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Lithuanian Intelligence System

The article describes and explains the evolution of Lithuania intelligence system and the main phases of its development. The article analyzes function and responsibilities of the two most important actors in this field - the State Security Department and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of Defence. Special attention is devoted to the implementation of the intelligence cycle and the division of responsibilities between two intelligence institutions. The article concludes that in 20 years Lithuania managed to create a functioning intelligence system that can support the decision making process and satisfy the needs of intelligence consumers, although serious weaknesses remain.

Introduction

Intelligence is a widely discussed topic in the public domain. Activities of intelligence services give raise to conspiracy theories and popular misunderstandings. Imaginative powers of intelligence services and their links - political, business or cultural elite - is a matter of speculation in the mass media in all countries of the world, including in Lithuania.

Several decades ago the art of intelligence became an increasingly important subject of academic studies. The theory and practices of intelligence falls largely within the realm of political science, but the application of intelligence methods links it to other disciplines such as economics or finances. Intelligence services of the US, the United Kingdom, France or Russia are analysed in numerous books and other publications, however experiences of smaller nations, like Lithuania, are mostly neglected.

Little attention by the academic community is paid to the intelligence activities of small and medium size countries contributes to misunderstandings that exist in this very sensitive area of national security. It is true that the intelligence services of smaller nations are not able to operate globally; their means of collection are limited. On the other hand they can provide specific expertise in their immediate neighbourhood that is more accurate than of their counterparts from bigger states. For example, Lithuania may have a deep insight of the latest development in Kaliningrad oblast of Russia but a very limited understanding of situation in Chad.

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In addition, the role of intelligence agencies is particularly sensitive in small states. Small states are particularly receptive to the issues of national security, for them the matter of national survival is not only a theoretical issue. This allows intelligence services to play more important role in politics comparing to bigger states. As Edward Lucas noted, "it is hard to find an ex-communist country in Eastern Europe in which the intelligence and security services are depoliticized and uncontroversial."¹

Lithuania is a wonderful example of a country where intelligence agencies became an integral part of political life. The influence is felt across a whole range of issues - from foreign policy formation, to participation in the impeachment procedure, of the President of the State. This particular issue exaggerated public debate on the role of intelligence services in politics. It sparked a heated discussion on the use of intelligence products by law enforcement agencies and by politicians.

Public interest in intelligence service rose even higher after a high ranking Lithuanian spy posted to Belarus, Vytautas Pociūnas, was found dead in mysterious circumstances. He is believed to have fallen out of the hotel's ninth-story window in Belarus, yet many suspect murder. The Parliament launched the parliamentary investigation, which led to a very critical assessment of the State Security Department. The parliamentary investigation also pointed out some fundamental problems with the overall structure and procedures in intelligence community.

This article is the first attempt to describe and understand the Lithuanian intelligence system, and also to specify its strengths and weaknesses. This article discerns to show the different dimensions of the Lithuanian intelligence agencies and their influence over the decision making process in the area of security and defence. This case study also tries to show how Lithuanian intelligence system fits in the overall pattern of intelligence activities in the world.

Every country is unique, so is its intelligence system. Modern Lithuanian intelligence system reflects her historical experience and preparations to deal with modern challenges. Two most important players in this field – the State Security Department (SSD) and the Second Investigation Department (SID) under the Ministry of Defence - have undergone major restructuring since their establishments, but roles and functions are under constant review. The author looks at the Lithuanian intelligence system from a holistic perspective with the understanding that intelligence is only one side of the national security equation.

The limited amount of publicly available information remains an important factor that limits the scope and depth of this article. For these reasons, the Lithuanian capabilities to collect information using human or signal intelligence could not be discussed in sufficient detail. Information on these issues is always classified and unavailable to the public.

¹ Lucas E. "State Insecurity", *The Economist*, December 20, 2006, <http://edwardlucas.blogspot.com/2006/12/spy-stories.html>

1. Overview of Literature

The Lithuanian intelligence system is not a popular subject in the Lithuanian academic community. Leading national newspapers from time to time come up with sensational news about activities about the Lithuanian intelligence services but no major publication on the role and scope of their activities exist so far. Historical perspective dominates the whole debate on intelligence.

The only successful attempt to link intelligence theory and practice remains the article, "The role of secrets services in democratic states and their control" written by Gintaras Bagdonas, former chief of SID and currently the Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence of the European Union Military Staff.² Although successful from theoretical perspective, Bagdonas's official position limits his ability to discuss openly sensitive issues surrounding the interaction of politics and intelligence. The SSD official Arūnas Paukštė in his PhD thesis "Terrorism and its prevention in Lithuania"³ introduced a separate chapter for the role of intelligence in fighting terrorism but fails take a critical look at the role of his own employer, the SSD. The relation between intelligence and the prevention of terrorism is discussed in the monograph by Egdūnas Račius, Asta Maskaliūnaitė, Deividas Šlekys and Vaidotas Urbelis "Challenges of international struggle against terrorism to Lithuania".⁴

Parliamentary investigation of the SSD activities conducted in 2006 resulted in the release of publicly available information on the internal structure and processes inside the SSD. The investigation also sparked public discussions and generated interest of politicians in intelligence services. One indirect outcome of this investigation was a set of suggestions and evaluations prepared in 2007 by the Conservatives party "Problemos VSD ir galimi jų sprendimo būdai [Problems in the SSD and possible ways to solve them]"⁵. Other political parties so far have not gone beyond making several public statements on the current state of affairs in the SSD. Intelligence is not even mentioned in their election manifestos or party programmes.

Military intelligence enjoy even less attention than the SSD. Directors of SID are almost absent in the mass media, their activities rarely provoke open reactions of politicians. The only book on the subject of military intelligence is "Žvalgybų intrigos Lietuvoje, 1994-2006 [Intelligence intrigues in Lithuania],

² Bagdonas G. "Slaptųjų žvalgybos tarnybų vaidmuo ir kontrolė demokratinėje valstybėje [The role of secrets services in democratic states and their control] ", *Kardas*, 2 (419), 2006, p.10-16.

³ Paukštė A. "Terorizmas ir jo prevencija Lietuvoje [Terrorism and its prevention in Lithuania]", PhD thesis, Romer University. - Vilnius, 2006.

⁴ Račius E., Maskaliūnaitė A., Šlekys D., Urbelis V. *Tarptautinės antiteroristinės kovos iššūkių Lietuvai analizė* [Challenges of international struggle against terrorism to Lithuania], Vilnius, Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2007.

