Recent years have been very turbulent for the small NATO member states located near the Russian border. Concerns about the credibility of collective deterrence and overall solidarity have been growing since the start of Donald Trump’s second presidency. For the Baltic states bordering Russia, the potential withdrawal of United States military support from Europe, as well as the insufficient levels of stockpiles and defense readiness among European states, have created a significant erosion of security. Baltic needs and expectations regarding European NATO powers could be better articulated and more focused once the United States’ levels of commitment and solidarity are clarified. The primary questions, however, center on how much of the Baltic states’ future survival is in their own hands and how much depends primarily on global powers with their own ambitions and preferences in the region. New affordable and acceptable solutions need to be found quickly, collectively, and at the intra-state level. Ankara’s NATO meeting in 2026 has brought some positive energy to Baltic security and deterrence options during Trump’s second presidency. Long-expected contributions from NATO to Baltic defense and security have not only been debated but also promised.
The aim of this article is to evaluate the tenure of Lithuania’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gabrielius Landsbergis, through the lens of successes and failures on the international stage with selected countries. From a research perspective, Landsbergis’s term at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be analyzed in the context of continuity and change within Lithuanian foreign policy, framed by the neo-idealism approach. This analysis revealed that despite the lack of strategic guidelines for Lithuania’s foreign policy, it was perceived by external stakeholders as relatively predictable and values-driven, particularly with regard to specific actions taken by the Lithuanian government towards China, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Taiwan.
By exploiting the potential of social media, disinformation has become an important element of warfare. The region of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is particularly vulnerable to disinformation, primarily from Russia. One of the reasons for Russia’s activities in this region’s infosphere is that most CEE countries are members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In this context, Russian disinformation activities aimed at the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) are particularly interesting. The image of the 3SI created in the media is crucial, for it translates into how the public understands, perceives and recalls this format of cooperation. The article aims to reconstruct the image of the 3SI in cases of Russian disinformation identified by the European External Action Service within the EUvsDisinfo project. The article’s methodology is based on a qualitative content analysis of disinformation cases identified by EUvsDisinfo. The article identifies four main frames of disinformation targeting the 3SI, showing that Russian disinformation is focused on undermining the credibility and integrity of this cooperation, both among Initiative countries and between them and their international partners.
The aim of the article is to present Chechen terrorism as a consequence of violations of basic human rights, including the crimes of genocide committed by the Russian Federation in the First Russo-Chechen War in 1994-1996. It has been argued that terrorism has become a dramatic way of drawing the international community’s attention to the tragedy taking place in Chechnya. Over time, Chechen fighters were influenced by radical Muslim groups and used terrorist fighting methods. On the other hand, the Russians did not shy away from bombing entire villages they suspected of sheltering wanted fighters. All this led to an escalation of terrorism and radicalization of religious views among a large part of the society. Moreover, the lack of a decisive reaction from the West to the policy of exterminating the Chechen population by the Russian Federation has led to an increase in anti-Western sentiment, which had not been recorded in Chechnya before.
The relevance of this article is based on the aim to fulfil the lack of understanding of public perception on nuclear energy in Lithuania. The results of the empirical survey (public poll carried out in 2013) are used to explain the public perception of nuclear energy and its contextual aspects (safety, economic benefit, possible new challenges, personal knowledge). To show the distribution of the attitude among the public cluster analysis was performed through which respondents were divided into two groups. The 1st cluster represents that part of the public which is well educated, actively working and actively contributing to the state economy. Meanwhile the 2nd is less educated, less active economically and more dependent on social security programs part of the public. The cluster analysis reveals small, but statistically significant differences in attitude between the clusters.