

*Virgilijus Pugačiauskas**

The General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania

The Military Doctrine of Russia and Practical Realities

This article surveys a strategic document regulating the military policy of Russia – the military doctrine of 2010 and its practical realization. The main characteristics of the doctrine are analyzed; the doctrine is compared with previous doctrines. Attempts are made to explain how the doctrine's provisions regarding the threat of NATO to the national security of Russia are related to practical actions of security and foreign policy under realization; at the same time, the article raises the problem of the instrumentality of this document in Russia's diplomatic policy, the goal of which is to considerably increase its influence on processes taking place in the international system. The author discusses how the main directions of the new military policy – a radical transformation of the military and its initial results – are constructed in the doctrine. The article emphasizes that the optimization and modernization of the armed forces that is going on enhances the military power of Russia, yet the political regime is not oriented towards democratic changes. Both in military policy and in other national security matters, the power of decision-making in essence largely depends on the unilateral decision of the president. This, without any doubt, gives a serious basis for talking about increased threats to the national security of Lithuania.

Introduction

On February 5, 2010, an important document defining the military policy came into force in Russia – a new military doctrine considered one of the essential strategic planning documents declaring the fundamental statements about defense (including preparation). More specifically, the document presents a viewpoint on the defense of the state by military means that also points out the main internal and external “dangers” and “threats” to the national security

* *Dr. Virgilijus Pugačiauskas* is an associated professor of the Department of Political Science of the Military Academy of Lithuania, Address for correspondence: Šilo 5a, LT- 10322 Vilnius, Lithuania, tel. +370 5 2103569, e-mail: pugaciauskas@istorija.lt

of the state¹. This doctrine completed a series of important documents defining Russia's foreign security and military policy for the coming decade: "The Conception of Foreign Policy" approved in 2008 and "The National Security Strategy Until 2020" in 2009.

The aim of the article is to discuss essential provisions of the doctrine by focusing most of the attention on Russia's position towards NATO as a primary threat and on the armed forces' modernization provisions and their practical realization.

This concrete and extensive instruction for the armed forces indicates military threats and military dangers, defines goals and tasks of the military policy, details priorities and directions of the development of the military as well as presents provisions on military-economic provision. The doctrine complements and extends the national security strategy by military provisions, but its separate articles are also associated with the conception of Russia's foreign policy. The compilers of this doctrine singled out the two most important problems of this document – the assessment of a NATO-posed threat and Russia's plans on the employment of nuclear weapons. Thus, the doctrine should be considered not only an exceptional military-nature document of the state, but also a strategy which reflects the outline of Russia's internal and particularly foreign policy. Moreover, the doctrine actually performs a certain instrumental role in the diplomacy of modern Russia. Its content has been influenced by two factors: a strengthened internal potential of the state and a foreign policy directed to realize one of the main goals – to strengthen the status of the state in the world².

The military doctrine of 2010 can be called defensive with certain exceptions. Most of the content of the document is taken up by provisions testifying that military power is necessary to ensure the security of the state, its allies, and citizens. However, as we will see later, defensive categories are not completely dominant. In several places the defensive position is changed into an attack for the sake of defense. We can doubtless consider the doctrine a continuation

¹ Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 23. Factual characteristics of the doctrine: the preparation of the new „Military Doctrine of Russia“ began from the summer of 2005, when President of the Russian Federation V. Putin set the task in the Security Council to prepare a new document about the military policy that became a priority objective of Russia's Security Council's working groups. It is common knowledge that the mastermind and implementer of the military reform was Chief of Russia's General Staff J. Balujevsky, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council since 2008, a mentor of the military doctrine development. In 2007–2008, Russian press was flooded by reports about the soon-to-be-made-public doctrine; however, the official declaration of the Security Council of Russia about the creation of the doctrine was announced only in 2009 and it came into force on 5 February 2010 when President of Russia D. Medvedev approved it by his signature.

² The political scientist Dmitry Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Centre has aptly named three primary ambitions of modern Russia: first, to strengthen its influence on former states of the Soviet Union by creating a certain bloc in which Russia's interests would take a privileged position; second, to guarantee equality with the leading power centers (EU, USA, China); third, Russia believes that it has the right to participate in discussing the most significant world problems, Дмитрий Тренин, Модернизация внешней политики России, <http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2010/03/25/trenin.html#>, 12 December 2010.

of the analogous document of the year 2000 because it only elaborates more concretely, deeply and clearly how the security of the state will be realized in the coming decade.

