The Russian Federation, with its plans to regain influence over former Soviet bloc countries, currently constitutes the main military danger for the EU and NATO. Because the war is so close to the EU’s borders, European allies have every reason to increase army financing instead of fuelling a transatlantic disagreement about burden sharing. This article deals with the question of whether the high strategic threat posed by Russia has increased military spending among European allies and decreased free-riding practices after 2014. To analyse this problem, we applied Spearman’s Rank Correlation test and then made a comparative analysis of 21 countries that are both EU and NATO members. Our results confirmed that European allies did not react in the same way to the Russian threat. We proved that strategic factors played a key role in the majority of Eastern European members of NATO, but not across Western European allies.
The article is devoted to the study of cybersecurity as a component of the national security of the state. It has been established that the development of information and telecommunication technologies testifies to the progress of society but also determines the security risks of their use. In particular, this refers to a cyberattack and other cyberthreats. It has been determined that cybersecurity should be understood as the protection of the vital interests of a person and citizen, society and the state when using cyberspace. An important role in ensuring such a security is played by the cyberthreat protection mechanism, which provides for the development and adoption of a cybersecurity strategy, the creation of a national cybersecurity system, strengthening of the security and defense sector’s capabilities to effectively combat military cyberthreats, cyberterrorism, and ensuring cyberprotection of state electronic information resources and information infrastructure. The existence of the Cybersecurity Strategy of Ukraine and other acts as the legal basis for countering cyberthreats has been noted. In turn, the national cybersecurity system provides for the activities of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Police of Ukraine, the National Bank of Ukraine, and intelligence agencies. In turn, in France, Finland, Germany, the central place in the cybersecurity system belongs to the National Cybersecurity Agency, the National Cybersecurity Center, and the Cyberdefense Center, respectively. Despite Ukraine’s significant steps towards increasing cybersecurity in the state, there is no public-private cooperation in this area. Due to this, authorized entities should establish cooperation with the non-state sector and establish effective institutional and legal instruments for such cooperation. At the same time, the issue of public-private cooperation in the field of cybersecurity is relevant for all states of the world in view of the global nature of existing cyberthreats.
The methodical approach to the integrated evaluation of the energy independence of the country and its regions has been improved based on the multidimensional mean, which includes the selection of statistical indicators, the choice of the base of their normalization, the use of the analytic hierarchy process for evaluation of weighting coefficients and the method of aggregation of indicators in the integrated evaluation of energy independence. Using the coverage ratio of consumption with the production of fuel and energy resources, the state of energy dependence has been analyzed for some world countries, which have successes in conducting the energy policy and experience of which should be implemented in the national strategy for the development of the energy complex. The calculation of integral indicators of energy independence for each region will make it possible to determine the “strong” and “weak” regions in the energy sector, identify the reasons of lagging of the most “energy-dependent” areas, and develop appropriate recommendations for improving energy independence for each region.
Public procurement as a system of procedures for purchasing goods and services is quite complex. Especially having in mind international legal regulation and high requirements for the assurance of such principles as transparency, fair competition, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality. Thus from the other side of the issue, in special fields as defence and national security, it is not always possible to strictly observe the mentioned rules. Institutions in a state, which is facing threats, must be able to flexibly; this would allow balancing the urgency and competiveness of purchasing procedures. Still such situations require clear managing system and legal regulation supporting it. In this article, the authors present the preliminary analysis of management of public procurement for defence and security via disaster management cycle theory and mostly focus on the phase of response towards certain destructive actions. The managerial aspect of the issue is supplemented by the analysis of the legal regulation, which should support managerial processes. Having in mind that in different phases of the disaster management cycle, different methods of management (requiring special legal regulation, as legitimation of such actions) should be applied, examples of two countries are presented. Lithuania as a member state of European Union is chosen to illustrate the reflections of managerial processes in legal acts, which are passed in the phases of mitigation and preparedness. Ukrainian example is presented to illustrate the difficulties, which state may face, when managerial processes as well as legitimation thereof in legal regulations are developed in the phase of response. To answer these questions, literature review, comparison, analyses of documents, synthesis and other methods were used. It is concluded that the public procurement processes definitely should be prepared in advance and every state should be ready for the urgent purchases before the direct threats for security appears. Ukrainian example shows, how it is difficult, costly and requiring other efforts to develop these processes and implement it in the same time. It should be mentioned that raised questions are in the constant process of learning and this article should be considered as a primary steps towards deep analysis of the continuity of state actions in the situations of real threats and tensions, which Europe is facing today.
Critical Energy Infrastructures can suffer different impacts from accidents and natural disasters which concern the whole energy system and specific functional aspects of Energy Security as well. A negative energy event -i.e. a strategic refinery blockade due to an accident- can provide useful experiences which demonstrate the connection among logistic efficiency, resilience and Energy Security. Spanish refinery Puertollano suffered an accident in year 2003 which stopped oil logistics in a significant part of the country. Military oil refined products logistics in Spain are managed by CLH oil products logistic company -operating in the framework of a Public-Private Partnership and civil-military cooperation model- and then this enterprise facilitated the implementation of a resilience measures aimed to guarantee the operation of oil products logistic chain in the affected area. Management of Puertollano refinery crisis in 2003 showed positive results for ensuring National Energy Security, market and business normal function, system stability and infrastructure re-adjustment. This crisis advanced criteria and lesson learned for Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection and business continuity planning.