Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review

The purpose of this article is to elucidate the problem of Japan’s nuclear security deterrence strategy dilemma, which is balancing between pursuing nuclear autonomy and remaining under the United States’ (the U.S.) extended nuclear deterrence protection. Through an examination of Japanese official documents, scholars’ relevant literature on both Japanese and U.S. nuclear security and an analysis of Japan’s geopolitical structure, the researchers resolve this dilemma through a nuclear deterrence perspective. Based on the evaluation of how Japan’s nuclear deterrence credibility’s potential is changing when pursuing either of the two options, the researchers conclude that the three geopolitical factors — the proximity to the strong nuclear adversary, the smallness of territory and lack of nuclear armament experience — determine that it is not in Japan’s national interest to leave the U.S. nuclear umbrella and pursue autonomy through independent nuclear capabilities. In addition, given the similarity of three such geopolitical factors shared by them, the majority of small states (e.g. Eastern European countries such as Lithuania), it is reasonable to constitute them into an empirical model and conduct a further deductive study on the cases of other small cases.

Since 2009 Boko Haram has been carrying out terrorist attacks in the northeastern part of Nigeria. In 2015 the group was seen as the world‘s deadliest terrorist organization, however, due to internal disagreements in 2016, Boko Haram split into two factions, namely the Islamic State – West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Jamā’at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da’wah wa’l-Jihād (JAS), which is still often referred to by its original name – Boko Haram. While the competition between these factions made way for the Nigerian government to retake formerly lost territories, attacks from Boko Haram continue, and government forces have yet to fully quell the insurgency. This article surveys the protracted survival of Boko Haram through their operating practices by basing itself on the two primary models of revolutionary warfare (people’s war by Mao Zedong and Foquismo by Che Guevara). It takes note of the similarities between traditional revolutionary and contemporary jihadist ways of thought. Despite these similarities, crucial distinctions can also be made between the two factions of Boko Haram in order to explain their comparatively different levels of success. The article is divided into 3 primary bodies, each examining one of the three pillars (ideological, popular-support and military) that are required for a successful revolution. Comparisons between ISWAP and JAS are made in each section. Finally, the addition and comparison of the results stemming from each part are summarized and aid in trying to understand the protracted survival of Boko Haram.

In the face of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Germany was not the only one to undergo “Zeitenwende” in Europe. The European Union (EU), as a whole, also witnessed an unprecedented surge in its determination to bolster its security and defence efforts. Using collective funds, EU countries, for instance, have been providing lethal arms to Ukraine and have committed to joint procurement of ammunition and missiles to assist Kyiv. Furthermore, the EU Commissioner for Internal Market has pro-actively carried to the European capitals the message about the need for the “war economy mode.” To what extent does recent progress in EU defence policy represent a fundamental shift in the EU’s self-perception and its approach to external policy? More concretely, can we realistically describe a stronger and more robust EU defence policy as being firmly rooted in a shared political and strategic vision? The paper examines relevant transformations, including recent developments, and argues that they are closely intertwined with the economic rationale, which is empirically distinct from a politico-strategic vision. This has implications for EU-NATO cooperation.

Debates following the events of February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, a mainstream viewpoint on how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia´s multi-ethnic and multilingual society has emerged. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita in 2022. As for the response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the majority of the Estonian public and elite support significantly more severe sanctions than those that have been enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded the straightforward intervention of NATO in the conflict, the strongest consensus backs the view that the Western world should not become directly involved but should indirectly support Ukraine to a greater degree than it has managed to thus far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite, as well as the Estonian language part of the society remains afraid that Russia will use the same logic and action against the Baltic States. The main question for Estonia is if and when, after the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in the Baltic states.

This article explores the key factors that could lead to a potential spillover of the conflict from Ukraine into Moldova. It also proposes strategies for Moldova to mitigate this risk and safeguard its stability against Russian aggression. By utilizing a mixed methods approach that combines qualitative insights from semi-structured interviews and quantitative analysis of institutional indices, migration and demographic data, also defense budget figures, the article provides a comprehensive evaluation to address the research question. The theoretical framework is based on the cross-border conflict theory, specifically employing the concept of securitization to frame Moldova’s response to security challenges. While the article does not predict outcomes, it highlights Moldova’s options to mitigate vulnerabilities and collaboratively enhance stability. Prioritizing the strengthening of the national security framework and proactive diplomatic initiatives emerges as essential.