Generolo Jono Žemaičio Lietuvos karo akademija

The purpose of the paper is to assess the impact of corporate governance on Vietnam banks’ performance measured by ROA (return on assets) and OER (operating efficiency ratio). The article uses a research method which is a quantitative research method through the construction of a binary Probit model with two aggregate variables, namely Macroeconomic indicators and financial index variables. The results are consistent with prior research findings, and more importantly, presents statistical justification for pursuing further corporate governance reforms to enhance Vietnam banks’ performance. These findings also lay a foundation for policy makers to make necessary changes to improve corporate governance (i.e role of board of directors, shareholder issues) of Vietnam banks in the future. Social Implications: the study used Vietnam listed banks’ financial data collected covering a period 2008 to 2018. The findings indicated that board size, CEO duality and large shareholder had statistically significant effect on bank performance in both ROA (return on assets) and OER (operating efficiency ratio). While institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders made no impact on Vietnam banks’ performance.

This study aims to examine the effect of corporate attributes and corporate governance mechanisms on accounting conservatism in politically connected firms. This study uses 806 company-year observations consisting of large companies registered for 13 years from 2005-2017. Moderation regression analysis panel data is used for the analysis. Using two conservatism measurements, namely accrual and book-market, the results of the study show that the two models are inconsistent in producing tests for the influence of company attributes but are consistent in producing tests of corporate governance mechanisms. Firm size, profitability, audit committee, independent board, and audit litigation are the determinants of accounting conservatism in large companies. Independent Commissioners and audit committees as an internal mechanism of corporate governance negatively affects the application of accounting conservatism. The results of this study are also consistent with testing the interaction of political connections that strengthen the audit committee’s negative influence on the level of corporate conservatism. These results provide empirical evidence that the existence of an independent commissioner or audit committee weakens the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on the application of accounting conservatism in politically connected companies. Looking at the educational background and work experience and free from political elements, so that the existence of the board of commissioners and the audit committee are no longer considered a rubber stamp for the policies that have been made by management. This study is the first to investigate the moderation of political connections on corporate attributes and GCG mechanisms towards comprehensive accounting conservatism.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of women empowerment through board diversity along with governance variables on capital structure and leverage dimensions. To achieve this objective, sample of 35 business firms over 2012-2016 is collected in the region of Thailand. Secondary data approach is implemented with descriptive and regression analysis. It is found that board diversity (presence of female members) is significantly associated to capital structure and leverage pattern. With the presence of firm age, fixed payments and risk factor, this effect is found to be true for total loan and leverage factors but insignificant for the debt to equity ratio. Effect of board size on capital structure and leverage dimensions is also found to be significant. Meanwhile, effect of age on debt ratio and total loan is positively significant but negatively significant for total leverage. Practical significance of the study covers managerial implication in the field of corporate governance and risk-taking behavior through capital structure and leverage.