⁵ Tėvynės Sąjunga "Problemos VSD ir galimi jų sprendimo būdai [Problems in the SSD and possible ways to solve them]", <http://www.naujadarbotvarke.lt/?id=23&pg=&nid=40>

1994-2006”⁶, written by journalist Gintaras Visockas and former SID official Kęstutis Kaminskas. Although well written, this book contains huge doses of untrustworthy information and cannot be regarded as a reliable source of information for this article.

The history of intelligence is more widely discussed topic in academic community. In 1993 Arvydas Anušauskas published a comprehensive survey of interwar intelligence “Lietuvos slaptosios tarnybos, 1918-1940 [Lithuanian secret services], 1918-1940”.⁷ In his study Anušauskas describes the scope and activities of Lithuanian intelligence service before WWII with special emphasis on their internal structure and relations with foreign intelligence services. The special issue of the journal “Krašto apsaugos [National Defence]” looks even further – to the times of Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the role of intelligence in the Middle Ages⁸.

Post war period and the fight against Soviet occupation is less covered when interwar years. Lithuanian historians frequently discuss methods used by NKVD (later KGB) to suppress Lithuanian armed resistance but fail to describe in more detail organisational structure of partisan movement and their intelligence collection capabilities.

For the Cold War period, the additional source of information are recollections of former members of intelligence services. Not all of them are entirely reliable but most of them provide us with very practical and concrete examples of intelligence activities. Quite a number of such publications directly or indirectly mention Lithuania. Most known examples are the book based by information provided by the former KGB officer Sergey Tretyakov *Comrade J.*⁹, recollections of the former member of the CIA Milt Bearden, *The Main Enemy. The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*¹⁰, Christopher's Andrew book based on documents smuggled by Vasilyi Mitrochin *The Sword and the Shield*¹¹ and even the first publication of former Lithuanian KGB officer Ričardas Vaigauskas *Slaptajame protų kare: tarybinio žvalgo prisiminimai [Secret War of Minds: Recollections of a Former Soviet Spy]*¹².

Overall, the Lithuanian intelligence system has not become a subject of academic analysis. Interwar period is satisfactory covered by the publications of Anušauskas but modern intelligence system is of interest only to the dozen of politicians and former members of intelligence services.

⁶ Visockas G., Kaminskas K. *Žvalgybų intrigos Lietuvoje, 1994-2006 [Intelligence intrigues in Lithuania, 1994-2006]*, Vilnius : Spauda, 2006.

⁷ Anušauskas A. *Lietuvos slaptosios tarnybos, 1918-1940 [Lithuanian secret services, 1918-1940]*, Vilnius: Mintis, 1993.

⁸ Žvalgyba Lietuvos didžiojoje kunigaikštystėje [Intelligence in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania]. *Krašto apsauga*, Nr. 18 (147), 2008, p.17-18.

⁹ Early P. *Comrade J*, P.Putnam's Sons, New York, 2007.

¹⁰ Bearden M., Risen J. *The Main Enemy. The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB*. New York: Ballantine Books, 2004.

¹¹ Andrew Ch, Mitrokhin V. *The Sword and the Shield*, Basic Books, New York, 2001.

¹² Vaigauskas R. *Slaptajame protų kare: tarybinio žvalgo prisiminimai [Secret War of Minds: Recollections of a Former Soviet Spy]*. Vilnius: Politika, 2005.

2. Institutional Structure of Lithuanian Intelligence

The history of modern intelligence in Lithuania starts in 1990. On 26 March 1990, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania established a State Security Department under the Government. The SSD several time changed its name but the present system was codified in 1994, when the Seimas passed the Law on the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and on the same year the Government adopted the Statute of the State Security Department. The Law claims that the SCD objective is “to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania and its constitutionally established system of government”. The Art.1 of the Law declared that the SSD is a state institution accountable to the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania and the President of the Republic. Such double accountability later became persisting problem for overall intelligence system.

After reestablishment, the first immediate task for the SSD was to recruit and train newly appointed inexperienced personnel to undertake intelligence missions. In the first years SCD accepted people with different background,, some of them were former members of Soviet economic police or even KGB¹³. The SSD lacked training facilities while international cooperation was just beginning to emerge. The CIA was the first to show interests in setting up contacts with newly established intelligence agency. CIA official Michael Sulick later recalled that at that time Lithuanians had no clue on the collection, processing and production of intelligence:

Laurinkus, [the chief of the new Lithuanian intelligence service] and Butkevicius [the new minister of defence] [...] both confessed to knowing little about intelligence. Laurinkus, who spoke some English and had visited friends in Massachusetts several times in the recent past, showed me two paperbacks. “This is all I know about intelligence. They are my guides but I think we need more,” he laughed nervously. Neither book would make CIA’s recommended reading list. One was the “CIA Diary” by Philip Agee, an exposé by an Agency-officer-turned-traitor who cooperated with Cuban intelligence to reveal the identities of CIA officers. The other was “The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence” by John Marks and Victor Marchetti, a harsh critique of the Agency published in 1974. Max¹⁴ had bought both in a Boston bookstore after learning he would be tapped to run the nation’s spy service.¹⁵

In addition to the lack of experience, the SCD also suffered from rapidly changing leadership. Until 1993 the SCD was led by Mečys Laurinkus, Danukas Arlauskas, Viktoras Zedelis, Balys Gajauskas, Petras Plumpa. Only in 1993 with the appointment of Jurgis Jurgelis, the SSD entered the era of

¹³ Interview by Visockas with Virginijus Česnuliavičius, “Slaptieji takai [Secret Paths]” “XXI amžius”, 20 November, 2007, N.9.

¹⁴ MAX – Nickname of Laurinkus.

¹⁵ Sulick M.J. “As the USSR Collapsed: A CIA Officer in Lithuania Remembering 15 Years Ago”, *Studies in Intelligence*, 50(2), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-50no2/html_files/CIA_Lithuania_1.htm

relative stability. Jurgelis served as Director General for five, his successor Laurinkus – for six years.

The military intelligence officially was re-established on 1 June 1990. The Second branch of the National Defence Department (which later became Ministry of Defence) was tasked to monitor location, movement and activities of remaining Soviet armed forces. Later responsibilities were more clearly divided. The SID was tasked with strategic intelligence and counterintelligence, while the armed forces developed integral intelligence capabilities for their own operational needs. Military intelligence was confronted with similar challenges as the SSD – it lacked experienced and trained professionals.

