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NATO Transformation Scenarios

The method of scenario building is used in this article to identify and examine the eventual directions of NATO transformation. This article analyzes the main driving forces of the Alliance, as well as the parameters which define the transformation of NATO. On the basis of the theoretical scenario building model, which is designed in this article, four alternative scenarios of NATO are constructed: (a) NATO as a global mechanism for crisis management; (b) NATO as a fortress of collective defence; (c) NATO as a paralyzed political forum; (d) NATO as a multifunctional security structure. The article also aims at answering the question, under which scenario the transformation of the Alliance is currently proceeding. Finally, the practical applicability of the scenario building method in the field of Lithuanian foreign policy is evaluated.

Introduction

For the past several years NATO has increasingly been focusing on external activities: intensive enlargement, development of various partnership programs, large-scale operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo, counter-terrorism and counter-piracy activities, development of multifunctional rapid response force capabilities, etc. The Alliance is becoming increasingly dissimilar to the regional organization of collective defence.

In the light of the ongoing transformation of the Alliance, many important questions about the nature, purpose and effectiveness of NATO become more and more relevant. It is not clear, where the limits of the NATO enlargement and partnerships are, what should be the balance between commitments for collective defence and out-of-area activities, what should be the role of the Alliance in the field of non-traditional and asymmetric security challenges generated by population growth, climate change, organized crime, humanitarian crisis, etc.

It could be asserted that the spectrum of NATO's functions and responsibilities is "diffusing". The Alliance is trying to combine different functional models: guarantees of an effective collective defence, tasks of a global political forum and commitments to neutralize threats beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. In other words, the Alliance faces many problems, which can be summarized as the absence of a vision for its further development. As NATO is stuck in

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such a "strategic crossroads", the questions regarding the future of the Alliance become crucially important: (i) which functional model will be chosen while adapting the Alliance to the rapidly changing security environment; (ii) what are the overall directions of further transformation of NATO; (iii) which factors can determine one or another model of the Alliance's development.

The complexity of the Alliance as a multifunctional subject of international relations is also revealed by the wide range of academic research. Various theoretical models (for example, the concepts of *security communities*, *collective security*, *alliances*, *cooperative security*, etc.) differently explain the logic of the Alliance and its interaction with other actors. NATO is characterized by features of modern (deterrence strategy, nuclear arsenal) as well as postmodern (focus on common values, engagement in crisis response/reconstruction operations) international security systems.

From the Lithuanian point of view, the discussion about the future of NATO is very important as further transformation of the Alliance will directly affect Lithuanian national security. The ongoing process of developing a new NATO Strategic Concept is an exceptional opportunity for Lithuanian foreign policy makers to engage actively in the discussion about the future of the Alliance.

The main objective of this article is to identify the main possible directions (scenarios) of NATO development as well as to answer the question, under which scenario the transformation of the Alliance is currently proceeding.

The methodology of forecasting[1] (particularly, the method of scenario building) is used in this article to examine eventual projections of NATO's development. Scenarios are understood as descriptions of alternative projections of the development of the object under consideration. Scenario building is seen as an analytical instrument, which allows methodologically consistent exploration of how the development of the research object (in this article – NATO) can change depending on different configurations of its main driving forces. Scenarios thus expand on an understanding of the key drivers and their potential interaction.

The Alliance is seen in this article as an international security structure, i.e. a complex subject of international relations, the main function of which is to ensure the security of the NATO. On the basis of the history of NATO transformation (Alliance's adaptation to the changing international security environment after the Cold War), it is assumed that NATO is a responsive structure, i.e. certain characteristics of international environment (specific configuration of threats and security challenges) determine respective set of NATO security measures.

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[1] Many synonyms of the term "forecasting" can be found in the academic literature: *foresighting, futurology, futurism, prospectivism, future studies, futuristics, futurology, prognostics* ir pan. See: Bell W., *Foundations of Future Studies: History, Purposes, and Knowledge*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003, p. 58-70.

1. Scenario Building in International Relations Research

1.1. Main characteristics of forecasting

Forecasting research is widely used for the analysis of various political, economic, social, environmental processes, tendencies of technological evolution, cultural paradigm shifts, etc.[2] It is evident that different research objects require different analytical instruments, i.e. different forecasting methods.

The selection of a particular forecasting method depends on the nature of the object, research purpose and available data. One of the most outstanding experts in the field of forecasting J. Scott Armstrong conducted a comprehensive analysis of the forecasting methodology and identified two basic categories – quantitative and judgmental methods.[3]

If precise quantitative data is available (usually possible in economics, demographic research, etc.), various quantitative forecasting techniques can be employed – simulation modelling, statistical analysis, econometric models, forecasting by extrapolation, etc. In the ideal case of quantitative forecast, the findings of the research are the same independently of the researcher (quantitative data can be manipulated in consistent and reproducible ways).[4]

If quantitative data is not available (or the research object cannot be quantitatively operationalised), Delphi surveys, scenario building, expert judgment, cross impact analysis and other qualitative techniques are usually applied. Qualitative methods are often criticized for being subjective and therefore lacking consistency, validity and reliability.[5] On the other hand, qualitative approach can be very beneficial as it allows using of researchers' intuition and experience – it is especially important in the analysis of various social processes.

In case of international relations research, such complex concepts as "interests", "power" and "security" usually are at the centre of the analysis. As it is complicated to quantify and measure such concepts, forecasting the development of international politics is usually based on qualitative methods

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[2] Groff L., Smoker P., *Introduction to Future Studies*, http://www.csudh.edu/global_option/IntroFS.html, 2009 11 10.

[3] Other terms referring to the distinction between quantitative and judgmental methods are also used in the academic literature: (i) subjective and objective methods – see Armstrong J. S., *Long Range Forecasting*, New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1985. (ii) *data-based* and *judgement-based* methods – see Gupta D. K., "An Early Warning about Political Forecasting: Oracle to Academics" in Schmeidl, S., Adelman H., eds., *Early Warning and Early Response*, Columbia International Affairs Online: Columbia University Press, 1998;

[4] Miles I., Keenan M., "Handbook of Knowledge Society Foresight", PREST, 2003, p. 81-93.

