Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review

Since 2003, with the release of the European Security Strategy, the EU’s political elites have continuously looked for ways and means to forge a common EU strategic culture. Both scholars and political elites agree that the EU’s strategic culture should be a product of a convergence of Member States’ strategic cultures. The research on the strategic culture of the EU has overlooked the theoretical advances of the fourthgeneration strategic culture theory. Instead, it has focused on the state level of analysis, as both research approaches might not be appropriate for an organisation with a supranational and intergovernmental decision-making system. This article proposes to employ a concept of strategic subcultures envisioned by the fourth-generation strategic culture theory and shift the research focus from the state level of analysis to the level of the EU. Drawing on the concept of subcultures, the institutions-based socialisation process and semi-structured interviews with the Ambassadors of the Political and Security Committee of the Council of the European Union, the article develops a model on how to define an EU-level strategic subculture and argues that the Political and Security Committee must be considered as another strategic subculture of the EU next to the Member States.

Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine was a wake-up call for the entire international community and, in particular, for NATO Alliance. It became obvious that Europe is no longer at peace, and that serious steps should be taken by the Transatlantic collective defence Alliance. NATO intensified the adaptation of its deterrence and defence posture. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit marked a major shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and it was agreed to transition from defence by reinforcement to forward defence. The article discusses the concept of forward defence, its historical evolution and its practical implementation by NATO. It evaluates forward defence in relation to defence and deterrence strategies that existed during the Cold War and how they have changed over the time. It examines how forward defence contributes to the doctrinal conventional deterrence and defence principles and indicates major changes in collective defence. It debates whether and how NATO is experiencing a real paradigm shift in its doctrinal deterrence and defence perception and how forward defence can help ensure that every inch of the Allied territory is defended.

This article argues that U.S. foreign and security policy is increasingly intertwined with the promotion of U.S. arms transfers (sales), thereby reflecting an enhanced geoeconomic orientation. Yet how effectively has the United States pursued this strategy among EU countries? Has this geoeconomic dimension been systematically incorporated in transatlantic security cooperation? To answer these questions, the study analyzes EU member states’ post-2000 procurement patterns in terms of the relative weight of U.S.-sourced heavy weapons in their orders. The analysis provides preliminary but systematic and consistent evidence showing a positive association between U.S. geoeconomic orientation and a higher share of European acquisitions of U.S. arms – an association that is stronger within the EU–NATO subset. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first study to examine such a geoeconomic linkage in the transatlantic context.

The current geopolitical changes and the dedication to regional safety have drawn researchers’ attention towards discussion on the multiple aspects of new residents’ integration. Ensuring that new members of society are welcomed has been of significant scientific and political interest in sustaining coherent and resilient communities. This discussion also extends to the well-being of soldiers and their families when relocating due to deployment. Since deployment locations vary, the state of scientific knowledge highlights the need to investigate the integration of soldiers and military-related families within the specific contexts of individual states. Accordingly, this study examines the case of Lithuania, with a focus on the socio-legal factors influencing the integration of military-related families. The research is based on a thematic analysis of international scientific literature, identifying the main challenges faced by families residing in foreign countries. It also outlines the conditions necessary for the successful integration of military-related families in the Lithuanian context. The findings indicate that: a) in addition to traditional integration programs, special attention must be given to the specific characteristics of military life; b) integration of military-related residents should adopt a family-centred approach that considers the past, present, and future experiences, needs, and aspirations of family members; and c) successful integration requires strong intersectoral cooperation. The practical implications highlight the need for practitioners to pay particular attention to monitoring and managing both the sequence and quality of the integration of foreign soldiers’ families during their residence in the host country.

The aim of this article is to evaluate the tenure of Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, through the lens of successes and failures on the international stage with selected countries. From a research perspective, Landsbergis’s term at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be analyzed in the context of continuity and change within Lithuanian foreign policy, framed by the neo-idealism approach. This analysis revealed that despite the lack of strategic guidelines for Lithuania’s foreign policy, it was perceived by external stakeholders as relatively predictable and values-driven, particularly with regard to specific actions taken by the Lithuanian government towards China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Taiwan.