It should be mentioned that the doctrine sports quite a few statements formulated in a vague diplomatic parlance, providing for unlimited interpretation possibilities. One of the essential differences can be discerned in the final part of the doctrine. The doctrine of 2000 ends with the commitment of the state "to guarantee a consistent and firm execution of the military doctrine", whereas the new one states that "the provisions of the military doctrine can be specified in compliance with the changing character of military dangers and threats, tasks set for ensuring military security and defense and also development conditions of the Russian Federation". Thus, this sentence of the doctrine grants the Kremlin, i.e. the president, broad possibilities not only to flexibly interpret the approved provisions, but also to effectively and unilaterally change them.

1. Security Challenges for Russia: NATO – "Danger" No.1

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, i.e. a military defensive alliance, has been rated first on the list of main military dangers³. According to the authors of the doctrine, the external danger to Russia's security lies in the following actions executed by NATO: first, by assuming global functions implemented in violating the norms of the international law; and second, by expanding the military infrastructure of members of the organization on the borders of Russia, including the admittance of new members⁴. Thus, Russian politicians, by taking advantage of the doctrine, at least publicly declare their loyalty to the traditional attitude to the world when the primary enemy was the USA and its allies in Europe, to be more precise, provisions that were formed during the time of the Cold War. All the more so in the doctrine of 2000, NATO and the USA are not named (not emphasized categorically), at least directly as the

³ J. Balujevsky, Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, named two major reasons that forced Russia to place NATO at the top of the list of dangers: rapid modernization of the strategic offensive weaponry in the 21st century and "material and ideological support of Georgia". Заместитель секретаря Совета безопасности Российской Федерации Юрий Балуевский, „Индекс Безопасности“, <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/sirus4-10/Interview-Baluevsky.pdf>, 2010 11 20.

⁴ Among the 11 possible most important dangers to the security of the state, it is possible to name several additional that are directly related to NATO and the USA. For example, the third danger on the list is defined as "the deployment of military contingents at the initiative of a foreign country (a group of countries) on the territories bordering on the Russian Federation and its states allies as well as in the adjacent waters". The fourth danger is "the establishment and deployment of the strategic missile defense systems that undermine global stability and violate the established balance of forces in the nuclear field, as well as the militarization of the outer space and deployment of strategic non-nuclear systems, precision weapons". Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.

danger of the most important potential military threat, though the first enlargement of the alliance gained practical application in 1997 after the admittance of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary⁵. This at first seemingly “old-fashioned” attitude should be considered a pragmatic ambition of Kremlin politicians to enhance Russian positions in the would-be consultations and negotiations with NATO, seeking to influence the shaping of the European security policy. Here is how Kremlin politicians word the goal of military security: “by employing various means to deter another state or a group of states to weaken the role and importance of Russia as a subject of international relations”⁶. Yet the Euro-Atlantic direction remains one of the most important in Russia’s security and foreign policy; therefore, it is possible to state that we are witnesses to a new and complex diplomatic game of states.

Let us see how the relations between Russia and NATO fared during the period of the formation of the doctrine and after its adoption. This will help accurately answer the question of what strategic goals Russian politicians sought instructing the designers of the doctrine to assign this “obsolete” wording an exceptional role. For nearly the last two decades, the enlargement of NATO has been going on in spite of the negative attitude of Russia. The only obvious result of Russian diplomacy is the NATO–Russia Council, performing consultative and practical cooperation functions concerning the most demanding security issues. It has been in settling concrete problems (terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting drug trafficking, crises management) that the positions most often differed. Since the very beginning of the second NATO enlargement “wave” in 2004, Russia’s hostile attitude toward this organization has been strengthening while its leaders more and more often and persistently kept declaring in their public speeches the right to defend their interests in the neighboring states⁷.

Such an attitude of mutual distrust, in spite of the dialogue in progress, was strengthened in Russia by two factors: first, the stabilization of Russia’s internal situation during Putin’s first term in office and the consistent strengthening during the second (mostly due to the export of energy resources) produced

⁵ To be truthful, in the doctrine of 1993, “the expansion of military blocs and unions” is named in the list among the major military dangers. The “main threat” in the doctrine of 2000 is the increase of military forces at the borders of the Russian Federation. Consequently, in both cases NATO is also kept in mind. *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 2000*. <http://www.iss.niit.ru/doktrins/doktr02.htm>, 2010 09 11. Traditionally, anti-Western declarations on the part of the authorities are rather intended for internal use. The more so based on the newest (03 02 2011) sociological poll on Russia’s enemies by Jurij Levada centre, the USA (40 per cent, for comparison in 2009 – 51 per cent) and NATO (32 per cent, 2009 – 34 per cent) rank second and third, after the internal enemy No.1 – the fighters of Chechnya. *Есть ли у России враги?*, <http://www.levada.ru/press/2011020302.html>, 2011 02 14.

⁶ А. И. Коповянский, В. И. Лутовинов. *Военная безопасность Российской Федерации и ее обеспечение в современных условиях*, Москва, 2009, с. 21.