[5] Washburn A. M., Jones T. E., "Anchoring Futures in Preferences" in. Choucri N., Robinson T. W., eds., *Forecasting in International Relations: Theory, Methods, Problems, Prospects*, San Francisco: W.H.Freeman and Company, 1978, p. 96.

of analysis.[6] In particular, the method of scenario building is widely used in forecasting international relations and international security.

1.2. Scenario building: practical and academic perspectives

Practical (policy formation) and academic approaches apply scenario building differently in the field of international relations.

From the practical point of view, two main manners of scenario usability can be identified:

1. Scenario building often plays an important role in the *cycle of strategic planning*.[7] Forecasting allows one to react more flexibly to the changes of the strategic environment. Scenario building in this case serves as a link between a particular policy program and a decision to implement it. Scenarios expand the mental map of eventual future alternatives and thus facilitate the process of adjusting policy strategies and adapting them to the most likely scenario. For example, forecasting of the eventual changes in the strategic environment is very important in the process of planning and implementing national defence policy.

2. Scenarios can be used as *practical guidelines for the implementation of foreign policy*. The state, while forecasting eventual changes of its strategic environment, can not only "detect" "objective" driving forces, but also identify *its own* role in the scenarios. In other words, forecasting not only helps one to foresee the eventual development of the international environment, but also shapes it. Actors possessing considerable structural power in international relations (e.g. United States) have the ability to affect the transformation of international system, i.e. they can anticipate an active role for themselves in the future scenarios and thus facilitate the realization of their foreign policy agenda.[8]

From the academic point of view, scenarios have value added as an instrument of policy analysis. Scenario building is a methodological tool allowing one to explore those aspects of the research object, which might be underestimated while using "traditional" methodology. There are many potentially important and currently "unthinkable" factors, which eventually might become crucial for the development of a certain actor – scenario building in this respect is very important as it enables a complex exploration of the environment of the research object. In other words, from the academic perspective, the main objective of the scenario building is not accurate forecast of the future, but, rather, methodologically consistent exploration of the research object. Scenario building is a tool to detect key drivers and to identify the impact of their

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[6] Janeliūnas T., Kasčiūnas L., "Prognozavimo metodų taikymas politikos moksluose", *Politologija*, 2007/3 (47), p. 14.
[7] Ratcliffe J., "Scenario Building: a Suitable Method for Strategic Real Estate Planning", *Property Management*, 18(2), 2000, p. 3-7.
[8] Janeliūnas T., Kasčiūnas L., "Prognozavimo metodų taikymas politikos moksluose", *Politologija*, 2007/3 (47), p. 25.

various configurations (interactions) to the research object. Scenarios give an opportunity to "crystallize" social reality by designing and exploring several alternative development projections of the research object.

Scenario building has a particular value as it can integrate various forecasting techniques: expert knowledge, Delphi surveys, statistical analysis, etc. Accordingly, it increases the flexibility and applicability of the scenarios in various fields[9], including international relations research, which is often based on the combination of quantitative methods and analytical insights. Moreover, many forecasting methods generate only one future "version" of the research object (the field of analysis is thus limited) while scenario building provides several future projections and thus is a good basis for comprehensive research.[10]

Two main types of scenarios can be found in theoretical scenario-building literature:

1. Extrapolation (descriptive model)[11] – in this model the main driving forces of the research object are identified by exploring present situation. It is then analyzed what scenarios of the research object can be generated by different configurations of the key drivers. The core element of this model is the question "what, if..?", i.e. different combinations of the independent variables and their impact to the research object is at the centre of analysis.

2. Goal-seeking (normative model) – on the basis of this model, firstly, one or several significant future states (wanted or unwanted) of the research object are selected; secondly, the pathways (specific configurations of the independent variables) leading to these states, are identified and analyzed. The core element of this model is the question, what circumstances or sequences of events would lead to the (un)desirable future state.

1.3. Theoretical model of scenario building

The success and results of scenario building very much depend on the methodological choices. It is specifically relevant in the field of international relations research, which is characterized by high complexity and multiple combinations of the variables. There is no universal model of the scenario building. Therefore, the choice of particular methodology each time depends on the purpose of the research.

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[9] Bood R.P., Postma T.J., "Scenario Analysis as a Strategic Management Tool", University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics, 1998, p. 8.

[10] Beck P. W., "Corporate Planning for an Uncertain Future", *Long Range Planning*, 15(4), 1982, p. 18.

[11] Two main types of scenarios (descriptive and normative) in this article are identified on the basis on the ideas of H. Kahn – one of the most distinguished figures in the field of forecasting. See: Kahn H., "Choosing a Perspective on the Future", Hudson Institute, http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=1161, 2009 10 10.

In accordance with the most important theoretical and practical research[12] within the field of scenario building, 4 general stages of scenario building can be identified (see Figure 1). These stages ensure the methodological consistency of the forecast.

I RESEARCH BASIS	II RESEARCH VARIABLES	III SCENARIO BUILDING	IV CONCLUSIONS
1. Purpose	1. Type of data	1. Configurations of driving forces	1. Comparison and evaluation of the scenarios
2. Research object	2. Methods of collecting data	2. Selection of scenarios	2. Analysis of practical implications
3. Methodological background	3. Driving forces (independent variables)	3. Invariable factors	3. Analysis of theoretical implication
4. Scope of research	4. Parameters of analysis (dependent variables)	4. Description, analysis and evaluation of dependent variables.	
5. Type of scenario			

Figure 1. **Main stages of scenario building (prepared by the author)**

The application of scenario technique in the field of international relations research is a methodologically complicated task. Three main methodological questions are the most challenging: (1) which factors are the most important for the research object, i.e. what factors should be regarded as independent variables; (2) what should be the logic of selecting particular combinations (interaction) of the variables; (3) how to measure the impact of the independent variables on the research object.

1. The method of *environmental scanning* is appropriate for the identification of the key variables (social, political, economic, technological, ecological factors and their various combinations). Depending on the character of the research, (i) independent variables might be quantified by assigning a certain value to each variable; (ii) different meaning of the independent variables might be described by taking *status quo* as the starting point and then evaluating the increase/decrease of their intensity/scope/amount.

