Challenges to national defence in contemporary geopolitical situation

Russia’s large-scale war against Ukraine was a wake-up call for the entire international community and, in particular, for NATO Alliance. It became obvious that Europe is no longer at peace, and that serious steps should be taken by the Transatlantic collective defence Alliance. NATO intensified the adaptation of its deterrence and defence posture. The 2022 NATO Madrid Summit marked a major shift in NATO’s deterrence and defence posture, and it was agreed to transition from defence by reinforcement to forward defence. The article discusses the concept of forward defence, its historical evolution and its practical implementation by NATO. It evaluates forward defence in relation to defence and deterrence strategies that existed during the Cold War and how they have changed over the time. It examines how forward defence contributes to the doctrinal conventional deterrence and defence principles and indicates major changes in collective defence. It debates whether and how NATO is experiencing a real paradigm shift in its doctrinal deterrence and defence perception and how forward defence can help ensure that every inch of the Allied territory is defended.

The purpose of this investigation was to empirically assess the association between military expenditure and income inequality in the 19 European member states of NATO between 2011 and 2022. To achieve this, the authors carried out multivariate statistical analysis using Kaplan-Meier life tables and survival estimation techniques. The results highlighted a trend in the countries analysed that income inequality tended to decrease when investment in the military increased during the period under consideration. The association manifested itself in the shortest time in the group of countries with the lowest military spending per capita, while emerging in the longer term in the countries with the highest. Furthermore, under high threat of war, the association tends to be shortest in relative terms in countries with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The results also revealed that the association between military spending and income inequality is more pronounced in the smallest countries by population and those with the lowest military expenditure per capita. The authors believe that this investigation will enrich scientific knowledge with new insights.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Lietuvos kariuomenės raida nuo 1994 iki 2004 m., t. y. Lietuvos pasirengimo narystei Šiaurės Atlanto gynybiniame aljanse laikotarpiu.1994–2004 m. Lietuvos krašto apsaugos sistema ir Lietuvos kariuomenė siekė užtikrinti valstybės gynybą, todėl turėjo įgyvendinti du labai sudėtingus uždavinius – kurti ir plėtoti nacionalines karines pajėgas ir kartu parengti jas narystei NATO. Šie uždaviniai buvo grindžiami dviem skirtingomis paradigmomis – modernios ir postmodernios kariuomenės, kas lėmė staigias Lietuvos kariuomenės transformacijas ir jų vertinimo prieštaringumą. Tačiau, nors buvo daugybė sunkumų ir sudėtinga situacija šalyje, Lietuvos kariuomenė per dešimt metų sugebėjo sukurti valstybės karinius pajėgumus, kurie atitiko NATO partnerėms keliamus reikalavimus, ir kartu įvykdė jai iškeltą prioritetinę Lietuvos Respublikos nacionalinio saugumo ir gynybos politikos užduotį – Lietuva tapo Šiaurės Atlanto aljanso nare.

Straipsnyje nagrinėjamas atkurtos Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsaugos sistemos ginklų ir karo technikos įsigijimo 1990–2004 m. procesas, išskirti jo etapai, juos apibrėžiantys politiniai ir ekonominiai veiksniai, kilusios problemos, iššūkiai ir ypatumai. Tyrinėjama, kiek ir kokių ginklų būta Lietuvoje atkūrus nepriklausomybę ir kokią galimybę jais disponuoti turėjo atsikurianti Lietuvos Respublikos krašto apsauga, iš kokių šaltinių ir kokiu būdu jų buvo įsigyjama.

Romania’s membership of NATO and the European Union has many advantages, but also risks for each of them. Romania continues to strengthen its position and role within NATO and the EU. Romania has shown that it is a loyal and credible partner in its relationship with all international organizations. Romania’s strategic documents with NATO and the EU are well structured and clear. These include mission, vision, strategic objectives and ways of cooperating with each other, as well as the financial, material, human and informational resources needed to implement them. The objective of our research was to identify the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities of Romania as a NATO member state. The analysis has led to the discovery of new ways of reducing risks and threats, as well as solving the major vulnerabilities of Romania. The research is based on the National Defense Strategy, the Romanian Armed Forces Endowment Plan for the period 2019-2028 and other strategic documents underpinning the development of the cooperation between Romania and NATO. Within the analysis process the main threats, risks and vulnerabilities of Romania in relation to NATO were identified. Based on the analysis carried out, several ways of action are proposed through which Romania can strengthen its defense and security capabilities. The results of the research are relevant both theoretically and practically because they show the major changes that Romania has made after entering NATO and the exceptional performances achieved both in the development of the defense and security capability and in fulfilling the commitments assumed by Romania with NATO and other organizations it belongs to.