⁷ I. Oldberg, *Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev*, Stockholm, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2010, Nr.1, p. 16–17; T. Janeliūnas, NATO ir Rusijos strateginės partnerystės viražai, in *Beieškant NATO Lietuvoje: pasiekimai, nesekmės, perspektyvos*, Vilnius: Vilniaus universiteto leidykla, 2010, p. 78.

conditions for attempting to regain the lost firmer positions in international politics; and second, a real threat in the closest perspective to encounter the third wave of the enlargement emerged. To put it more precisely, the Council failed to become an effective tool, providing Russian diplomacy with possibilities to exert weighty influence on the enlargement plans of NATO.

True, the cooperation of Russia and NATO was marked by attempts to achieve qualitative results; however, they did not yield practical outcomes⁸. The first attempt to build a long-term partnership failed completely because of different “weight categories” and interests of the negotiators and inability to reach compromise solutions. The ambition of Georgia and Ukraine to become members of the Alliance was one of the most significant reasons for the deterioration of the relations, while Russia’s military response to the developments in Georgia became one of the most obvious practical examples of the clash of its interests with the Alliance⁹.

Consequently, the dynamics of such political realities coincided with the final stage of the preparation of the doctrine. It is possible to state that from this moment on, Russia declared its principle position – it would not permit anyone or anything to ignore its interests and would employ all means possible, including military ones as well, to reach its goal. Thus, the strengthened potential of the great regional power enabled Russian politicians to finally formulate and begin to realize the principle strategic goal – to participate in the security policy of Europe as an equal partner. Russia’s ambition to be one of the main parts of the multi-polar world by employing “multi-vector diplomacy” and its negative attitude to the dominant role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic direction were recorded in the “National Security Strategy Until 2020”¹⁰ adopted in 2009. Thus, the Kremlin’s diplomacy has undertaken a unilateral initiative – dialogue and cooperation with the Alliance on the continuity of the enlargement at the new political discourse level.

The first diplomatic initiative occurred during the last autumn month of 2009 when President of Russia D. Medvedev proposed a project of the “European Security Treaty”. By the way, at the same time, the Security Council supported the project of the military doctrine. The President’s proposal can be considered a cardinal rearrangement of the existing security system since all European countries were invited to sign the Treaty, the participants of which cooperate on the basis of the principles of “indivisible and equal security” taking into consideration, under obligation, security interests of each Treaty participant. Article 10 unveils the proposition to all states in the Euro-Atlantic and Euro-Asian space, ranging from Vancouver to Vladivostok, as well as to

⁸ For example, the NATO–Russia Council (before 2008) developed a conception on international peace-making operations, yet this document was not publicized.

⁹ K. Paulauskas, NATO šiandien: pasiklydę transformacijoje?, *Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga 2009–2010*, Vilnius, 2010, p. 41.

¹⁰ According to the compilers of the document, Russia’s national security is concerned about the policy, pursued by NATO in two principle directions: first, the expansion of the Alliance’s military infrastructure at the borders of Russia; second, the attempt to assign NATO a global role.

the most important international organizations, including NATO and CIS, to sign this Treaty¹¹.

At the same time, the Kremlin decided to make the diplomatic assault still more intensive by employing new actions aimed at increasing the pressure on the West. The military doctrine pronouncing NATO the primary danger for Russia was approved on the eve of the Munich Conference on Security Policy. The new NATO security strategy, NATO missions, and actualities of regional security were discussed in the doctrine. At the conference the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov, resorting to a rather sharp rhetoric, criticized the policy executed by the West: the inability to guarantee security in the region, NATO's expansion to the East, and the instigation of a new Cold War. Even an ultimatum-level position was expressed implying that in case the West further continued the current policy, the tension would keep increasing¹².

Consequently, in 2010, by demonstrating internal strength, Russia kept further accelerating the diplomatic process, or to be more specific, propagated this president's initiative at different top-level meetings including negotiations with heads of individual states, as for example, with the Chancellor of Germany, A. Merkel. Russia did not get a principled answer from the leaders of the West because comments were limited to short phrases, making it clear that in the near future there were no intentions of changing the status of the institutions responsible for security¹³. In the first half of 2010, Russian diplomacy, having pooled all means possible, tried to force the West to react to its unilaterally proposed radical changes, but did not achieve any tangible results.