Newly re-established intelligence institutions several times changed their names, functions and responsibilities but since 1994 only minor changes occurred. The SID transferred several not intelligence related function to the Armed forces (e.g., protection of VIP's, interrogation) but its main functions remained intact. Armed Forces intelligence was slightly reorganized in 2008 when J2 was moved from the Defence Staff of Ministry of Defence to Joint staff, which is responsible for conduct of operations and exercises. The SSD also conducted several internal reorganizations and in 2006 established Department for the Fight against Terrorism.

Creation of a legal and institutional framework was completed after the Parliament in 2000 passed the Law on Intelligence. The Law stated the principal goals of intelligence are as follows:

- To supply the State institutions, which safeguard the national security of the Republic of Lithuania, with the intelligence information, necessary to perform their functions;
- To create favourable conditions for the implementation of the national security and foreign policies of the Republic of Lithuania;
- To determine, reduce or eliminate the threats to national security and the risk factors arising from abroad

These tasks could be interpreted quite widely. First of all, the Law speaks about “creation of favourable conditions,” which implies an active role of intelligence services in political, economic, financial and other areas of political life. This principal goal could also encompass non-intelligence related matters such as image building or investment climate. In these areas intelligence services may be important but not the leading institution.

Secondly, the Law emphasizes a close linkage between intelligence and foreign policy. Intelligence information is vital for making foreign policy decisions. Surprisingly this important statement is not reflected in other articles and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Law is not mentioned at all.

Thirdly, the Law asks intelligence services to determine, reduce or eliminate the threats from abroad. This statement encompasses not only counterintelligence but also active measures including covert action in foreign countries. Surprisingly, the Law mentions only threats that come “from abroad” but does not mention threats “from inside”. Considering that the SSD has considerable

powers in the area of law enforcement, the Law fails to mention one important activity of intelligence agencies.

All these contradiction do not preclude intelligence service from performing their principal tasks. Although not entirely sound, Lithuanian legislature established a solid legal framework for successful functioning of intelligence community.

2.1. Institutional Arrangements

All intelligence agencies are organized according their tasks, methods, issues or domains their where they have specific authority to act. Types and numbers of intelligence services vary from country to country. This article distinguishes following dividing lines between different services:

- According to area of expertise - military and non-military intelligence services;
- According to information collection methods - all source intelligence agencies and specialized agencies (e.g. signal or communication information);
- According to aim – to gain information (intelligence) and to deny information (counterintelligence).

In practice, the number of intelligence agencies range from 16 in the US to just 1. Bjorn Muller-Wille suggested that almost all countries have one or several agencies that support decision-makers in the following intelligence functions¹⁶.

- Military intelligence collects and assesses information on actual and potential activities of foreign military forces within and outside its own territory. National agencies producing this kind of intelligence are in general placed under the authority of the ministry of defence.
- Security intelligence surveys (domestic) threats targeting the governmental functions defined in the constitution (or equivalent). It is, amongst other things, engaged in surveying counter-espionage, left-wing' and 'right-wing' extremist activities and terrorism.
- Criminal intelligence engages in the fight against serious and organised crime. It differs from the other functions in the respect that it is linked to criminal investigations, which aim at producing evidence that can result in conviction in a court of law.
- External or foreign intelligence, finally, focuses on the development in foreign countries. It supports decision-making on foreign policy in general and produces situation assessments on issues in the fields of security, defence, foreign and economic policies.

¹⁶ Muller-Wille B. "For our Eyes Only? Shaping an intelligence community within the EU", European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional paper N.50, January 2004, p. 8-9

Almost no country in the world could maintain a number of intelligence agencies for each intelligence function. In most countries separate military and non-military security agencies exist but in Norway, Finland, Sweden or Denmark all foreign intelligence collection falls under the responsibility of the Ministries of Defence¹⁷. Many countries maintain intelligence agencies that specialise in one collection method (e.g. signals intelligence) but most small countries are not in the position to allow themselves such a luxury.

Despite different institutional arrangements most European states maintain at least a security intelligence / counterintelligence service (similar to the SSD in Lithuania) and military intelligence service (similar to SID). In addition most countries maintain intelligence services that serve operational needs of the armed forces. The US Army Intelligence or Intelligence Corps in the United Kingdom are good examples of such organisations. Intelligence community could also include criminal or economic intelligence services such as Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence under the Department of the Treasury or Drug Enforcement Administration under the Department of Justice in the US.

The Law on Intelligence states that in Lithuania, only two state institutions shall have intelligence services: 1) The State Security Department; 2) The Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence. According to the Law the SSD and the SID are all source intelligence. They both have separate counterintelligence divisions and they are allowed to collect necessary information abroad and inside the country.

According to the Law, the SSD and the SID divide their responsibilities strictly along functional lines. The SID is purely military intelligence, while the SSD performs all remaining function, including foreign intelligence and security intelligence / counterintelligence. Surprisingly, the Law does not include into intelligence community armed forces intelligence or criminal and economic intelligence.

The institutional framework of the Lithuanian intelligence system has a number of advantages. The responsibilities and functions of both services are clearly divided and intelligence community is not fragmented into many competing agencies. From the other side, the SSD functions are too broad and combine foreign / security / counter intelligence and law enforcement functions. This arrangement is not typical for democratic countries.

Lithuanian politicians quite frequently come up with ideas on how to change the current arrangement. For example the former chief of the SSD Laurinkus suggested separating foreign and security intelligence. In his opinion “we shall have a fresh look at the functions of the SSD. The SSD has to maintain

¹⁷ Gintaras Bagdonas, *Žvalgybinės ir teisėsauginės veiklos tarpusavio santykio nustatymo svarba: užsienio šalių patirtis* [Relations between Intelligence and Law enforcement: experience of other nations], Conference “To be or not to be: the Place of the Law on Operational Activities in Lithuanian legal system”, 26 May 2006, Vilnius

only foreign and counterintelligence functions".¹⁸ The ruling Conservative party suggest separating intelligence from counterintelligence. In their opinion the SSD could become counterintelligence service.¹⁹

Different modifications to the current arrangements could be implemented in Lithuanian, although reform of intelligence system must respect several important principles. On one hand, there is no need to create a highly fragmented system with many competing agencies. Creation of new services increase administrative burden and not always enhance effectiveness of the system. On the other hand, the creation of one intelligence service would abolish healthy competition between the SSD and the SID (e.g. security in Russia currently is of interest to both services). Most countries try to maintain competitive analysis. Mark Lowenthal claims that "there is belief that by having analysts in several agencies who have different backgrounds and perspectives work on an issue, parochial views more likely will be countered—if not weeded out and proximate reality is more likely to be achieved."²⁰ Forced consensus could lead to acceptable to all parties, but not provocative or acute intelligence.

