actions have been approved that should be tested by common military actions. Great progress has been made westbound, where a common air defence system has already been integrated, whereas units of the military grouping participate in the exercise, and presumably, they act concordantly. Meanwhile the Caucasus direction is supported only by the Russian armed forces and there is little probability that the latter group was ready for common actions. Also exercises among the military groups themselves is lacking since the concept envisages the common actions of all groups.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that the CSTO has stepped into the final military integration stage and has created a common command instrument – a Joint Headquarters. During this stage the examples and elements of the Russian and Belarusian military integration, e.g. common antiaircraft defence system, could be helpful.

The main problems may be brought up to the CSTO by the national expectations of the member states that are naturally associated with the military integration goals and may fluctuate and modify to a certain degree. Yet, after reaching the third stage there should be no fundamental gaps between the expectations and actual results. Trust remains the only one obstacle in the CSTO military integration process, since the intentions of members are not predictable and only close collaboration and partnership may curb them, enhance transparency and trust in bilateral relations. The structure of military alliance may also become an additional object of discussion that has already been going on regarding the union institutions between Russia and Belarus on transnational level.[61]

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[61] BNS press release. The Constitution of the Union state may be adopted by the end of the year. The Russian-Belarusian Union state secretary Pavel Borodin declared during a press conference held in Moscow on 21 September that a referendum regarding the Russian-Belarusian Union state may be held already in December of the present year. The politician also added that a draft of this document should be discussed in the Russian-Belarus Supreme Council in November. The main object of discussion should be the structure of the Union state control institutions. 22 September 2006. (in Lithuanian)

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