The answer of the West to Russia's diplomatic initiatives and military doctrine can be considered NATO's new "Strategic Concept for the Security and Defense", declared on 19 November 2010, in which the main direction of the cooperation policy with Russia remained unchanged. Just as previously, the strategic importance of cooperation with Russia is emphasized, that "NATO poses no threat to Russia" is declared, and the cooperation mechanism – consultations, practical cooperation and NATO–Russia Council – is unchanged. The most painful issue for Russia – NATO enlargement plans¹⁴ in the neighboring states, belonging to the zone of its interests – is also being solved without major changes. The network of NATO's partnership programs in the East is

¹¹ Article 1 of the project reads: "all actions in the security area which will be executed by the signed countries, individually or together with others, and also within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions shall be carried out only taking into consideration the interests of all participating parties. Article 4 suggests that emerging problems should be solved by participants through consultations, a conference and an extraordinary conference. Проект Договора о Европейской безопасности, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/6152>, 2010 12 15.

¹² Transcript of Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 46th Munich Security Conference, February 6, 2010, <http://www.securityconference.de/Lavrov-Sergey.573.0.html?&L=1>, 2010 11 17.

¹³ T. Janeliūnas (footnote 7).

¹⁴ Расширение НАТО отодвинуто ударом "железного кулака", <http://www.rg.ru/2011/01/20/karaganov-site.html>, 2011 02 20.

being continued within the institutional framework of NATO–Ukraine and NATO–Georgia Councils¹⁵.

Thus, we see a rather complicated and paradoxical situation when both countries, claiming to call themselves strategic partners manifest diametrically different, rather hostile positions in their official strategic documents. Besides, judging by President D. Medvedev's annual report to the Federal Meeting presented after the declaration of NATO strategy, the Euro-Atlantic direction in Russia's security policy remains only one of the important ones, i.e. it is not granted the highest strategic priority level. In their documents, in a diplomatic way, decisions adopted in Lisbon are discussed, allusions are made as to "modern partnership based on security indivisibility, mutual trust, transparency and predictability", while Euro-Atlantic security perspective with Russian initiatives is treated with "cautious optimism"¹⁶. Today it is obvious that the newly-born cooperation between NATO and Russia in the first decade of the 21st century was not strategic, stable, or bearing results and did not become a new stimulus in the direction of strategic partnership.

It is safe to state that the statements about NATO's danger No.1 to Russia's security recorded in the military doctrine are an instrumental means in the big diplomatic game in seeking to ensure favorable positions (freedom of maneuver) in complicated negotiations. For example, in the "Foreign Policy Doctrine" approved in 2008 with regard to relations with NATO, provisions are laid to first of all "make use of the political dialogue and practical cooperation to the utmost" in solving common threats and only afterwards, the Alliance's actions, analogous to those mentioned in the military doctrine¹⁷ and not meeting Russia's requirements are listed. After a lapse of two years, in his annual report, President D. Medvedev still emphasized the significance of the West: Russia needs the USA for "intensive economic cooperation".

The European Union is treated in a similar way for the sake of the "Partnership for Modernization"¹⁸. Thus, the cooperation with the West for modern Russia is important in the military sphere for strengthening the security of the

¹⁵ Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, 19 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68580.htm, 2010 11 21.

¹⁶ Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию, 30 ноября 2010 года, 13:00 Москва, Кремль <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9637>, 2010 12 01.

¹⁷ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/osndd>, 2010 12 02.

¹⁸ Послание Президента Федеральному Собранию, 30 ноября 2010 года, 13:00 Москва, Кремль <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/9637>, 2010 12 01. In the opinion of the political scientist D. Trenin, the leaders of Russia realize the significance of the West to the state's technological modernization, the success of which depends on the investments of rich countries. Moscow is improving relations with the West by building "modernistic alliances" with Germany, France, Italy, "recharging relations with the USA"; a perspective surfaces for the partnership with NATO, particularly regarding Afghanistan and in the area of air defense. The expert maintains that for Russian foreign policy to become modern and stable it is necessary, first of all, to "irreversibly demilitarize Russia's relations with the USA and NATO". Дмитрий Тренин, Какую роль могла бы играть Россия в новом десятилетии, <http://carnegie.ru/publications/?lang=ru&fa=42205>. 2010 12 12.

country and particularly vitally necessary in the economic and technological areas.

Another important element of the doctrine in terms of both international and regional security is related to nuclear weapons employment strategy. The nuclear deterrence strategy holds a central place in the documents of Russian security policy doctrine. The first doctrine (1993) stipulates that a nuclear weapon can be used in case of a global war only. In the second doctrine, Russia reserved the right to employ nuclear weapons in two cases: in the first case, as retaliation after nuclear or any other kind of mass destruction weapon has been employed against it or its allies; in the second, at the start of the aggression while using conventional weapons in “critical to Russia’s national security situations”¹⁹. In the third doctrine, an essentially identical position is provided, just having changed the wording of the last five words to “the threat to the very existence of the state”. Thus, the employment of this most effective type of weapon is narrowed still further, and this, beyond a doubt, should be treated as a positive step, testifying that the employment of nuclear weapons established in the new doctrine is possible for an exceptionally defensive purpose only. Finally, it should be mentioned that a considerable reduction of the nuclear weapon arsenal in compliance with the New START Treaty has no negative influence on the national security of Russia.