Most likely the Lithuanian intelligence community will be restructured and enlarged by new members. However this enlargement must take place only in the areas where is considerable lack of intelligence information. The current institutional arrangements could be revised but they shall not fundamentally change the current system.

2.2. Subordination

Almost all intelligence services in the world are subordinate to heads of states and governments, while ministers of defence in most cases exercise control over military intelligence. Subordination to the highest state officials is necessary due to the extreme sensitivity of intelligence matters (especially in the case of covert action). A high level of subordination also assures that security / foreign policy decision makers can assure political control of their activities.

In Lithuania, subordination of the SID to the Minister of Defence corresponds to the practice of most democratic states. The Minister of Defence has the right to task the SID, evaluate its performance and appoint or dismiss Director of the SID. Direct subordination does not imply that the Minister in person is the main consumer for intelligence, but he shall maintain political control over the agency.

The SSD is accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic. Such double accountability creates many questions about tasking, control and

¹⁸ Slaptieji agentai neišsivaduoja iš įtakų verpeto [Secret agents cannot escape whirlwinds of different influences]. Kauno diena, 16 September, 2006, 212 (17976).

¹⁹ Juknevičienė Rasa: Rimtų problemų sprendimas tik imituojamas [Solutions of real problems is simulated], May 15 2008, <http://www.bernardinai.lt/index.php?url=articles/78819>

²⁰ Lowenthal M. *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, (3rd Edition), Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005, p.8

supervision of the SSD. The question asked by Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1940 “Who is in charge?”²¹ or in other words “Who speaks on behalf of intelligence agencies?” is extremely acute in Lithuania.

No clear subordination mechanism raises irritation among experts and even politicians. Member of Seimas and vice chairwomen of the Conservative party Rasa Juknevičienė once noticed “first of all we have solve subordination issue. Nobody gives the SSD clear guidance and nobody is held accountable for what they are doing”.²² The Conservative party rightly notices that the President’s only adviser on intelligence issue is seconded from the SSD and the Seimas is too busy to exercise day-to-day control of the SSD. As a consequence the SSD operates separately from other institutes of the Government.²³

Former chief of the SSD, Laurinkus, also raises similar concern. In his opinion now the SSD feeds with information three highest state officials and it is not quite clear who gets what kind of information and when. Laurinkus suggest establishing one institution that would supervise activities of the SSD.²⁴

The majority of experts suggest making the SSD directly accountable only to the Prime Minister. Such an arrangement would help to supply the Government with timely intelligence information. Juknevičienė pointed out that according to the Constitution, the Government is responsible for the safeguarding of the state security therefore is it logical that the SSD would be place under the Prime Minister.²⁵ Others argue that current arrangements could be kept, but the Government shall every year issue some kind of guidance to the SSD. The third option is the establishment of British type Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and assuring better involvement of Minister of Foreign Affairs into intelligence guiding process. The forth option would delegate more responsibility to the President who according to the Constitution shall decide the basic issues of foreign policy and, together with the Government, conduct foreign policy. Such an arrangement would be logical if the SSD is relinquished from security intelligence function and becomes foreign intelligence service.

2.3. Coordination of Intelligence Activities

Coordination of intelligence efforts could be conducted using two basic concepts: hierarchical and non-hierarchical coordination. The JIC and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) represents the difference between the British system of cabinet government based on consensus and the American Presidential system of greater personal power and responsibility.²⁶

²¹ Herman M. *Intelligence Services in the Information Age*. London: Frank Cass, 2005. p.132

²² Juknevičienė, op.cit.

²³ Tėvynės sąjunga, op.cit.

²⁴ Slaptieji agentai neišsivaduoja iš įtakų verpeto. op.cit.

²⁵ Juknevičienė, op.cit.

²⁶ Herman, op.cit., p.133

- Non-hierarchical coordination. Overall intelligence coordination — of MI 5, MI 6, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) — is undertaken by the JIC²⁷. Great Britain does not have a central analytic agency. British rely on departmental rather than central arrangements, and to interdepartmental consensus as epitomized in the working of the JIC.²⁸
- Hierarchical model. The US system clearly defines DNI as the highest intelligence official. DNI is the United States government official subject to the authority of the President and responsible for overseeing and directing the National Intelligence Program²⁹. Two other important actors – secretaries of state and defence control significant intelligence assets other which DNI has only very limited control.

The Lithuanian system does not correspond to either of these models. In Lithuania there does not exist the “director of national intelligence” and a JIC type coordination system is also missing. Existence of only two intelligence agencies in theory makes the coordination process much easier but still many discrepancies exist.

According to the Law on Intelligence, the State Defence Council (SDC) is responsible for coordination of intelligence activities. The SDC consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Seimas, the Minister of Defence and the Commander of the Armed Forces. However the Law on the State Defence Council clearly states that decisions of the Council are not obligatory and the Council has no executive powers. Furthermore, the absence of ministers of foreign affairs and internal affairs preclude the SDC from becoming even an unofficial coordination mechanism.

Exclusion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from the intelligence process is extremely ridiculous keeping in mind that MFA is the main consumer of foreign intelligence. Timely intelligence has essential value in complex international negotiations. The MFA also has a large network of embassies that collect vast amounts of information. Despite these obvious facts, the Law on Intelligence does not even mention the MFA. Consequently the MFA has no internal structure, which could request, task, or evaluate intelligence information. The MFA tries to fill this gap by procuring some services from think tanks but this could not be considered as a substitute for intelligence.

Other consumers of intelligence production, the President and the Prime Minister, are even less involved in the intelligence process. Their staff do not contain personnel dedicated to work with intelligence (one SSD officer works for the President but it is doubtful that he can provide the President with independent advice). Bearing these circumstances in mind it comes as no surprise that confirmation procedure of the Annual Intelligence Plan in the SDC is pure formality.

²⁷ Todd and Boch, *op.cit.* p.105.