Over the past ten years, Western defence analysts have assumed that, in any hypothetical war, Russia would be substantially, if not entirely, a sanctuary from NATO operations and even attacks. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has challenged this assumption for two main reasons: it is implausible to defend one’s country effectively without striking into the enemy’s territory; and Ukraine has successfully struck and even invaded Russia without provoking nuclear escalation. Western hesitation toward hypothetical strikes on Russia is increasingly strained under these pressures, yet little dedicated analysis has emerged to evaluate the consequences of granting or denying Russia sanctuary. The article first explores the concept of sanctuary as such and the modern literature that implicitly or explicitly assumes Russia would be a sanctuary in case of war. Second, it discusses the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, Ukraine’s campaign against Russia itself and, implicitly, Western hesitations about targeting Russia. Finally, it engages with the various military, strategic, and political considerations of extending or not extending sanctuary to Russia.

The article presents a comprehensive examination of the Russian Federation’s use of United Nations (UN) mechanisms to advance its geopolitical objectives, obstruct international initiatives that contradict its policy, and wage information and psychological warfare. The analysis indicates that the Russian Federation’s participation in the UN Security Council lacks a clear legal foundation, raising questions about the legitimacy of its use of veto power’. It is documented that Russia systematically uses this privilege to veto resolutions aimed at condemning its aggression and investigating war crimes, thereby prolonging the war and evading accountability. Significant attention is given to Russia’s manipulation of UN peacekeeping operations, which it seeks to exploit to consolidate control over occupied territories. The study emphasizes Russia’s information and psychological operations within the UN, which facilitate the spread of disinformation, undermine trust in international institutions, and adversely influence state voting on critical resolutions in the General Assembly. The results obtained illustrate the necessity of revamping the UN decision-making mechanism, particularly by limiting aggressor states’ ability to exercise the veto in their own interests. Proposed procedural reforms aim to enhance the UN’s effectiveness in maintaining peace and safeguarding international security.

This article examines Ukraine’s legal framework for ensuring state security. The study aims to assess the current stage of its development and to propose legal improvements that align with international security standards. The findings indicate that Ukraine’s legislation lacks a unified conceptual approach to defining state security, resulting in legal uncertainty and inefficiencies in protective measures. Three key dimensions of state security are identified: substantive (a set of military actions to counter threats), institutional (the distribution of powers among authorities), and organizational-legal (a system of regulatory provisions). The concept of state security is proposed to be understood as preventive and deterrent measures undertaken by the state to safeguard territorial integrity. The study concludes that a legal framework distinguishing state security from national and military security should be developed. It further advocates legislative reforms to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience against modern threats and to ensure the effective protection of national interests.

Jair Messias Bolsonaro was the president of Brazil from 2019 to 2023, and he is regarded as one of the most pro-American presidents in Brazilian history. Due to similar political rhetoric, J. Bolsonaro was often compared to Donald John Trump. During his administration, Brazilian foreign policy was orientated towards improving bilateral relations with the USA. In this article, I used neoclassical realism theory to examine the dynamics of Brazil-USA relations during J. Bolsonaro’s presidency and how his ideological proximity to D. Trump affected relations between these two states. I also took into consideration the systemic factor that the USA is the strongest state in the American continents, and from this, I constructed the argument that the USA’s superiority in power against all countries in the Western Hemisphere forced J. Bolsonaro to maintain dialogue even with ideology different Joseph Robinette Biden Jr. administration (2021-2025).

The art form of impersonating others is not exempt from this trend and has been incorporated into the soft-power arsenal. This precise and meticulously chosen tool for conducting information attacks may be far more effective than simple hard power: it can affect millions, discredit influential people, and split societies into factions based on the behaviour, speeches, and expressions of public figures. For example, if the prime minister of a neighbouring country expresses an opinion on sensitive issues in an official statement about upcoming events in the country, it could lead to the loss of population trust in that leader and, simultaneously, leave the message open to competing interpretations. One of the lesser-known tools for conducting information attacks in the Russian soft power arsenal is telephone trolling by pranksters. Thus, like a chef de cuisine, Russia’s political-military establishment is searching for recipes to prepare meals for the ’public’s eyes and minds. What would be the most suitable ingredients to prepare a popular dish? How should the final product be delivered? Who should be the target audience? Will it be aimed at a domestic audience or directed abroad (for example, at neighbouring countries and/or other regions and continents)? Ingredients for the dish might be personal dissenting opinions of influential politicians, famous actors, etc. The careful selection of targets and the use of different methods to extract information by provoking a target person allow attackers to obtain sensitive material and then build campaigns to publicise such information or to use it in subtle geopolitical games. These operations can play a crucial role in influencing people — such as a targeted country’s political leaders and influential celebrities — to steer an ongoing process in a desired direction.