Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

Based on an inter-disciplinary theoretical approach about built form as a social construct which mirrors power relations, this article examines the role of what is broadly understood as ‘physical infrastructure’ in Crimean political history, with particular emphasis on the late modern period. The analysis reveals that the infrastructural component proved to be crucial in terms of physically ‘attaching’ the peninsula either to the Russian or Ukrainian parts of the mainland, with the latter naturally seen as a much better option due to the existing terrestrial connection at least as long as all of them remained within a single state. The Soviet disintegration therefore immediately made Crimea’s infrastructure both a contested milieu and a medium of this contestation. As a result, the 2014 annexation and subsequent flashpoints cannot really be explained without referring to such issues as transportation gateways, energy security, and even water supply. While long being quintessentially political, physical infrastructure in Crimea is becoming existential.

As the Ukrainian crisis unfolded and the West declared sanctions against Russia, the country’s political elite returned to the rhetoric typical to its foreign policy tradition about Asia as a counterbalance to Europe and the U.S. Contrary to the previous stages, this time recognition of Russia’s objective strategic and economic needs allowed for a genuine breakthrough in the relationships with the region that had increasingly become central to international politics and economics. However, Russia had first to deal with the long-standing problems of its “Eastern vector”, the primary of which continued to be the dependence of its “Asian politics” on China. This article attempts to evaluate the correspondence between the goals proclaimed by Moscow’s foreign policy makers in Asia and the actual results achieved throughout the research period of 2014 to 2016 inclusive, with particular focus on its fundamental objective to thus gain more room for manoeuvre on the global and regional levels of international politics.

Kilus Ukrainos krizei ir Vakarams paskelbus sankcijas Rusijai, šios šalies politinis elitas sugrįžo prie jos užsienio politikos tradicijai būdingos retorikos apie Aziją kaip atsvarą Europai ir JAV. Priešingai nei ankstesniais etapais, šįkart objektyvių šalies strateginių ir ekonominių poreikių pripažinimas leido tikėtis tikro proveržio santykiuose su tarptautinės politikos ir ekonomikos centru vis labiau virstančiu regionu. Tačiau pirmiausia Rusijai reikėjo susidoroti su ilgalaikėmis savo Rytų vektoriaus problemomis, tarp kurių svarbiausia tebebuvo auganti jos Azijos politikos priklausomybė nuo Kinijos. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama įvertinti Maskvos užsienio politikos Azijoje išsikeltų tikslų ir pasiektų rezultatų atitikimą per 2014–2016 metų laikotarpį, ypač pabrėžiant pamatinį jos siekį tokiu būdu įgauti daugiau manevro laisvės globaliu ir regioniniu tarptautinės politikos lygmenimis.