The European defence industry faces significant challenges in light of the Russo-Ukrainian War, which has exposed critical vulnerabilities in its ability to meet the urgent demand for defence materiel and platforms. This paper examines the “defence industrial trilemma” – the delicate balance between technological excellence, economic competitiveness, and security of supply – as a key factor shaping the industry’s future. It highlights the critical role of supporting sectors – namely the steel, chemical, semiconductor, and industrial robotics industries – in maintaining Europe’s defence readiness. The analysis reveals that stringent EU regulations, soaring energy costs, and a heavy reliance on foreign suppliers hinder these industries’ growth and competitiveness. For the EU, strengthening these sectors is essential to mitigate dependencies on external supply chains and ensure Europe’s long-term defence capabilities in an increasingly volatile global landscape.
The Russian Federation, with its plans to regain influence over former Soviet bloc countries, currently constitutes the main military danger for the EU and NATO. Because the war is so close to the EU’s borders, European allies have every reason to increase army financing instead of fuelling a transatlantic disagreement about burden sharing. This article deals with the question of whether the high strategic threat posed by Russia has increased military spending among European allies and decreased free-riding practices after 2014. To analyse this problem, we applied Spearman’s Rank Correlation test and then made a comparative analysis of 21 countries that are both EU and NATO members. Our results confirmed that European allies did not react in the same way to the Russian threat. We proved that strategic factors played a key role in the majority of Eastern European members of NATO, but not across Western European allies.