It might be possible to believe this axiom; however, practice is far more complicated and less clear. First of all, it is doubtful that military doctrine provisions related to nuclear weapons are of a general nature, therefore they can be easily interpreted. Here, the decisive right to make a decision (Part III, article 22 of the doctrine) is granted exclusively to the President of the Russian Federation whose decision will be essentially based on the subjective perception of the threat. Secondly, as is well-known after the Russian President signed the doctrine, “The Foundations of State Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence until 2020” were also approved. However, one can only speculate about the content of the document that was not publicized. On the other hand, the doctrine does not touch upon the strategy of the redeployment of nuclear weapons, though it can be extremely relevant as can be seen from a very complicated context for negotiations between Russia and NATO on anti-aircraft defense²⁰. This shows that nuclear weapons can serve the Kremlin not only as a “backup” strategy, but also as an instrument of pressure in its diplomacy with the West.

¹⁹ Keir Giles, *The Military doctrine of the Russian federation 2010*, Research Review, NATO Defense College, Rome–February 2010, p. 6; Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации 2000, <http://www.iss.niit.ru/doktrins/doktr02.htm>, 2011 11 12.

²⁰ After NATO Secretary General announced the plans to create the European anti-aircraft defense of two independent (European and Russian) yet compatible defense systems, the President of Russia reacted radically and threatened to deploy nuclear missiles near the border with Western countries if the project was not renounced. General determined to turn Lisbon agenda into action, 24 Jan. 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-6DACF545-9EB449FD/natolive/news_69920.html, 2011 02 12; Россия берет ударные обязательства. В системе ЕвроПРО вскрылись непредвиденные разногласия, *Коммерсантъ*, пг. 11(4552) or <http://kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1573245>, 2011 01 23; Встреча с Постоянным представителем России при Организации Североатлантического договора (НАТО) Дмитрием Рогозиным 24 января 2011 года, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/10135>, 2011 01 25.

2. Military Policy of Russia: The Complex Reform of the Armed Forces

In the third and broadest part of the doctrine, the key goals of the military policy are defined and a detailed perspective of the development of the armed forces is presented: the goals of the military forces in peacetime and during aggression, major objectives of the development of the armed forces, the aims of military planning, and priorities are set. First of all, we will give a panoramic view of the essential moments of the military policy: prevention of potential conflicts and characteristics of the employment of military forces.

Prevention of military conflicts envisages the employment of numerous initiatives of different nature within the framework of cooperation from both unilateral and multilateral and international organizations, including the European Union and NATO. Attention should be drawn to the fact that the authors of the doctrine put clear emphasis (in the doctrine of 2000, it is entered as a priority) on the importance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and on “enhancing its potential”. In this way, Russia is continuing to play a diplomatic game while demonstrating that it has an alternative to NATO – its own, Russian, variant of this organization. The CSTO, even considering the weakness of this organization, offers an additional opportunity for Russia to assert its dominance in this principle zone of interest and, at the same time, substantiates and extends the employment of the Russian army outside the state’s borders under the CSTO mandate. While pondering over the perspectives of the Russian foreign policy, political scientists of the Kremlin agree, diplomatically claiming that Russia must seek collective security and become involved in “one or another military-political alliance”²¹.

When compared with the previous doctrine, emphasis is placed not only on the personal security of Russia as security of its allies is also constantly being discussed, i.e. Russia is unambiguously proclaiming its zone of responsibility. A separate article diplomatically declares “expansion of the circle of partner countries and development of cooperation with them on the basis of common interests”—of course, in accordance with all norms of international law²². In practical policy, this would primarily imply the CIS space; however, it is also indicative of Russia’s intensions to strengthen its influence in active involvement in a wider global context as one of the gravity centers.

²¹ Russian military experts claim that the establishment of the collective rapid reaction force has just started and, judging by the objectives set to it, the yet unestablished military force needs “radical reorganization”. А. Карнаухов, В. Целуйко, Военная доктрина России и состояние ее Вооруженных сил. Теория и реальность, *Новая армия России*, Москва: Центр анализа стратегий и технологий, 2010, с. 119; А. И. Коповянский, В. И. Лутовинов (footnote 6).

²² In the doctrine of 2000, there is no formulation, giving a clear outline of the employment of military force outside state borders, but it is essentially dealt with only with its use in stopping an aggressor who has violated state and territorial integrity as well as in international military conflicts or peacekeeping and peace restoration operations. Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.

