This paper analyzes one-way attack UAV saturation and air defense adaptation using open-source attack data recorded by Shahed-136/131 UAVs in Ukraine. Descriptive statistics, correlation, regression, and non-parametric tests indicate rapid growth in UAV volume, partial saturation effects, and a clear distinction between kinetic destruction and broader neutralization. The study contributes a measurable counter-UAS assessment model that links attack volume, defensive performance, and small-state air defense planning.
The increasing weight and technological complexity of modern main battle tanks (MBTs), particularly the Leopard 2 series, impose substantial demands on military transport systems and supporting infrastructure. This study evaluates the logistical and infrastructural constraints associated with the transport of heavy armoured vehicles within the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) in the context of NATO military mobility requirements. The analysis focuses on both road and rail transport systems, with emphasis on technical compatibility, regulatory compliance, and operational feasibility. The methodological approach combines comparative analysis of vehicle and transport system parameters, empirical axle load measurements, and assessment of compliance with national legislation and NATO transport standards. The study further integrates infrastructure-oriented evaluation to capture systemic constraints affecting mobility performance. The results indicate that road transport operations frequently exceed permissible axle load limits defined by national legislation, while rail transport is constrained by insufficient wagon load capacity and limitations in vehicle securing systems. These constraints collectively reduce the operational flexibility of heavy armoured vehicle deployment. The findings demonstrate that current transport capabilities within the CAF are only partially sufficient for the deployment of Leopard 2 MBT without operational restrictions or reliance on external logistical support. These limitations negatively affect strategic mobility and rapid deployment capability, particularly within multinational operational frameworks. The study therefore highlights the need for continued modernisation of transport assets, adaptation of transport infrastructure, and closer alignment with NATO standardisation and European military mobility initiatives.
Pub. online:5 Jan 2026Type:Research WorkOpen Access
Journal:Mūsų žinynas
Volume 41, Issue 1 (2026), pp. 5–27
Abstract
Kognityvinis karas (angl. Cognitive Warfare) – tai kova dėl žmogaus sąmonės, suvokimo ir sprendimų. Jam svarbi ne tik fizinė erdvė, bet ir informacinė bei psichologinė erdvės, kur priešininkas siekia pakeisti, sugriauti ar valdyti asmens ir visuomenės mąstymo procesus. Autorių diskusijos apie kognityvinį karą apima ne tik propagandą ar informacines operacijas, bet ir platesnį poveikį žmogaus sąmonei. Tam įtakos turi ir technologiniai, psichologiniai bei kultūriniai elementai. Straipsnyje nagrinėjama, kaip kognityvinis karas tampa nauja konflikto dimensija, kurioje pagrindinis taikinys – žmogaus protas. Šiuolaikinės technologijos: dirbtinis intelektas, duomenų platformos, socialiniai tinklai – sudaro galimybes manipuliuoti žmogaus suvokimu, turimomis nuostatomis ir elgesiu. Kognityvinis karas atskleidžia ne tik gaunamos informacijos turinį, bet ir jos suvokimą, kuriuo yra keičiami pažinimo procesai. Straipsnis papildo esamus tyrimus, jame apžvelgiama kognityvinio karo koncepcijos raida ne tik iš teorinės (akademinės), bet ir iš institucinės (NATO) perspektyvos, jungiant į vientisą analizę, atskleidžiančią, kaip pažinimo procesai tampa šiuolaikinės gynybos politikos dalimi. NATO kontekste kognityvinis karas apibūdinamas kaip „mūšis dėl proto“, kuriuo siekiama formuoti sprendimų priėmimo procesą, o ne užgrobti fizinę erdvę.
Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine was a wake-up call for the entire international community and, in particular, for NATO Alliance. It became obvious that Europe is no longer at peace, and that serious steps should be taken by the Transatlantic collective defence Alliance. NATO intensified the adaptation of its deterrence and defence posture. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit marked a major shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and it was agreed to transition from defence by reinforcement to forward defence. The article discusses the concept of forward defence, its historical evolution and its practical implementation by NATO. It evaluates forward defence in relation to defence and deterrence strategies that existed during the Cold War and how they have changed over the time. It examines how forward defence contributes to the doctrinal conventional deterrence and defence principles and indicates major changes in collective defence. It debates whether and how NATO is experiencing a real paradigm shift in its doctrinal deterrence and defence perception and how forward defence can help ensure that every inch of the Allied territory is defended.
