Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review

The purpose of this investigation was to empirically assess the association between military expenditure and income inequality in the 19 European member states of NATO between 2011 and 2022. To achieve this, the authors carried out multivariate statistical analysis using Kaplan-Meier life tables and survival estimation techniques. The results highlighted a trend in the countries analysed that income inequality tended to decrease when investment in the military increased during the period under consideration. The association manifested itself in the shortest time in the group of countries with the lowest military spending per capita, while emerging in the longer term in the countries with the highest. Furthermore, under high threat of war, the association tends to be shortest in relative terms in countries with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The results also revealed that the association between military spending and income inequality is more pronounced in the smallest countries by population and those with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The authors believe that this investigation will enrich scientific knowledge with new insights.

The establishment of the European Defence Fund (EDF) marks a significant shift in how EU Member States approach the integration of the defence industry as it aims to systematically promote inter-European defence-industrial cooperation across national defence sectors. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the actual dynamics regarding EDF implementation. While there are accounts of EU countries’ varying political positions on defence integration, including its industrial aspect, it remains unclear whether Member States’ actual participation in integration projects aligns with these positions. Are national motives consistent once effective defenceindustrial integration is underway? The findings, based on Masson’s (2024) data on by-country distribution of EDF project financing (2021–2022), present a more nuanced picture of EU countries’ effective engagement with defence-industrial integration than anticipated by the political perspective. While there is a positive relationship between participation in the EDF and defence market size, strategic culture does not influence EU members’ involvement in the Fund. Furthermore, while liberal economicindustrial governance is negatively associated with national participation in EDF projects, a country’s institutional quality has a significant positive relationship with it. This article reveals more complex dynamics of EDF implementation than suggested by the political perspective on defence-industrial integration pre-EDF.

The aim of the text is to verify such changing geopolitics through an increasing (possible) cooperation concerning the United States of America, Taiwan and Lithuania in the fields of politics and security, as well as to point out what China has lost by Lithuania’s withdrawal from cooperation in the format ‘16+1’. The research problem is a diplomatic discussion between Lithuania and China, which has achieved increasing interest from foreign countries. The theoretical basis of the research is post-structural theory and Gustavsson’s model. From this conception, Lithuania accepts and raises its identity as it is, primarily according to a huge and unsafe power.

This study examines the communication of the State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania and the Second Investigation Department under the Ministry of National Defence in 2012–2022. It identifies the aspects relevant to the strategic communication of the intelligence services, analyses specifics of the texts and tendencies in national threat assessments and activity reports, and examines how these institutions present themselves. The study applies the theory of securitisation and critical discourse analysis. It includes other research related to the topic, practices of foreign intelligence services in publishing annual reports and using the YouTube social media platform, media publications and other sources. The study concludes that strategic communication for intelligence agencies is essential for the long-term success of their operations. By focusing on strategic objectives, they inform and educate the public about themselves and national security and develop a cooperative relationship, contributing to deterrence. Both institutions examined in this study are becoming not only formally more open to the public, but also aim to build and maintain a high institutional reputation, connect with their audience and create an image of professionalism, modern accountability and openness to the public.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.

The purpose of this article is to analyse how the most read Romanian media outlets (Libertatea, Digi24, Ştirile Pro TV, Adevărul, Click!) were reporting news about Lithuania in the period between 24 February 2022 and 15 April 2024, with two aims being elaborated in the research. The first goal is to focus on the reflection of Lithuanian and Romanian bilateral relations; the second goal is to assess the Romanian media coverage on the news related to Lithuanian national security. The research suggests that the Romanian media is extensively reporting news from Lithuania. These news items can be grouped into three categories: the first category is the security news; the second category is the other news containing anything directly related to Lithuania excluding security questions; the third category is the contextual news, with only contextual references to Lithuania among other things. Meanwhile, the security category can be grouped into three subcategories, those being: the news from Lithuania; the news covering Lithuanian and Romanian bilateral relations; the contextual news. The analysis confirms the intensively developing bilateral relations as well as wide coverage of Lithuanian security questions in Romanian media. The study aims to expand the perceptions of the geographical dimension of the Lithuanian network of bilateral relations, and representation of Vilnius’ security perceptions in NATO allies.

This article analyses the dynamics of relations between Ukraine and the United States under the presidency of Donald Trump, covering the approaches of the parties to bilateral cooperation, key events and issues. It describes in detail the main features of Washington’s policy towards Ukraine during this period, the factors that shaped it and the reasons for any contradictions involved. It is noted that the course of the Trump administration’s foreign policy towards Ukraine has been shaped by three factors: strong pressure from Congress, contradictions between the president and his foreign policy team, and public suspicions of collusion between Trump’s entourage and the Kremlin in the 2016 US presidential election, which was accompanied by a bitter domestic political struggle. With no room for manoeuvre in such circumstances, the Trump administration chose the safest course of action – to continue the policy of the Obama administration with certain tactical changes designed to demonstrate a more decisive stance than its predecessor. These involved a significant increase in economic and military assistance to Ukraine, including the provision of lethal weapons and the appointment of Kurt Volker as US Special Representative for Ukraine Negotiations. Based on extensive empirical evidence, this paper also highlights the progress made and achievements with regard to cooperation in four areas that made up the Ukrainian-US relations agenda during the period covered: political dialogue, security, energy projects and the fight against corruption. The author shows that the contradictory nature of US policy towards Ukraine under Trump comprised a combination of a significant increase in military assistance and a decrease in the intensity of high-level political contacts.

The arguments made in this article are divided in three sections. First, the analysis looks at some of the immediate security-related concerns that have come to shape the Baltic Sea region. The second section branches out from the Baltic confines and takes into account the impact that the so-called CRINK states (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) have gained on the war against Ukraine through their support for Russia. This has turned the war into a broader conflagration than most observers have admitted for an extended period. Finally, the analysis cautiously addresses some of the imponderabilities provided by the upcoming presidential election in the United States.