However, one of the most controversial parts of the doctrine concerns the employment of military forces. At the very beginning, Russia declares that it can rightfully (*pravomerno*) use its armed forces - "to protect its citizens outside of the Russian Federation, in accordance with commonly recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of Russia" (sentence 20). Also provided for is another possibility for defending citizens abroad (sentence 26) - "in order to protect the interests of Russia and its citizens, the maintenance of international peace and security, the formation of the Russian Federation armed forces can quickly be used outside of Russia in accordance with (*v sootvestvyi*) commonly recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of Russia and federal law".

The solid safeguards (treaties, norms of international law) are unlikely to give cause for concern over the employment of military power, yet due to some circumstances, a closer look should be taken at this actual issue. First, this streamlined diplomatic formulation of the problem allows the decision-making party to make a number of different interpretations justifying the use of force, i.e. the criteria of measuring the interests of the state and its citizens, especially those living outside Russia, are quite ambiguous. From the perspective of the security of neighboring states - non-allies, this is "the most dangerous" formulation of the defense doctrine, which, under certain circumstances, could allow Russia to execute offensive military actions. The newest legal changes realized by the Kremlin in the pre-doctrine period helped to simplify the procedure of the use of military force outside Russia even more and, most importantly, gave the president the right to take a decision, as K. Giles puts it, "consulting less and under slightly more diverse circumstances"²³.

On the other hand, attention should be paid to the fact that military policy in the doctrine is formulated not as a rigid code of laws, but dynamic provisions which can be changed primarily by a decision of the President of Russia "by federal laws". This decision is dependent on the subjective attitude of one person²⁴. On the other hand, the employment of Russian troops outside the territory of the state in defending the citizens' interests is becoming almost formally legitimized.

In Part 3 of the military doctrine "Military Policy of the Russian Federation", the conception of the development of military forces is widely viewed. It is interesting that the doctrine defines the objective and complex outline of the reform of the Russian armed forces which has been undergoing intensive implementation in practice for several years. For this reason the military reform is a particularly important moment in the assessment of the doctrine. In the doctrine of 2010 the theoretical basis is rather widely, yet specifically formed.

²³ Amendments to the Law on Defense of 2009. K. Giles, (Footnote 18, p. 7).

²⁴ The Russian political scientist Sheinis also highlights the excessively great power (by the Constitution, individual laws or their respective treatment) of the President of Russia to unilaterally solve key issues concerning national security despite the fact that this concept is not referred to in the Constitution. В. Л. Шейнис, Национальная безопасность России. Испытание на прочность (часть III), *Полус*, 2010, № 2, с. 79–76.

By the way, most probably as a legacy from the previous doctrine, which contained many general statements, beginning with the polysemous word “to improve”, words with a slightly more concrete content, such as “to enhance quality” or “to provide” are used²⁵. The main tasks of the armed forces in war and peacetime are determined, major priorities with the purpose and tasks of military planning are indicated, and ways of their implementation are particularly consistently set here. In essence, a radical military reform without using the word “reform” is described – the structure, composition and strength of military forces are determined according to the predicted extent of threat, capabilities of the state and other parameters including demographic factors. For example, such evident innovations are envisaged as the establishment of strategic and operational systems in the military infrastructure, creation of permanent readiness units and their provision, optimization of the system of military education, and further development of the contract system. Mention is made even as to the necessity to have state and civil control over all activities of executive authorities in the field of national defense²⁶.

Let us see what modernization measures foreseen in the doctrine are being implemented, the more so because this structure inherited from the time of the Soviet Union has seen no radical reorganization with the exception of the reduction of the number of troops. The first (2008-2009) and the second (2010-2012) stages are aimed at the fundamental reorganization of the military organizational structure and its control, radical downsizing of the number of officers and reorganization of the officer training system. The first task – the military has been reorganized or is in the final stage of reorganization according to the three planned levels: the military district, the regional command and the brigade (a new permanent readiness brigade), a fundamental reform of the Air Force organizational structure and its control has started. The optimization process of the military has begun – in the middle of 2010, two-thirds of the officers were dismissed from the military. The system of military education is undergoing its first tests: training of new officers has been stopped, the number of higher military institutions is being reduced, and the professional training system is being changed²⁷. This enhances military professionalism, mobility, and preparedness to participate in different military actions.

It may be stated that today Russian military reformers enjoy considerable support from the political command and have financial resources at their disposal necessary for the realization of modernization. The successful start

²⁵ In the doctrine of 2000, in the chapter on the military organization of the state, among general declarations beginning with the word “to improve” or “to increase effectiveness”, there is a sentence which refers to the underlying task - the implementation of the complex military reform, yet no details are provided.

²⁶ Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.

