Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review

The article follows the perspective of the World-system and aims to reveal the factors determining Russian foreign policy. In response to the neo-realistic interpretation of Russia’s behaviour in the international system, based on the logic of maintaining the balance of powers, an alternative interpretation is formulated: Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by structural geo-economic factors – belonging to the ‘semi-peripheral’ geo-economic zone. It leads to socio-economic tensions and political instability within the state and forces the Russian regime to use various domestic and foreign policy instruments to mobilize the society. One such instrument is military aggression in foreign countries, including Ukraine.

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the problem of China’s ambiguous neutral stance towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For around a two-month period (i.e., between February and April) since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on February 24th 2022, there has been no clear diplomatic message from Beijing concerning its final choice of position between Ukraine and its quasi-ally Russia. Parallel to this obscurity in China’s foreign policy, there are numerous arguments (this paper lists eight of them) that attempt to speculate Beijing’s next move based on their respective rationales that might prompt China to aid Russia’s military venture or abandon support for its quasi-ally. In this paper, the researcher tries to study China’s neutrality through an offensive realist prism and frame these arguments into two major underlying raison d’état: 1) to immediately rebalance the power equilibrium in the system by aiding Russia and soliciting it into China’s coalition—namely, to change the configuration of the units in the system; 2) to sustain the positive relat`ive gains in long-term until China surpasses the USA by abandoning Russia, thereby buying time as a diplomatic détente with United States—namely, to change the systemic capability distribution among its units. By comparing the weight of the two raison d’états through an examination of the eight major arguments respectively, the researcher concludes that the inextricable uncertainty of gains/losses between the two antinomic grand strategy approaches is exactly the reason that causes Beijing’s obscure attitude of neutrality between the two belligerents.

The purpose of the article is to determine the role of co-financing technologies (crowdfunding, fundraising) under the conditions of war and post-war reconstruction. The basis of the study is the case analysis of international support to Ukraine to counter Russian aggression. The central issue of the article is to clarify the acceptability, effectiveness, as well as problems of applying co-financing technologies to solve the problems caused by the war. The existing global experience of using co-financing technologies during wars was studied, the peculiarities of the Ukrainian case were revealed. The advantages, problems and risks of using crowdfunding and fundraising during a full-scale war are identified. The motivation of the public of other states to co-finance the solution or mitigation of the problems caused by Russia’s aggression on the territory of Ukraine is ascertained. The research is based on the analysis of projects supporting Ukraine and Ukrainians during the days of the Russian aggression on leading crowdfunding platforms, as well as through fundraising. Crowdfunding and fundraising are considered as forms of remote involvement, elements of digital action repertoires, which are used by the democratic public from all over the world (and in the case of Ukraine, also by government institutions) to convey their position on war and mitigate its consequences. It is concluded that modern technologies of cofinancing enable remote involvement of citizens of different states in international conflicts and humanitarian crises caused by these conflicts and wars. The dependence of the use of crowdfunding and fundraising technologies on the type of political regime and the characteristics of political culture of the dominant part of the population is proven.

The purpose of this article is to study the differentiation of CEE countries’ approaches towards Russia’s expansion, and then to identify explanatory variables. CEE policies fit to the balance of power categories, specifically: counterbalancing and accommodation. The method of assessing each CEE country’s policies towards Russia combines gathering information on 2014-2021 activities classified in three groups: bilateral relations with Russia; relations with other NATO countries framed as counterbalancing Russia; relations with Ukraine regarding counterbalancing Russia. The method of explanation for diverse CEE policies consists in assigning quantitative values and applying statistics in order to discover correlations. The result of the first step is placing each CEE country on the axis of relatively pro- (Hungary) and anti-Russian (Lithuania and Poland) policies. The quantitative version of the axis serves as dependent variable in the statistical research which reveals finals results: the strongest correlations are demonstrated by proximity and distance to Russia, which reflects Russia’s closest neighbors’ counterbalancing tendencies. Historical grievances and the size of Russian minorities are second-strongest. However, excluding Hungary, historical grievances become the strongest factor of anti-Russian policies.

The article delves into the willingness of citizens in the Baltic States, particularly Estonia, to fight for their countries in the face of rising threats, notably the Russian threat following the Crimean annexation. With historically weaker NATO defenses and relatively small armed forces, Baltic States like Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia rely on allied support and their residents’ determination to defend their homeland. The study explores variables that influence this willingness, focusing on Estonia’s leadership in this aspect. The article consists of three main sections: a literature review, a comparative case analysis, and conclusions. The literature review examines past data from global, regional, and national perspectives, touching upon the theories of renowned researchers like Ronald F. Inglehart. The comparative case analysis delves into new variables—civic engagement, government functionality, and corruption levels—exploring their correlation with citizens’ readiness to fight for their country. The analysis uncovers distinct patterns in Estonia, which consistently outpaces Latvia and Lithuania in civic engagement, efficient governance, and lower corruption levels. Ultimately, the research emphasizes that civic engagement positively associates with willingness to defend one’s country, exemplified by Estonia’s higher voter turnout and volunteering rates. Effective government functioning also contributes to citizens’ willingness to fight, with Estonia’s robust governance over the past decades potentially boosting resilience. Furthermore, low corruption levels appear to enhance citizens’ confidence in their state, potentially encouraging them to defend it. The study concludes that understanding these multifaceted factors can guide policymakers and community leaders in bolstering citizens’ determination to protect their countries, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania.

The concept of hybrid threats plays an increasingly important role in the security studies agenda, as it raises awareness about the multidimensional nature of contemporary security. Hybrid threats are considered hostile activities that involve the simultaneous use of two or more types of threats and are controlled or coordinated by a specific actor, whether state or non-state. Some experts may argue that hybrid threats are the most prevalent type of threat in the European security landscape at present. As a result, the focus of research has shifted to an investigation into this phenomenon and the vulnerabilities that make a country weaker in the face of emerging hybrid threats. However, much less attention has been paid to the subjective perception of hybrid threats in particular societal and historical contexts, as well as their impact on security policy-making. This article analyses the perceptions of Latvian society in regard to its vulnerability to hybrid threats, as well as how these perceptions are reflected in the main security policy documents. It is concluded that the Latvian population recognises certain hybrid threats as being current in their security agenda. This is especially true of information and cyber threats. On the other hand, the analysis of the key national security documents reveals the lack of a well-defined agenda for preventing and combating hybrid threats.

The subject of this article is the foreign policy of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The aim of this article is to analyse the foreign policy and its main objectives pursued in 2019–2022 by the President of the Republic of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda. The analysis attempts to answer the question of whether foreign policy is a continuation of previously pursued foreign policy activity or marks a change, and, in the case of the latter, to what extent has the policy changed? The author focuses his research on foreign actions towards the countries of the region (the Baltic States, Poland and Ukraine). The research is based on Gustavsson’s model involving the analysis of various stages of foreign policy development.

Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Egle E. Murauskaite, & Devin Ellis (2021). Escalation Management in the Gray Zone. University of Maryland. 234 pages.