Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

The article analyzes how Germany, particularly through the Ukrainian crisis that began in 2014, has been placed at the decision-making center of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), thus becoming the de facto chief architect after Poland of the EU’s response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine. The article highlights the internal and external implications of this role, including in other policy areas in particular with regard to the Baltic States. To do so, we must first take a closer look at the principles of German foreign policy and the specific nature of German-Russian relations.

The aim of the scientific article is to reveal motives and features of using private military companies in Russian Federation foreign and security policy in 2014-2019. In order to do so, qualitative research method is applied, using case analysis method. From the analysis of the motives for the use of private military companies and conventional forces, it can be said that they are similar, as the use of both military structures allows to achieve more or less the same interests. However, it was observed that in terms of the specifics of the forces and the diversity scheme of social deviations, private military and security companies are more similar to regular forces. Nevertheless, both types of private companies help Russia avoid direct liability for various violations of the law. Considering the case of Russia analyzed in the study, the factors explained in the microtheory are adjusted, supplemented and interrelated. The analysis found that not all regions that are far from Russia are financially beneficial, but strategically, all give Russia an advantage over the United States.