Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

This article focuses on modeling the spread of disinformation narratives on social media using the SEDPNR epidemiological model, an extension of the basic SEIR model that takes into account the specifics of digital communication. This includes the existence of a "doubt" phase and the division of active users according to their sentiment polarity. The analyzed data describe a specific disinformation narrative, “Biolabs Ukraine,” that spread in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results demonstrate that the dissemination of the narrative exhibits characteristics of an infodemic wave: a rapid increase, a brief peak, and a subsequent decline. The analysis confirms the significant role of active users and shows that supportive and critical reactions both contribute to the further dissemination of content.

The article presents a comprehensive examination of the Russian Federation’s use of United Nations (UN) mechanisms to advance its geopolitical objectives, obstruct international initiatives that contradict its policy, and wage information and psychological warfare. The analysis indicates that the Russian Federation’s participation in the UN Security Council lacks a clear legal foundation, raising questions about the legitimacy of its use of veto power’. It is documented that Russia systematically uses this privilege to veto resolutions aimed at condemning its aggression and investigating war crimes, thereby prolonging the war and evading accountability. Significant attention is given to Russia’s manipulation of UN peacekeeping operations, which it seeks to exploit to consolidate control over occupied territories. The study emphasizes Russia’s information and psychological operations within the UN, which facilitate the spread of disinformation, undermine trust in international institutions, and adversely influence state voting on critical resolutions in the General Assembly. The results obtained illustrate the necessity of revamping the UN decision-making mechanism, particularly by limiting aggressor states’ ability to exercise the veto in their own interests. Proposed procedural reforms aim to enhance the UN’s effectiveness in maintaining peace and safeguarding international security.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.