This article addresses the issue of protecting civilian space assets that are utilized by states, and particularly by armed forces. It examines the unique characteristics of operating in the space environment, importance of these space assets, the concept of the military use of space, and the strategies applied in the United States to ensure the protection of such assets. The authors propose five protective measures: war risk insurance; physical protection of the ground segment; in-orbit physical protection; deterrence; and threat information sharing.
This article analyses how the evolving Arctic security environment generates new requirements for the intelligence staffs of non-Arctic North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) armies, using the Czech Army as a case study. Drawing on doctrinal analysis, scenario-based assessment, and a review of intelligence education, it identifies a structural mismatch between land-centric intelligence practice and the Arctic’s multi-domain, hybrid, and environmentally extreme operational character. The article concludes that non-Arctic allies require proportionate doctrinal adaptation, differentiated professional education, and a limited but credible Arctic intelligence capability.