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[12] Van Notten P., et al., "An Updated Scenario Typology", *Futures,* 35, 2003; Ratcliffe J., "Scenario Building: a Suitable Method for Strategic Real State Planning" *Property Management*, 18(2), 2000; Schwartz P., *The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in an Uncertain World*, Doubleday Currency, New York, 1991; Postma T., Liebl F., "How to Improve Scenario Analysis as a Strategic Management Tool?", *Technological Forecasting & Social Change*, 72, 2005; Becker H., "Scenarios: A Tool of Growing Importance to Policy Analysts in Government and Industry", *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, 23, 1983; Van der Heijden K., *Scenarios Strategies and Strategy Process*, Breukelen: Nijenrode University Press, 1997; Chermack T. J., "A Theoretical Model of Scenario Planning", *Human Resource Development Review*, 3(4), 2004; Keough S. M., Shanahan J., "Scenario Planning: Toward a More Complete Model for Practice", *Advances in Developing Human Resources* 2008, 10(2), 2008.

2. The model of identifying certain configurations of the independent variables is usually determined by the nature and quantifiability of the variables. In accordance with the objective of scenario building and the type of available data, various methodological instruments can be selected – matrix, "decision tree" model, random interaction, extreme cases, etc. Variables can be selected and combined on the basis of different principles – plausibility, differentiation, consistency, decision-making utility, etc.[13] The more variables that are included in the research, the more possible configurations become available. In order to select the most valuable combinations, the principle of rejecting insignificantly different scenarios can be applied: (i) many different combinations of the independent variables are identified; (ii) their impact to the dependent variables is analyzed and measured ("drafts" of the scenarios are prepared); (iii) scenarios are classified (divided into groups); (iv) insignificantly different scenarios are rejected and thus one scenario is selected/crystallized from each group.

3. In order to assess the impact of the independent variables it is essential to identify the dependent variables (parameters of analysis), which define crucial characteristics of the research object. The content of each scenario is revealed namely by the description of dependent variables and their certain combinations. Before focusing on the content of scenarios, the *status quo* of each dependent variable has to be described. Scenario building reveals eventual changes of this situation subject to different configurations of independent variables.

Based on these principles, theoretical scenario building model is constructed (Figure 2). This model is the background for further analysis in this article.


1. Operationalizing independent and dependent variables	
Description of the *status quo* of the independent variables (IV) and their eventual values (marked by: ...*)	Description of the *status quo* of the dependent variables (DV) (marked by: ...*)

IV	Increase (+2)	Increase (+1)	Status quo (0)	Decrease (-1)	Decrease (-2)
IV no. 1	...*	(*)	...*	...*	...*
IV no. 2	(*)	...*	...*	...*	...*
...	...*	...*	...*	(*)	...*
IV no. n	...*	(*)	...*	...*	...*

DV	Increase (+2)	Increase (+1)	Status quo (0)	Decrease (-1)	Decrease (-2)
DV no. 1			...*	X	
DV no. 2		X	...*		
...			...*		X
DV no. n		X	...*		

2. Identification of the specific configurations of the independent variables (an example is marked by circles)	3. Description and assessment of the values of dependent variables, which are determined by the chosen configuration of the IV (marked by : X)

Figure 2. **Theoretical model of scenario building[14] (prepared by the author)**

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[13] Ratcliffe J., "Scenario Building: a Suitable Method for Strategic Real State Planning" *Property Management*, 18(2), 2000, p. 10.
[14] The methodology used in a study "Future World Scenarios" (conducted by the Allied Command Transformation) can be regarded as a starting point of the research principles reflected in this theoretical model. See: Allied Command Transformation, "Future World Scenarios: Supporting Paper to the Long Term Requirements Study". http://www.act.nato.int/multiplefutures/ACTFutureWorldScenariosApr06.pdf, 2009 11 02.

2. Directions of NATO transformation

2.1. The driving forces of the Alliance

The analysis of NATO's strategic environment and internal dynamic reveals two key factors, which are the most important for the transformation of the Alliance: (1) the characteristics of international security environment (the main challenges for the security of the Alliance can be divided into 2 groups: "modern" and "postmodern"); (2) the internal dynamics within NATO (relations between member states and their interest in the efficiency of the Alliance.

Accordingly, three groups of independent variables can be identified. Each group contains three variables, which define certain parameters of the external environment and internal dynamics of the Alliance:

1. "Modern" security challenges: (a) aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy; (b) threats posed by alternative centres of power (states and political-military blocks); (c) threats posed by unpredictable and aggressive ("rogue") states.

2. "Postmodern" security challenges: (a) asymmetric threats; (b) threats posed by transnational organized crime and socio-economic problems; (c) threats posed by the lack of critical resources and negative impact of the climate change.

3. Internal NATO asymmetry (a) US disinterest in the efficiency of NATO; (b) disagreements between NATO members; (c) evolution of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP/CSDP)[15] as the counterbalance to NATO.

In accordance with the theoretical model, each variable can obtain five different values: zero (0) value defines the *status quo* of the variable and is described in the table 1. Possible changes of the *status quo* are defined by the increase (+1 or +2) or decrease (–1 or –2) of intensity of the variable.

Importantly, the research of NATO transformation scenarios in this article encompasses long a term period, i.e. it is assumed that all forms of independent variables might become evident within the period of 10-15 years.

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[15] In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force on 1 December 2009, the ESDP was 'upgraded' from a 'European' to a 'Common' Security and Defence Policy. The abbreviation "CSDP" is therefore used in this article.

Table 1. **Independent variables (driving forces of the Alliance)**[16]

	Main independent variables (status quo)
Aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy	- The Alliance is regarded as a hostile actor. - Military force is used against NATO partners. - Hostile political rhetoric is used with regard to NATO. - Disagreement with various forms of NATO policy (enlargement, missile defence, etc.) - Energy and economic pressure; aspirations to influence internal political process in certain NATO countries and partners. - International commitments are not fulfilled. - Support for the states, which are hostile to the Alliance. - Sustainment of large scales of nuclear arsenal; intensive development of conventional military capabilities. - Frequent demonstration of "military muscle": large scale military exercises, strategic bomber flights, etc.

