The analysis of the training needs for the crews of police multi-purpose Black Hawk S70i helicopters serving in Polish Police Forces has been an impulse to attempt the construction of the simulation system within the research and development project financed by the National Centre for Research and Development entitled “Helicopter Simulator for Police Aviation” consisting of three components, i.e. a training stand for a pilot (cockpit), a stand for a cargo handler, a training stand for the police officers practicing the air drop operations. The simulator is supposed to provide an opportunity to drill various emergency situations, which consequently will allow to prepare the crews and technical personnel in the full range to perform the tasks as far as theoretical knowledge and practical skills are concerned. Replacing real exercises by the training held in virtual environment will contribute to the decreased costs to be incurred by Police and increased safety for any persons participating in the actions remaining the subject matters of the said trainings. The article presents the designing assumptions resulting, among other things, from multidisciplinary research performed over the determination of the detailed training needs and equipment requirements with regards to the Full Flight Simulator. The said research was conducted in collaboration with the officers of the Police Aviation Board in the High Command of the Police Headquarters as well as the operators of the counter terrorism sub-units of Polish Police Forces.
The purpose of this article is to present the role of the Border Guard in detecting vehicle smuggling on the Podkarpackie section of the Polish-Ukrainian border in 2014-2020. Organized transfer of stolen cars from the European Union to the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States and introduction of cars to the Polish customs territory excluding customs and tax duties is one of the most important threats to the security of Poland and the European Union. Uncontrolled smuggling of stolen vehicles is concentrated mainly in larger border crossing points, and the disclosed attempts show with considerable professionalism, specialization and organization of criminal groups, often with international connections.
The aim of the article is to present Chechen terrorism as a consequence of violations of basic human rights, including the crimes of genocide committed by the Russian Federation in the First Russo-Chechen War in 1994-1996. It has been argued that terrorism has become a dramatic way of drawing the international community’s attention to the tragedy taking place in Chechnya. Over time, Chechen fighters were influenced by radical Muslim groups and used terrorist fighting methods. On the other hand, the Russians did not shy away from bombing entire villages they suspected of sheltering wanted fighters. All this led to an escalation of terrorism and radicalization of religious views among a large part of the society. Moreover, the lack of a decisive reaction from the West to the policy of exterminating the Chechen population by the Russian Federation has led to an increase in anti-Western sentiment, which had not been recorded in Chechnya before.
The energy security of the Visegrad Group countries is a derivative of their energy potential resulting from the lack of strategic natural gas and crude oil resources, limited fuel storage capacity and limited access to the transmission network. This causes a dependence on supplies of raw materials from Russia, which is not even, but applies to each of these countries. The Czech Republic and Slovakia have small deposits of natural gas and crude oil. Hungary and Poland have greater potential, but it is still not enough to achieve energy independence. The energy market of the V4 countries is of interest to the Russian Federation, but it is not a priority for it as it accounts for a small part of Russian transmissions. Russia aims to keep the market for crude oil and natural gas at a uniform level, but the actions of the V4 countries in terms of diversification of supplies, aimed at increasing the level of energy security, effectively hinder the implementation of this goal. The threat to the energy security of the V4 countries is related to their dependence on gas supplies from Gazprom. The terms of the contracts contain unfavorable clauses that negatively affect the sale of surplus Russian gas, as it is necessary to pay fees for the ordered gas regardless of the scale of its use. The differentiation in the energy policy of the Member States is also worth noting. An example is the lack of clear opposition from the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia to the plans to expand the Nord Stream and Turkish Stream gas pipelines. These states show interest in participating in projects, which, in fact, constitute the implementation of the Russian concept of building new transmission routes. Poland takes a different position, consistently preventing the implementation of Russian energy projects.