Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

Military could perform different roles in a state. In democracies civilian control and supervise of the military leaves it acting in the defense areas mostly. In military juntas, the military is involved in a state governing, but usually does not intervene other spheres of social life. The extreme of military influence and domination is a military state phenomenon. Here the military not only leads the governing but also transferes its values, culture and philosophy to the entire state. There have been military states in the past but what we see today in a majority of cases are military juntas. Russia under Putin rule is different. The military here is becoming a leading pover, a provider of ideas and a realizer of tasks. It is loved and admired by Russian elites and is spreading own culture and values to all society. Some time ago, Russian experts analyzing a process of military infiltration into administrative and political areas of statehood named this as a militocracy. Now militocracy is expanding, the military organization is penetrating country’s leadership minds and hearts and moving the entire state to a status where social, cultural and economical and other spheres of life become dominated by military with the military mindset prevailing. The military values and institutional characteristics become dominative as well. The state become almost a military state. This situation became possible due to Russian military organization remaining a Prussian military type creature with specific philosophy, values, working culture, etc. To succed in domination and secure achievements, the military organization worked out an entire system of programs and actions allowing not only regaining a power but strenghen own positions. Next to a physical infiltration of the military personnel into other social groups, those actions also include designing and applying a military “Modus of Operandi” in the state governing, spreading military mindset, culture, values to the nation and participating in a creation new Russian elites.

Changes in the state governance in Russia continues. The reasons why those changes are made could be found in “Russian Doctrine” an academic work of Russian right wing academia, which recommends establishing in Russia a new type of empire - a network based hierarchical governing system. Without publicly announcing the Doctrine as own ideological doctrine V. Putin uses it as a guidance. While restoring Russia as a global power he sees this type of governance as the best condition to maintain his own status as well. With V. Putin coming from the military organization which appreciates efficiency achieved though centralised management, synchronized activities and application of technologies, the changes are achieved by applying same principles in political statements and official documents and implemented in structural changes and applications of technologies.

All Zapad exercises which took place after the collapse of the former Soviet Union (in 1999, 2009, 2013 and 2017) attracted the attention of neighboring countries and led to different estimates and conclusions. Every exercise had something particular happening which could not be explained or understood in the West. Step by step, while analyzing Zapad exercises and changes in Russia and its armed forces, sufficient information was gathered allowing for the partial explanation of the behavior of Russian forces during different exercises, and the reasons why they acted in such a manner.

Visi po SSSR žlugimo vykę Zapad mokymai (1999, 2009, 2013 ir 2017 metais) pritraukdavo kaimyninių valstybių dėmesį ir iššaukdavo skirtingus vertinimus. Kiekvieną kartą jų metu vykdavo kažkas tokio, ką Vakarų valstybėms buvo sunku suprasti ir paaiškinti. Palaipsniui, vertinant tiek Zapad mokymus, tiek Rusijoje ir jos ginkluotose pajėgose vykstančius pasikeitimus, buvo surinkta pakankamai informacijos ir įrodymų, leidžiančių dalinai paaiškinti Rusijos pajėgų veiksmų skirtingu Zapad metu niuansus bei priežastis, kodėl taip buvo elgiamasi.

Iš pradžių dauguma ekspertų 2008 m. Rusijos gynybos ministerijos pradėtą karinę reformą laikė eiline, nesėkmei pasmerkta politinės vadovybės avantiūra. Tada daugelis skelbė apie greitą jos žlugimą, tačiau šiandien jau pripažįstama, kad ši nuostata buvo klaidinga. Dar daugiau, dabar jau akivaizdu, kad reforma tęsiasi ir plečiasi, pereidama iš Rusijos Federacijos gynybos ministerijai pavaldžių pajėgų reformos į visos valstybės karinės sistemos reformą. Rusijos veiksmai panaudojant reformos metu sukurtus karinius pajėgumus Kryme ir Ukrainoje, tolesnis reformos tęsimas ir išplėtimas į kitas valstybės struktūras, jos įtaka naujo tipo karinių pajėgumų rengimui ir sampratai apie valstybės funkcionavimą karo metu rodo, kad šalies politinės vadovybės požiūris ir pasiryžimas užbaigti tai, kas pradėta išlieka ir nesimato jokių ženklų, kad pradėto darbo bus atsisakyta. Visa tai verčia pradėti galvoti, kodėl Rusija skiria milžiniškus resursus ir deda daug pastangų sukurti kokybiškus naujus tiek Rusijos Federacijos gynybos ministerijos, tiek kitus valstybės karinio funkcionavimo mechanizmus, pajėgas ir sąlygas, kad jie galėtų būtų sėkmingai panaudoti.

