Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review

The study focuses on an indicative analysis and critical evaluation of tools and methods used for fact-checking, which represent a key instrument in combating disinformation within the contemporary media environment. In the context of the spread of false or manipulative narratives, particularly through social media and online platforms, systematic fact-checking may be one of the tools for preserving information integrity and protecting the public from harmful content. The aim of the study is to formulate recommendations, based on a constructively critical mapping of the current situation, which can contribute to more effective management of the related agenda.

The aim of this article is to propose a functional categorisation of counter-drone measures based on an analysis of selected technical and operational aspects of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) protection for critical infrastructure and soft targets in hybrid conflicts. Traditional UAV protection approaches based primarily on legislative regulation and UAV cooperation are necessary but insufficient. Problematic are non-cooperative drones, especially autonomous systems. Emphasis is given to active protection and hard-kill solutions.

By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.

The article discusses the use of technologies for influencing the weather by the main actors of international relations and the potential consequences of the use of these technologies on global security. The authors showed that technologies for influencing the weather are currently being actively studied and legally applied in developed countries of the world (for example, in the USA, China, Russia and the United Arab Emirates) for precipitation management. However, the use of such systems for military purposes can pose serious threats not only for countries using such technologies and their neighbors, but also on a global scale, especially since the consequences of using methods of influencing the weather are not well understood in the long term. The authors believe that one of the ways to control the use of technologies for influencing weather on global level is the creation of a special international monitoring service, which will be responsible for coordinating research and the use of weather management technologies by states.

This article discusses the Ukrainian legislation on cybersecurity. The necessity of developing an efficient cybersecurity system was raised by the hybrid war conducted by Russia over the last few years, in which many critical infrastructure objects have been destroyed with serious consequences not only for the end consumers but also for the security of the state. Consequently, Ukraine has begun issuing a number of laws aiming at strengthening its cyber defense capabilities by establishing an efficient national cybersecurity system. The analysis has clearly shown that although important steps have already been taken in this direction, much still remains to be done to protect the Ukrainian critical infrastructure.