Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

The paper examines contemporary national defence challenges arising from the interconnection of digital technologies, social dynamics, and global tensions. Using interdisciplinary analysis and policy review, it explores how cyber threats and emerging technologies shape resilience and security outcomes. The findings highlight the critical role of societal trust, strategic communication, and coordinated international frameworks such as NATO and EU initiatives. The study implies that effective defence strategies require integrated technological, social, and policy dimensions. The paper contributes original insights into comprehensive security approaches that enhance both national and collective resilience in the digital age.

The study focuses on an indicative analysis and critical evaluation of tools and methods used for fact-checking, which represent a key instrument in combating disinformation within the contemporary media environment. In the context of the spread of false or manipulative narratives, particularly through social media and online platforms, systematic fact-checking may be one of the tools for preserving information integrity and protecting the public from harmful content. The aim of the study is to formulate recommendations, based on a constructively critical mapping of the current situation, which can contribute to more effective management of the related agenda.

This paper examines whether adapting a multilingual large language model (LLM) to clearly pro‑Kremlin or pro‑Western texts can improve the automatic detection of pro‑Kremlin narratives in Czech‑language content. The study compares three variants of the same model: a base multilingual model, a pro‑Kremlin adapter trained on Russian‑language texts with pro‑Kremlin framing, and a pro‑Western adapter trained on Western sources that respond to the same topics from an opposing perspective. All models are fine‑tuned using a parameter‑efficient method and evaluated on a small Czech corpus covering five key narrative types. The pro‑Kremlin adapter shows the strongest ability to distinguish between texts with pro‑Kremlin framing and neutral texts, while the pro‑Western adapter brings only a modest improvement over the base model. These findings suggest that exposing an LLM to ideologically aligned training data can make it more sensitive to that ideology, with potential applications for supporting the detection of hostile information operations in smaller‑language NATO member states.

This paper examines how digital media discourse influences national security and institutional trust using UK-related data (39,760 mentions; reach 255.3 million) collected between November 2025 and April 2026. Applying AI-assisted media analytics, it identifies key risk patterns, including the dominance of negative sentiment, platform-driven amplification, and the transnational circulation of narratives. The findings show how these dynamics generate structural vulnerabilities for democratic institutions and complicate strategic communication. The study proposes a practical analytical framework for monitoring influence operations, enabling earlier detection of coordinated campaigns and supporting faster, evidence-based policy responses in complex digital information environments today.

Disinformation is becoming one of the most serious security challenges for the European Union, especially in the context of the deteriorating geopolitical situation. In recent years, disinformation has evolved from a marginal phenomenon to a systematically used tool of influence and manipulation, which disrupts the functioning of democratic societies, undermines trust in democratic values, principles and institutions and destabilizes social cohesion. Both state and non-state actors use disinformation to achieve their political, ideological, security and economic goals without direct military confrontation. The European Union is responding to these threats with comprehensive political, legislative and strategic measures, including the European Democracy Action Plan, the Digital Services Act and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, among others. Strengthening societal resilience through the development of media and digital literacy, critical thinking and pluralistic public discourse also plays a key role. The analysis shows that an effective and efficient fight against disinformation necessarily requires a coordinated and broad-spectrum response that respects democratic principles and values, but at the same time minimizes the space for abuse of the information environment.

This article focuses on modeling the spread of disinformation narratives on social media using the SEDPNR epidemiological model, an extension of the basic SEIR model that takes into account the specifics of digital communication. This includes the existence of a "doubt" phase and the division of active users according to their sentiment polarity. The analyzed data describe a specific disinformation narrative, “Biolabs Ukraine,” that spread in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results demonstrate that the dissemination of the narrative exhibits characteristics of an infodemic wave: a rapid increase, a brief peak, and a subsequent decline. The analysis confirms the significant role of active users and shows that supportive and critical reactions both contribute to the further dissemination of content.

The article presents a comprehensive examination of the Russian Federation’s use of United Nations (UN) mechanisms to advance its geopolitical objectives, obstruct international initiatives that contradict its policy, and wage information and psychological warfare. The analysis indicates that the Russian Federation’s participation in the UN Security Council lacks a clear legal foundation, raising questions about the legitimacy of its use of veto power’. It is documented that Russia systematically uses this privilege to veto resolutions aimed at condemning its aggression and investigating war crimes, thereby prolonging the war and evading accountability. Significant attention is given to Russia’s manipulation of UN peacekeeping operations, which it seeks to exploit to consolidate control over occupied territories. The study emphasizes Russia’s information and psychological operations within the UN, which facilitate the spread of disinformation, undermine trust in international institutions, and adversely influence state voting on critical resolutions in the General Assembly. The results obtained illustrate the necessity of revamping the UN decision-making mechanism, particularly by limiting aggressor states’ ability to exercise the veto in their own interests. Proposed procedural reforms aim to enhance the UN’s effectiveness in maintaining peace and safeguarding international security.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.