Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

Debates following the events of February 2022 in Estonian society have been hot, and despite diverging opinion, a mainstream viewpoint on how to assist Ukraine, how to respond to Russia, what to expect from NATO allies and how to deal with the inner cohesion of Estonia´s multi-ethnic and multilingual society has emerged. The least problematic has been the understanding of how to help Ukraine, with Estonia emerging as the leading donating nation per capita in 2022. As for the response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the majority of the Estonian public and elite support significantly more severe sanctions than those that have been enacted. Although there have been voices which have demanded the straightforward intervention of NATO in the conflict, the strongest consensus backs the view that the Western world should not become directly involved but should indirectly support Ukraine to a greater degree than it has managed to thus far. Despite its membership in NATO, the Estonian political and military elite, as well as the Estonian language part of the society remains afraid that Russia will use the same logic and action against the Baltic States. The main question for Estonia is if and when, after the end of the war in Ukraine, Russia might be ready and motivated to challenge NATO in the Baltic states.

The Russian federation uses several tools to allow it to place pressure on the western world in an asymmetric manner, among them being cyber-attacks, economic tools, and information-influence campaigns. These instruments are especially strongly felt in Estonia. This article uses Estonia’s example in order to delve into Russia’s political goals and strategic conduct. Specifically, analysis is provided in regard to the political context, instruments which form part of the ‘information war’, and any effective counter-measures, with all of this being carried out within the theoretical framework of constructivism. As will be argued, the shift from European to Eurasian power and Russia’s carefully crafted management process of not exceeding red lines, as well as its process of exploiting the socio-economic weaknesses of the west all play a relevant role in understanding the political context. As for instruments, Russia has developed tools which can be analysed in terms of strategic conspiracy narratives, while it has likewise used several channels which lie next to the usual media tools, along with policy tools such as Pax Russica and the compatriot policy.

The study relies on the assumption that, to some extent, the current misinterpretations and unrealistic expectations between Russia and the West are caused by linguistic and conceptual differences between the opponents. Thus, the aim of the study is to discuss the ways how Russia linguistically and conceptually understands and construes the terms normative power, deterrence, and sanctions. As the authors see it, deterrence, normative power, and sanctions constitute the three main elements in the toolbox used by the Western world in international relations to achieve its goals. However, none of these three terms has a clear and easily understandable meaning in the Russian language, furthermore, Russia’s psychological pattern does not overlap with the one of the Western countries, which makes it difficult to believe that these three elements have a chance to succeed in practice. The indication that the EU and NATO seek to move forward in terms of progress in the relations with Russia entails that challenges and limitations need to be accepted. It seems that normative power is the least likely to be accepted by Russian politicians and members of society out of the three aforementioned elements considering that its translation in the Russian language is linguistically complicated for Russians to understand and it is loaded with negative undertone of domination and disrespect. In this respect, sanctions might have slightly more chances to succeed, as Russia does not question the legitimacy of sanctions, furthermore, Russia might be motivated to find mutual understanding and search for compromises for this matter.

Atliekant tyrimą remiamasi prielaida, kad dabartinius Rusijos ir Vakarų klaidingus aiškinimus ir nerealius lūkesčius tam tikru mastu lemia oponentų lingvistiniai ir koncepcijų skirtumai. Taigi tyrimo tikslas – aptarti, kaip Rusija lingvistiškai ir konceptualiai suvokia ir aiškina sąvokas normatyvinė galia, atgrasinimas ir sankcijos. Autorių manymu, atgrasinimas, normatyvinė galia ir sankcijos sudaro tris pagrindinius Vakarų pasaulio naudojamų priemonių elementus, siekiant savo tikslų tarptautinių santykių srityje. Vis dėlto rusų kalboje nėra nustatyta nė vienos iš šių trijų sąvokų aiški ir lengvai suprantama reikšmė, be to, Rusijos psichologinis modelis iš dalies nesutampa su Vakarų šalių psichologiniu modeliu, dėl to mažiau tikėtina, kad šiuos tris elementus pavyks sėkmingai praktiškai pritaikyti. Nurodoma, kad tuo atveju, jei ES ir NATO siekia santykių su Rusija pažangos, būtina atsižvelgti į su tuo susijusius iššūkius ir apribojimus. Iš šių trijų elementų, atrodo, mažiausiai tikėtina, kad Rusijos politikai ir visuomenės nariai sutiks su normatyvine galia: šios sąvokos vertimas į rusų kalbą lingvistiniu požiūriu yra sudėtingas ir sunkiai suprantamas rusams, nes su juo siejamas neigiamas dominavimo ir nepagarbos atspalvis. Šiuo atžvilgiu yra šiek tiek didesnė tikimybė, kad pavyks sėkmingai pritaikyti sankcijas, nes Rusija nekvestionuoja sankcijų teisėtumo, be to, ji gali būti motyvuota siekti abipusio supratimo ir ieškoti kompromisų šiuo atžvilgiu.

This current study aims to assess the credibility of the deterrence posture provided by NATO in avoiding Russia’s potential aggression against the Baltic countries; what could the aggression scenarios look like; what should be done to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy and the ability of the Baltic countries to employ additional deterrence instruments. The focus of the analysis is on four components: capability (both nuclear and conventional military capabilities), communication, cohesion, and interdependence/acceptance of norms. In this way, the authors build-up their own framework to cover both the physical capabilities of potential parties to the conflict and behaviouralethical aspects related to the current security environment. The article demonstrates the challenges for the Alliance’s deterrence strategy and makes several suggestions of how to increase the credibility of NATO’s deterrence strategy to avoid Russia’s potential aggression.

Šios studijos tikslas yra įvertinti NATO pateikiamos atgrasymo laikysenos patikimumą, siekiant išvengti potencialios Rusijos agresijos prieš Baltijos šalis; nustatyti, kokie galėtų būti agresijos scenarijai; ką reikėtų padaryti, norint padidinti NATO atgrasymo strategijos patikimumą ir Baltijos šalių pajėgumą panaudoti papildomas atgrasymo priemones. Analizės dėmesys sutelktas į keturis komponentus: pajėgumai (ir branduoliniai, ir konvenciniai kariniai pajėgumai), komunikacija, vieningumas, normų tarpusavio priklausomybė / jų priėmimas. Taigi autoriai kuria savo tyrimo struktūrą taip, kad ji apimtų ir fizinius potencialių konflikto šalių pajėgumus, ir bihevioristinius-etinius aspektus, susijusius su dabartine saugumo aplinka. Straipsnis parodo Aljanso atgrasymo strategijos iššūkius ir pateikia keletą pasiūlymų, kaip padidinti NATO atgrasymo strategijos patikimumą, siekiant išvengti potencialios Rusijos agresijos.

Current study aims to analyse the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and related economic and political sanctions in the framework of game theory, debate the possible outcomes and to suggest the measures, which could contribute to the successful solution of the conflict. “The chicken dilemma” and “the dollar auction game” have been selected among various models for deeper analyse as matching the starting criteria and possible rational options for conflict endgame. The criteria of success and predicted success scenarios are seen different, but as the authors see it, in theory both Russia and the EU could be motivated to “pull back”. However, their willingness not to “lose the game” is determined in real terms by the “breaking points” that both parties to the conflict would like to avoid.