Although Lithuania by now has been a member of the international antiterrorist coalition with all the issuing consequences (including its international commitments and new threats for its safety) for more than three years, studies of and research on terrorism in it remain in the embryonic phase. There are practically no contributors writing about the terrorism phenomenon in the Lithuanian language. As a result, there is no discourse about this sphere of studies. This means that so far no well defined terminology and standing conventions of academic parlance have been introduced, which would enable to go deeper into not only the nature of terrorism as a phenomenon (this is being done for at least forty years in the world) but also the perception of terrorism here, in Lithuania.
Reasons which stimulate terrorism, the motivation and goals of terrorists, the perception of the reality of threats as well as readiness to deal with them on both political and social levels - these are the subjects of this article. Though the objective of this article is not to carry out a comparable analysis with the situation and practice of other states, the particular case of Lithuania is conceptualized in the perspective of the international terrorism and global antiterrorist drive.
A peculiar pattern for this article was a recent (published in the spring of 2004) study “International Terrorism and Finland” by Toby Archer, where the threats of terrorism to Finland are analyzed.
The changes in geostrategy of the United States have become clear after the events of September 11. These changes have encouraged the reformation and adaptation process of the geopolitical codes of the other main geopolitical actors. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and China are facing the necessity either to adapt to the transformed US geostrategy or to project and implement alternative geopolitical combinations striving for its neutralisation. The change of the geopolitical codes of the main geopolitical actors (including various alternatives variants) would_shape the main tendencies of global geopolitical development at the beginning of the 21st century. It is necessary to evaluate the action scenarios of the main geopolitical actors in order to identify the opportunities of Lithuania’s geopolitical code and also Lithuania’s foreign policy transformation in the global geopolitical environment since the possibilities of Lithuania’s foreign policy directly depend on the changes of the global geopolitical situation. The analysis of global geopolitical development and the identification of opportunities of Lithuania’s foreign policy are based both on static and dynamic approaches. This study identifies the interests of the US, Russia, major powers of the European Union (EU) and China in the global geopolitical environment. Such identification sets the conditions for Lithuania’s possible location in the geostrategic plans of the great powers and that is the static part of the analysis. The dynamic part of the analysis relies on the model of the strategic choice and presents the main geostrategic alternatives of the most important geopolitical actors. They depend on the changes of interaction among the geopolitical subjects. The models of this interaction allow identifying possible global geopolitical scenarios and evaluating Lithuania’s eventual geopolitical role in the changing geopolitical space.
The article attempts to look at foreign and security policy of independent Lithuania as a state identity formation process. The analysis is based on social constructivism methodology, underlying the predominant role of immaterial factors in the development of international system. The article begins with the presentation of the Lithuanian geopolitical environment as an interaction of differently constructed identities. In this context, the place and role of Lithuania in the Northern dimension of the EU before and after the EU membership is analyzed. In analyzing Lithuanian foreign policy landmarks after the double enlargement, a wider survey of problems and perspectives of its participation in the latest EU foreign policy initiatives and its relationship with the EU Eastern dimension is given. The article states that Lithuania, trying to become the center of regional cooperation, is creating a civil state identity assembling other states by force of the example to be followed. However, the regional identity of Lithuania is still under formation: pretensions to unite the North, South and East are conceptually not grounded enough and the narrative uniting the region is still at an embryonic stage. In its position Lithuanian foreign policy substantiation is closer to the EU Northern and not Eastern dimension.
With the dual enlargement of NATO and the EU to the Baltic States in 2004 the post-Cold War transition process in the Baltic Sea Region has begun to draw to a close. The article argues that this is posing questions for, and is likely to change, the character of cooperation within the region. During the 1990s it is argued regional cooperation was driven primarily by motivations of idealism and security, with one of the central elements of regional cooperation being its conceptualisation as a project of identity and subjectivity creation. With the transition process completed the key motivations behind this political project are becoming less important, with the result being that this idealistic element to regional cooperation is being replaced by more pragmatic, functionalist and self-interested aspects. However, whilst internally idealism, solidarity and internationalism are on the wane, it is argued these elements have not disappeared altogether but are increasingly becoming an accepted part of the international profile and identity of the region.
The illicit trade in arms, strategic and dual-use goods has attracted considerable international attention since the end of the Cold War. A particular interest has developed with regard to preventing the diversion of weapons from the licit market into the ‘black market’. This paper focuses explicitly upon the actors suspected of facilitating these diversions - arms brokers. After briefly considering the role played by ‘middlemen’ in the competitive licit arms market, the darker side of arms brokering will be explored.
Two cases involving Baltic States citizens will then be discussed, which illustrate how arms brokers operate from a variety of locations, use corrupt state officials, front companies, flags of convenience and circuitous routes with weak customs and border controls to supply ‘undesirable end-users’. The potential of transport services in the Baltic States for brokering-related services will also be highlighted.
The Baltic States are among the few states which currently have legislation for defining, controlling and monitoring brokering activities. Yet, national controls are insufficient for preventing diversions, which require international co-operation. This paper considers the challenges posed for the Baltic States in this regard, and also the challenges that the Baltic States are posing for traditional thinking about international non-proliferation regimes. The paper concludes by asking: what role for the Baltic States in combating diversions from the licit to illicit arms markets and controlling brokers?