[16] Independant variables were identified on the basis of two groups of sources: 1. Analytical forecasting studies, which focus on the analysis of international security tendencies and eventual development of various international threats (security challenges): Allied Command Transformation, "Future Security Environment", Norfolk, 2007, http://www.act.nato.int/multiplefutures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf; National Intelligence Council, "Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project", Pittsburgh: Government Printing Office, 2004, http://www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf; Hettne B., Odén B., eds., "Global Governance in the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives on World Order", Stockholm: Almkvist & Wiksell International, 2002, http://www.egdi.gov.se/pdf/study/study2002_2.pdf; American Council for the United Nations University, "Global Energy Scenarios. Technology Pushes off the Limits to Growth", CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 2006, http://www.acunu.org/millennium/energy-technology.html#this. 2. Studies, which examine characteristics, development and activities of NATO, as well as various political-military security challenges and their possible implications to the Alliance: Hamilton D., Barry C., "Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century", Atlantic Council of The United States, 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/65/NATO-AllianceReborn.pdf; Larrabee F., Lindley-French J., "Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for Action", Venusberg Group and Rand Corporation, 2009, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2009/RAND_RP1382.pdf; Cebrowski A., Lanxade J., "NATO Transformation: Problems and Prospects", Atlantic Council of The United States, 2004, http://www.acus.org/docs/0404-NATO_Transformation_Problems_Prospects.pdf; Naumann K. et al., "Towards a Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership", Noaber Foundation, 2007, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080110_grand_strategy.pdf; Korteweg R., Podkolinski R., "New Horizons: Finding a path away from NATO's de-solidarisation", The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2009, http://www.natonewhorizons.org/NewHorizons-DigitalEdition.pdf; Allied Command Transformation, Multiple Futures Project Final Report, 2009, http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_finalrep.pdf.

Threats posed by alternative centers of power	- Alternative political-military structures (Collective Security Treaty Organization – CSTO, Shanghai Cooperation Organization – SCO) do not pose direct military threat to the Alliance. - Alternative structures are militarily weaker and not integrated politically. - Regional powers (Russia, China, etc.) use various means to expand their "zones of influence", it is often incompatible with NATO interests. - Alternative centers (China, India, etc.) seek for more regional and global power by strengthening their conventional and nuclear military capabilities.
Threats posed by "rogue" states	- Unstable nuclear countries (North Korea, Pakistan, eventually – Iran) do not pose direct military threats to NATO, however, they intensively invest into capabilities needed for successive nuclear attack. - Unpredictable countries (for example, Iran) seek for regional leadership, implement aggressive regional policy, use harsh political rhetoric with respect to NATO, rapidly modernize their military.
Asymmetric threats	- Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are regarded as the main threats to the security of the Alliance - Terror attacks against NATO members are conditionally rare. - Various non-governmental actors attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction. - Hostile actors do not have technological and financial capabilities to use weapons of mass destruction; the process of proliferation is restricted by active endeavours of the international community; - Increasing threats of cyber attacks from various actors, proliferation of ballistic missiles and other asymmetric challenges play an important role in NATO agenda.
Threats posed by organized crime and socio-economic problems	- Failed or failing states are considered as a substantially important challenge for the security of the Alliance. - Increasing intensity of piracy violates economic and energy interests of NATO member states. - Organized crime is not considered as significant challenge for Alliance's security (it is not considered as NATO's field of responsibility). - Rapid population growth and intensive urbanization frequently leads to regional ethnic-religious conflicts; however, it does not have direct consequences for the security of the Alliance.

Lack of resources and negative impact of climate change	- The effects of climate change lead to increasing tension in the Arctic region. There is a discussion within the Alliance about eventual forms of NATO engagement in the Arctic. - The competition between states over energy resources is increasing. - Certain non-NATO countries use energy resources as a means for political pressure of other states. - Climate change implications for NATO security are not clear; increasing shortages of energy resources are considered as important security challenge for the Alliance.
US disinterest in the efficiency of NATO	- One of the most important principles of US foreign policy – close cooperation and sharing responsibility with partners. - US needs the Alliance as a structure, which allows to restore the trust of partners and international prestige. - US considers NATO as a security structure, which ensures the strength of transatlantic cooperation and guarantees the principle of indivisible security. - Without the support of NATO partners, the US would be unable to succeed in Afghanistan operation, which is the priority of US foreign policy. - US often emphasizes commitment to the principles of collective defence and indivisible security.
Disagreements between NATO members	- Members of the Alliance have different opinions with regard to various items in NATO agenda: enlargement policy, strategy of missile defence, conventional threats to the Alliance, relations with Russia, etc. - Tension within the Alliance is increasing due to disproportionate burden-sharing in international operations. - The decision making process within the Alliance is impeded by the conflict between Turkey and Greece.
Evolution of CSDP as the counterbalance to NATO	- Economic and political integration of the European Union (EU) is successful; however, the EU remains an actor of divided sovereignty in the field of defence policy. - CSDP attempts to be more autonomous from the Alliance; however, the EU remains incapable to conduct high-scale crisis response operations. - The majority of the EU states lack of critical military capabilities (for example, strategic lift). - Partial structural overlap between NATO and CSDP: countries often assign the same capabilities to both organizations. - CSDP is constantly strengthening operational planning capabilities. - The cooperation is based on Berlin+ arrangements (these arrangements grant the EU access to NATO planning resources for EU-led operations).

2.2. NATO security measures

NATO security measures are dependent variables, which can obtain different values and are the basis of the content of each scenario. Comprehensive analysis of various NATO activities reveals five main NATO security measures: (1) the development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities; (2) the development of "asymmetric" capabilities; (3) the development of civilian capabilities; (4) policy of partnerships and enlargement; and (5) intensity and spectrum of operations.

