The recent transatlantic row is not merely about ways of dealing with specific issues of international concern such as the war in Iraq. The rise of anti-American sentiments in Europe seems to imply that there is a deeper rift in the transatlantic alliance. There are several explanations of this phenomenon. They are not mutually exclusive, since they can be subsumed under a more general explanation pointing to two different ideologies, those of individualism and collectivism, prevalent respectively on the western and the eastern side of the Atlantic (or possibly, the Dover strait). The difference is reflected in the policies both at the domestic and at the international level: the American distrust of big government contrasts sharply with the European statism, and the American reluctance to submit to supranational rule, contrasts with Europeans' readiness to embrace post-national governance. The Central and East European countries have sided with America (and NATO) for reasons of security, and they have also sought a closer European integration for the reasons of economic growth. The two objectives might prove to be incompatible, unless Europe moves to the more individualist and dynamic Anglo-Saxon model of economic development as against that of "social market" favored by Germany and prance.
This article is centered on the opportunities of small states in the emerging imperial world order. Particularly, policy options for Lithuania as a small state in the evolving new international arena are explored. The authors present a brief analysis of theoretical studies and historical researches on the empires and the roles of small states in imperial structures. The article focuses on the current characteristics of the U.S., Russia, and the EU "core" countries. This permits one to draw a conclusion concerning the imperial developments in domestic and foreign policies of these geopolitical actors. Having completed this analysis, the authors cautiously investigate foreign policy options for Lithuania that possibly follow from the interplay of the projects of the liberal global empire of American neoconservatives, projects of "enhanced cooperation" of the EU "core" and Putin's policies to reintegrate CIS states under Russian domination.
The article puts forth several tasks. The first task is to ascertain the possible Germany's impact on the further development of Lithuania's geopolitical subjectivity. The second task is to identify the main principles of current Germany's geopolitical code. Thirdly, it will examine Lithuania's and Germany's interests in the context of eventual global geopolitical transformations and construct scenarios of development relating to the international environment. Fourthly is will construct the broad spectrum of possible scenarios (including positive and negative ones) on Lithuania's and Germany's bilateral relations. And fifth, it will ascertain the optimal model for Lithuania in shaping its relations with Germany.
It is essential for the state to have a strategic partner at the regional level. This is justified by the fact that Lithuania decided to turn into an active regional country while reducing the possible threat from Russia. The potential alliance of Lithuania and Poland should be the most rational direction of the strategic partnership. In attempting to justify this assumption the geopolitical interests of Lithuania and Poland, its coherence and compatibility, are examined. Conditions strengthening the development of the strategic partnership are reviewed. The most plausible scenarios of further co-operation between Lithuania and Poland are also presented.
Although Turkey has been knocking on the EU's gates for almost four decades, only the echo of that knock was being heard in Lithuania until 2004. After Lithuania joined the EU, the question of Turkish membership in the EU was by design added to the agenda of the Lithuanian government's foreign policy. High-ranking state officials rushed to assure both citizens and the world that Lithuania supports the objectives of Turkey, whereas opposition (rightist) parties expressed concern about the lack of debate on this issue in the Parliament, the government and society in general. The opinion of the society, to which the Lithuanian government had not yet appealed in any way, is not clear yet. Political analysts and journalists writing on this issue tend to demonize Turkey and practically frighten the general public. It seems that a passively negative mood is settling over ordinary citizens, which in the case of referendum can become potential "No's" to the Turkish membership in the Bloc.
The history of Lithuania's and Russia's national intercommunion is a basic part of their coexistence as well as the manifestation of their cultural life. However, their history plays a great role in the relationship between these two countries. And it is not a good sign when it includes not only a cultural, but also political sphere as well. Usually it points towards the fact that countries such as these still lack a steady civil identification and that their relations are still being influenced by various ideologies, myths, versions or simply speculations. Lastly, they may also have various and apparent, as well as theoretical pretences towards each other. Therefore these countries practically cannot develop normal relations built on partnerships and collaboration. On the other hand, this situation undermines history too. In practice it is being turned into an ideology, because competing countries do not need an objective history, but a version that grounds their position and disproves the opponents' one.
The article discusses the tension of historical interpretations existing today between Lithuania and Russia and its genesis. It also explores the negative impacts on the relations between Lithuania and Russia in the general field of relations and offers ways to reduce these tensions.
This article aims to review the economic cooperation between two countries, with more attention devoted to the energy sector as seen in the light of positive economics that describes the world as it is - through statistical indicators, calculations, statements and examples (as opposite to normative economics). The intentions are to analyze the economic trends, events and facts in Russia and Lithuania between the years 2004-2005, focusing on the significance of the national energy system, explaining reasons of certain solutions, unveiling the strategists and executors as well as possible consequences affecting the economic development and the economic security of the population.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the causes of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and find out how changes in the political regime have influenced the course of Kiev's foreign policy. The first part of the article tries to clarify what internal and external factors determined the transformation of the political regime at the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. The answer to the question why the Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place is provided. It is based on the assumption that the transformation of the political regime was influenced not only by internal circumstances (first of all a crisis of the oligarchic political regime) but also by external ones. The West and Russia treat Ukraine as a strategically important state; therefore, it is becoming a special object of competition for the influence between Western institutions and the East. It should be pointed out that such overlapping of interests is a dynamic process: it can determine the tendencies of stability and cooperation between the West and the East or confliction. The author comes to the conclusion that in the near perspective future, Ukraine might become a hotbed of tension and conflicts between Russia and the West (primarily the USA). The second part of the article answers the question how the political crisis of September 2005, the splitting of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko's alliance, the gas conflict of Russia and Ukraine can affect tendencies of foreign policy of the country before the Rada elections in March 2006. The article points out that in spite of a complicated social and economic situation and political crises, Kiev attempted to adhere to a pro-Western course of foreign policy. Cooperation of Ukraine with NATO and Kiev's regional policy experienced particular impetus. Such tendencies in foreign policy of Ukraine are actively supported by the USA which is hoping to establish, in the western part of the CIS, a counterbalance for Russia's ambitions to restore its influence there. On the other hand, such Kiev's activity makes relations with Moscow even more strained. The author of the article claims that further cooperation of Ukraine and Western institutions will depend on the Rada elections in March 2006.
The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military's capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.
Although the KGB in Lithuania officially stopped existing on I October 1991, the assessment of the secret service legacy of the communist regime is constantly being revisited. Public researchers point out those aspects of the past that in one way or another continue into the present from peoples past recollections. They also explore those moments that are related to the unaddressed past problems, such as wrongs, a sense of guilt and responsibility, which end up persisting the longest. The article aims at surveying the attitude of the KGB legacy, the relationship to society and politicians, and to one more recent aspect of the KGB legacy that has lately emerged - the so-called "KGB reserve." With respect to the past legacy and memory, with the prevalence of unconstructive standpoints based on partial amnesia and relativism in political circles of the country, attempts to choose more effective action strategies concerning officials who got into the "KGB reserve" scandal and the heads of institutions responsible for national security of Lithuania. These are all analyzed. Reconsideration of the relations-hip to the KGB has been turned towards parliamentary research and improvement of legal acts. And though from the legal point of view no traces of any "conscious" cooperation2 have been detected in the publicized past of high state officials or KGB reservists, a considerable part of society does not justify the fact that the past of one or another person was connected with the activity of the KGB, an organization of repressions and terror.