Countries are changing their military measures and strategies, thus they increasingly recruit private military and security companies or private military companies to pursue their interests instead of their regular forces. The aim of the research article is to reveal the motives and features of the use of private military companies in Russia’s foreign and security policy of 2014–2019. The novelty and relevance of the research object have prompted the use of the microtheory, i.e., the principal-agent theory, the application of which in political sciences has started just recently. It provides the basis for the assessment of the motives and features which led to recruitment of private military companies for the purposes of Russia’s foreign and security policy. The qualitative research method was selected in order to achieve this aim: the case analysis method was applied for the purpose of selection of the cases, i.e., regions: Syria, North-East and Central Africa, Ukraine, and Venezuela, focussing on the analysis of the factors which led to Russia’s decision to recruit private military companies instead of the regular forces.
Based on the analysis of the motives for using private military companies and conventional forces, we may claim that they are similar, because the use of both military structures enables achieving somewhat the same interests. Nevertheless, it was noted that, based on the specifics of the forces and the chart encompassing the variety of social deviations, private military and security companies are more similar to the regular forces. Nevertheless, both types of private companies help Russia avoid direct liability for various violations of the law.
The factors explained in the microtheory are adjusted, expanded, and correlated by taking into account the case of Russia analysed within the course of the research. The analysis of the case of Russia also has shown that the Kremlin faced only one problem explained by the principal-agent theory, i.e., agency slack. The analysis has shown that not all regions located further away from Russia were useful in terms of finances, but all of them gave Russia advantage over the USA in respect of strategy.
Valstybės keičia savo karines priemones ir strategijas, vis dažniau savo interesams įgyvendinti pasitelkia ne reguliariąsias pajėgas, o privačias karines ir saugumo kompanijas arba privačias karines kompanijas. Šiame straipsnyje siekiama atskleisti privačių karinių kompanijų panaudojimo Rusijos užsienio ir saugumo politikoje 2014–2019 m. motyvus ir bruožus. Dėl tiriamojo objekto naujumo ir aktualumo tyrimas atliekamas naudojant neseniai politikos moksluose pradėtą taikyti mikroteoriją – samdytojo ir samdinio teoriją. Remiantis ja, galima įvertinti šio reiškinio bruožus ir motyvus, kurie lėmė privačių karinių kompanijų pasitelkimo Rusijos užsienio ir saugumo politikoje poreikį. Šiam tikslui pasiekti pasirinktas kokybinio tyrimo metodas: taikant atvejo analizės metodą, atrinkti atvejai, t. y. regionai – Sirijos, Šiaurės rytų ir Centrinės Afrikos, Ukrainos ir Venesuelos, ir analizuojami veiksniai, lėmę Rusijos sprendimą pasitelkti ne reguliariąsias pajėgas, o privačias karines kompanijas. Atsižvelgiant į pasirinkimo naudoti privačias karines kompanijas ir konvencines pajėgas motyvų analizę galima teigti, jog jie yra panašūs, nes pasitelkus abi karines struktūras galima įgyvendinti daugmaž tokius pat interesus. Vis dėlto pastebėta, jog pagal pajėgų specifiką ir socialinių nukrypimų įvairovės schemą privačios karinės ir saugumo kompanijos yra labiau panašios į reguliariąsias pajėgas. Nepaisant to, abiejų tipų privačios kompanijos padeda Rusijai išvengti tiesioginės atsakomybės už įvairius teisės pažeidimus.
Atsižvelgiant į tyrime analizuojamą Rusijos atvejį koreguojami, pildomi ir tarpusavyje siejami, remiantis minėta mikroteorija, aiškinami veiksniai. Analizuojant Rusijos atvejį pastebėta, jog Kremlius susiduria tik su viena samdytojo ir samdinio teorijos iškelta problema – samdinių vangumu, taip pat jog ne visi regionai, nutolę nuo Rusijos, finansiškai jai naudingi, tačiau visi suteikia Rusijai strateginę persvarą JAV atžvilgiu.
The aim of the scientific article is to reveal motives and features of using private military companies in Russian Federation foreign and security policy in 2014-2019. In order to do so, qualitative research method is applied, using case analysis method. From the analysis of the motives for the use of private military companies and conventional forces, it can be said that they are similar, as the use of both military structures allows to achieve more or less the same interests. However, it was observed that in terms of the specifics of the forces and the diversity scheme of social deviations, private military and security companies are more similar to regular forces. Nevertheless, both types of private companies help Russia avoid direct liability for various violations of the law. Considering the case of Russia analyzed in the study, the factors explained in the microtheory are adjusted, supplemented and interrelated. The analysis found that not all regions that are far from Russia are financially beneficial, but strategically, all give Russia an advantage over the United States.
This work is beneficial for researchers doing study cases on Russian Federation foreign and security policy. Due to the novelty and relevance of the research object, a new microtheory in political science has been applied. Research is carried out using principal-agent theory which was only used analyzing US case.