²⁸ Herman, *op.cit.* p.132

²⁹ Stratfor US: Strengthening the Power of ODNI. 31 June 2008, http://www.stratfor.biz/analysis/u_s_strengthening_power_odni.htm

2.4. Internal structure

Intelligence agencies rarely disclose their internal structure and methods of collection. But despite secrecy some obvious common principle exist how intelligence agencies organise their work. It is highly unlikely that Lithuania would constitute an exception from this general rule. The author presumes that both the SSD and SID have the following division:

- Foreign intelligence division that using secret, diplomatic, foreign and open channels makes analytical assessments on foreign countries or territories.
- Counterintelligence division. The SID is responsible for counterintelligence only within defence structures while range of activities for SSD is much broader.
- Security service division that do not fall under the counterintelligence. The SSD for this purpose has established divisions that deals with economic security and fight against terrorism. The SID is unlikely to focus on this function but most probably has dedicated staffs that observe the psychological atmosphere in military units or operations.
- International cooperation departments. Their importance increased after Lithuania became member of NATO and the EU and the information exchange with allies and partners increased substantially.
- Divisions specialising in one information gathering method (e.g. signal intelligence). Lithuania is not able to procure most sophisticated and expensive information collection systems (e.g. satellites) but in certain areas her abilities are quite impressive.
- Administrative divisions responsible for financial issues, personnel policy, public relations, etc.

Armed forces intelligence is organised differently – they usually have a small central headquarters. The rest of their personnel is serving in military units (“second sections”) and are subordinated to local commanders while central staff is responsible for their preparation as intelligence officers. In the Lithuanian armed forces each military unit also has “second section”, but none of intelligence officers could be called as Chief of the armed forces intelligence. Chief of J2 in the Joint Staff is the highest intelligence officer by rank but Joint Staff’s responsibilities are limited only to the organisation of exercises and conduct of operations.

2.5. Resources

Capabilities of intelligence agencies largely depend on available human and financial resources to conduct their activities. Modern technologies are expensive, therefore large intelligence agencies allocate huge amounts of money

for acquisition and modernisation projects. But the most important is the human factor, including motivation and quality of staff. Intelligence agencies compete in the open market with private and other governmental institutions for qualified personnel. For example, a specialist of signal intelligence is welcome in telecommunication sector, cryptanalysts may easily apply their knowledge in personnel security or banking sectors. Strong competition with the commercial sector forces intelligence agencies to allocate increasing amount of funds to personnel expenditures instead of investing in technological development.

In Lithuania the first people to join the intelligence service in the early nineties were specialists with security or law enforcement backgrounds (economic police, military, police, etc.), also physicist and historians. In 1997, after the establishment of the Special Investigation Service most people with economic background left the SSD for the new agency. In late nineties both intelligence services started to admit increasing number of social science students, especially from Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science. The SSD is still inviting young students to join the service in the hope to prepare them as intelligence specialists later. Not surprisingly, the average age in the SSD is only 30 years.³⁰ Lack of experience for several decades will remain a limiting factor for the production of quality intelligence.

The financing of Lithuanian intelligence agencies is constantly increasing. Allocations for the SSD are open for public while SID's budget is classified.

Table 1. Budget of the SSD (mln. euro)

	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
The SSD	9.6	13.0	13.6	10.1	15.9	18.8	19.7	22.0	18,3
Communication Centre under the SSD	1.1	1.3	1.3	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	3.3	2,3

Compared to other countries, Lithuania's expenditures on intelligence are small. Investment budget of the SSD is only 5.8 mln. euro (this does not include expenditures for infrastructure). It is highly unlikely that the SSD is able invest into modern surveillance and information collection technologies or buy expensive services from private sector.

Budget data allows making approximate estimation of the number of people working for intelligence services. Taking into consideration that the SSD spends on personnel 10 mln. euro, it is reasonable to assume that less when 600 people are working for the SSD. In total, including the SIID and other related services, Lithuanian intelligence community most probably does not exceed one thousand personnel.

³⁰ *VSD bandys atsikratyti jiems nebūdingų funkcijų [The SSD will get rid of not typical functions]*, January 30, 2006, <http://www.sekunde.lt/content.php?p=read&tid=27947>

3. Intelligence Cycle in Lithuania

In their daily work all intelligence agencies follow a five-step process called the Intelligence Cycle. Intelligence cycle refers to the steps in intelligence from the perception of requirements to the delivery of production. As the CIA describes it, this process ensures the agency does the job correctly through a system of checks and balances. The following stages are essential:

- *Setting requirements.* It means defining area and issues that policy makers and intelligence communities consider requiring intelligence support.
- *Collection.* Information is collected overtly (openly) and covertly (secretly). It includes all available collection methods – from open sources to satellite collection.
- *Processing.* All the information collected is processed (interpreted) before it is put into an intelligence report. This could be anything from a translating a document to a description of a satellite photo.
- *Analysis and Production.* During this step intelligence agencies take a closer look at all the information and determine how it fits together, while concentrating on answering the original tasking.
- *Dissemination.* In this final step, intelligence agencies give final written analysis to a policymaker, to the same policymaker who started the cycle.

Lowenthal, in his book “Intelligence: from Secrets to Policy” adds two additional steps: *consumption, and feedback*³¹. He claims that policy makers are not blank slates that are impelled by the actions of intelligence. Policy makers consume intelligence in different ways and these differences might lead to diverse understanding on what intelligence production is saying. After all, policy makers can give intelligence feedback of how their requirements were met and what improvements could be made.

In the modern era, almost all intelligence professionals study the Intelligence Cycle as a kind of model of how intelligence functions. Yet it is not a particularly strict model, since the cyclical pattern does not always describe what really happens. Hulnick noted that the practice is frequently different from theory: Policy officials rarely give collection guidance. Collection and analysis, which are supposed to work in tandem, in fact work more properly in parallel. Finally, the idea that decision makers wait for intelligence before making policy decisions is equally controversial. In the modern era, policy officials seem to want intelligence to support policy rather than to inform it.³² Despite criticism, in the absence of alternative approaches, the intelligence cycle remains the main intellectual tool of producing and delivering intelligence to decision makers.

³¹ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.54..