Table 2. **Dependent variables – NATO security measures[17]**

Development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities	- Conventional military capabilities play an important role in the security strategy of the Alliance. The main purpose of NATO is to ensure credible collective defence; deterrence strategy plays a crucial role in NATO security posture. - Effective deterrence is ensured not only by extensive conventional military power, integrated military structure, effective operational planning system, integrated air defence system, but also by large nuclear arsenal (including US nuclear presence in Europe). - Such instruments as NATO security investment program are used to develop infrastructure within NATO (air and seaports, communications, etc.). - NATO currently does not consider territorial defence as a priority; for the past several years, operation in Afghanistan is a top priority. - NATO officially declares commitment to limit the proliferation of WMD; however, it has no ability to influence the process of non-proliferation considerably.
Development of "asymmetric" capabilities	- Development of mobile and multifunctional (i.e. able to conduct various tasks of reconstruction, stabilization, evacuation, etc.) forces is one of the main priorities of the Alliance: NATO seeks to be ready to react rapidly to various asymmetric security challenges. - Considerable attention is devoted to strengthening antiterrorist capabilities (Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism; Defence against Terrorism Program; etc.). - Cyber defence capabilities are developed; special attention is paid to the security of critical information systems and coordination of actions. - Possible role of the Alliance in the field of climate change is discussed (specifically, with respect to eventual NATO's engagement in the Arctic region) - Eventual forms of NATO's involvement in energy security issues are discussed within the Alliance (information and intelligence fusion and sharing; advancing international and regional cooperation; supporting the protection of critical infrastructure; etc).

[17] The *status quo* of NATO security measures is described in accordance with: (1) key NATO documents (1949 North Atlantic Treaty; 1999 NATO Strategic Concept; 2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance; 2009 Declaration on Alliance Security, etc.); (2) declarations and statements of NATO Heads of State and Government, as well as Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence; speeches by NATO Secretary General; (3) committee reports by NATO Parliamentary Assembly; official NATO publications.

Development of civilian capabilities	- One of the main operational priorities of the Alliance (specifically in Afghanistan) – the ability to coordinate actions with other international and non-governmental organizations. NATO is developing a comprehensive approach (integrating various civilian and military measures, as well as focusing on close cooperation with other actors), which becomes one of the most important elements of NATO strategy in the operations. - The Alliance itself does not possess civilian capabilities, which are needed for reconstruction operations. NATO basically focuses on ensuring security (as well as training local forces), while reconstruction is more a function of other actors (United Nations, World Bank, non-governmental organizations, etc.). - NATO basically does not possess capabilities designed to influence socio-economic development of politically and economically weak states (law enforcement missions; economic and humanitarian aid; social and educational programs; energy, economic, infrastructure projects; prevention of disease; etc.)
Policy of partnerships and enlargement	- The Alliance has developed a wide network of various partnerships: Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, NATO-Russia Council; NATO-Ukraine Commission, NATO-Georgia Commission, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The development of cooperation and dialogue policy is considered by the Alliance as one of the most important measures in order to expand security/stability zone, based on common values, mutual trust and transparency. Partnerships are seen as an instrument to prevent new sources of instability. - On the other hand, NATO has not developed extensive political cooperation with such actors as China or India, substantial cooperation with such actors as African Union or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The relations with the UN are often disturbed by many political and procedural problems. Certain NATO partnership programs (for example, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative) are more declaratory and lack substance. - NATO-EU relations are often based on competition rather than cooperation (many procedural problems). - For the past several years NATO has pursued intensive enlargement policy – seven states became members of the Alliance in 2004; two (Albania and Croatia) – in 2009.
Intensity and spectrum of operations	- NATO for the past several years has been engaged in large scale operation in Afghanistan (ISAF) and Kosovo (KFOR). NATO is also conducting counter-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa, NATO Training Mission in Iraq, antiterrorist naval operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, the Alliance continues to support the African Union in its peacekeeping missions.

2.3. NATO transformation scenarios

Each scenario will be presented and assessed as follows: firstly, the characteristics of NATO's strategic environment and Alliance itself (independent variables) will be shortly presented and generalized. Secondly, the tables with the configurations and values of independent and dependent variables will be provided. Finally, the content of the scenario will be unfolded by elaborating the characteristics of each dependent variable.

2.3.1. Scenario A: NATO as a global mechanism for crisis management

This scenario is characterized by a strong intensity of the "postmodern" security challenges (+6), effective internal interaction within the Alliance (-4; US and European states in this scenario are interested in efficiency of the Alliance) and basically insignificant set of "modern" challenges (-2). Such a configuration determines high intensity of dependent variables (four out of five NATO security measures have the value of +2, i.e. the highest intensity within the analytical framework of this article). In other words, high intensity of "postmodern" security challenges determines the need of wide spectrum of security measures, which is "enabled" by the absence of internal problems. In accordance, NATO focuses on development of rapid response force, as well as stabilization and reconstruction capabilities.

Table 3. **The configuration of independent variables in scenario A**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
„Modern" security challenges				A	
				A	
			A		
„Postmodern" security challenges	A				
	A				
	A				
Internal NATO asymmetry				A	
					A
				A	

Table 4. **The values of dependent variables in scenario A**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
Conventional capabilities				A	
„Asymmetric" capabilities	A				
Civilian capabilities	A				
Partnerships and enlargement	A				
Intensity of operations	A				

1. The importance and development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. "Modern" security challenges in this scenario are not relevant for the security of the Alliance; therefore, conventional military capabilities lose their importance. Russia is considering NATO as an important partner and does not seek to expand its influence in neighbour countries. Military actions are not used to solve interstate problems. Alternative centres of power (large countries and political-military structures) commit to reduce nuclear arsenal, the importance of "zones of influence" in international relations is decreasing. "Rogue" states do not pose direct threat to the Alliance; however, they intensively develop weapons of mass destruction, demonstrate hostility to NATO countries and reject various disarmament and confidence building mechanisms.

In light of such a security environment, the Alliance, though retains nuclear arsenal (needed for effective deterrence), does not invest considerably into static infrastructure (required for collective defence) and heavy weaponry. On the other hand, much attention is devoted to the development of the missile defence system, which can assure partial defence from intercontinental ballistic missiles. Also, maritime capabilities play an important role in NATO defence posture – the Alliance is increasing its role in the field of ensuring safe transfer of energy resources (securing sea-lanes) and defending NATO interests in the areas of new territories, which become available for the navigations due to the climate change (for example, the Arctic).

Article 5 commitments formally remain; however, they are not strengthened. The expeditionary character of the Alliance and non-existence of conventional security challenges lead to the "diffusion" of the Article 5, which is seen only in the light of asymmetric security challenges.

2. The meaning and development of "asymmetric" capabilities. Various asymmetric challenges pose the most acute threat for the Alliance in this scenario: terror attacks against NATO countries, well organized network of transnational terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of WMD, attacks against NATO computer systems, etc.

