Mūsų žinynas: karo mokslo, karinio rengimo ir ugdymo žurnalas

Thesis: The future of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) in the Baltic States is set to be significantly impacted by the emergence of advanced threats, including missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and hypersonic systems. This necessitates operational innovation, enhanced mobility, and deeper regional and NATO integration to ensure adequate defence.

Original Contribution: The article synthesises recent combat lessons from 2022–2025, quantifies strike / interception trends, and applies these operational insights specifically to Baltic States vulnerabilities — radar gaps, stationary C2, limited DCA/OCA assets — and proposes practical operational / tactical level measures (passive AD, layered C-UAS, UTM, OWUAS employment) that go beyond prior strategic overviews.

The methodology and sources employed are as follows: The present study employs a combination of qualitative doctrinal analysis and empirical evidence derived from a range of open-source operational reports, air-war monitors, defence think-tanks and NATO documents (for example, the Kyiv Dialogue, RUSI, RAND, and NATO publications). The paper employs a cross-referencing approach, utilising statistical data on strikes and interceptions, imagery, diagrams, and doctrinal literature to derive recommendations.

Utility for readers: Defence planners, NATO policymakers, and researchers will find a focused, evidence-based assessment of Baltic States IAMD shortfalls and actionable operational options (mobility, sensor mix, UAS integration, networked C2) that bridge strategy and implementable procurement/integration choices.