³² Hulnick A.S. What’s Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle, *Intelligence and National Security*, (6) 216, 2006, p.959-960

3.1. Setting the requirements

Setting requirements is the first important step in the intelligence cycle. Requirements derive from national policies and are closely tied to security policy objectives and national interests. In some cases they are clearly articulated in official documents, e.g. national security strategies, but frequently they are dictated by current events. Policy makers have a constant need for tailored (meaning written for their specific needs), timely intelligence that will provide background, context, information, warning, and an assessment of risks, benefits, and likely outcomes. Their needs are met by subject matter experts – namely the intelligence community.³³

Earlier chapters already highlighted that Lithuania lacks mechanisms for setting requirements to intelligence services. The President, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs do not possess dedicated staff and authority to fulfil this important task. Consequently intelligence services are left for themselves, i.e. they set requirements, produce intelligence and evaluate their own performance. Malakauskas once declared that:

The problem in Lithuanian is setting the requirements. [...] Nobody set tasks and goals for the SSD, nobody recommends what information has to be collected and where to do this – in the north or in the south. We should establish mechanism [...] It is not intelligence responsible for what we investigate, it is political decisions. These decisions have to be made and we all have to agree before proceeding further.³⁴

Similar problems exist also in the Ministry of National Defence. The Minister formally sets goals and requirements to the SID but in reality he does not possess qualified personnel able to advise him on these issues. In such circumstances, implementation of the intelligence cycle becomes extremely dependant on the personality of the minister. If he thinks he does not need intelligence information or intelligence information contradicts his political aims, the SID starts working almost in vain.

Policy officials also tend to concentrate their attention on current issues and forget long term developments on which they rarely give collection guidance. Therefore intelligence could not be limited to very strict tasking, some kind of flexibility must be kept. Malakauskas once notices “if I would sit and wait for orders until I received formal tasking, it would already be too late to do something”.³⁵ In his opinion the SSD must become proactive, not consequence management services:

If an intelligence service will just wait for request for information this will not work because you cannot request something until you have some information. Intelligence services must supply decision makers with information that can allow them to make judgements and formulate requests. The world practice shows that if we do not

³³ Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p.57.

³⁴ Seimas discussion on the appointment of Povilas Malakauskas as the Director General of the SSD. May 24, 2007.

³⁵ Lithuanian Television “Be Pykčio [Without Anger]”, October 9, 2007.

do this, we will receive tasking only after the new threat has already materialised and we have to deal with its consequences.³⁶

Such a challenge is common for all intelligence services. The only solution is frequent but not too intimate contacts between intelligence producers and consumers. In Lithuania this would mean more active participation of key decisions makers in setting requirements phase of intelligence cycle and more active role of intelligence agencies in educating their consumers on value and specifics of their production.

3.2. Collection

In theory, collection derives directly from requirements. Once requirements and priorities have been established, the necessary intelligence must be collected. Not every issue requires the same types of collection support. Some requirements will be better met by specific types of collection, but most of them may require the use of several or even all types of collection. As Lowenthal pointed out, the key question is who is doing what and how much can or should be collected to meet each requirement. For example, concerns over a possible threat from cyber attacks likely derive little useful intelligence from imagery but much better intelligence might be derived from signals intelligence, which can reveal capabilities or intentions of possible adversary.³⁷

Collection methods are so important that even professionals often chose to categorise intelligence according to the means by which it was collected. According to Bjorn Muller-Wille this distinction makes perfect sense, since one must utilise different means and methods to collect different kinds of information. The most common categories of intelligence sources or collection disciplines are³⁸:

- Human intelligence (HUMINT), which is derived from human sources, is the oldest form of intelligence collection. It can be obtained through espionage, but the bulk is provided by diplomatic reporting, own field staff, or by the local population.
- Imagery intelligence (IMINT) is information from various kinds of images (from photographic, radar, infra-red and other types of imaging devices) that are taken by e.g. persons, aircraft or satellites.
- Signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts electronic signals of all type. It provides the ability to “listen” to communications (when needed after encryption), as well as to locate the source of the emission.
- Open-source intelligence (OSINT) is published media and other publicly available information, e.g. internet.

³⁶ Seimas discussion on the appointment of Povilas Malakauskas as the Director General of the SSD. May 24, 2007.

³⁷ Lowenthal, *op.cit.*, p.59.

³⁸ Muller-Wille, *op.cit.*

Each collection method can provide unique perspective to one or another issue. One of the major advantages of having multiple means of collection is that one system or discipline can provide tips or clues that can be further collected against by other systems. Intelligence community answer to this call by producing all-source intelligence, or fusion intelligence, that is, intelligence based on as many collection sources as possible³⁹.

In theory the SSD and the SID are allowed to collect intelligence using all available means but in practice due to their small budget and lack of well trained people. They must to a high degree rely on information provided by allies and partners. Small size and limited financial capabilities prevent them from developing independent satellite intelligence or extensive human intelligence networks.

- SIGINT has long traditions in Lithuania – her intelligence started to listen to phone conversation already in 1921.⁴⁰ There is no reliable information on current SIGINT capabilities although Visockas and Kaminskas mention radio intelligence division within the SID.⁴¹
- IMINT relies in domestic capabilities within the SSD and the SID and on information provided by allies. Some IMINT activities because of their closely link to HUMINT operation are kept in high secrecy.
- HUMINT is the most secret area of intelligence activities. It is widely believed that intelligence services of foreign countries, especially Russia, has invested strongly into developing their HUMINT networks in Lithuania. Lithuanian capabilities are not well known although Russia from time to time accuses her citizens for spying for Lithuania. For example, in 2008 Russia accused Vasiliy Chitriuk for selling information about Russian armed forces and location of their units.⁴²
- OSINT is cheapest (although not as cheap as one might imagine) intelligence collection discipline. Lithuania is paying considerable attention to this area and is quite hard investing in preparation of OSINT specialists.

3.3. Processing

Collection alone produces information, not intelligence. Information must undergo processing and exploitation before it can be regarded as intelligence and given to analysts. This step in the intelligence cycle involves translating raw data collected by collection discipline into understandable material or data that could be used by analysts. Processing involves decoding

³⁹ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.70

⁴⁰ Anu auskas, op.cit., p.56.

⁴¹ Visockas, Kaminskas, op.cit.p.109-110.

⁴² “Kaliningrade - tariamos Lietuvos žvalgybos byla [In Kaliningrad – supposed case for Lithuanian intelligence]”, *Vakarų ekspresas*, January 17, 2008.

encrypted signals, interpreting photographs or translating foreign language material. Not surprisingly, processing requires huge workload and not all collected information is processed in a way suitable for further analysis. As a result a lot of collected information is never being used and efforts to collect the data are in vein.