In accordance, the Alliance focuses on the development of multifunctional rapid response force. NATO countries fill all the gaps of capabilities, which are needed for effective expeditionary operations. Sophisticated defensive and offensive cyber capabilities are developed, NATO also devotes a lot of attention to the prevention of biological and chemical terrorism, as well as preparation to neutralize the consequences in case of such attacks. The Alliance develops a doctrine of preventive military actions and strengthens its role in the field of securing critical objects of energy and other infrastructure.

3. The importance and development of civilian capabilities. Rapid growth of population and intensive urbanization leads to regional ethnic-religious conflicts, which have complex socioeconomic consequences. Frequent disarray of energy supply, as well as a lack of critical resources raises many political problems for the countries, which import resources from unstable regions.

In response to these challenges, NATO is rapidly developing civilian capabilities. The Alliance acquires various political, economic and diplomatic instruments, which enable NATO to influence countries, which are negatively affected by the lack of resources and demographic problems. NATO creates an integrated crisis management system, which contains various instruments of stabilization and reconstruction (specific programs of law enforcement, good governance and education; economic and humanitarian aid, etc.). Their implementation is closely coordinated with other international organizations. The Alliance thus can effect socioeconomic development of unstable regimes and thus prevent their eventual transformation into failed states.

4. The policy of partnerships and enlargement. A wide spectrum of security challenges leads to a wide network of NATO partnerships. Close cooperation with partners (Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, Japan, etc.) is maintained, the limits between NATO members and strategic partners are vanishing; partner countries are involve in the decision making process and financially contribute to NATO operations and programs. There are basically no limits for NATO enlargement to the post-soviet space and the Balkan region. Much attention is devoted to the geo-strategically important countries (from the perspective of supply or provision) – the Alliance seeks to ensure the stability of these countries, various forms of cooperation and assistance are used for this purpose.

The prevention of nuclear proliferation becomes one of the key elements of NATO's external policy. Various countries and organizations are involved into global strategy of stopping the spread of WMD, various commitments to non-proliferation become essential part of NATO partnership programs. Many actors of international politics are involved in counter-terrorism activities and fight against organized crime, as well as climate change and "rogue" states. NATO coordinates its policy with regional powers (China, India, Russia, Brazil, Pakistan, etc.).

5. The intensity and spectrum of operations. NATO has a global agenda in this scenario; operations are conducted in various regions. The Alliance not only devotes much attention to the counter-terrorism operations, but is also engaged in the missions of stabilization, reconstruction, peace keeping, conflict prevention, humanitarian aid, etc.

2.3.2. Scenario B: NATO as a fortress of collective defence

"Modern" threats dominate in this scenario (+5, aggressive foreign policy of Russia, increasing importance of power politics in international relations), "postmodern" challenges are not intense (-3), there are basically no problems in terms of internal interaction in the Alliance. Such a configuration determines intensive strengthening of NATO's collective defence. Conventional military capabilities and nuclear deterrence measures play essential role (+2), whereas the intensity of all the other dependent variables is low – the Alliance's functi-

ons are basically limited to collective defence. The US retains its interest in the security of Europe. NATO as a structure of collective security remains crucially important for European countries.

Table 5. **The configuration of independent variables in scenario B**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
„Modern" security challenges	B				
	B				
		B			
„Postmodern" security challenges				B	
				B	
				B	
Internal NATO asymmetry			B		
				B	
				B	

Table 6. **The values of dependent variables in scenario B**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
Conventional capabilities	B				
„Asymmetric" capabilities				B	
Civilian capabilities					B
Partnerships and enlargement					B
Intensity of operations					B

1. The meaning and development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Conventional military threats are essential for the security of the Alliance in this scenario. Due to regular Russian military provocations and the use of military power against NATO partners, there is a potential military conflict between Russia and NATO. Russia does not follow international agreements in the field of arms control and nuclear disarmament. Other actors (China, India) intensively develop political-military blocs, which strengthen their influence in the "zones of influence"; the principles of territorial integrity are often violated. The military potential of the alternative structures is rapidly growing. The situation in international politics is also complicated by aggressive states (Syria, Iran, North Korea), which possess WMD and have technical abilities to use them against NATO.

Such a geostrategic environment leads to a situation, where the security of the Alliance is largely dependent on the effectiveness of deterrence and the capabilities of collective defence. NATO strengthens its nuclear arsenal (high readiness is maintained permanently), the programs of medium and short range ballistic missiles are pursued, considerable investments are made in heavy armament, integrated air defence system, strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, etc.

Much attention is devoted to the development of the missile defence system and host nation support capabilities. Large scale Article 5 exercises are regularly conducted; NATO creates various mechanisms of increasing its visibility in member states and improving demonstration of force capabilities.

The general defence plan of the Alliance becomes the basis of NATO collective defence; the Alliance conducts permanent military planning, which elaborates in detail eventual response of NATO in case of external aggression.

2. The meaning and development of "asymmetric" capabilities. Asymmetric security challenges are not relevant to the Alliance in this scenario. The threat posed by terrorism is rather low, various terrorist organizations are not well organized, do not have technical ability to make considerable damage (usually are unable to overcome NATO security systems), act chaotically and do not possess WMD. Demographic processes do not have direct implications for the security of the Alliance. NATO, though retaining rapid response capability, does not consider the development of "asymmetric" capabilities as a priority. On the other hand, cyber defence capabilities are developed rapidly due to frequent cyber attacks.

3. The meaning and development of civilian capabilities. Projection of security (capabilities of stabilization, reconstruction, etc.) is not an important element of NATO functional model in this scenario. The Alliance does not develop "soft" capabilities, which could ensure the ability to influence socio-economic transformation of various countries.

4. The policy of partnerships and enlargement. Some NATO countries are objecting wide functional and geographic spectrum of NATO activities. In the light of increasing importance of power politics and conventional military threats, NATO is not developing its network of partnerships. Closer cooperation is maintained with the most important strategic partners only (Australia, Japan, and South Korea), while relations with other countries and partners lack substance (no coordination of political decisions or common military projects). NATO enlargement is very much limited by the aggressive Russian foreign policy in its "zone of influence".