The purpose of this paper is to assess the development of relations between Russia and the two Western power centres, the United States of America and the European Union, in 2003 - 2004. It goes without saying that it would be quite problematic and risky to formulate an unequivocal evaluation of this dynamic phenomenon. The author, however, sought to identify and determine the key trends of development. This was done through a search for answers to more specific questions: what was the strategy of Russia’s foreign policy, how did it interact with the goals and aspirations of the USA and EU, and, finally, toward what - convergence or alienation - did evolve the dialogue between the global power centres that are of greatest importance for the Central and Eastern European countries.
These tasks have dictated the trinomial structure of the paper. The first part deals with the changes in the Russian foreign policy strategy in recent years. It shows how, upon sensible assessment of its opportunities, Russia abandoned its former rush-about and concentrated on the inclusion of the CIS states (the Ukraine in particular) in its political orbit. The second and the third part of the paper analyse the peculiarities and ups and downs of Russia’s relations with the USA and the EU respectively. Despite certain variations, the development of these relations increasingly shows signs of alienation and cooling, which were partly masked by the intention of the EU larger Member States, in particular of the Germany, to maintain good relations with Russia at any cost. Finally, a brief overview of the culminating event in the Russian-Western relations - the Ukrainian “orange revolution” - is presented at the end of the paper, supplemented by a broader summarisation of the period under consideration. The underlying idea of the summary is that the so-called “value gap” has been widening in the Russian-Western relations in recent years. It forms a basis for supposing that in the future the pressures between the West and Russia should increase despite the pragmatic nature of their relations. The situation might only be changed by democratic changes in Russia itself, which at present seems hardly probable.
The article deals with the internal political process compound and idiosyncratic element of so called election cycle covering the period of 2003 elections to the State Duma and 2004 elections of the president democracy problem. First, the general characteristics of the preelection political regime are defined as of the main factor influencing the content of the elections. Main attention is paid to the violations of the democracy requirements in the procedural course of the presidential and the State Duma’s election campaigns and to the analysis of the propresidential party „United Russia“ exceptional keynote „democratic“ position on forming the government on the basis of the Duma’s results. The political results of the elections are discussed that for the additional four years have legitimized the direction of the political monocentric power strengthening and freezing of the democratic processes conducted by Putin and it is stressed that it is achieved violating the principle of the democratic representation justice as the equal opportunities were not guaranteed for all participants of the political competition in the election procedural course. Thus, the last elections have not become the indicator of the further spread of democracy.
In the article it is reviewed the Russian military policy in the period of the years 2003-2004. It is tried to reveal the evolution o nature and the latter peculiarities of the military policy of Russian Federation (RF). There are presented quite a few instances of the Russian military policy‘s inconsequence as well as duplicity.
Due to the extent of the subject there are reviewed not all, but only the most important and for the Baltic region the biggest impact doing or being able to do aspects of the Russian military policy: the changes in the Russian military doctrine, the nature of the RF military reform, the role of the strategic nuclear forces and the tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian military strategy, the development of the military - industrial complex, the peculiarities of the military collaboration with other nations, regional structures of the regional and political - military blocs.
The most attention is given to the Russian military policy in the CIS space, to the Russian role in the Organisation of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and to the Russia-Belarus military collaboration, while analysing this phenomenon as one of the means of the RF military policy implementation. There is also briefly discussed the Russian military strategy of the latter years in the Baltic region.
The article aims to reveal how the changing international environment, Lithuania’s membership in NATO and the reform of its National Defense System influence the development of the Lithuanian military and to what extent the latter corresponds to the general trends in the development of the militaries in NATO countries. In the first part, the Charles C. Moscos model of the transformation of the society and the military from modern to postmodern which is applied in the comparative analysis of the development of the armed forces in Western democracies is presented. This part deals with the trends in changes of the armed forces of NATO countries in the period after the Cold War and collapse of the communist system. In the second part of the article, variables of the Moscos model are used as a theoretical basis to discuss the trends in the changes of the Lithuanian military. Attempts are also made to determine the extent to which the changes in the Lithuanian armed forces correspond to similar processes in the old NATO countries and what problems Lithuania faces having become a member of NATO.
In 2004, Lithuania celebrated not only its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU but also the tenth anniversary of its participation in international peace operations. In the last decade NATO became one of the key actors in resolving conflicts and crises in Europe; therefore, active participation of Lithuania in the operations of the Alliance contributed to its membership aspirations. However, it is not only NATO but also other international organizations that participate in the resolution of international conflicts in Europe as well as in the world; the EU is also building its crisis management force. The article analyses what challenges and problems Lithuania might encounter in executing its policy of international military participation already being a full member of NATO and the EU. Review of the expansion of international peace operations after the cold war and the development of NATO and the EU conflict and crisis management policy leads to the conclusion that the greatest challenges to Lithuania are caused by military aspects of peacekeeping and potential NATO and the EU competition.