Processing of available information for small countries is a real challenge. Small countries in order to understand and explain acquired information must recruit wide range of specialists from interpreters to photographers. In many cases intelligence services have to rely solely on the expertise of their colleagues from other countries, e.g. interpretation of satellite images.

Translation from foreign languages puts additional strain on limited human resources. Terrorism expert from the SSD R. Valančius once admitted “we have troubles with foreign languages but situation is getting better. SSD’s officials are studying Arabic, Turkish”⁴³. Language specialists are also crucial in international operations for tactical human intelligence functions. Lithuania’s strength is a good knowledge of Eastern European especially Slavic languages. Taking into consideration Russia’s expansion into former Soviet Union space, this may become serious advantage, even specialisation, of Lithuanian intelligence services.

3.4. Analysis

Identifying requirements, conducting collection, and processing it is meaningless unless the intelligence is given to analysts who are experts in their respective fields and can turn the intelligence into reports that respond to the needs of the policy makers. Analysis is an intellectual exercise that translates collected and processed information into a final product – assessment, forecast or evaluation of current or future state of affairs. There are two type of intelligence analysis: current intelligence focuses on issues that are at the current political agenda and require immediate attention. Long term intelligence deals with trends and issues that are important but not receive current attention of policy makers. Constant tension exists between long term and current intelligence. Lowenthal claims that a 50-50 ratio could be the goal⁴⁴.

Intelligence agencies conduct their analysis trying to exploit data provided from human, technical or open sources. Analysts add to this his knowledge, experience and in some cases common sense. Good analyst does not base his analysis merely on technical data – to understand the world of international security the analysts must employ high degree of common wisdom or even personal feeling of particular situation. Intelligence is first of all about human decisions, therefore good analysts always takes into account human factor and cultural aspects of certain scenarios.

⁴³ Valančius R. Terorizmo prevencija [Prevention of Terrorism], seminar on Suicide Terrorism, Lithuanian Military Academy, May 19, 2006.

⁴⁴ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.61.

It must be noted, that methodology of producing long term or current intelligence is in no way different from methodology used by social sciences. Therefore, as Shulski observed, in the absence of a particular piece of secret information, or of a specialized method of analysis, the intelligence analyst's judgment often does not have any special entitlement to be accepted over the judgment of anyone else.⁴⁵ A certain amount of intelligence analysis may be no more sophisticated than current conventional wisdom on a given issue. For example, long term analysis on the future developments in China or Russia prepared by intelligence agencies has almost the same value as the publication of major think tank based in America or Europe unless intelligence analysts have particular type of secret information that substantially changes his forecast. Another example: diplomatic reports on the political situation in the host country can be important inputs to any political analysis. A diplomat who has good access to major political figures in a country or a sophisticated appreciation of the country's history and political makeup should be able to provide insights into the internal political situation that would not be found elsewhere.⁴⁶

Not surprisingly the former US secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld went to great lengths to define the limits of the analysts' opinions. "If you think about it, what comes out of intelligence is not fixed, firm, conclusions. What comes out are a speculation, an analysis, probabilities, possibilities, estimates. Best guesses."⁴⁷ Due to inherited unreliability of intelligence (especially on longer term developments) policy makers are free to reject or to ignore the intelligence they are offered. They may suffer penalties down the road if their policy leads to bad outcomes, but policy makers cannot be forced to take heed of intelligence. After all they are responsible for good or bad decisions, not intelligence community.

Notwithstanding serious shortcomings of long term intelligence, Lithuania is heavily investing into analysts, who are able to understand and draw conclusions from nationally or with the help of allies collected information. Investment into analysis is the investment into people, their motivation and skills. Lithuanian strength in this area could be excellent knowledge history and geostrategic environment of her neighbours, comprehension of their political culture and languages. Small countries frequently have much better understanding of their regional peculiarities comparing to larger but more distant states.

Until now Lithuania is not making the best use of its analytical assets. For example the decision to assume command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team in the Ghowr province of Afghanistan was made without requesting any support from intelligence agencies. Therefore the first stages of preparation for the mission did not fully take into consideration culture, history and traditions of local population and it took years to rectify this problem.

⁴⁵ Shulski, *op.cit.*, p.137.

⁴⁶ Shulski, *op.cit.*, p.39.

⁴⁷ Jack D. "Intelligence Analysts and Policymakers: Benefits and Dangers of Tensions in the Relationship", *Intelligence and National Security*, (6)21, 2006, p.1001.

3.5. Dissemination

Dissemination involves moving intelligence production from producers to consumers. The product line ranges from bulletins on fast braking and important events to studies that may take a year or more to complete⁴⁸. Current intelligence is especially important for diplomats that are engaged in complex negotiations, where knowledge of your opponents' position may switch the balance in negotiations to your favour. In contrast military force planners are more interested in long term forecast that could influence armed forces development plans.

Diverse needs and bureaucratic culture determined different approaches to whom and how much intelligence is distributed. In most case intelligence is distributed to top decision makers – presidents, prime ministers, ministers and their staffs. For example, the US intelligence community distributes the following intelligence products:

- President's Daily Brief is delivered every morning to the President of the US;
- Senior Executive Intelligence Brief is distribution more widely and is prepared by CIA;
- The Military Intelligence Digest is prepared by DIA and concentrates on military issues but to certain extend overlap with Senior Executive Intelligence Brief;
- National Intelligence Estimates represents consolidate opinion of intelligence community on long term developments. It attempts to estimate the likely direction of an issue in the future.

Down the chain of command officials received more focussed and tailored intelligence that meets their specific needs.

All these products must be timely and understandably transmitted to intelligence consumers and it is up to them to decide where and how to use this information. In Lithuania, intelligence agencies are making only the first steps in establishing operational system for dissemination of intelligence production.

Table 2. Intelligence products of the SSD and the SID

	SSD	SID
Long term analysis	No	Annual threat assessment
Midterm analysis	Informational briefing (several times a week) to highest officials.	Evaluated of geostrategic trends (not regularly) to highest defence officials.
Short term analysis	Assessment of current events submitted to highest officials and their staffs.	Assessment of current operations (several time a week) submitted to the Minister of Defence and his staff
		Assessment of moods in the armed forces submitted to Minister

⁴⁸ Lowenthal, op.cit., p.62.

