Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

This study traces and contrasts two parallel processes: the development of Lithuanian security culture since the country’s independence in 1990, and the evolution of NATO’s relation to nuclear weapons since the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Lithuania has historically been a vocal advocate for NATO shoring up defences vis-à-vis Russia, the nuclear nature of NATO’s deterrent has largely escaped the public discourse. Lacking historical traditions of open public discussion on matters of defence and security, the gap between Lithuania’s foreign and domestic discourse had only started to close in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine conflict. Narratives surrounding this watershed event also differ dramatically: for NATO it marked the end of the non-proliferation and arms reduction era, while Lithuania focused on the role of Russian militias and failed to take note of the changes in NATO’s nuclear stance. As NATO dusts off classical nuclear deterrent doctrines, posturing in the new geopolitical environment, the limited ability of Eastern European member states like Lithuania to adequately participate in these debates risks subsequently undermining the utility of the agreed concepts and eventually – chipping away at alliance unity. A Lithuanian case study offers insights into the security culture challenges common among NATO’s Eastern European members and partners – acknowledging and understanding them can help identify the building blocks needed to get more of these countries on-board as effective creators of a collective security environment.

The article explores threats related to illicit trafficking of radioactive materials and dual-use goods applicable in state level nuclear programs, actualizing the global trends for the Baltic region. The article points to Eastern Europe’s changing risk profile in this respect, as increasing penetration of Russian criminal groups inside Ukraine and the destabilized situations in neighboring countries create an environment where the risk of nuclear smuggling is on the rise. Criminal entities can be seen forming new bonds, with trafficking routes intersecting and zones of influence shifting – consequently, an unusual level of criminal involvement in nuclear smuggling is observed, alongside a geographic shift of smuggling patterns. In addition, states seeking materials and technologies for their military programs have taken a notable interest in this region as a way of circumventing international transit regulations. The article looks at the likely implications of these new nuclear smuggling trends for the security of the Baltic states. It suggests that Lithuania may soon be facing a relatively new threat, and one that it is ill-prepared to counter. The article discusses the risk factors and indicators to watch before that risk becomes reality, and offers ways for Lithuania to contribute to addressing these increasingly acute problems on a regional level.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamos grėsmės, susijusios su radioaktyviųjų medžiagų ir branduolinėms programoms pritaikomų dvejopos paskirties prekių gabenimu. Taip pat aktualizuojama šių tendencijų problematika Baltijos šalims. Rusijos nusikalstamų grupuočių skverbimasis ir suaktyvėjimas Ukrainoje, situacija konflikto destabilizuotose aplinkinėse sudaro prielaidas branduolinei kontrabandai ir keičia Rytų Europos regiono rizikos profilį. Formuojasi naujos grupuotės, susipina kontrabandos keliai, keičiasi įtakos zonos. Dėl šių priežasčių pastebimi neįprastas organizuoto nusikalstamumo elementų įsitraukimas į branduolinę kontrabandą ir geografinė pervežimo kelių slinktis. Taip pat pastebimos valstybių, siekiančių kontrabanda gauti medžiagų karinėms programoms, pastangos apeiti tarptautinius reguliacinius mechanizmus per šį regioną. Straipsnyje keliama problema – naujų branduolinės kontrabandos tendencijų pasekmės Baltijos šalių saugumui. Lietuva gali susidurti su šaliai santykinai nauja grėsme, kurios tinkamai atremti nėra pasiruošta. Įvardijami rizikos faktoriai, į kuriuos būtina atkreipti dėmesį dabar, kol galimas pavojus netapo realybe, ir būdai Lietuvai prisidėti prie šių problemų sprendimo regioniniu mastu.