Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

The establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) marks a significant shift in how EU Member States approach the integration of the defence industry as it aims to systematically promote inter-European defence-industrial cooperation across national defence sectors. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the actual dynamics regarding EDF implementation. While there are accounts of EU countries’ varying political positions on defence integration, including its industrial aspect, it remains unclear whether Member States’ actual participation in integration projects aligns with these positions. Are national motives consistent once effective defenceindustrial integration is underway? The findings, based on Masson’s (2024) data on by-country distribution of EDF project financing (2021–2022), present a more nuanced picture of EU countries’ effective engagement with defence-industrial integration than anticipated by the political perspective. While there is a positive relationship between participation in the EDF and defence market size, strategic culture does not influence EU members’ involvement in the Fund. Furthermore, while liberal economicindustrial governance is negatively associated with national participation in EDF projects, a country’s institutional quality has a significant positive relationship with it. This article reveals more complex dynamics of EDF implementation than suggested by the political perspective on defence-industrial integration pre-EDF.

In the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany was not the only one to undergo “Zeitenwende” in Europe. The European Union (EU), as a whole, also witnessed an unprecedented surge in its determination to bolster its security and defence efforts. Using collective funds, EU countries, for instance, have been providing lethal arms to Ukraine and have committed to joint procurement of ammunition and missiles to assist Kyiv. Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market has pro-actively carried to the European capitals the message about the need for the “war economy mode.” To what extent does recent progress in EU defence policy represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s self-perception and its approach to external policy? More concretely, can we realistically describe a stronger and more robust EU defence policy as being firmly rooted in a shared political and strategic vision? The paper examines relevant transformations, including recent developments, and argues that they are closely intertwined with the economic rationale, which is empirically distinct from a politico-strategic vision. This has implications for EU-NATO cooperation.

France’s status as a conventional power makes Paris an inevitable actor in the context of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Insofar France is considered as a staunch protagonist of the EU/European strategic autonomy and an opponent against the US/NATO dominance in Europe, the most recent CSDP progress may be expected to belong to the merits of French decision-makers. Based on a closer analytical look, however, CSDP is not reducible to a coherent outcome of French interests. At the EU level, the French influence turns out to be limited. A strong ideological attachment of this EU Member State to sovereign politics and a consequential lack of commitment to common issues of defence and security may be viewed as an impediment to the materialisation of a more significant clout of Paris on the communitarian scale. Yet relevant limits are predominantly a structural consequence, which is a pattern enhanced by the current dynamics in global politics. This makes one consider France’s status as a “system-influencing state” more cautiously. In a sense, the paper takes issue with the literature on the recent CSDP progress as an expression of political and policy convergence and re-focuses attention on manners in which inter-European dynamics can shed light on positions of individual members.

Dėl Prancūzijos, kaip konvencinės galios, statuso Paryžius yra neišvengiamas veikėjas bendros saugumo ir gynybos politikos (BSGP) kontekste. Prancūziją laikant lojalia ES/Europos strateginės autonomijos šalininke ir JAV/NATO dominavimo Europoje priešininke, galima manyti, kad pastarųjų metų BSGP pažanga priklauso Prancūzijos sprendimų priėmėjų nuopelnams. Tačiau remiantis išsamesne analize, BSGP negali būti apibūdinama kaip nuoseklus Prancūzijos interesų ir politinio veikimo rezultatas. ES lygiu Prancūzijos įtaka yra ribota. Šios ES valstybės narės tvirtas ideologinis prisirišimas prie suverenios politikos ir įsipareigojimo bendrais gynybos ir saugumo klausimais stoka, kurią, atrodytų, lemia toks prisirišimas, gali būti vertinami kaip kliūtis, neleidžianti ES viduje pasireikšti didesnei Paryžiaus įtakai. Vis dėlto atitinkami suvaržymai daugiausia yra struktūrinių pokyčių padarinys, o susidariusią situaciją dar labiau veikia dabartinė pasaulio politikos dinamika. Tai verčia atsargiau vertinti Prancūzijos, kaip „sistemai įtaką darančios valstybės“, statusą. Tam tikra prasme darbe kritiškai žvelgiama į literatūrą apie pastarųjų metų BSGP pažangą kaip nacionalinių politinių pozicijų ir įgyvendinamų politinių strategijų supanašėjimo išraišką. Pakeitus dėmesio kryptį, bandoma parodyti, kaip europinė dinamika gali atskleisti individualių narių poziciją.