5. The intensity and spectrum of operations. NATO concentrates its attention to the efficiency of collective defence and deterrence; therefore, large-scale expeditionary operations beyond Euro-Atlantic area are not conducted. NATO is capable to perform small-scale counter-terrorism operation in various regions; however, it is not ready to engage in long-lasting missions, especially if civilian capabilities are needed.

2.3.3. Scenario C: NATO as a paralyzed political forum

Various "postmodern" threats are the most relevant in this scenario (+4); therefore, there is a need to develop asymmetric and civilian capabilities. However, high asymmetry within NATO (+3; CSDP is developed as a counterbalance to NATO; transatlantic link is weak; US foreign policy becomes unilateral) paralyzes the ability to develop necessary capabilities. Conventional military power is

not strengthened (-2) due to minimal intensity of "modern" challenges (-5). In this scenario, NATO is inefficient despite US interest in the efficiency of the Alliance. NATO is functioning more or less properly only as a political forum.

Table 7. **The configuration of independent variables in scenario C**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
„Modern" security challenges				C	
				C	
					C
„Postmodern" security challenges		C			
	C				
		C			
Internal NATO asymmetry			C		
		C			
	C				

Table 8. **The values of dependent variables in scenario C**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
Conventional capabilities					C
„Asymmetric" capabilities					C
Civilian capabilities					C
Partnerships and enlargement				C	
Intensity of operations					C

1. The meaning and development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Conventional capabilities are not developed due to radical change in Russian attitude towards NATO. Russia not only considers the Alliance as an important partner, but also initiates various forms of cooperation. The atmosphere of trust in international relations is also strengthened by cooperative behaviour of other centres of power.

The atmosphere of cooperation determines a "freeze" of NATO collective defence. Though the validity of Article 5 formally remains, it is not supported by sufficient military capabilities, operational planning, integrated air defence and political commitments. In the light of intensive nuclear disarmament, NATO's nuclear capability looses it relevance. As a result of the pressure by European countries, the US withdraws its nuclear arsenal from Europe. NATO military structures are transformed into low readiness weakly integrated system of commands, which are rarely used. The Alliance does not modernize its heavy armament; no common acquisition projects are pursued; no investments in host nation support capabilities are made. NATO becomes a political forum, which

(usually not represented in the highest political levels) is used for discussions about global security problems. It has however no sufficient practical measures to influence the situation.

2. The meaning and development of "asymmetric" capabilities. In terms of asymmetric security challenges, the geostrategic environment is extremely complicated in this scenario. Security situation is complicated by a wide network of terrorist structures, ill-controlled proliferation of WMD, frequent cyber attacks. Many problems are posed by the failed states.

Despite these challenges, internal problems within the Alliance lead to a paralysis of the development of asymmetric capabilities. NATO's rapid response force, designed for various asymmetric functions, exists only formally. Practically, it lacks critical capabilities, which are necessary for operational efficiency. Instead of developing NATO abilities, European states distribute their resources and capabilities via more efficient CSDP structures.

3. The meaning and development of civilian capabilities. In this scenario, only CSDP possess civilian capabilities, NATO does not have any means of civilian effect. In accordance with complicated decision making mechanism and absence of activities beyond Euro-Atlantic area, NATO's cooperation with other international actors and organizations is rather passive. NATO's reaction to the problems generated by the lack of resources and climate change is limited to political declarations.

4. The policy of partnerships and enlargement. Partnerships are the only conditionally effective policy of the Alliance. Various forms of NATO partnerships are transformed into political forums, which are used for discussions about international security challenges. The number of practical cooperation forms is decreasing – the Alliance does not practically contribute to the modernization of partners' defence sector, almost no events of common exercises and training are organized, etc. The enlargement of NATO is stuck as countries cannot find a consensus about eventual directions of enlargement.

5. The intensity and spectrum of operations. Disagreements within NATO and the military weakness of the Alliance (poorly integrated military structure and lack of necessary resources) lead to an inability to engage in the operations outside NATO borders.

2.3.4. Scenario D: NATO as a multifunctional security structure

In terms of the characteristics of the security environment, this scenario is a mix of scenarios A and B, i.e. not only "modern" (+3), but also "postmodern" (+4) security challenges are relevant to the Alliance. Hence, it is the only scenario, in which the development of conventional, as well as civilian and asymmetric capabilities is needed. Internal structural dynamics of the Alliance is very favourable (-5). The characteristics of geostrategic environments determine a need not only to develop intensively conventional military capabilities (the probability of war with Russia is high), but also to focus on strengthening the

expeditionary arsenal (the threat posed by terrorism is eminent). In accordance, NATO faces a complex problem of operational and financial overstretch.

Table 9. **The configuration of independent variables in scenario D**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
„Modern" security challenges	D				
				D		
			D			
„Postmodern" security challenges			D			
			D			
	D					
Internal NATO asymmetry.					D
				D	
					D

Table 10. **The values of dependent variables in scenario D**

	+2	+1	0	-1	-2
Conventional capabilities	D				
„Asymmetric" capabilities		D			
Civilian capabilities		D			
Partnerships and enlargement		D			
Intensity of operations				D	

1. The meaning and development of conventional and nuclear military capabilities. Aggressive Russian foreign policy directly affects security of the Alliance. NATO also faces a threat of WMD attacks from aggressive and unpredictable countries (Syria, Iran, etc.). The danger of military conflict with Russia determines the strengthening of NATO's collective defence posture – high readiness of nuclear weapons is maintained, missile defence system is intensively developed, the principles of territorial integrity are reflected in the planning and exercising of the Alliance, as well as in its military structure and integration. In order to be able to neutralize eventual attacks by the "rogue" states, NATO devotes much attention to the development of preventive capabilities.

2. The meaning and development of "asymmetric" capabilities. The characteristics of the strategic environment determine the need to have effective mechanisms, which would enable the Alliance to address various asymmetric challenges effectively. NATO devotes much attention to the development of multifunctional rapid response force and various counter terrorism measures. Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities play an important role in NATO agenda; the Alliance is preparing to neutralize consequences in case WMD attack.

Protection of energy transportation routes and critical infrastructure is an important element of NATO strategy in this scenario. Due to the intensity

of climate change, newly available energy resources increasingly become the cause of conflict and competition between the states. Therefore, the Alliance develops specific military capabilities, allowing them to engage in the process of regulating these conflicts. The biggest suppliers of energy resources are using them for aggressive foreign policy. A fluent supply of the resources is therefore a very relevant topic in NATO agenda.

