Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

The aim of this paper is to analyze the legal definition, organizational status, and forms of deployment of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic within the crisis management system and during declared states of emergency. Methodologically, the paper is based on a normative analysis of applicable legislation, a content analysis of relevant academic sources, and a synthesis of findings derived from practical implementation experience. The results identify persistent ambiguities in competences and limitations of the legal framework governing the domestic deployment of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, particularly in the areas of command, coordination, and the interpretation of assistance-related tasks. The paper therefore contributes to the professional debate on the need for doctrinal and normative anchoring of civil-military cooperation under the conditions of the Slovak Republic. The findings indicate the need to refine the legal framework in order to increase the effectiveness of crisis management and civil-military cooperation. The main contribution of the paper lies in a generalizable and systematic linkage between the normative and operational dimensions of the deployment and functioning of the armed forces within the state crisis management system.

This article presents a view and opinion on the methods of applying risk analysis in the Czech Republic, gained through practical experience. Risk analysis is a fundamental building block in the creation of key documents in the field of emergency planning and crisis management, which are an integral part of the security system of the Czech Republic. In risk analysis, an important role is played by determining the threats that most threaten the Czech Republic, and then adopting measures that will reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level. The increasing number of natural and anthropogenic emergencies naturally brings with it an increase in the severity of their consequences. Within the framework of the systematic application of the policy of preventing emergencies and crisis situations, the analysis of threats and the risks arising from them is of key importance. The publication describes the risk analysis methodology, which culminated in the adoption of the document "Threat Analysis for the Czech Republic" approved by Resolution of the Government of the Czech Republic No. 369 in April 2016. The document analysis method was used as the basic research method. This qualitative research method was focused on the analysis of threats in the Czech Republic. At the same time, it responded to the past extraordinary events that are commented on in the publication. The developing trend of research in the field of protection against the effects of CBRN substances was also emphasized. The analysis of documents is limited to the period from 2016 to the present, because the Threat Analysis for the Czech Republic was approved in 2016. The basic question is therefore whether this threat analysis corresponds to the current security situation in the Czech Republic and in Europe. Some challenges and potential shortcomings in this area are pointed out, especially at the level of territorial self-governing units and in the area of legal regulation and legislation. The perspective on new challenges in connection with protection against the effects of CBRN substances, increased risk of terrorism and other extraordinary events causing large-scale violations of the law is also emphasized. In this context, the issue of soft targets is also partially analysed, since the vast majority of similar incidents occur in these facilities. The conclusions from the article and the aforementioned ambiguities should be the subject of expert discussion in the future, and possible legislative revisions should be made in order to ensure systemic efficiency and clear definition of responsibilities both in the area of risk analysis and in the area of subsequent processing of crisis plans and other security documents.

This paper analyzes the resilience of healthcare systems in the context of armed conflicts and hybrid threats, focusing on the role of healthcare data and process management. Based on a mixed-methods approach combining qualitative and quantitative research, it identifies key systemic vulnerabilities, particularly in the areas of data sharing and coordination. The results highlight the need for healthcare organizations to prepare for operations in the event of digital infrastructure disruptions and emphasize the importance of the ability to transition to alternative modes of operation as a key element of resilience.

The primary concern of this article is to review the knowledge and ability of people to act to protect themselves and others in the face of various risks and hazards, and to manage accident and crisis situations. Relevant issues include the needs and requirements of emergency situations, people’s ability to respond to them, and factors that affect coping ability. The selected sub-areas are practiceoriented and defined in terms of real-world problems rather than theories or scientific concepts. One of the purposes of choosing to structure the review of risk, accident and crisis management psychology in this way is to emphasize the importance of human limitations and capabilities as an element in all areas of activity and responsibility. This approach, in turn, assumes that the review contains a broad theoretical base and multifaceted approaches, which are necessarily treated here rather generically.

This paper focuses on terrorist attacks carried out by so-called ‘lone wolves’ or ‘lone actors’. It provides an analytical evaluation of the basic characteristics of these attackers and discusses possible access to their identification in society. To create the profile of a ‘typical’ lone wolf, we collected information from a database of lone wolves who committed their terrorist attacks in the United States, Canada, the European Union, Switzerland, Norway and Australia from 1998 to 2016. Based on these data, it was demonstrated that lone wolves are not homogenous group, therefore, there is no one ‘typical’ lone wolf. Instead, three main groups of lone wolves were identified: 1) lone wolves with a criminal past, 2) lone wolves with a mental illness and 3) young lone wolves coming from minority groups in the country. These characteristics could be used as an auxiliary tool by state security forces during identification of potential lone wolf terrorists.

The article discusses the problems of the limitations of the human rights in the situations of crisis. The measures of crisis management are undertaken both in international and national levels, but the definitions of crisis and crisis management are rarely provided in legal acts. The article further discusses the theories of national security and their connection with the assurance of human rights. The permanent and temporary limitations of the human rights provided in international and national legal acts are discussed in the context of the measures taken in crisis management.