Journal:Mūsų žinynas
Volume 40, Issue 2 (2025), pp. 252–266
Abstract
The paper discloses theoretical approach of multi-domain military operations (later – MDO) and how it might be used by small NATO countries. Hereby NATO MDO is being understood as multinational approach, operational goal focused, joint armed force operations. Additional to this future warfare insights are being provided revealing difficulties of small NATO countries facing MDO or even higher level of military operations. In order to meet the goal of the article content analysis was executed disclosing various perspective on MDO and its’ application using official, public available information sources. The results of the paper determine difficulties for small NATO countries to execute MDO or even higher profile operations and for this case its’ leads to necessity to integrate national armed forces into bigger ones like NATO alliance. Final outcome of the paper disclose that modern warfare requires more than just MDO but rather joint all domain operations (later – JADO). Hereby JADO is new venue to face future conflict which goes beyond military domain and for this purpose small countries have to adopt accordingly.
The purpose of this investigation was to empirically assess the association between military expenditure and income inequality in the 19 European member states of NATO between 2011 and 2022. To achieve this, the authors carried out multivariate statistical analysis using Kaplan-Meier life tables and survival estimation techniques. The results highlighted a trend in the countries analysed that income inequality tended to decrease when investment in the military increased during the period under consideration. The association manifested itself in the shortest time in the group of countries with the lowest military spending per capita, while emerging in the longer term in the countries with the highest. Furthermore, under high threat of war, the association tends to be shortest in relative terms in countries with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The results also revealed that the association between military spending and income inequality is more pronounced in the smallest countries by population and those with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The authors believe that this investigation will enrich scientific knowledge with new insights.
Journal:Karo archyvas
Volume 36, Issue 1 (2021), pp. 169–197
Abstract
Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Lietuvos kariuomenės raida nuo 1994 iki 2004 m., t. y. Lietuvos pasirengimo narystei Šiaurės Atlanto gynybiniame aljanse laikotarpiu.1994–2004 m. Lietuvos krašto apsaugos sistema ir Lietuvos kariuomenė siekė užtikrinti valstybės gynybą, todėl turėjo įgyvendinti du labai sudėtingus uždavinius – kurti ir plėtoti nacionalines karines pajėgas ir kartu parengti jas narystei NATO. Šie uždaviniai buvo grindžiami dviem skirtingomis paradigmomis – modernios ir postmodernios kariuomenės, kas lėmė staigias Lietuvos kariuomenės transformacijas ir jų vertinimo prieštaringumą. Tačiau, nors buvo daugybė sunkumų ir sudėtinga situacija šalyje, Lietuvos kariuomenė per dešimt metų sugebėjo sukurti valstybės karinius pajėgumus, kurie atitiko NATO partnerėms keliamus reikalavimus, ir kartu įvykdė jai iškeltą prioritetinę Lietuvos Respublikos nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos politikos užduotį – Lietuva tapo Šiaurės Atlanto aljanso nare.
Journal:Karo archyvas
Volume 35, Issue 1 (2020), pp. 343–373
Abstract
Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas atkurtos Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos sistemos ginklų ir karo technikos įsigijimo 1990–2004 m. procesas, išskirti jo etapai, juos apibrėžiantys politiniai ir ekonominiai veiksniai, kilusios problemos, iššūkiai ir ypatumai. Tyrinėjama, kiek ir kokių ginklų būta Lietuvoje atkūrus nepriklausomybę ir kokią galimybę jais disponuoti turėjo atsikurianti Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsauga, iš kokių šaltinių ir kokiu būdu jų buvo įsigyjama.
The article contains systematic principles, features and procedures for conducting information and psychological operations in NATO countries. The concepts of information operation (IO), psychological (information-psychological) operations (PSYOPS), strategic communications are defined, as well as their differences and functional relationships in the context of Ukrainian national perception of these processes.
The following basic principles of IO and PSYOPS are highlighted and explained: truthfulness, consequentiality, consistency, coordination, understanding, timeliness and efficiency, evaluation, responsibility. The following features of the IO and PSYOPS are identified and explained: interaction with other units and components of the military operation, operational planning, targeting, operation evaluation, target evaluation.
The process of coordination, planning and organization of information activities is described, as well as their differences in the prism of the domestic experience of information and psychological activities.
The science article is dedicated to the actual problem reinforcement and reformation the system of information security in counties that relate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The main threatens to country’s information security has been defined, the analytical grouping of problems by level of complexity and prognostication calamity have been made. The process algorithm for ensuring eternal operation of the information security system under the pressure of information threaten was elaborated. The critical components of NATO information infrastructure was well-defined.