3. The meaning and development of civilian capabilities. The Demographic situation and climate change have complex socioeconomic consequences, which have direct implications for the security of the Alliance. In this scenario, European countries become a driving force of the development of civilian dimension (CSDP is weak, civilian resources are therefore distributed via NATO structures).

4. The policy of partnerships and enlargement. The policy of partnerships is an important element of NATO strategy in this scenario. On the other hand, the spectrum and efficiency of partnerships, as well as the enlargement policy is very much limited by conflict with Russia. NATO is maintaining close relations with its strategic partners, as their support is very important for the Alliance in the field of counterterrorism, proliferation of WMD, organized crime, etc. NATO and the EU are closely coordinating on the decision making process and create interoperable defence planning systems.

5. The intensity and spectrum of operations. The Alliance is capable of conducting small-scale operations of stabilization, evacuation, etc. At the same time, considerable attention to the collective defence capabilities leads to a situation, when NATO is not able to engage in large scale long-lasting reconstruction operations, which require a lot of resources. The Alliance is ready to use preventive military action against aggressive states and non-state actors, possessing weapons of mass destruction.

Conclusions and a View from Lithuania

By summarizing the scenarios, it could be claimed that *the need* for certain NATO security measures is determined by the international security challenges, while internal factors (the strength of the transatlantic link, internal disagreements within NATO, the evolution of the CSDP as a counterbalance to NATO) define *the potential* to implement certain security measures and ensure their efficiency.

The scenarios, which were constructed in this article, give an opportunity by using identified independent variables and the results of their interaction, to answer the question under which scenario the transformation of Alliance is currently proceeding.

In the short term (1-3 years), the intensity of the "modern" security challenges is likely to increase in the light of: (a) increasing Russian military activity, political and economic penetration into neighbour states, based on the doctrine of "exclusive zone of influence"; support for the countries, which are hostile to the Alliance; (b) increasing role of alternative centres of power

(growing importance and political integrity of such structures as the CSTO); increasing geopolitical ambitions of China, India and Brazil in the international politics (collision with the interests of the Alliance is expected); (c) increasing threat to the Alliance, posed by unpredictable aggressive countries (Iran, North Korea, Syria, and eventually – Pakistan).

The intensity of "postmodern" challenges is also likely to increase because of the following reasons: (a) in the light of current geostrategic situation (instability in the Afghanistan and Pakistan), the importance of asymmetric threats (terrorism and the proliferation of WMD) will certainly increase; (b) the expansion of transnational organized crime (trafficking of humans and drugs), as well as piracy is likely to rise; rapid growth of population, migrations and urbanization will probably also have security implications for the Alliance; (c) the process of climate change will certainly have consequences for NATO, firstly, in the Arctic region; complex problems generated by the lack of critical resources will impact NATO countries directly.

With respect to the internal dynamics within the Alliance, it could be forecasted that: (a) in accordance with the politics of current US administration, the US interest in the efficiency of the Alliance will not decline; (b) new tangible disagreements between NATO members are not likely. On the other hand, (c) the autonomy of the CSDP (firstly, in terms of developing independent operational planning capabilities) is likely to increase gradually – it may have negative implications for the security of the Alliance.

These tendencies for the short period in many respects correspond to the configuration of the independent variables in the scenario D. If such tendencies remain the same, in the long term perspective (10-15 years), further transformation of the Alliance will proceed namely on the basis of scenario D (NATO as a multifunctional security structure).

It is important to notice that some of the features of current NATO activities, as well as some elements of the Alliance's short term strategy do not correspond to the pattern of development, which is forecasted in scenario D. For example, current strong commitment to continuing the operations in Afghanistan indicates increasing operational tempo of the Alliance, meanwhile, the scenario D projects opposite tendencies. It must therefore be stressed that the added value of the scenario building is namely the opportunity to identify those tendencies, which would remain unconsidered if the analysis was limited to examination of the *Alliance itself*.

Yet more opportunities for a comprehensive analysis would become available if the independent variables were used as indicators for the monitoring of NATO driving forces during a certain period. Such an observation would allow for identifying even more accurately the direction of NATO's transformation and formulating respective practical recommendations.

The debate regarding the future of the Alliance is especially relevant to the countries which, due to their specific geostrategic situation, consider NATO membership as a fundamentally important element of their security policy. Lithuania certainly is one of such countries.

On the one hand, Lithuanian foreign policy makers can be rightfully worried about the suggestions to transform the Alliance into the universal crisis management structure and reject all the "relics of the Cold War", including the principle of collective defence.

On the other hand, the official statements and declarations by Lithuanian politicians give the impression that Lithuanian strategic thinking is based on the principles of a "surrounded fortress": emphasis is frequently put on the need of direct US military presence in the Baltic region, importance for the development of NATO infrastructure in the territory of Lithuania, as well as necessity for NATO exercises on the basis of Article 5 scenario, etc.[18] The question of how the implementation of such measures would practically contribute to the security of Lithuania is usually not raised at all.

Of course, such a position is not without ground – the increasing aggressiveness in Russian foreign policy during the last several years does not strengthen the sense of security in neighbouring countries; the increased intensity of fierceness in Russian politics was also anticipated by the short term forecast in this article. However, it seems that the main slogans of Lithuanian security policy are not adapted to a changing posture of international security. Unconditional strengthening of a US military presence is not necessarily a *conditio sine qua non* for successful security policy of Lithuania. On the contrary, under certain circumstances it might be even counterproductive and indicate deterioration of the security situation.

Forecasting methods can be seen as a useful tool to stimulate innovative political (as well as academic) thinking. Scenario building can be used as a methodological device for the systematic reflection of NATO strategic environment. In turn, it would give an opportunity to evaluate the transformation of the Alliance and allow regular renewal of Lithuanian strategy for NATO.

October-November, 2009

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[18] Symptomatic examples – Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, *Nutarimas dėl Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybės programos*, 2008 12 09, Nr. XI-52, Vilnius; Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, the Statement Adopted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs with Regard to New NATO Strategic Concept, http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=6430&p_d=91187&p_k=1, 2009 10 09