last decade. However, the significance of this issue escalated in the early 2000s following the accession of former Eastern Bloc countries to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which coincided with increased Alliance attention to energy security as a strategic concern. The onset of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, marked a period of heightened energy security uncertainty in Europe, bringing the issue to the forefront of both EU and NATO institutional discourse. This study employs securitization theory to explore the research question: How do the European Union and NATO differ in their institutional securitization of energy security during the period 2022–2024? Drawing on qualitative discourse analysis, it examines official institutional documents, statements, and strategic communications issued by both organizations. The analysis shows that energy security was framed as a security concern by both organizations throughout the period under review, although it was articulated in distinct ways that reflected each organization’s institutional context and mandate. By comparatively analyzing these discursive practices, the article contributes to the literature on securitization and international organizations by highlighting variations in how energy security is framed during periods of crisis.
Recent years have been very turbulent for the small NATO member states located near the Russian border. Concerns about the credibility of collective deterrence and overall solidarity have been growing since the start of Donald Trump’s second presidency. For the Baltic states bordering Russia, the potential withdrawal of United States military support from Europe, as well as the insufficient levels of stockpiles and defense readiness among European states, have created a significant erosion of security. Baltic needs and expectations regarding European NATO powers could be better articulated and more focused once the United States’ levels of commitment and solidarity are clarified. The primary questions, however, center on how much of the Baltic states’ future survival is in their own hands and how much depends primarily on global powers with their own ambitions and preferences in the region. New affordable and acceptable solutions need to be found quickly, collectively, and at the intra-state level. Ankara’s NATO meeting in 2026 has brought some positive energy to Baltic security and deterrence options during Trump’s second presidency. Long-expected contributions from NATO to Baltic defense and security have not only been debated but also promised.
Growing maritime activity, climate driven changes, and geopolitical competition are increasing the strategic importance of the Arctic and raising new security concerns for NATO. This study examines how defence and security professionals in Lithuania perceive Arctic geopolitical risks, NATO maritime preparedness, regional threats, and future security scenarios. A quantitative survey was conducted using a five point Likert scale. Data were analysed using descriptive statistics, Spearman rank correlation, the Kruskal Wallis test, and K-Means cluster analysis. Three distinct respondent opinion clusters were identified: Manageable Situation, Lowest Perceived Threat, and Growing Threat. The results showed that stronger perceptions of geopolitical competition were associated with higher perceived escalation risk. Perceived Russian threat was positively associated with support for increased NATO investment in long term Arctic capabilities. In contrast, assessments of NATO preparedness and respondents' professional experience were not significantly associated with perceived escalation risk. The findings indicate that support for stronger NATO engagement in the Arctic is mainly shaped by perceptions of specific security threats rather than general assessments of NATO capabilities. The study supports continued attention to long term maritime capability development, regional cooperation, and changing Arctic security conditions.
This study evaluates the implementation of NATO environmental protection requirements across operational phases using a checklist-based gap analysis. Eight environmental domains within the Czech Armed Forces were assessed by comparing current and target states of compliance. Results indicate overall high to full implementation, with full compliance achieved in waste management, POL handling, HAZMAT and water management. Higher implementation gaps persist in air quality, energy management, and infrastructure planning, reflecting sensitivity to operational constraints. The findings confirm that environmental compliance is phase-dependent and influenced by infrastructure, logistics, and resource availability, highlighting the need for scalable and early integrated environmental measures.
Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) have become central to NATO’s approach to future warfare, requiring the integration of military effects across Land, Sea, Air, Cyberspace, and Space. This article analyses whether the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) adequately reflects the capability requirements generated by the MDO concept. Drawing on unclassified NATO documents and open sources, the study identifies structural misalignment between domain‑centric capability planning and the integrative, data‑centric demands of MDO, and outlines implications for the adaptation of NATO defence planning.
This paper examines the role of training programme accreditation in enhancing interoperability within NATO. A case study of the Slovak JTAC programme supported by SWOT analysis and document review was applied. In this paper we have found that accreditation improves procedural standardisation, technological compatibility and operational performance, while revealing resource and organisational challenges. The study expands understanding of interoperability through a multi-layered framework as a research implication. Recommendations support optimisation of training, resource use and capability development which is a clear practical implication. Originality and value have been achieved by providing a unique empirical view of accreditation as a key tool for strengthening NATO's interoperability.
This paper analyses projections of defence expenditure in the Bucharest Nine (B9) countries in the context of NATO’s new commitment from the 2025 Hague Summit. Based on historical data and national declarations, we model two scenarios for development through 2035: the baseline trend and national ambition. The results show significant polarization within B9 countries. While the countries of the northeastern flank (Poland, the Baltic states) are accelerating toward 5.5% of GDP, the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans are converging more toward the baseline level of 3.5%. The study identifies the fiscal limits of this transformation and structural differences in the implementation of the new alliance goals.).
This study evaluates the role of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in demining operations and environmental monitoring under wartime and post-conflict conditions. A structured literature review (2015–present) assessed UAV-enabled detection, mapping, and environmental sensing capabilities. The results indicate that UAVs significantly enhance reconnaissance efficiency, reduce suspected hazardous areas, and improve safety, yet cannot independently meet humanitarian clearance standards. While wartime use prioritises rapid risk mitigation, post-conflict deployment supports systematic clearance, environmental monitoring, and land restoration. The study highlights a gap in doctrinal integration and underscores the need for standardised UAV-based demining and environmental workflows.
Military expenditures represent an important component of government spending devoted to the provision of national defense as a core public good. Despite their importance, no universally accepted definition of military expenditure exists, as national governments and international organizations apply differing conceptual and methodological approaches. This paper examines the evolution of defense burden, measured as military expenditure as a share of gross domestic product across NATO member countries from 2010 to 2025, with particular attention to NATO spending commitments adopted at the Wales Summit in 2014, all within the context of the current defense spending commitment adopted during the Hague Summit in 2025. Using SIPRI military expenditure data, defense burden trends are analyzed in three periods: pre-2014, post-2014 and pre-2022, and post-2022 following the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The results reveal a long-term shift from declining defense burdens prior to 2014 toward a sustained increase across most NATO members after the Wales Summit, with a pronounced acceleration after 2022. While the NATO-wide average defense burden rose above 2% of GDP by 2025, significant disparities among member states persist. A detailed case study of the Czech Republic demonstrates a broadly similar but lagging trajectory, with defense spending consistently remaining below NATO average and median values and failing to reach the 2% GDP threshold by 2025. The findings underscore structural differences in burden sharing within NATO and highlight the relevance of past spending behavior for assessing the credibility of current and future defense commitments.
This article examines the political responses of NATO member states to the 2025 Hague Pledge, which combines a 3.5% core defence target with a 1.5% resilience component. Based on structured qualitative coding of official statements, government documents, and media reports, it develops the Hague Negotiation Score (HNS) for 25 member states. The findings show that formal consensus masks significant differences: strong support is concentrated among allies on the eastern flank and the United Kingdom, while others accept, reinterpret, postpone, or resist this commitment. The article adds an ex-ante perspective to debates on burden-sharing within NATO.