²⁷ Александр Гольц, Армия в 2020 году: современная или советская? Pro et Contra, т. 14, № 4–5, с. 55–56; Итоги российской военной реформы: разные мнения, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/7144>, 2011 02 28; Преобразования закончены, развитие продолжается, http://vpk.name/news/49078_preobrazovaniya_zakonchenyi_razvitiye_prodolzhaetsya.html, 2011 02 25.

gives reason to believe that practical implementation of the military reform set in stages for a long period of time is not going to face a variety of serious problems such as weakening political support, lack of substantial financial resources, or strong opposition from the military. There is no doubt that the work done today, considering the miserable traditions of the failed reforms in Russia, witnesses the qualitative progress of the military forces and the increased possibilities for the implementation of the task set forth in the doctrine to guarantee state sovereignty and its territorial integrity. At the same time, another concluding idea should be stated – reforms of the military forces increase Russia's military power whereas the principles of the ruling of the political regime remain untouched by modernization making the direction of evolution still vague.

3. Material and Technical Base of the Defense: Grim Legacy and Complicated Future

Military modernization is not feasible without one more important constituent – provision of modern armaments and equipment to the troops. In the last, extensive Part IV (making one-third of the doctrine text) called “Military and Economic Security of Defense”, tasks, principles and directions of defense technical provision are detailed. We are going to touch upon the main tasks. Alongside adequate financing and optimization of expenses, the issue of complex rearmament of the military (first of all, strategic nuclear forces, permanent readiness military units, etc.; however, there is no mention of the Navy and the Air Force) with modern multifunctional weapons, military and special equipment are laid out. It is intended to create new types of accurate acquisition weapons and develop their information security, establish major scientific and industrial structures, maintain the state monopoly of the strategically most important enterprises, ensure technological independence of the state, and finally, increase quality and competitiveness. And the key task is to maintain the effective high technology multi-sector that can satisfy the needs of the armed forces and ensure the strategic involvement of the Russian Federation in the global market of high technology products and services²⁸.

A list of numerous complex tasks is presented which shows that in this field ambitious plans, not mentioned in the doctrine approved 10 years ago, are sought to be implemented. Of course, it is not only the most ambitious, but also the most problematic part of the military reform, the realization of which directly depends on the economic potential of the state. The beginning of military rearmament coincided with the protracted procedure of the approval of the doctrine. Let us take a look at the situation of the rearmament of

²⁸ Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года, http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/461/, 2010 09 12.

the military and see the first achieved results. One should bear in mind that so far military provisions have been simply catastrophic, and it was only the uninterrupted arms export that ensured the survival of the military-industrial complex in the stagnation period²⁹.

It is true that this process started earlier, when the state armament program for 2007-2015 was announced; however, in practice it was only in 2009 that the first small-scale batches of new weapons reached military units. This fundamental problem, unsolved for nearly two decades (provision of new weapons ended in 1991-1992), is attempted to be solved by upgrading the old armaments. Modernization of the tank park is being implemented most successfully. In 2010, a Graney class nuclear submarine, the building of which started in 1993 and which is capable of launching long-range missiles equipped with both conventional and nuclear warheads, entered service. In 2009, work started on another Graney class submarine, the Kazan³⁰. So, the first small-scale qualitative changes can be seen, though the process is still slow.

Major tasks (the state arms development and procurement program) are designed to be implemented in the period of 2012-2020, i.e. approximately until the time a new doctrine is developed. As is known, a task has been set by 2020 to provide the army with no less than 70 per cent of new armament and material. This part of military modernization of the military requires not only considerable time, but even more material expenditure and human resources (intellectual potential). There is no doubt that today the domestic situation in Russia is noticeably more favorable than a decade ago and provides practical possibilities to start to essentially solve the perennial problems of state defense: financing of the military is rapidly increasing (in 2010 – 2.6 per cent of GDP, in 2011 – 2.9 per cent); and due to domestic orders and growing export, the military-industrial complex is recovering (according to armament sales, in 2009, with 18 per cent, Russia took second place after the USA with 39 per cent)³¹. However, the military-industrial complex will need considerable time to recover after the stagnation period in order to be able to develop industrial capabilities, modernize production, create new examples of modern weapons and start their serial manufacture. For example, it is claimed at the highest political and military level that new technologies are the weak point of the military industry. In other words, after the task has been set, considerations

²⁹ More on this see: L. Zdanavičius, Rusijos gynybos pramonė: tendencijos ir perspektyvos, *Lietuvos metinė strateginė apžvalga 2005*, Vilnius: Lietuvos karo akademija, 2006, p. 204–208, 213, 215; M. Puidokas. Valdymo pokyčiai Rusijos gynybos pramonėje, *Viešojo politika ir administravimas*, 2005, Nr. 11, p. 116.