Back in 2008 a majority of experts tended to take Russia’s military reform as a potential failure and an adventurist step by the Russian political leadership. At that time proclamations about its fast failure were quite popular, but today a majority accepts that the prognosis of failure was premature. In actual fact, today it is becoming evident that the reform is not only succeeding but is already starting to affect the entire state’s military system. The actions of the reformed Russian armed forces in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, a strong willingness to continue with changes in their defense forces, and an extension of the reform into other state institutions show that the Russian political leadership is dedicated to finish what has been started and there are no signs of any changes in course. All this raises the following questions: why is Russia ready to sacrifice huge resources and to go to such effort to create an essentially new military and to create an effective mechanism to run the state in wartime, and what situation would be the most suitable for the use of those assets.

This study will discuss briefly the history of missile defense, the concept of its design, created by a pioneer of the system—the USA—, as well as differences and similarities of three different and more or less functional missile defense systems existing today. The indirect influence and impact of a missile defense system to defense policies and international relations will be presented in brief as well. Additionally, the following points of popular discussion will be addressed: the potential of missile defense to substitute nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence and its role as an instrument of propaganda and pretext to justify actions will be discussed in more detail. At the end of the study, based on all the prior-named features of the missile defense system organization design and known differences of existing US, NATO and Russian missile defense systems, the feasibility of the creation of a single missile defense system, proposed by Russia, will be explored.

Šioje studijoje pristatoma priešraketinės gynybos sistemos atsiradimo istorija, šios sistemos pradininkės JAV sukurta sistemos organizavimo koncepcija ir aptariami pagrindinių trijų skirtingų dabar daugiau ar mažiau realiai funkcionuojančių priešraketinės gynybos sistemų panašumai ir skirtumai. Taip pat trumpai aptariama, kaip priešraketinės gynybos sistemos gali tiesiogiai ir netiesiogiai daryti įtaką ne tik karinės veiklos, bet ir tarptautinių santykių ar gynybos politikos sritims. Taip pat aptariami du dabar akivaizdžiausi nekariniai priešraketinės gynybos vaidmenys: jos potencialas pakeisti branduolinius ginklus, daryti įtaką branduolinio atgrasymo politikai ir jos, kaip propagandos instrumento ar argumento ir preteksto savo tikslams pateisinti, vaidmuo. Studijos pabaigoje, remiantis joje įvardintais, priešraketinės gynybos kūrimo ir panaudojimo ypatumais, taip pat skirtingais JAV ir Rusijos priešraketinės gynybos organizavimo principais, įvertinama Rusijos siūlomos vienos bendros priešraketinės gynybos sistemos kūrimo galimybė.

Šiandienos ginkluotųjų pajėgų reforma, skirtingai nuo iki šiol vykusių ir reformomis vadinamų pajėgų mažinimų, numato visas pajėgas pakeisti iš esmės. Jai rengtasi ilgai. Nors oficialiai ji pradėta 2008 m. pabaigoje, tačiau pirmosios idėjos sklandė jau nuo 2005 metų, kad Rusijos kariuomenė turėsianti būti efektyvi, panaudotina taikos ir karo metu ir tokia, kad šalis galėtų ją išlaikyti. Ši reforma užtruks ne vienerius metus, todėl yra vykdoma etapais. Nors ją pabaigti numatyta 2020 m. tačiau jau šiandien pasiektas taškas, kai grįžti į priešreforminę būklę nebeįmanoma. Rusijos politinei vadovybei demonstruojant tvirtą valią ją užbaigti, jau 2012–2015 m. bus atlikti beveik visi struktūriniai pajėgų pertvarkymai, o likusieji metai bus skirti perginklavimui. Sėkmingai ją įvykdžius, Rusijos ginkluotosios pajėgos gali tapti vienomis iš geriausių pasaulio pajėgų. Šioje studijoje aptarsime reformos tikslus, jos etapų ypatumus, spėjamą rezultatą bei būdus, kuriuos Rusijos politinė vadovybė ketina panaudoti šiam rezultatui pasiekti.

Unlike previous downsizings of the military forces which were called reforms, the present military reform is designed to essentially change all the forces. Its preparation took a long time. Although officially it was launched at the end of 2008, the first ideas that the Russian Military would have to be effective, used at peacetime and in war and be maintainable by the country emerged as early as 2005. This reform is going to take a long time and will be carried out in stages. Though it is planned to be completed by 2020, it has reached the point today that makes it impossible to go back to the pre-reform state. With the Russian political authorities showing their strong will to complete it, in 2012-2015 nearly all structural reorganizations will be finished and the remaining years will be devoted to rearmament. After successful implementation of the reform, the Russian Armed Forces may become one of the best militaries in the world. This study is intended to discuss the objectives of the reform, peculiarities of its stages, the foreseeable result as well as the ways which the Russian political authorities plan to use to achieve this result.