The concept of hybrid threats plays an increasingly important role in the security studies agenda, as it raises awareness about the multidimensional nature of contemporary security. Hybrid threats are considered hostile activities that involve the simultaneous use of two or more types of threats and are controlled or coordinated by a specific actor, whether state or non-state. Some experts may argue that hybrid threats are the most prevalent type of threat in the European security landscape at present. As a result, the focus of research has shifted to an investigation into this phenomenon and the vulnerabilities that make a country weaker in the face of emerging hybrid threats. However, much less attention has been paid to the subjective perception of hybrid threats in particular societal and historical contexts, as well as their impact on security policy-making. This article analyses the perceptions of Latvian society in regard to its vulnerability to hybrid threats, as well as how these perceptions are reflected in the main security policy documents. It is concluded that the Latvian population recognises certain hybrid threats as being current in their security agenda. This is especially true of information and cyber threats. On the other hand, the analysis of the key national security documents reveals the lack of a well-defined agenda for preventing and combating hybrid threats.
The presence of NATO troops in the Baltic states has increased in the last years due to changing international environment, increased level of potential risks and threats, and necessity to enhance deterrence in the region. As a result of NATO’s Wales and Warsaw summits decisions, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are entitled to host a battalion size battle group. The article aims at investigating how host nation support (HNS) can contribute to the national defence and, additionally, to the self-defence capabilities of the Baltic states. The concept of HNS is present in the national defence concepts of all three countries. However, its active application and utilization started in the last two years. The article argues that more intensive incorporation of an HNS system in national defence policies serve the capability development in fields like national military logistics, infrastructure, and civil-military cooperation. Those capabilities can serve as an extension of the national defence.
Pastaruoju metu NATO karių Baltijos valstybėse padaugėjo dėl kintančios tarptautinės aplinkos, padidėjusio potencialių pavojų ir grėsmių lygio ir būtinybės sustiprinti atgrasymo priemones regione. Varšuvoje ir Velse vykusiuose NATO viršūnių susitikimuose priimtų sprendimų pagrindu Estija, Latvija ir Lietuva turės priimti bataliono dydžio kovines grupes. Straipsnyje siekiama išnagrinėti, kaip priimančiosios šalies parama (PŠP; angl. Host Nation Support, HNS) gali prisidėti prie nacionalinės gynybos ir prie Baltijos valstybių savarankiškos gynybos pajėgumų. PŠP sąvoka figūruoja visų trijų šalių nacionalinės gynybos koncepcijose. Tačiau ją pradėta aktyviai naudoti ir taikyti tik per pastaruosius dvejus metus. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad intensyvesnis PŠP sistemos inkorporavimas į nacionalinės gynybos politiką padeda plėtoti pajėgumus tokiose srityse kaip nacionalinė karinė logistika, infrastruktūra ir civilių ir karių bendradarbiavimas. Šie pajėgumai gali būti naudingi kaip nacionalinės gynybos tąsa.