³⁰ McDermott Roger N., The Restructuring of the Modern Russian Army, *The Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Volume 22, Issue 4, October 2009, p. 485–501; К. В. Чуприн, *Вооруженные силы стран СНГ и Балтии*, Минск: Современная школа, с. 19–21; Military units were issued about 50 aircraft, 38 helicopters, more than 100 tanks. Под новый облик-новое оружие, <http://www.redstar.ru/army.html>, 2010 12 05; *Российское военное обозрение*, 2010, №. 7 (77), с. 3.

³¹ In the period of 2002-2009, according to armaments export, Russia remained among the five top countries. Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R4140>, 2011 01 12.

of how to essentially realize the technological breakthrough in a number of branches of the military industry started³². It is difficult to stimulate this process, particularly when encountering state capital corporations that have no direct contact with risks in a competitive environment³³. So, a lot of internal problems have accumulated in state corporations and they are hard to overcome through additional financing only or by means of administrative leverage.

Top officials who are in charge of the Russian armament program admit that the military industry lacks the necessary capabilities for the production of different types of weapons. This is the main reason that made Russian politicians and military officials procure a modern assault ship, the Mistral, from France and 14 unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel. These were but the first steps, and in the future, this may turn into standard practice³⁴. The state that provides itself with all types of armaments used a simple principle that has long been applied in the world – you buy what you cannot make yourself – Russia had not followed that since the time of World War II. It should be acknowledged that this is a certain novelty in the Russian military policy. The initial results are rather limited, yet as compared with the earlier situation, it is evident that the first concrete step forward has been made. With reference to the mentioned initial results of rearmament, an obvious inadequacy between the tasks declared in the doctrine and practical possibilities of Russia (at least within the planned period of the program) can be seen. It is likely that even under favorable conditions the rearmament program will not be fully implemented. It is evident that even the increasing financing will not suffice to provide the whole military force (for example, the Navy) with modern armaments. Yet, in terms of tendencies, we can be sure of one evident issue that the military-industrial complex and procurement of military equipment from abroad will enable the Russian military, rapid reaction units in particular, to have new armaments and material at their disposal

³² Утверждён перечень поручений по итогам заседания Комиссии по модернизации и технологическому развитию экономики России, посвященного теме инновационного развития оборонно-промышленного комплекса. <http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/20/news/9124>, 2011 01 12; Дмитрий Семенов, Время прорывных технологий, http://www.redstar.ru/2011/02/02_02/1_01.html. 2011 02 11

³³ These corporations ignore President D. Medvedev's decrees to give priority attention to the development of new technologies. Госкорпорации должны кардинально повысить расходы на НИОКР, <http://state.kremlin.ru/commission/20/news/10186>, 2011 02 02. Russia also uses another method – procurement of modern weapons produced in Western countries (the Mistral, unmanned aerial vehicles) is lucrative seeking to start production according to their license or trying to copy them.

³⁴ Дмитрий Васильев, Новый бизнес итальянцев в России, <http://vpk-news.ru/articles/6426>, 2011 01 13; Под новый облик-новое оружие, <http://www.redstar.ru/army.html>, 2010 12 05.

Concluding Remarks

In terms of quality, the Russian military doctrine of the year 2010 can be regarded as a new edition of the previous doctrine, where guidelines for military policy are formulated and concrete tasks for the nearest perspective are set. However, the doctrine is not an exclusively military strategic document; changes in home and foreign policy of modern strengthening Russia are reflected and intertwined in it. It can be said that the doctrine has become one of the tools of tactical and strategic warfare in Russia's energized "multi-vector diplomacy", a certain landmark in information warfare whose pragmatic objective lies in gaining as great a power to dominate in international politics as possible. The indefiniteness of the doctrine provisions, broad possibilities for their free interpretation, still greater concentration of decision-making in the hands of personalized authorities and the statement about the possibility of protecting Russian citizens by military means give reasonable grounds to speak about an increased threat to the security of the neighboring countries. Having added the statement about NATO and the USA as "potential partners and, at the same time, potential enemies", it is possible to speak about the strong tradition of the Russian anti-Western policy.

Less than a year after the approval of the doctrine, it is possible to claim that its provisions concerning modernization of the armed forces are being practically realized and this is indicative of the tendency of the gradually increasing military power of Russia. At the same time, military modernization is being carried out, maintaining *status quo* of the present type of the political regime whose transitological perspective remains vague; besides, in following this perspective, it is hardly possible to become part of the West. Again, it must be stated that the Russian authorities do not comply with their own provisions concerning the enhancement of democracy and civil society as the main national interests which are included in "The National Security Strategy". The military doctrine reflects the contradictions found in the home and foreign policy of modern Russia and does not help give an answer to the essential question – will the country take a turn to gradual rapprochement with the West or will it look for its own way?

April 2011