Model of dissemination in Lithuania is not very different from other countries but several unusual characteristics could be observed:

- The SSD does not produce long term analytical documents. This could be explained by the absence of tasking (nobody asked) and by involvement of the SSD into law enforcement affairs. Law enforcement function requires the SSD to collect evidences that could be used in courts and limits its ability to produce long term analysis;
- Absence of joint intelligence estimates. Joint activities could be pursued in many areas, e.g. assessment of Russia's security policies or situation in Lithuanian led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan;
- Existing long and mid-term intelligence is not linked to strategy. For example, Lithuanian national security strategy was prepared without taking due account of threat assessment prepared by intelligence community;
- The President and the Prime minister do not receive daily intelligence brief.

Existing shortcomings reveal that the intelligence community enjoy a vast scope of unused opportunities to satisfy needs of intelligence consumers. The SSD and the SID must create more sophisticated dissemination process and educate users how to use it. Otherwise their job is useless. Former chief of the SSD Laurinkus speaking about the role of the SDC noted:

In the process of state long term planning, capabilities of the SSD to collect analyse and plan remain underused. [...] I cannot understand why in the most important meetings on the strategy and long term plans of the country, officials of the SSD are not invited? I tried to change this attitude but unfortunately governments were changing very frequently.⁴⁹

This remark by Laurinkus reveals other problematic issues – intelligence services should be proactive and present information that could go against current policies. Seclusion of intelligence services from “the process of state long term planning” allows politicians avoid hearing unpleasant and uncomfortable information. On the other hand, intelligence agencies cannot go too far and start influencing political decisions or even implementing them. This would go beyond their tasks and responsibilities and would violate democratic values of the country. Lithuania must find a delicate balance based in mutual understanding between politicians and intelligence community on each other needs and methods of work.⁵⁰

3.6. Consumption

Intelligence products after being delivered are interpreted by policy makers. Policy makers are not blank slates or automatons who are impelled

⁴⁹ Bačiulis A. “Lietuva dar neišmoko naudotis savo žvalgyba [Lithuania so far has not learned how to make best us of intelligence]”, *Veidas*, 34, 2002 08 22.

⁵⁰ Bagdonas, “Slaptųjų žvalgybos tarnybų vaidmuo ir kontrolė demokratinėje valstybėje, op.cit., p.12.

to action by intelligence. How they consume intelligence - whether in the form of written or oral briefings - and the degree to which the intelligence is used are important issues. Hulnick noticed that policy makers only have 10 or 15 minutes a day to absorb intelligence products. Consumer surveys consistently show that this is about all the time policy officials have for such things – current intelligence is rated as the most useful product from the Intelligence Community⁵¹.

Intelligence community must also not overburden policy makers with highly classified and groundbreaking intelligence. Although the intelligence community picks up warnings and threats all the time, it must not over exaggerate their importance. Many of those that turn out to be true are vague⁵². For example before 09/11 in spite of official awareness of the threat, the Washington Post reported that by “late July, according to one national security official, Tenet had delivered so many warnings with so much urgency that some administration colleagues grew tired of hearing them.”⁵³ In such circumstance it came as no surprise that warning on terrorist plot on 09/11 was missed.

Lithuanian politicians until now have not shown satisfactory interest in routine activities of intelligence services. Laurinkus in 2002 confessed:

[..] with the President our relations are very close – once per week I myself or another authorised person present information. The President’s staff also makes considerable number of request for information. But with the Government our relations are somewhat fragmented. With every new Prime minister we start our relationship from scratch. When they ask me questions I understand that these people with few exceptions for the first time hear about intelligence.⁵⁴

Other consumers of intelligence – staffs and planners have more time to consume intelligence. It is this people that have to tie intelligence with policy and long term plans. Their ability to use intelligence is a matter of skills and competence. Intelligence community in its part must invest in training these people to understand its product and to be able to use it.

3.7. Feedback

Communication between intelligence officers and decision makers greatly enhance efficiency of intelligence cycle. Feedback does not occur nearly as often as the intelligence community might desire, but a dialogue between intelligence consumers and producers should take place after the intelligence has been received. Policy makers should give the intelligence community some sense of how well their intelligence requirements are being met and discuss any adjustments that need to be made to any parts of the process. Ideally, this

⁵¹ Hulnick, op.cit., p.965..

⁵² Parker C., Stern E. “Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure? Revisiting September 11 and the Origins of Strategic Surprise”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 1, 2005, p.309.

⁵³ Parker, Stern, op.cit. p.311.

⁵⁴ Bačiulis, op.cit.

should happen while the issue or topic is still relevant, so that improvements and adjustments can be made. Failing that, even an ex-post facto review can be tremendously helpful.

Difficulty in giving feedback is common problem for small countries like Lithuania. There are several underlying reasons for this. First of all, intelligence consumers have difficulties in recruiting personnel that is able to advice their masters on intelligence matters. Secondly, the quality of feedback largely depends on the accuracy of requirements. In their absence, feedback could at best reflect personnel judgement but not more.

Conclusion and Recommendations

After reestablishment of independence, Lithuania intelligence agencies evolved into functioning state security institutions. From 1994 institutional framework remained stable, but functions and public attention to intelligence matters were growing substantially. Lithuanian intelligence services established good contacts with their counterparts from NATO and the EU countries, recruited young and skilful staff and created procedures for handling of classifies information. Despite many successes and relative stability, intelligence cycle in Lithuania is still not working properly. Deficiencies exist almost in all areas – from setting requirements to receiving feedback. Not clear chain of command, duplication of effort, separation of intelligence from strategy remains inseparable features of Lithuanian intelligence system.

This article clearly showed that there are many areas where capabilities of Lithuanian intelligence services could be strengthen. Several most important strands of work could be distinguished:

- Continue investment into people. People are the backbone of intelligence agencies; their quality can diminish impact of small budgets. Education of intelligence consumers and general public should not be forgotten;
- Revise implementation of intelligence cycle. Intelligence cycle is not ideal model but it allows logically assign duties and responsibilities. Requirement setting, dissemination and feedback remain weakest steps in Lithuania;
- Revise functions and subordination. Double subordination of the SSD has to be abolished. The SSD has to stop acting as the law enforcement agency and concentrate on intelligence;
- Allocate sufficient resources. Small financing seriously weakens ability of intelligence services to attract best people and hampers their ability to invest into modernisation of their equipment.